

# THE FAR EAST

## The Annals

VOLUME CXXII

NOVEMBER, 1925

EDITOR: CLYDE L. KING

ASSOCIATE EDITOR: JOSEPH H. WILLITS

ASSISTANT EDITOR: J. T. SALTER

EDITORIAL COUNCIL: C. H. CRENNAN, DAVID FRIDAY, A. A. GIESECKE, A. R. HATTON,  
AMOS S. HERSHEY, E. M. HOPKINS, S. S. HUEBNER, J. P. LICHTENBERGER,  
ROSWELL C. McCREA, E. M. PATTERSON, L. S. ROWE, HENRY  
SUZZALLO, T. W. VAN METRE, F. D. WATSON

*Editor in Charge of This Volume*

AUSTIN F. MACDONALD,  
University of Pennsylvania



THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

39TH STREET AND WOODLAND AVENUE

PHILADELPHIA

1925

Copyright, 1925, by  
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE  
All rights reserved

#### EUROPEAN AGENTS

ENGLAND: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 2 Great Smith Street, Westminster, London, S. W.  
FRANCE: L. Larose, Rue Soufflot, 22, Paris.  
GERMANY: Mayer & Müller, 2 Prinz Louis Ferdinandstrasse, Berlin, N. W.  
ITALY: Giornale Degli Economisti, Rivista di Statistica, Milano (26)—Via Canova 27  
SPAIN: E. Dossat, 9 Plaza de Santa Ana, Madrid.



# CONTENTS

## THE FAR EAST

	PAGE
FOREWORD.....	
<i>PART I. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS</i>	
THE FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC AS A PHASE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS....	1
Herbert Adams Gibbons, Ph.D., Litt.D.	
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE REPUBLIC.....	8
Harold S. Quigley, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota; 1921-23 on the Faculty of Tsing Hua College, Peking, China	
WHAT POLICY IN CHINA?.....	15
G. Nye Steiger, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History, Simmons College; formerly Professor of History and Government, St. John's University, Shanghai	
IDEALS OF THE PHILIPPINES.....	18
Maximo M. Kalaw, Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of the Philippines	
THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES—A SURVEY OF SOME POLITICAL ASPECTS OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY.....	26
Ralston Hayden, Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan; sometime Exchange Professor, University of the Philippines	
<i>PART II. COMMUNICATIONS, COMMERCE AND WEALTH</i>	
DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN JAPAN.....	49
J. Takaku, M.B.A., General Passenger Agent, Tokyo Division, Government Railways of Japan, Tokyo, Japan	
THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY.....	57
Chin-Chun Wang, C.E., Ph.D., LL.D., Peking, China	
THE CABLE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST.....	70
George Atcheson, Jr.	
ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC.....	78
Walter S. Rogers, Chairman of a Committee Appointed by National Social Research Council, to Inquire into International Communications and Opinion	
CHINA'S POST-WAR TRADE.....	82
Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché to China, U. S. Department of Com- merce	
NATURAL RESOURCES OF JAPAN.....	96
Hiroshi Saito, Consul General of Japan to the United States	
<i>PART III. EDUCATION AND FINANCE</i>	
CHINA'S NEW SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS.....	100
Chi-Pao Cheng, Executive Secretary, National Southeastern University, Nanking, China and W. T. Tao, Director, National Association for the Advancement of Education	
EDUCATION IN JAPAN.....	111
Hon. Ignacio Villamor, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines	
THE EQUIPMENT OF AMERICAN STUDENTS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE.....	124
W. B. Carpenter, B.A., M.A., LL.B., Lately Lecturer in Peking Law College, Peking, China	

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA.....	181
Frederic E. Lee, Ph.D., Executive Dean, University of Maryland; former American Economist Consul in China	
SOURCES OF REVENUE IN JAPAN.....	181
Tadao Wickawa, Assistant Financial Commissioner from the Japanese Government to the United States	
<i>PART IV. SOCIAL PROBLEMS</i>	
THE OPIUM PROBLEM.....	188
Welles A. Gray, Instructor in Government, Cornell University	
LIVING CONDITIONS IN JAPAN.....	189
Herbert H. Gowen, Department of Oriental Languages, University of Washington	
LIVING CONDITIONS IN CHINA.....	187
Maude B. Warner	
EUROPEANIZATION AND THE ANCIENT CULTURE IN PACIFIC ASIA.....	174
Upton Close (Josef Washington Hall, University of Washington)	
<i>PART V. ASIATIC IMMIGRATION</i>	
AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS—THE LOGIC OF THE EXCLUSIONISTS....	181
Sidney L. Gulick, Secretary, Commission on International Justice and Goodwill, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York City	
THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT—HOW IT HAS FUNCTIONED.....	188
Kiyo Sue Inui, Professorial Lecturer, Tokyo University, Tokyo, Japan	
CALIFORNIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ORIENTAL.....	199
Eliot Grinnell Mears, Executive Secretary, The Survey of Race Relations, headquarters at Stanford University	
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	214
William Adams Slade, Chief Bibliographer, Library of Congress	
<i>ADDENDA</i>	
THE THREE MAJOR COMMODITIES OF PERSIA.....	247
Hon. Sultan Mahmoud Amerie, M.F.S., School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.	
BOOK DEPARTMENT.....	265
INDEX.....	275

## FOREWORD

ANY attempted solution of world problems that fails to recognize the tremendous present and potential influence of the Far East is foredoomed to failure. With an area greater than that of all Europe, and a population far in excess, with vast natural resources still largely unexploited, the rôle of the Orient in international affairs must of necessity be an important one.

Within the memory of living men the island empire of Japan has emerged from obscurity and taken its place among the world powers. It has demonstrated its military prowess in no uncertain manner. In affairs of peace its progress has been no less astounding. During the past decade its combined imports and exports have tripled. The industrialization of Japan is not a dream of tomorrow, but a fact of to-day.

China is still largely the plaything of the powers. Torn by civil war, its people united only by a common hatred of the foreigner, it can offer no very effective resistance to the nations seeking to take its natural riches as they formerly took its territory. But China is a sleeping giant. The four hundred millions of its population, tireless, pa-

tient, uncomplaining, are a force that some day must be reckoned with.

Americans are more vitally interested in the Orient at present than ever before. American manufacturers wish to develop new markets, while American traders are intent on continuing the commercial connections brought about by the World War. American Christians hope to find millions of converts to their faith, and American statesmen seek a way to improve the strained relationships of recent days.

This volume has been prepared in the hope that it will help to make clear the significant position of the Orient in world affairs, a position that is bound to become increasingly important with the passing of time. Europe's day of mastery is passing, if it has not already passed; but the Far East faces the rising sun.

Special credit is due Mr. W. A. Slade, Chief of the Division of Bibliography of the Library of Congress, for his painstaking care in preparing the selected list of works dealing with Far Eastern affairs.

AUSTIN F. MACDONALD,  
*Special Editor.*

**E**  
and  
Good  
Asia,  
of Eu  
and  
strong  
Euro  
It r  
howe  
roll  
teres  
alter  
Near  
were  
Euro  
form  
ment  
state  
war  
the  
W  
of F  
of A  
shap  
twen  
state  
publ  
been  
year  
inter  
that  
Gerr  
Egy  
19th  
faul  
cour  
shov  
owe  
conf  
by  
Rus

# The Far East and the Pacific as a Phase of European Politics

By HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D., LITT.D.

EVER since the discovery of America and the voyages of exploration and commerce around the Cape of Good Hope, the southern coasts of Asia, and into the Pacific, the attitude of European nations toward one another and their foreign policy have been strongly influenced by their extra-European ambitions and interests. It remained for the 19th century, however, to mark the preponderant roll of extra-European conflicting interests in making the European nations alternately friends and enemies. The Near East, Africa and the Far East were the regions of the world where European alliances and ententes were formed and broken, making new alignments, and finally bringing about a state of affairs that rendered a world war inevitable in the second decade of the 20th century.

With amazing candor Viscount Grey of Falloon admits the vital influence of American and Asiatic questions in shaping his country's policy during the twenty-five years before 1914. He states very clearly in his recently published memoirs what it would have been rank heresy to have said ten years ago (although all students of international affairs knew it for a fact), that Great Britain depended upon Germany to retain her position in Egypt during the last decade of the 19th century and that it was Germany's fault, not Great Britain's, that the two countries were not actually allies. He shows also that the later Triple Entente owed its existence to the adjustment of conflicting African and Asiatic policies by Great Britain with France and Russia and not to any natural affinity

or desire to serve the general interests of humanity and the progress of civilization.

These facts—they are not revelations to the initiated—afford ample justification for reviewing and discussing events and policies in the Far East and the Pacific as a phase of European politics. It is not too much to say that political, economic and social conditions in Japan and China to-day are what they are because of European diplomacy in the Far East; that what has happened during the last twenty-five years in the Far East has brought about existing conditions throughout Asia and the Near East; and that the diplomatic problems (easily translated into economic problems) created by these conditions have set the Great Powers against one another in Europe. The Near East brought the powers into conflict from Guizot to Disraeli. Since 1878 the Far East has gradually come to the front as a source of ill-feeling and war, and, with the rise of Japan, the area of international political skirmishing has spread over the Pacific Ocean.

## CONFLICTING INTERESTS AND ALLIANCES THEREFROM

After Great Britain succeeded in maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Russia and shut Russia off from the Mediterranean in the Congress of Berlin, Muscovite expansion was diverted to Central and Eastern Asia, threatening India and Korea. This embittered the relations between Russia and Great Britain and compelled Japan to go to war with China to prevent Korea from falling

into Russian hands. Just about the time that Japan was preparing to issue this first challenge to the doctrine of European eminent domain, which was to mark Japan's entrance into world politics, Great Britain and France nearly went to war because of the encroachment of France upon Siam, which threatened to extend French influence through southern China to the borders of Burma.

A Franco-British war, which would have changed the contemporary history of Europe "might have been caused by something that had little real importance," as Lord Grey puts it.<sup>1</sup> The British disagreement with France about Siam was of "little real importance"—except to Siam. That it almost led to war was due to friction between the two powers in Egypt and to the fact that France and Russia were drifting into an alliance, and Russia was Britain's enemy while France's traditional enemy, Germany, was Britain's friend.

After the victorious war with China, however, Germany joined Russia and France in compelling Japan to renounce the fruits of victory. The Treaty of Shimonoseki had given Japan a foothold, for the defense of China against European aggression, on the Liao-tung Peninsula. Having ousted Japan, Russia ensconced herself there. The motive of German intervention had been to secure political influence—and ultimately territory—on the Pacific coast of China. To do this she risked the friendship of Great Britain and played into the hands of powers that were potentially her enemies as well as those of the British. Her reward was permission to secure a lease at the end of Shantung, where she established the naval base of Kiaochau.

Great Britain was occupied at the

<sup>1</sup> "Twenty-five Years: 1892-1916," Vol. I., p. 12.

time in reconquering the Sudan and then in keeping the French away from the Upper Nile. Followed the Boer War—a great strain on British resources. But in the Far East the British were clever enough to seize the opportunity of making friends with Japan. An Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in 1902. Not long after that Japan fought Great Britain's battle as well as her own in the Far East in her great war with Russia. Here again the exigencies of European politics resulted in the creation of a new and far-reaching situation in the Far East and the Pacific.

Overnight Japan had become a naval power to be reckoned with. On land the battle of Mukden, fought, as the naval battle had been fought, with modern equipment, demonstrated the ability of an Asiatic nation to defeat a European nation with European weapons by the use of European military science. To Mukden can be traced the rise of nationalist movements among Asiatic peoples, which has so profoundly affected and is still affecting the course of European politics. Russia's *Drang* to the open sea, checked in the Far East by the fall of Port Arthur, turned Muscovite efforts back to the Near East, revived the dream of Constantinople, and paved the way for the formation of a Triple Entente and the events of 1914. Mukden also was responsible for the Russian revolution—and the triumph of Bolshevism twelve years later.

The renewed aggression of European Powers in China, following Franco-Russo-German intervention to invalidate the Treaty of Shimonoseki, provoked the Boxer uprising and its suppression by the joint action of the European Powers, Japan and the United States. To the mad scramble for leased territories after Shimonoseki, also, must be attributed the dramatic



intervention of the United States in China and the formulation of John Hay's "Open Door" notes.

Germany found in the Spanish-American War, which so suddenly changed the balance of power in the Pacific, the occasion to purchase those island possessions of Spain in the Pacific that were not ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. The new territorial status in the Far East became of incalculable importance in contemporary history. Germany was encouraged to reject the alliance offered by Chamberlain and to challenge Great Britain's naval supremacy. Her shipbuilding program, more than any other factor, made the British turn from enemy to friend of France and Russia, and prepared the way for the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, with all their fateful consequences. At the same time Japan was put into the position where, by waiting for the war of 1914, she could take one more step in her program of driving the European Powers from China and at the same time extend her influence in the Pacific by occupying Germany's Marshall and Caroline islands.

#### JAPANESE POLICY IN CHINA

After the Boxer Rebellion the course of negotiations between China and the powers was deeply affected by the diplomatic situation in Europe. The United States alone, having no axe to grind and no actual or potential allies to support, was in a position to counsel moderation. But she failed. Punitive indemnities were imposed upon China as well as renewed recognition of the recently-imposed leases and spheres of influence. The result was the discrediting, and eventual disappearance, of the Manchu Empire, and the establishment of the Republic. There followed a period of civil strife

in China that has not yet ended. But coupled with internal political anarchy, resulting from the disappearance of the old régime and the too sudden introduction of an Occidental form of representative government, the Chinese began to show an amazing solidarity of sentiment against foreign exploitation. The leaders of New China could not agree among themselves as to who should succeed to the Manchus, but they were all of the opinion that the time had come for China to assert her sovereignty, to deny the justice and even the legality of treaties imposed upon the old régime, and to reassert the territorial integrity and full sovereignty of their country.

During the World War, when the life and death struggle in Europe occupied the attention of the other powers, including the United States, Japan was able to take the step in China toward which the Far Eastern policy of the European Powers and the immigration policy of the United States and the British Dominions had been pushing her for thirty years. When Japan declared war on China in 1894 the Japanese Government announced that the war was really undertaken in China's interest, to save China from the European aggression against which she was too weak to defend herself. There was much truth in the contention. But of course the primary cause of the war was the menace of Russia to Japan, if Russia became installed in Korea. And after the war the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki indicate that Japan had determined to follow the policy and methods of the European Powers in her dealings with China. Her statesmen used the same argument that European statesmen always used in the Far East: "We affirm the principle of the integrity and sovereignty of China, but we must insist upon a sphere of influence or a

lease to save the Chinese from having to cede the particular region we want to—or let it fall under the influence of—some other power.” Japan had to hunt with the pack—in her relations with China, in her conception of the privileges and obligations of an alliance with other powers, and in her treatment of Germany in 1914. No other course was open to her except the alternative of remaining a second-rate power and being treated by the Occidental world as the countries of the Asiatic continent were being treated.

The twenty-one demands presented to China by Japan in 1915 were directed against all the European Powers, and were reinforced in the following year by the “understanding” negotiated by Baron Ishii with Secretary Lansing in Washington. It was as logical for Japan to regard the presence of European Powers in strongholds on the coast of China a menace to her security as for Great Britain to take the same attitude in regard to the presence of Germany in North Sea ports. It was as logical for Japan to maintain that she had special interests, political and economic, in China, and to refuse to allow any further extension of the doctrine of European eminent domain in the Far East and the Pacific, as for the United States to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. And it was as reasonable and legitimate for Japan to regard China as her special sphere of political and economic overlordship as for Great Britain to hold a similar view in regard to India—more so, in fact, seeing that Great Britain had access to colonizing areas, raw materials, coaling stations and markets under her own flag all over the world, which was denied to Japan. Thirty years of straining every nerve to maintain her independence against European encroachment in the Far East had forced Japan to adopt

the Occidental industrial system, with its consequent rapid increase of population and dependence for food supplies and raw materials upon regions beyond her own islands.

Japan was successfully pursuing her policy of making China a protectorate when two events, at the beginning of 1917, led to a complete change in the international political situation in the Far East and the Pacific: the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany and the Russian Revolution. What would follow from these events was clearly foreseen in Tokyo. No nation possessed more capable diplomatic agents at Washington and St. Petersburg than Japan. Her Foreign Office was fully informed as to the probable consequence of the awakening of America and the collapse of Russia. This fact explains the shrewd anticipation of the results of American intervention and of the course of the Russian Revolution.

#### U. S. BUNGLING OF SHANTUNG MATTER

Between the time that the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany and declared war against Germany, the Japanese ambassadors at London, Paris and Rome secured a written agreement with Great Britain and France and Italy's verbal promise that in the eventual peace negotiations (Japan was a party to the Entente agreement not to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers), Japan was to have a free hand to settle directly with China the future of Shantung and was to retain control of Germany's island possessions in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1919, when President Wilson was defending the Shantung clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, he told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he had been confronted at Paris with these arrange-



ments the existence of which he had not known.

This astonishing statement will always remain an indictment of Woodrow Wilson's statesmanship. There is no reason why he should not have known and every reason why he should have known of the existence of the understandings between Japan and the Entente Powers. They had been revealed at the beginning of 1918 by the publication of the archives of the Russian Foreign Office. And long before that, when the Balfour-Viviani mission was in Washington, Mr. Wilson had been in the position to demand of the Allied Governments the communications of all their secret commitments that might affect the peace terms in which the United States now had a common interest along with the other enemies of Germany.

The mistake made then in Washington and Mr. Wilson's ignorance of the Far East and the Pacific as a phase of European politics had tragic consequences. No one factor more than the Shantung clauses tended to discredit the Treaty of Versailles before American public opinion. These Shantung clauses put into the hands of Mr. Wilson's opponents their strongest argument against his conduct of the peace negotiations at Paris. They helped powerfully to prevent the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles without reservations by the American Senate, and played a vital part in keeping us out of the League of Nations and in the verdict of the "solemn referendum" of the American people in the Presidential election of 1920.

#### INDIRECT EFFORTS OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Russian Revolution, culminating in the victory of the Bolsheviks and the separate peace of Brest-Litvosk, provoked "the five Principle and

Allied Powers," as they were called in the Paris treaties, not only to ostracize Russia, but also to give active armed aid to counter-revolutionary movements in European Russia and Siberia. The lessons of history and the study of national psychology should have prevented us from entering upon this foolish policy, with its inevitable result of strengthening the very régime we imagined we could destroy. The consequent alienation of Russia made impossible the establishment of a stable peace in Europe after the war; led to Turkey's successful resistance against the terms imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres;<sup>2</sup> contributed powerfully to the development of nationalist movements among Mohammedan and other subject peoples; and rendered abortive the work of the Washington Conference in so far as a solution of Far Eastern problems was concerned. For Russia could no more be ignored and left out of the reckoning in the establishment of a new international status in the Far East and the Pacific than in Europe.

In China as in Persia, Soviet Russia, triumphant over all the counter-revolutionary movements, struck a death blow to the old European system by cancelling all her former imperialistic agreements with other powers that were

<sup>2</sup> In Soviet eyes it seems that China will have to follow the example of Turkey. The Russian ambassador to China, Karakhan, gave an interview to the American correspondents in Moscow on September 16, 1925, in which he said that the forthcoming tariff conference in Peking would do nothing real to meet the aims and demands of the Chinese people, and that any upward revision of the tariff would be practically negligible and would go almost wholly to pay the interest on China's present or future obligations to European Powers. He was not displeased with this possibility, inasmuch as it would "prove to China that any hopes that the powers will voluntarily abdicate their privileges is a delusion, and that to obtain this result China must take other measures." See Walter Duranty's despatch to the *New York Times* of September 17.

to the detriment of the independence of these countries. She waived her rights to repayments of loans and indemnities, and to concessions, by virtue of which the European Powers assumed the right to intervene in the affairs of Asiatic countries, and she renounced capitulatory privileges of extraterritoriality. This bold move may not have been sincere. It may have been motivated only by the dictates of an opportunist policy. But it successfully checkmated British plans in Persia and Afghanistan and it has created an embarrassing situation for Occidental imperialism in the Far East.

It must be pointed out, however, that the precedent for this action was created by the Entente Powers themselves. The Paris Peace Conference, in its anxiety to punish and cripple the defeated powers, forced Germany and her allies to forego the privileges that European nations had arrogated to themselves in Egypt, Turkey, Siam and China. This decision was due to considerations of European international politics. But, coupled with the Russian initiative, it has undoubtedly given the Chinese a powerful argument for the restoration of full sovereign rights. In the Lausanne negotiations the Turks cleverly pointed out that if Germans, who were Europeans, could live and do business under Turkish laws, there was no reason why other European nations could not do the same.

This leads us to wonder whether the European Powers did not dig their own grave in China, after China entered the war, when they insisted that the Chinese Government dispossess and deport Germans and Austrians. The same action was not only tolerated, but instigated, by the Entente Powers at Bangkok when Siam entered the war. Of course what the enemies of the Central Powers had in mind was to clear

these countries of German influence. They wanted to clear China also of Russian influence. But they are beginning to find that Oriental peoples do not make distinctions among white men and that what is thought good for the goose is naturally deemed good for the gander. Should we, were we in their place?

#### AS TO THE FUTURE

We must be prepared to admit, therefore, that what was originally a war in Europe led to the establishment of precedents that are acting as a boomerang upon the victors. The prestige, the invincibility, the inviolability, of the European Powers in the Far East have been irremediably shattered. As long as white men stood together, shoulder to shoulder, in asserting their supremacy in Africa and Asia, the colored peoples were defenseless. When white men enlisted the aid of colored men against other white men, the so-called "white man's burden" was revealed in all its ugly and naked sordidness.

The new situation that the Occidental Powers are now facing in China — and in the Pacific — is the result of subordinating the general interests and reputation and progress of Occidental civilization and the Occidental economic and cultural system to conflicting and rival interests of the particular European nations.

Japan now reaps the benefit of our greed, of our pigs-in-trough diplomacy, of our internecine strife. If Russia accepts the wall erected against her by European diplomacy from Bessarabia to the Gulf of Finland and becomes an Asiatic Power, a Russo-Japanese alliance will be able to dictate the future of the Far East. Such a combination would eliminate the European Powers and the United States from special — or even from equal — privileges in

China  
bers  
a pe  
that  
peri  
or to  
Of  
mon  
Paci  
poli

China, if the Chinese are made members of the alliance and not regarded as a people to be exploited. But, seeing that human nature is what it is, this is perhaps too much for us to hope for — or to have to fear.

Of one thing we can be certain. The moment that the Far East and the Pacific cease to be a phase of European politics, the United States will be called

upon to formulate her own definite Pacific policy. Shall we commit ourselves to the creed of a white man's world in Australasia and to the old doctrine of the white man's burden by retaining the Philippines? If so, we must begin to strengthen greatly our naval forces in the Pacific and to accept cheerfully the heavy obligations that such a policy will inevitably entail.

# Constitutional and Political Development in China Under the Republic

By HAROLD S. QUIGLEY

Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota; 1921-23 on the Faculty of Tsing Hua College, Peking, China

IT is not a new thing for China to suffer the inevitable effects of revolution. The Manchu was the twenty-second dynasty to fall in China and invariably conditions between dynasties have been extremely disturbed. The Chinese theory of monarchy may be contrasted with that of the Japanese by suggesting an analogous comparison between the sovereignty theories of Locke and Hobbes. To the Chinese an emperor was not immutable but ruled by right only so long as he ruled well, which meant so long as he retained the "mandate of Heaven" which heard and saw as the people heard and saw. This fundamental basis of popular independence is to be taken account of in estimating the prospects for the success of the republic.

The reasons for the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911 were five: the resentment of the Chinese at alien rule which became vocal and effective with the revelation of the weakness of the dynasty; the corruption of the court, under the weak or susceptible rulers who succeeded the great Emperor Ch'ien Lung; the hostility of the provinces to national efforts toward centralization; misjudgment on the part of the Empress Dowager, Tzu Hsi, of the forces which had been aroused to favor constitutional reform by the coming of the foreigner; and finally, misjudgment of the power of the foreigner, revealed in the support by the court of the Boxer Rebellion in the hope of driving the foreigner "into the sea."

## FORERUNNERS OF THE REVOLUTION

Forerunners of the republican revolution were the several efforts or gestures in the direction of political reorganization. Most notable among these were the reforms of the Emperor Kuang Hsi, of 1898, designed by their instigators, K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'ich'ao, not to do away with the monarchy but to limit it and cleanse it of corruption. These reforms were rendered abortive by the Empress Dowager, who considered them a menace to the monarchy. However, following the Boxer catastrophe it was clear, even to the Empress Dowager, that at least in form consideration must be given to the demand for reform and a program was announced which included the reorganization of all branches of the government and the establishment of a written constitution. That the Empress Dowager had in mind only formal changes is clearly evidenced in a decree of 1908, which contained a body of "Principles of the Constitution," which are nothing more than the application to proposed institutions of the single principle that the Manchu autocracy was to be maintained forever. To this end the emperor was to remain the source and final authority in all matters, executive, legislative and judicial. He might carry on government without parliament, which might only propose laws, not pass them, and which had no control over finances.

The growth in strength of the reform movement led to the calling of national and provincial assemblies, the former



in 1910, the latter a year earlier. These showed unexpected courage in criticism and brought from the court another statement of principles, called the "Nineteen Articles," which were not really representative of Manchu political theory but rather of the temper of the national assembly, by whom they had been framed for the court's acceptance, and which were promulgated in the midst of the revolution, in a last-moment effort to save the dynasty. They continued the dynasty but stripped it of power. They were, however, never legally applied, since the southern provinces revolted in favor of a republic and successfully supported their revolt with arms. Yuan Shih-k'ai, in whose hands the Manchus had placed the trust of saving the monarchy, chose, for reasons still only guessed at, not to fight the issue to a conclusion and the Manchus were compelled to abdicate. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, first provisional president, gave way voluntarily to Yuan, who took oath to support the provisional constitution of the new republic.

#### PERIOD OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI

The history of constitutional evolution under the Republic may best be dealt with in two periods, the first entitled the period of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the second the period of contention between "North" and "South." During the first period President Yuan Shih-k'ai clashed with the parliament over the question of the division of powers between the executive and that body. This clash was the symbol of the wider struggle between military and civilian forces for supremacy. It was inevitable, constitution or no constitution. It grew out of the overthrow of that central ruler whom all classes of the community were accustomed to obeying. With his disappearance it was natural that there should be a contest

of forces for his power. This struggle was avoided in Japan by the continuance of the monarchy and the exaltation of its position in the establishment of constitutional government. The provisional constitution, on the other hand, failed to give the president the powers which Yuan Shih-k'ai considered he ought to have, consequently he took them and when parliament protested he dissolved it and along with it the provincial assemblies. Thus the Republic was little more than two years old when its republican institutions had been destroyed.

His success in this assertion of presidential prerogatives encouraged Yuan to go further and attempt to establish a new imperial dynasty for his own ambitious family. This move was foiled by a second revolt in the south, after a protest by a number of powers, not including the United States, had been rebuffed as *contra vires* by Yuan. The failure of Yuan's attempt suggests the most potent force working against the re-establishment of monarchy in China, the jealousy of rival military leaders.

#### CLASHES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH

Shortly afterward Yuan died and thereafter the country had a succession of presidents: Li Yuan-hung, Feng Kuo-chang, Hsü Shih-chang, Li Yuan-hung once more, and the recent occupant, Marshal Ts'ao K'un. All of these men held military rank but none of them approached Yuan Shih-k'ai in administrative ability or in his hold upon the country. Parliament was revived, also the provincial assemblies. The first flush of enthusiasm was gone, however, and the assemblies came back badly divided into cliques and more susceptible to outside influences. President Li Yuan-hung was honestly in favor of the establishment of a liberal constitution and encouraged the parlia-

ment, which was also the constituent assembly, to hasten the drafting of a document which might take the place of the provisional constitution as a permanent instrument of government. His premier, Tuan Ch'i-jui, took a different attitude, similar rather to that of Yuan Shih-k'ai, which favored the legal recognition of existing circumstances of disturbance and the consequent need of a strong executive. Hence the same clash arose as in 1913 and with the same result—the dissolution of parliament—in 1917. This dissolution was due in part to the general constitutional antipathy between Tuan and parliament, in part to a particular manifestation of that antipathy, in which Tuan desired to break off relations with Germany while parliament refused to do so except upon certain conditions.

From that time until the summer of 1922 work on the draft of the constitution was arrested. The "Old Parliament," as the body elected in 1912 had come to be called, migrated to Canton, where in 1921 it elected Dr. Sun Yat-sen "President" of South China. The monarchist *coup* of General Chang Hsün failed in Peking in 1917 but President Li Yuan-hung was compelled to flee. He designated Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang to act as President. Under a new law, which was nothing more than an executive mandate drawn up by a hand-picked council appointed by Feng, a new parliament was elected in the north, which is known to history as the "*Tuchuns*' Parliament" because it was virtually selected by the northern military governors and it was entirely submissive to them. The two governments, one at Canton, the other at Peking, for several years maintained that the opposing government was unconstitutional and should yield to the legally constituted authority. Between them there was little to choose

on constitutional grounds. After 1916 the members of the first house of representatives, after 1919 the members of the first senate, were sitting without legal right, unless it be accepted that parliament could extend its own term by the methods and the majorities required to amend the provisional constitution, which at that time it had not taken the trouble to do. President Hsü Shih-chang, who succeeded Feng in 1918, was elected to office by the "*Tuchuns*' Parliament," which had no constitutional status. "President" Sun Yat-sen was elected by a rump of the "Old Parliament" too small in numbers, even had its members been sitting within their constitutional terms, to elect a president. Where neither side could call on valid arguments both descended to abuse and military attacks. In 1919 an attempt was made to settle outstanding issues by conference, but it failed. The country gradually broke apart into practically autonomous provinces, each considering its relation to the capital with reference to advantages to be gained for itself.

Hsü Shih-chang retained the northern presidency until 1922 when he was asked to retire in favor of a former president, Li Yuan-hung. His downfall was simply an incident of a struggle for power between certain of the stronger politico-military factions. Li assumed office unwillingly, realizing his dependence upon armed forces which he himself could not control. He announced a program opposed to provincial militarism and in favor of completing the national constitution. A sufficient number of the members of the "Old Parliament" returned to Peking to produce a quorum and resumed the task of elaborating a constitution. President Li soon found his premonitions to have been well-grounded. The double-dyed militarist, Marshal T'sao

K'un, proved to be ambitious for the presidency and began a campaign of bribery among the members of parliament. At the same time he urged the early completion of the constitution. The outcome of this effort was the promulgation of the constitution and the election of T'sao K'un on October 10, 1923. A group of legislators refused to participate in the passage of the constitution, alleging corruption, although the terms of the document were principally the product of this group.

#### CONTINUED STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY

The situation of the provinces under the Republic requires explanation. Upon the outbreak of the republican revolution the old viceroys and governors had fled and their places had been taken by military men who received their designations from a local group, or were appointed by Yuan Shih-k'ai, or simply appointed themselves. The complete breakdown of the administrative machinery of the Manchus weakened the civil power and the uncertainty of the future made it the natural thing for men who could do so to seize authority. This could only be done through military support, hence the development of military dictatorships in the provinces. Although civil governors were appointed in many provinces, in many cases they also were military men, the subordinates of the military governor, while in other cases the military governor held concurrently the civil post. Even after the provincial assemblies were revived the predominance of the military element was not seriously affected, since the great majority of the legislators could be intimidated or bribed. The situation had many of the political phases of feudalism.

While Yuan Shih-k'ai lived the military governors remained, on the whole,

loyal, since they had been appointed or confirmed by him and they recognized his strength and ability. With his death the last check upon their autonomy was removed and they have since gained power year by year until to-day China is not a genuine political unit but a geographical area, comprising a large number of units which are independent of each other save as they may desire, by special arrangements, to act together. With this development of independence has marched the steady increase of provincial armies until to-day it is estimated that there are between a million and a million and a half men under arms in China. To provide for these bloated armies and to serve the other purposes of the *tuchuns* the provincial revenues have been absorbed to a ruinous extent, leaving little for essential government services and nothing for the central government. Not content with monopolizing the provincial revenues the governors have in many cases also seized the returns from the national salt monopoly and in some cases, the funds of the national railways. Peking has been forced to get along as best it could without provincial support, save for very small contributions from provinces in its immediate vicinity.

These military governors have been not only provincial dictators but they have formed cliques to struggle with one another either for local purposes or for the control of Peking. Having established its control by arms a clique could fill the national offices with subservient officials and secure the profits which might be the legitimate or illegitimate fruits of relations between Peking and the foreign powers or might be squeezed from the attenuated revenues which the customs, salt, wine and tobacco and other national sources might provide. Thus the country has been kept in a continuous state of civil

war, without great loss of life, it is true, but with tremendous results in holding back China's forward development along all lines. Conditions have been growing steadily worse, as is demonstrated by the increase of banditry, a perennial curse of China, and by the increased disregard of foreign life. The *tuchuns* have grown more arrogant as they have found that their earlier irregularities were not being punished.

The localities, the villages and the districts have not been greatly affected by the revolution. One may say, however, that this in itself is an effect of the chaotic conditions which have followed the revolution, since it would have been one primary object of an enlightened republic to raise the people of the localities to a better educational standard and to have stimulated the advancement of health and general economic conditions. It is, however, remarkable that, save for more frequent bandit forays in some areas and for requisitions for food, labor and recruits on occasions, the life of the villages has gone on as it has for centuries. There have been no bloody massacres, no general confiscations, no mistreatment of the weak. Possibly these will come, if ever, with civilian resistance to the evil conditions wrought by the military elements.

Until the last few months the "Chihli Clique" of military leaders has managed to control Peking and most of central China. This group, which gained undisputed control of Peking in 1920, had as its principals the President, Ts'ao K'un, a man of no repute save that of a clever politician and a mishandler of funds, who bought his way into the presidency with heavy bribes; Marshal Wu Pei-fu, an excellent military leader but a poor man at the hustings; and General Feng Yu-hsiang, the so-called "Christian General," a splendid disciplinarian and a man of strong

character and ability. This triumvirate, with its satellites among the military governors, had the support of most of the provinces of central China and seemed capable of holding Peking so long as the existing alliances held good. There were, however, rivalries within its ranks, as recent incidents have proved.

The three large provinces of Manchuria are under the control of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, himself possessed of a bandit record but now known for his summary despatch of bandits, which has given Manchuria comparative freedom from that handicap. Since his dispute with the Chihli Clique in 1922, Chang Tso-lin has maintained an independent attitude toward Peking, which of late appears to have been considerably modified. So long as Wu Pei-fu remained the dominating member of the Chihli faction, however, there could occur no fusion between it and Chang Tso-lin, as the two generals both were determined to control the Peking government.

The third of the more important groups was that of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the provinces south of the Yangtze, more particularly Kwangtung, Yunnan and Kwangsi. Dr. Sun dropped the title of "President" and assumed that of "Generalissimo." A true liberal himself, in fact the most outstanding political liberal in China, he was compelled to resort to the methods of his enemies in order to keep himself in the struggle at all. Ruptures within his small southern circle greatly weakened him and at his death he was with difficulty holding even the city of Canton.

The overturn which has occurred since last August has resulted from the combination of a greatly strengthened Chang Tso-lin and division within the ranks of the Chihli Clique. Ever since his defeat two years ago Chang has



been preparing, and very scientifically too, for the next trial of strength. He has enlisted foreign advice and employed practically all the Chinese graduates of West Point. In equipment, supply services, aeroplanes and artillery his army was superior to that of Marshal Wu. But of greater advantage than military superiority has been the unity of policy which Manchuria has enjoyed. The Chihli faction has been weakened by divided counsels and by jealousy.

#### PRESENT CONDITIONS

The latest of China's civil wars, which got under way in August, 1924, began on the Yangtze with an attack by Governor Ch'i Hsi-yuan, of Kiangsu, upon Commissioner Ho Feng-lin, of Shanghai, and Governor Lu Yung-hsiang, of Chekiang. Its purpose was to carry one step further the campaign of Marshal Wu for the forcible unification of the country. It was successful, partly because of military, partly because of financial, superiority. But before the spoils of success could be gathered Chang Tso-lin descended in strength from Manchuria, compelling Wu Pei-fu to throw all the troops he could muster into the gateways of the Great Wall.

It is hardly likely that Wu could have been defeated had he been supported by all his generals and been able to maintain his connections with his bases. But his principal reliance, the "Christian General" Feng Yu-hsiang, betrayed him. Feigning obedience to Marshal Wu's orders to guard against a flank attack in the vicinity of Jehol, far to the west of Shanhaikuan where Wu was directing his own troops, General Feng swiftly returned to Peking without striking a blow and overthrew the government, proclaiming his alliance with Wu ended. At the same time Feng compelled the Manchu court

to quit its splendid prison in the Forbidden City and surrender its obsolete titles. Wu made a feeble attempt to re-take Peking but failed. He was permitted to escape to Honan, his native province.

General Feng's betrayal of his superior appears to have had a mixture of motives behind it. He had an old score to pay since the time when Wu Pei-fu had removed him from the governorship of Honan; he was opposed to Wu's program of forcible unification of the whole country; and he is ambitious. His expulsion of the Manchu court from the palaces also may be traced to a combination of considerations. The agreement with the Manchus made by the new régime at the establishment of the Republic was practically obsolete through mal-observance; to Feng the "Little Emperor" may have appeared a probable centre for another monarchical movement, fostered, possibly, by Chang Tso-lin; and there may have been Russian influence, likely to be valued by Feng as a future source of military supplies rather than on any grounds of appreciation of Soviet theory.

Wu disposed of, at least temporarily, the relative strength of Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin became the important question, for it was soon clear that they were not in harmony regarding the control of Peking. As yet the two generals have not clashed, but it would appear as though both were strengthening their forces and improving their positions for an eventual struggle. In the meantime Marshal Chang has had his will regarding the provisional presidency, which has been held for a number of months by the war premier, Tuan Ch'i-jui, a militarist of advanced years, influential because of his ability and long experience in politics. Tuan has followed the precedent of Yuan Shih-k'ai and Feng Kuo-chang in set-

ting up a hand-picked "Reorganization Conference" in whose hall of assembly, the writer is informed authoritatively, opium couches were provided for those who might weary of discussion. This group has closed its sessions after passing a measure for the calling of a Citizens' Conference, at which a new and still more "permanent" constitution is to be drafted. This conference was convened in Peking on July 30, 1925. The members of the second conference are, in general, the same men who attended the first conference. Both conferences have overlooked the members of political or military cliques hostile to Chang Tso-lin. There are, however, mingled with the place-hunters, a few men of a different type, among them the men who drafted the last constitution but refused to be bribed by T'sao K'un. In them lies the possibility that the work of the second conference may have some useful results toward the progress of constitutionalism.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen came to Peking and died there. He had not affiliated himself with the clique in control but had sought to bring his influence to bear

toward a settlement that would represent the views of all China. It would seem fair to conjecture that Sun realized the seriousness of his malady and wished to die in Peking. His death took away the single national figure of recognized liberal ideals and influence. To-day his party is without a leader and is in danger of splitting up into factions.

In conclusion, greatly as one must desire to perceive in the history of the Chinese Republic a steady, if gradual, evolution of genuine constitutionalism, he finds it impossible as yet to identify any lines of development which he may regard as likely to be permanent. The liberal forces have struggled against the forces of reaction but they have lost ground badly. It may be anticipated that they will not regain the position they held in 1911 for several generations and that when they do it will be through the accumulation of a large group of influential leaders of "Young China" who, while holding themselves above intrigue, will realize the importance of knowing the conditions of their own people and will seek to establish forms of government in harmony with these conditions.

## What Policy in China?

BY G. NYE STEIGER, PH.D.

Assistant Professor of History, Simmons College; formerly Professor of History and Government, St. John's University, Shanghai

A NEW day will have dawned for the Western nations when they realize that the "gunboat policy" in China is a failure, and that the only possible course is one of graceful submission to the national aspirations of the Chinese people. For three and a half years the United States and the other Western powers have been marking time in their relations with the Chinese Republic. Of the various good intentions embodied in the resolutions which were adopted by the Washington Conference, the only one to be put into effect by the conferring powers was that which abolished the foreign post offices on Chinese soil. Negotiations for the rendition of Weihai-wei and Kwang-chow-wan have become involved in diplomatic intricacies, while the resolutions dealing with the presence of foreign troops, with the Chinese tariff, and with the abolition of extraterritorial privileges, have, until the last few weeks, been blocked by the delay of France in ratifying the basic nine-power treaty.

During the period since the close of the Washington Conference, Japan, alone of the powers there represented, has taken positive steps toward a revision and improvement of her relations with China. The agreement relating to Shantung, and Japan's consequent withdrawal from that province, have not completely dispelled anti-Japanese sentiment in China, but they have done much to remove a serious stumbling-block from the path of future Sino-Japanese relations. There are, of course, arguments which

may be brought forward in extenuation of the failure on the part of the Western governments to give effect to their Washington program. The internal situation in China has, during the last three years, been so chaotic as to warrant the question whether any government existed with which an arrangement could be made, or which could accord protection to foreign life and property. Yet the fact remains that the Western powers have been marking time, while Japan, and—to an even greater extent—Russia, have been making considerable progress in the direction of increased consideration for Chinese susceptibilities.

Developments in China have now brought the question of Chinese policy abruptly into the foreground. The disturbances in Shanghai and the sympathetic demonstrations in various parts of the Republic have furnished unmistakable evidence as to the intense resentment with which the Chinese people regard the extremely privileged position enjoyed by the stranger within their gates. The people of China have no desire to deprive themselves of the benefits resulting from foreign trade, and there appears little reason to fear that the triumph of nationalism will endanger the legitimate aspirations of Western commerce and investment. But the present government at Peking lacks the power—even if it has the will—to secure from the nation a fulfilment of the humiliating concessions which were, between 1840 and 1900, forced from the Manchu Dynasty.

## PAST POLICIES MUST BE ABANDONED

The "Treaty Powers" are confronted by a situation which compels a choice between two alternatives. They must either seek to re-establish, by forceful methods, their crumbling edifice of special privilege, or they must abandon, frankly and with good grace, the complex of forced and unilateral treaties by which China has, for more than three quarters of a century, been held under foreign domination. There will be no lack of voices raised in support of the first of these alternatives. In the Treaty Ports of China there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of foreign residents who sincerely believe that the foreigner cannot exist in China if divested of the privileges which he now enjoys. There are many others who, contemptuously ignorant of the strength of the Chinese people, regard the conquest and subjugation of the Republic as a simple matter. Yet the armed invasion of China for the purpose of restoring Western dominance is, to-day, an idle dream. A people whose nominal government plays no important part in the national existence, a country whose economic life is almost independent of its great cities, China offers no "military objective" upon which the plans of the invader could be focussed. A million troops could be poured into the country, and they would merely suffice to hold a few provincial capitals together with the essential lines of communication. Such railroads as exist would be destroyed by the peasants of the countryside, and some—probably most—of the military commanders now engaged in civil strife would combine to make common cause against the outsider. An attempt to invade and conquer China, if such an attempt were made, would result in a catastrophe similar to that which overtook the "Grand Army" of Napoleon in Russia.

There is but the one alternative to face. Sooner or later, voluntarily or in spite of themselves, the powers must face the fact that a new day has dawned in China, and that the policies of yesterday are no longer *à propos*. If this realization comes promptly, if the decision to meet China as an equal and treat her with respect is made voluntarily and gracefully, the bitterness with which the Chinese people have come to regard the West will soon be dissipated, and the intercourse between China and the West will become more cordial and beneficial than it has ever been under the old régime.

It is to the credit of the United States that the State Department at Washington has been strong in its insistence that steps be taken toward settling the question of extraterritoriality along the lines which were laid down by the Washington Conference. The recent action of the Administration in remitting the final portion of the Boxer Indemnity (some six and a quarter million dollars) is an additional, and not inconsiderable move toward gaining the favor of China. But more than this will be required to remove the distrust and suspicion with which Americans, in common with all other foreigners, are now regarded by the Chinese people. The aspirations of modern China cannot be appeased by gracious words—nor bought up for six million dollars.

A revision of past policies toward China is demanded by considerations of pure self-interest. Strong in their reliance upon equity and abstract justice, the Chinese have never accepted as final any settlement achieved by force. Even if the forceful domination of China were momentarily possible, the continuation of this policy would but render more widespread and more intense the resentment with which the "Sons of Han" have come to regard

the outside world. The overthrow of foreign control would be delayed for a brief period, but, in the end, the overthrow would prove far more of a catastrophe—both for China and for the West—than the present voluntary abandonment of that control by the powers.

For America and for the other Western powers, the time has come when a policy of frank and unqualifiedly equal treatment for China as a member of the "family of nations" cannot, with safety, be long delayed. Force can lead but to disaster. Even if an appeal to force should meet with temporary success, the armed domination of China must soon end, and such

temporary success would have been gained at the price of incalculable future loss. To-day the resentment of the Chinese toward the Western aggressors can be allayed by a reversal of the policies which have given rise to this feeling, with little damage to the essential interests of the Western world. If the Western governments fail to appreciate the situation, and delay in meeting the nationalistic demands of the Chinese people, the present popular resentment may easily reach an intensity which will lead to the catastrophic destruction of all the foreign interests which have grown up within the country during the last hundred years.



# Ideals of the Philippines

By MAXIMO M. KALAW

Dean, College of Liberal Arts, University of the Philippines

UPON the ending of hostilities in Europe in 1918, the final adjustment of the question of Philippine independence became the topic of political discussion in the Philippines. It was thought that the time had come, now that the United States had ended its war with Germany, to take up the Philippine problem for final and definite solution. The two political parties in the Philippines, while both in favor of immediate independence, offered two distinct plans for the solution of the Philippine problem. The Democrata, or opposition party, would take up the question directly at the Peace Conference. The Nacionalista, or majority party, however, was in favor of submitting the question first to the government of the United States; and with this end in view, on November 7, 1918, it secured the passage in the legislature of a concurrent resolution creating a Commission of Independence, the purpose of which was to consider and report to the legislature on the ways and means of negotiating the independence of the Philippines, the external guarantees of that independence, and the organization of a constitutional and democratic internal government. The majority party was opposed to the plan of taking the question directly to the Peace Conference, because, inasmuch as the United States had given the formal pledge of independence to the Filipinos, it naturally supposed that the first logical step was to urge the United States to fulfill its promise, and that to disregard the United States at that time would have meant not only a discourtesy to the American Government,

but a lack of faith in the solemn pledge of the American people. This view prevailed, and on March 17, 1919, the Philippine legislature passed what is known as "The Declaration of Purposes," which officially states the attitude of the Filipino people on this vital problem.

## THE DECLARATION OF PURPOSES

Those who desire to know the final and authorized view of the Filipino people on the independence question should read the "Declaration of Purposes" passed by their constitutional representatives. What did the Filipino people say in this "Declaration of Purposes?" Briefly it was this: that the time had come for the final and definite adjustment of the independence question. They reiterated their firm belief in the good faith of the American people in extending the blessings of self-government and holding out generous promises of independence. They referred to the Jones Law as morally, at least, a veritable pact, or covenant, entered into between the American and Filipino peoples, whereby the United States promised to recognize the independence of the Philippines as soon as a stable government could be established in the Islands. They then solemnly stated that they had already performed their part of the covenant with America, that there was now a stable government in the Philippines satisfying the conditions of stability required by the United States and of other countries, and that, therefore, it was now up to the American people to perform their part of the understanding.

The stand taken in "The Declara-

tion of Purposes" has been ratified by the people in every subsequent election and by every subsequent legislature. In pursuance of the mandate of the people, Philippine missions have been sent to the United States, the first one having been charged with the message to convey to the government of the United States the frankest assurances and the good-will, friendship and gratitude of the Filipino people, and to submit with such respect and confidence the question of Philippine independence with a view to its final settlement.

At no time since the extinction of our short-lived Republic have the Filipino people as a nation taken a more decisive attitude than on the issuing of "The Declaration of Purposes" and its subsequent ratification by every legislature. Its only parallel in our history was seen in 1899 when the Revolutionary Government made its determination known to the American authorities that the Filipino people would not accept the American flag and American sovereignty unless their independence or their right to independence was recognized and safeguarded; that they would rather defy the might of the greatest Republic on earth than unconditionally submit to American domination. That the Philippine Government then voiced the sentiments and had the loyal and determined support of the entire people, was proved by the three years of exasperating warfare that followed, a war which cost the Philippines hundreds of thousands of lives, the devastation of fields, and the misery of innumerable families—and the United States half a billion dollars.

Not that there is in our present demand even a shadow of the old warlike attitude which our fathers took. Everybody is now glad that the bitterness of the past has gone. But just as the founders of our lost Republic made

known to the American Government that the Filipino people would not accept anything short of the recognition of their right to independence, so have our constitutional representatives of to-day, using the implements of peace and the more civilized means of discussion and arbitration, respectfully and in all friendship, upon the basis of a previous understanding, presented to the American people the desire of the Filipinos for the termination of their present political relationship with America. It is true that there have been in the past petitions and petitions for independence handed to the American people, and that as soon as the Filipino people resumed their peaceful pursuits, they served notice on the American people that they had not forgotten their desire for independence. But they had not yet assumed the attitude that they have now taken which is based on the fulfillment of their part of the understanding with America, that as soon as a stable government could be established, they would be granted their independence.

#### A "STABLE GOVERNMENT"

They have ample reasons to believe that they have already established the stable government demanded of them in the Jones Law as the only prerequisite to the granting of independence. Stable government has a definite meaning in American foreign relations. It is a government supported by the people and capable of keeping order and fulfilling international obligations. Its origin and its application to the Philippines can easily be traced to America's relations with South America. It was the policy of Presidents Grant and McKinley. It was President Grant who, as early as 1875, expressed the idea that as soon as the Cuban people had set up a stable government, their independence would be recognized.

This policy was supported by President McKinley. When he urged Congress to declare war on Spain to liberate Cuba, he definitely stated that as soon as the Cuban people had established in the Island

a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquility and the security of the citizens as well as our own,

Cuban independence would be recognized. The Cuban people were told by Secretary of War Root, through the military governor, to establish "a stable, orderly and free government," and as soon as this was done, as soon as the Cuban people had elected their officers and established a government capable of maintaining order and fulfilling international obligations, then it was declared that there was a stable government in Cuba,—and American sovereignty was withdrawn.

The Democrats simply adopted the American policy for the recognition of Cuban independence—a policy established under Republican auspices—and applied it to the Philippines. The phrase "stable government" was first used in the Democratic platform in 1900, drafted by Mr. Bryan. That platform read in part as follows:

We favor an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside interference.

Mr. Bryan confessed that he had just borrowed that policy from the Republican record in Cuba; and, in accepting the nomination for the Presidency, he declared that if elected he would recommend to Congress the establishment of "a stable form of government in the Islands just as we are now establishing a stable form of government in Cuba," and the granting

of independence "to the Filipinos as we have promised to give independence to the Cubans."

This policy has been repeatedly included in the Democratic platform until, with the co-operation of the Republicans, it was converted into law on August 29, 1916, with the passage of the Jones Law.

The Filipino people accepted the promise of independence given by America just as the Cubans had accepted in good faith the promise of the United States to withdraw from their island as soon as a stable government had been established there. The Filipinos immediately began to set up the stable government demanded of them, and to-day the task is accomplished. There is now a stable government in the Philippines.

The representative of the American Government in the Philippines, who supervised the establishment of the government under the Jones Law, has concurred in the report of the Philippine legislature that there is a stable government in the Philippines now. President Wilson, in his farewell message to Congress, officially certified that the Filipino people had already fulfilled the condition imposed upon them as a prerequisite to independence, and hence that independence should no longer be denied them. He said:

Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands.

I respectfully submit that, this condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.



CAUGHT IN THE NATIONALISTIC  
CURRENT

Besides the fulfillment of their part of the understanding with America, the Filipino people have another reason for wanting independence now. They are caught in the nationalistic current which is sweeping practically every subject people on earth. They believe that the right of self-determination has now a better chance to live than ever before. The Great War gave birth to ten new nations in Europe. An Irish Free State has been created, based on treaty relations with England. The self-governing colonies of the British Empire have virtually become independent, and the Empire itself has become a minor league of nations. The representatives of the different members of this British league now sit on an equal footing at the councils of the great League of Nations.

Turn to Asia and Africa. The nationalist movements there are also in full sway. All demand self-determination. Egypt has regained her independence. Representative institutions are being tried in Java and India. Korean nationalism has reasserted itself, and China has received at the Washington Conference more freedom of action in her foreign relations.

When you think of the new-born nations in Europe—the majority of them half as large as the Philippines, some of them bankrupt, starving, their fields devastated, their homes ruined, staggering under heavy taxation, weighed down by gigantic debts, yet proud of their hard-won independence,—and compare them to the Philippines,—to ten million Christian Filipinos, free from the turmoil of war, free from the weight of huge war debts, free from social unrest,—do you wonder why the Filipino people now believe that they should become the

chief arbiter of their national destiny? They want to drink in the new life, the new freedom, the new atmosphere. They believe they should now take their appointed place in the progress and the broader events of the world.

CHAFING AT THE BIT OF AMERICAN  
SOVEREIGNTY

It is true that the Filipino people have enjoyed considerable autonomy, but American sovereignty is still supreme. It is still the final arbiter of their destiny. From it, all their political privileges and individual freedom emanate, and in it their political life subsists. With one stroke of the pen, the present government can be wiped out by the American Congress. They are not yet a free people, for a free people is one whose life, government and institutions are theirs by right to change or modify as they please. The American flag still symbolizes an alien sovereignty imposed against their will, no matter how lightly or generously exercised that sovereignty may be.

What the Filipinos most chafe under is what we would call our spiritual bondage, born of the lost Republic, of the war of conquest, of the days of the Empire, of the reconcentration-camps, of the early American bureaucracy, of the insidious campaign of the retentionists, with all their retinue of accumulated memories, of traditions, and of hurt national pride. Add to this mortification the ever-growing national consciousness, the promises given by America, and the call from beyond, from the wide surging world, from what Filipinos conceive to be their manifest national destiny, and you have the independence movement in a nutshell.

And precisely at this moment, they do not believe that American sovereignty is being exercised lightly. The Filipino people, through the Special Mission recently sent to Washington,

has presented the following charges against Governor-General Wood:

Governor-General Wood has set at naught all understandings the Filipino people have had with the American Government, and has ignored the assurance given them by the late President. He has most decidedly taken a backward step depriving our government of the key and the nerve-center of the former autonomous administration—the counsel of the Filipinos. He has surrounded himself with a secret cabinet composed of military and other extralegal advisers, which has encroached upon the legitimate functions of the Filipino officials in the government. He has broken asunder the bonds of concord that united Americans and Filipinos after the bloody struggle of 1899, a concord that reached its highest expression in the first years of autonomous government. He has placed himself over and above the laws passed by the Philippine legislature, laws that have never been declared null and void by the courts or by the Congress of the United States. He has claimed for himself an unlimited executive responsibility that neither the existing laws nor the practices already established have recognized. He has deviated from the policy of the American Government to give the Filipino people an ever-increasing self-government, a policy announced by every President beginning with President McKinley and ratified by the Congress of the United States in the Jones Law. He has abused the veto power, exercising it on the slightest pretext on matters of purely local concern that did not affect the sovereignty of the United States or its international obligations. Thus he has attempted to control our legislature, a prerogative that has never been claimed by the elective executives of America, by the President of the United States, or the Governors of the several States. He has disregarded the right of the Senate in his exercise of the appointing power. He has destroyed our budget system, the greatest achievement in the financial administration of our gov-

ernment. He has endeavored to defeat the economic policy duly laid down by the Philippine legislature for the protection of the rights and interests of the Filipino people in the development of the resources of the Islands.

#### TAKING THEIR CHANCE AS A NATION

The movement of the Filipino people for independence has been termed by some as vacillating and ambiguous because it does not state the kind of independence they want and the definite nature of the relationship they desire with the United States. This impression is not true. Their constitutional representatives demand complete and absolute independence, but they are willing to consider conditions which the United States may desire to impose, provided that these conditions do not impair their sovereign rights.

It is not up to the petitioner to state the conditions of the grant. A people that desires to be free should accept whatever responsibilities freedom may entail. Because of the friendly relations which the Filipinos have with America, their position may be compared to that of the young man who desires emancipation from the parental roof. No matter how strong is mutual attachment, if he is manly enough and is deserving of freedom, he will not condition his petition upon future protection in case of trouble. If, being opposed to his freedom, his father for spite releases him upon the condition that he is to leave "bag and baggage," he should welcome freedom just the same. That is the position of the Filipino people. They are willing to take under any condition, their chance as a nation.

They do not believe they are taking even half as great a chance as smaller nations, beset by greater problems and dangers, have taken; or that they are in

a worse plight than the Thirteen Colonies, when they wrested by force of arms their freedom from England, or the new nations in Europe, which, though bankrupt and impoverished, staggering under heavy debts, have proudly hoisted the ensign of their independence and are defying their neighbors to take it.

There is an international significance of the independence movement which has not escaped the attention of the Filipino people. Many Americans raise the spectre of Japan and frankly tell us that, in case of independence, our northern neighbor would gobble us up. It seems hard to understand why the United States, should she desire it, would not be able to secure the pledge of Japan to respect the political integrity of an independent Philippines when she was able at the recent Washington Conference to persuade the island kingdom to return coveted Shantung to China and to keep her hands off Manchuria. And, besides, it is difficult to think now of bellicose Japan after the tremendous blow Nature has dealt her, a catastrophe which cost her a quarter of a million lives, destroyed two of her cities, and completely demolished her great naval base. And even if there should be danger of foreign aggression—and there will always be danger of foreign aggression—why should it be a determining factor in the settlement of the independence problem, if the Filipino people are willing to risk any such danger?

#### TO WHICH SIDE INCLINES AMERICA?

But there is one special international aspect of the independence problem to which special attention should be directed. Forces of liberalism and reaction are now in struggle all over the world. With the signature of the Treaty of Versailles, the pessimists of

America raised the cry that the world was madder than ever before, that the treaty was the very instrument of imperialism and the oppression of weaker peoples, instead of being the vaunted protector of self-determination and nationalism. In the grim humor of the day after, with the pessimists sullen and downhearted, the reactionaries were in the ascendant. But methinks we now see liberalism in the lead. At this crucial moment, at this particular time, the liberals of the world are watching America's policy in the Philippines.

America's solution of our independence problem, to my mind, will show to which side she inclines her might, whether on the side of the reactionaries bent on the return of the old order, or whether she still believes in her vaunted principles of self-determination and the consent of the governed. Philippine independence, in my opinion, is a great moral reconstruction problem of the United States. On this question, whether she wants it or not, she has to show her cards to a world apparently grown dubious and skeptical.

America may give perfectly valid reasons for a half-hearted support of a League to enforce peace; she may say that the other nations are not sincere in their advocacy of the right of self-determination and the consent of the governed; she may affirm that the Treaty of Peace was confabulated precisely to perpetuate autocracy and imperialism and preserve the *status quo*. On these grounds, she can practically refuse her help in the further application of those noble principles in the far-off nooks and corners of the globe, in the still dark caverns peopled by submerged nationalities. "What is the use," she may say, "the other nations do not believe in these principles, and I certainly will not be the self-appointed guardian of their morals

and consciences!" But can America consistently refuse the application of this doctrine in a land within the confines of her own boundaries, in a purely domestic problem like Philippine independence, in the solution of which her pride cannot and will not require the consent or the sanction of any other nation?

The right of self-determination, like all noble principles, certainly has limitations in its practical application. It is difficult to apply it in a land where we do not know who will do the determining and how it will be done. In many cases, conflicting interests clash. Where there is a diversity of races, it has been found necessary, as in the provinces ceded to Denmark and in the Saar Valley, to have a plebiscite. In many cases, propinquity and paramount national interest and other vested rights demand the temporary sacrifice of the doctrine, and thus we see portions of the globe still denying its very existence. But America cannot find these obstacles in the Philippines. Here we have a people already politically organized under her own supervision into a representative government—a people who have said in all their elections, the acknowledged channels for the expression of popular will, that they want the full application of the doctrine,—political independence.

Self-determination and the consent of the governed were the very principles the Filipino people invoked when they demanded to be heard at the Paris Treaty Conference in 1898; they were the very same principles which made the Filipinos wage a disastrous and unequal war rather than unconditionally submit to American sovereignty; they were the very same principles they held on to when defeated in war, they had to appeal to the spirit of justice and *fair-dealing* of the American

people; and they are the very same principles which they are invoking at present when they ask, in all respect and friendship, that the United States do now recognize the independence of the Philippines. It is the plea of the only Christian nation in the Orient to the greatest nation-leader of Christian movements in the world.

America holds the key to the door of Philippine independence. Can she afford to keep that door locked when the liberals of all continents await its opening as a signal that America is still the leader of enlightened statesmanship? Can she consistently refuse to unlock the door which leads into the avenue of democracy and self-determination? That avenue, once open, goes into the very heart of Asia. As an American writer puts it: "Philippine independence will light a new lamp in Asia." And Asia houses and feeds one half of the human race!

The Filipinos, on their part, realize the significance of their independence movement. They know the responsibilities which an expectant world will place on their shoulders. They have, therefore, through their representatives, defined the conduct which they intend to follow after they have been granted their independence. They have said:

The Filipino people would not be just to themselves if at this moment, when their political separation from the sovereign country is proposed, they should fail to express in the clearest and most definite manner the sentiments and purposes that inspire their action. They, therefore, deem it proper to affirm that independence, instead of destroying or weakening, will tend to strengthen the bonds of friendship and appreciation . . . for all the previous disinterested work so splendidly performed for the benefit of the Philippines by so many faithful sons of America; that this gratitude will be the first fundamental fact in the future relations between the United States and the Philippine Islands; that in

the present state of international affairs, the Filipino people merely aspire to become another conscious and direct instrument for the progress of liberty and civilization; that in the tranquil course of their years of constitutional development, they will maintain for all peoples inhabiting their hospitable land the essence and benefit of democratic institutions; that they will continue to associate in so far as this will be practicable and their strength will permit in the

work of reconstruction, justice and peace carried on by the United States; . . . and that in thus preserving their best traditions and institutions in the new situation which will strengthen and perfect them, the Filipino people will continue to make their country as heretofore a safe place of law and order, justice and liberty, where Americans and foreigners as well as nationals may live peacefully in the pursuit of happiness and prosperity.



# The United States and the Philippines

## A Survey of Some Political Aspects of Twenty-five Years of American Sovereignty

By RALSTON HAYDEN

Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan; sometime Exchange Professor, University of the Philippines

WHEN at the end of the Spanish-American war the United States acquired possession of the Philippine Islands it embarked upon an undertaking involving difficulties, complexities and responsibilities which might well have given pause to any nation. After twenty-five years its Philippine policy and the actual administration of the Islands are still serious problems for its government and may at any time become important issues in American politics. Differences between the American Governor-General of the Philippines and the Filipino leaders, and a determined effort of the latter individuals and their supporters in the United States to obtain a complete readjustment of the relations between the two countries, brought the Philippine problem to the focus of governmental and public attention in 1923 and 1924. During the last session of Congress bills providing for immediate independence and for a "commonwealth" type of government were favorably reported in the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, while President Coolidge, in one of the longest public papers which he had yet issued, took a decided stand against any immediate change in the status of the Islands. The outcome of these events marks, I believe, a definite constitutional period in the history of America's stewardship in the Philippines. It certainly affords an excellent point from which to survey its quarter-

century experiment in the government of this Oriental and tropical people.<sup>1</sup>

### RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS

An American resident in the Philippines once remarked to the writer that in their campaign for independence the Filipinos would do well never to let it be forgotten that they number 11,000,000 people. Many nations whose position and importance in the world no one questions are less numerous than they and the mere factor of the size of the Philippines has had an important bearing upon American policy toward them. It has made it necessary to deal with the Filipino people as a nation. This statement is more fully true to-day than it was twenty-five years ago and it will be more important still a quarter-century hence. In 1903 the population of the Islands was 7,635,426; in 1949, at the present rate of increase, it will be 17,139,000. The homogeneity of the Filipinos is becoming correspondingly greater.

<sup>1</sup> The limits of this paper make it impossible to discuss the economic aspects of American rule in the Philippines. It may be stated briefly, however, that the American policy has been on the whole, one of non-exploitation; that the natural resources of the Islands have been preserved almost intact for the Filipino people; that reciprocal free trade between the United States and the Philippines coupled with a protective Philippine tariff against other nations have made the Islands economically dependent upon the United States; and that economically the Philippines is to-day the least developed and poorest large and populous colony in the Orient.

Early American administrators were much impressed by the racial diversity of the inhabitants of the Philippines and American public opinion upon the Philippine question has always been strongly affected by their views. From the ethnographic standpoint this diversity is very great. No less than forty-three distinct ethnographic groups speaking eighty-seven recognized languages and dialects exist in the archipelago.<sup>2</sup> Yet with the exception of some 36,000 Negritos and 45,000 mountain primitives of semi-negroid or non-negroid type, practically all of the people of the Philippines are of one great racial group, the Malays. Among the 10,000,000 civilized Christians and Mohammedans who dwell in the lowlands the type is fairly uniform, although in almost every group the pure Malay stock has been blended with Indonesian and mongoloid elements. Among the 400,000 pagan mountaineers greater ethnic diversity exists, Indonesian types and Malay blends in which the Indonesian and mongoloid elements are predominant being common.

Administratively the United States has recognized and dealt with three major groups in the Philippines: the Christians, the Mohammedans, or Moros, and the pagans. The Christians number about nine and a half million and are divided into eight "tribes" differing from each other in habitat, language and culture. Of these groups the Bisayans, numbering about 4,000,000, the Tagalogs, somewhat less than 2,000,000, and the Ilokanos, about 1,000,000, are the

largest and most important. Authorities disagree as to the political importance of the racial differences between these eight Christian peoples. There is no doubt, however, that they are highly conscious groups and one of the tasks which both the American and the Filipino elements in the Philippine Government have set themselves is to subordinate this group consciousness to an all-powerful sentiment of Filipino nationality. To this end instruction in the public schools has been entirely in English from the beginning of the American régime and it is intended to make English the universally used second language. American school teachers and officials and the more important Filipino political leaders have preached the doctrine of Filipino nationality for a generation. Certainly to-day the great majority of the native Christian population of the Islands are Filipinos first and Tagalogs or Bisayans or Ilokanos afterwards in their attitude towards foreigners, including Americans. And, as is usually the case, the dominant group in each division is far less local and more nationalistic in character and in sentiment than are the masses of the people. Practically all of the members of these controlling groups speak Spanish or English, or both. The more important political leaders of every province are known personally to the leaders of every other province. They have made common cause against the Americans for twenty-five years and have become accustomed to working together for a common end. So, while it is true that if either Mr. Quezon, Mr. Osmeña, or Mr. Sumulong, at present the recognized leaders of their people, can only address about one-sixth of them without the aid of an interpreter, yet it is also a fact that their leadership is accepted and followed by practically all of the Christian Filipinos.

<sup>2</sup>H. Otley Beyer, — *Population of the Philippine Islands in 1916* (Manila, 1917). This study, together with *The Non-Christian People of the Philippines*, by the same author (Manila, 1921, reprinted from the *Census of the Philippine Islands: 1918*, Vol. II), contain the most accurate and best arranged ethnological information about the people of the Philippines.

In this connection it should not be forgotten that the Christian Filipino "tribes" have never had any effective native tribal or other political organization higher than the village, and that during the three centuries of Spanish dominion the Philippines were governed as a political unit. How far the centrifugal forces of group antagonism and particularism among them would constitute a menace to the unity of an independent Philippines, once the powerful pressure of American domination were withdrawn, no man can say. Although they were an important factor in preventing any general rebellion against Spain during her long rule in the Islands, they have not presented really serious political or administrative problems during the American régime and are in no sense comparable to the racial and religious differences which divide the peoples of British India. At the present time from forty to sixty per cent (American and Filipino estimates) of the Filipinos are literate. About 1,100,000 Filipino children, constituting one-third of the school population, are in the public schools.

Each of the major non-Christian groups, the Moros and the pagan hill people, were early recognized by the Americans as presenting problems quite different from those of the remaining nine-tenths of the population. Spain had never really conquered or governed either of them, and during her régime bitter enmity between them and the Christians had been the rule. The United States subjugated both types of peoples and prior to 1913 governed them firmly, justly and wisely through American officials working in an organization distinct from that which administered affairs in the Christian provinces. During the régime of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison, however, the government of the pagans

and the Moros passed almost completely into Filipino hands. Although the fine enthusiasm which made possible the remarkable American achievements among the wild mountain people is notably absent among the Filipinos who now direct the government of the Mountain Province, where by far the largest groups of the pagans live, yet nothing has thus far developed which indicates that if left to themselves the Filipinos will not be able to handle safely the problem now presented by the mountain folk.

As to the Moros, they have given both Americans and Filipinos vastly more trouble than the hill tribes, and probably will continue to do so. During the past three years armed clashes between the Philippine Constabulary and Moro bands have been increasing in number and in gravity. The Filipino leaders declare that the friction is due to the policies of the Wood administration in Moroland, while Americans assert that it is the inevitable result of the Filipinization of that part of the government against the wishes of the Moro people. Each party accuses the other of bribing or otherwise improperly influencing prominent Moro *datos*, while the Filipinos are openly and skillfully campaigning in the southern islands to indoctrinate the Moro leaders with their ideas of nationalism and independence. Their task is made the harder because many of the older Moros fear and distrust them as Christians and view the Filipino schools, hospitals and friendly spirit simply as thinly disguised attacks on their religion. Without question the United States could govern the Moros satisfactorily to itself and to them. Whether it will be able to do so, through Filipino instrumentalities, as it is now attempting to do, is doubtful. Were the Filipinos to undertake the task single-handed at the present time,



an expensive and ruthless war, in which the Moros would be defeated without being eliminated as a serious problem of government, would be quite possible.

Of the foreign elements in the population of the Philippines, aside from the Americans, only two, the Chinese and the Spanish, are of major importance in the life of the country. At present there are close to 50,000 Chinese in the Islands, while it has been estimated that the native-born inhabitants who have a considerable mixture of Chinese blood number about 500,000. In the hands of the former group is a very large proportion of the commercial business of the archipelago, a situation which is duplicated in most of the other countries of the Far East, with the exception of Japan. Practically all of the Chinese *mestizos* consider themselves Filipinos and are Filipinos in spirit and in fact. Among them are to be found many of the social, business and political leaders of the nation and of each province and municipality. Those who know them best declare that in the long run their influence, which is a powerful one, will be thrown towards establishing an Oriental rather than Occidental society in the Philippines. Sergio Osmeña, one of the two outstanding leaders of the Filipino people to-day, and Emilio Auginaldo, one time President of the Philippine Republic and leader of the insurrections against Spain and the United States, have a large admixture of Chinese blood, as did Jose Rizal, the national hero of the Philippines.

Somewhat less than 200,000 of the population of the Philippines are partially of Spanish blood, and the influence of this group is out of all proportion to its numbers. Its members, or those who were trained under its influence, largely control both the local and central governments and will continue to do so for five or ten years.

In earlier days many of them resisted "Americanization" and some of them still look forward to the time when Anglo-Saxon ideas of government and of life can be discarded in favor of a Latin-Oriental culture. Manuel L. Quezon, at the present moment the most powerful Filipino statesman, and the late Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, the leading scholar of the Islands, are outstanding examples of the Spanish-Filipino type.

Some idea of the Philippine problem from the point of view of the number of the population and its racial and religious elements may, perhaps, be gained from this brief discussion. As Rome took care to divide in order to rule, the United States has striven to unite that she may liberate. American and Filipino leaders have sought to unify the Filipino people in thought, in speech, in spirit, and in their economic and political life. Great progress has been made towards this end. It seems apparent, however, that the immediate and complete withdrawal of America from the archipelago would increase greatly the difficulties to be overcome by the Filipino leaders if they are ultimately to attain the national unity which they seek.

#### U. S. GOVERNMENT AND POLICY

When the United States assumed the sovereignty of the Philippines in 1899 it considered that it had undertaken a two-fold responsibility. On the one hand it was bound to give to the Filipino people an enlightened, just and efficient government; on the other it felt obliged to educate them in self-government. Although in the beginning these two aims were deemed by many people to be mutually exclusive, the administrative history of the Philippines from 1899 until the present moment is simply the story of American and Filipino efforts to accomplish both of them.

During the first Republican régime, 1899-1913, good government was considered as fundamental and the extension of political power to the Filipinos was made dependent upon their demonstrated capacity to use it to their own advantage. Filipinization proceeded from the bottom upward and government was carried on under American supervision and control. At the end of the period the central government consisted of an American Governor-General; a commission composed of five Americans and four Filipinos, which was the upper house of the legislature and four members of which headed the executive departments; and the Philippine Assembly, an elective body created in 1907 and composed wholly of Filipinos, which was the lower house of the legislature. Upon the supreme bench sat five Americans and four Filipinos under the chief justiceship of a Filipino. In all branches of the government the proportion of Filipinos in the service was seventy-two per cent as against twenty-eight per cent of Americans.

During this period the governments of the provinces and municipalities were almost completely Filipinized. From the outset America proceeded upon the theory that among any people real political freedom must rest upon a basis of sound and active local self-government. In his instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, 1899, President McKinley directed that body

to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs to the full extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be con-

sistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.

In accordance with the spirit of these instructions a general provincial and a general municipal act were passed by the Philippine Commission in 1901. Both laws were the product of American and Filipino collaborators and represented an adaptation of American principles of local government to the desires, the needs and the capabilities of the Filipino people. This legislation provided for the establishment of municipal governments manned almost entirely by Filipinos and possessing a wide measure of autonomy; and for provincial governments, in which Americans were in control, possessed of sufficient supervisory authority over the municipalities to keep them within their legal powers and to guarantee a certain minimum of good government. In 1901 the Commission explained its plans and its hopes thus:

We have thought that by establishing a form of municipal government practically autonomous, with a limited electorate, and by subjecting its operations to the scrutiny and criticism of a provincial government in which the controlling element is American, we could gradually teach them the method of carrying on government according to American ideas.<sup>3</sup>

The Municipal and Provincial Acts of 1901 were applied, with appropriate local modifications, to the old Spanish provinces and *pueblos*. These ancient political entities, with their names, boundaries and property were simply given a new organization and added powers. The municipalities were given, broadly speaking, the status and powers of American municipal corporations. The provinces were likewise constituted bodies corporate and were assigned functions and powers greater

<sup>3</sup> Report of the Philippine Commission, 1901, Part I, p. 21.

than those of American counties and less than those of the states of the Union. Both were subjected to supervision and control, designed chiefly to keep them within their legal spheres, by the Executive Bureau, a branch of the office of the Governor-General. This final supervision was, of course, American. Both classes of governments were also eventually required to keep their accounts in accordance with a carefully prepared and uniform system provided by the central government and frequently inspected by a corps of highly trained and efficient traveling auditors. Probably no single feature of the system of local government did more to promote efficiency and honesty than the rigidity of the accounting and auditing regulations imposed and enforced by the insular authorities. Limitations were also placed upon the taxing powers of the local units and upon the proportion of their total incomes which might be expended upon salaries.

The system of local government which was thus established during the early days of the American occupation of the Philippines has since been modified mainly in three directions: during the Republican régime American control was gradually reduced and between 1913 and 1921 it was practically eliminated; the actual control of the central authorities over the municipalities has tended to increase rather than to diminish; through an extension of the franchise and the general political development of the people, local government has become somewhat more democratic. On the whole the results have justified the American policy of regarding local government as the indispensable school of all self-government. The people at large, the voters and the active politicians have acquired in that school experience in the actual conduct of their own political affairs

that they could have received in no other way. Practically every official of prominence in the executive and legislative branches of the Philippine Government, or in the Philippine political parties, has behind him a successful record in his municipal or provincial government, or in both. It has been much more difficult for the United States to see to it that the Filipinos have governed themselves reasonably well in the sphere of government which touches every person in the Islands, than it would have been to govern them through American administrators comparable to the members of the Indian Civil Service, or the Dutch officials who are always associated with native magistrates in the Netherlands East Indies. Such a policy, however, would not have served the primary purpose of America in the Philippines: to educate the Filipinos for democratic self-government.

During the period from 1899 to 1913 the foundations of the new Philippines were laid. The old Spanish legal codes were largely rewritten and modernized, a modern government was organized and successfully operated, a great system of popular education was created, a census was taken, a modern currency system was established, a program of public works including the construction of roads, bridges, port improvements, irrigation works, artesian wells, school houses, markets and other public buildings was laid down and carried out, an admirable public health service was inaugurated, the wild pagan tribes and the intractable Moros were brought under sympathetic control, the Catholic church was eliminated from the government and its great landed possessions bought by the state, and sound foundations for the development of democratic self-government were laid. In these and many other useful

undertakings the Filipinos co-operated with their American rulers, once their rebellion against American authority had been crushed. Throughout the period, however, final responsibility for the conception and execution of policy rested with the American members of the Philippine government and, broadly speaking, they possessed power commensurate with their responsibilities.

Between 1907 and 1913 both the political and the administrative problems of the Islands were greatly complicated by the existence and growing powers of the Philippine Assembly, the popularly elected chamber of the insular legislature. This purely Filipino body gradually drifted into a position of permanent disagreement with the American-controlled Commission (the upper chamber and executive). The story is told, in part, by the record of the conflicts between the two chambers over legislation. In 1913 the Commission rejected sixty-six per cent of the 131 bills sent to it by the Assembly while the latter body refused to pass seventy-one per cent of the sixty-one measures which originated in the upper house.

The Assembly finally resorted to tactics which these Malays had learned from many an Anglo-Saxon precedent. It refused to pass the annual appropriation bill. The fact that the Organic Act authorized the Governor-General to proceed as though the entire amount appropriated in the last appropriation act had been appropriated for the ensuing year softened the effects of this legislative-executive deadlock, yet the deadlock existed, to the embarrassment of the government and the injury of the public. The first great period of American rule in the Philippines, therefore, ended with the Filipino assembly in apparently hopeless deadlock with the Ameri-

can-controlled branches of the government.

#### FATEFUL DEMOCRATIC RÉGIME

The news of the advent of a Democratic administration in Washington was received in the Philippines with rejoicing. Nor were the expectations of the Filipinos to be entirely unfulfilled. President Wilson was completely in accord with the views of his party on the Philippine question, and since 1900 speedy Philippine independence had been advocated in every Democratic platform. The President's first important act in connection with the Philippines was the appointment of Representative Francis Burton Harrison of New York as Governor-General. His second was the announcement that the Filipinos would at once be given a majority in the Philippine Commission and thus put in control of both houses of the Philippine Legislature. Mr. Harrison was virtually selected for the governor-generalship by Mr. Manuel E. Quezon, a Filipino, who at that time represented his people in the lower house of the American Congress.<sup>4</sup>

The new Governor-General was known to believe that the Philippines should be granted independence as soon as Congress could pass the necessary legislation, and that meanwhile the people of the Islands should be accorded the maximum amount of autonomy possible under the existing law. Personal characteristics which affected his relations with the Filipinos and with Americans in the Philippines were a brilliant intellect, great personal charm, and an entire absence of race

<sup>4</sup> The Philippines are represented in the American House of Representatives by two resident commissioners chosen by the Philippine legislature and possessing practically the status of other members except that they cannot vote.



prejudice. Upon his assumption of office was inaugurated the "New Era" in the Philippines, a period soon spoken of with enthusiasm by Filipinos and with bitterness and derision by a large majority of the American residents of the Islands.

During the first three years of the Harrison administration the government of the Philippines was carried on under the Organic Act which had been in effect since 1902. But never in history has there been a more striking example of the fact that in character and quality government is of men and not merely of law. The deadlock between the Filipinos and the Americans was at once broken, partially by the appointment of a majority of Filipinos to the upper house of the legislature, partially because the Governor-General from the outset exercised the powers of his office in accordance with the wishes of the Filipino leaders in matters which concerned the domestic affairs of the Islands.

The process of Filipinization was immediately extended to practically every branch of the insular, provincial and municipal governments. Within nine months 275 Americans had been replaced by Filipinos and, to quote the late Secretary Dean C. Worcester, a large percentage of them "were old-time bureau chiefs, division chiefs, or occupants of other positions of great responsibility, were, in short the men who determined policies and spent the government's money." By 1921 Governor-General Harrison could state with pride that,

with the exception of the bureaus of Education, the Mint, Prisons, Forestry, Science, Weather, the Quarantine service, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the Metropolitan Water District, the other thirty bureaus and offices of the government had Filipinos either regularly appointed as chiefs or acting as such, and in virtually all cases Fili-

pinos were assistant chiefs, in training for future greater responsibilities.

During this same period the number of Americans in the entire government had been reduced to less than four per cent of the total of officials and employes. Most of the remaining Americans were either technical experts or school teachers. In fact, only eight citizens of the United States occupied positions of real political power in the Philippines when the Democrats had done their work. These were the Governor-General, the Vice-Governor, the Insular Auditor and the five American members of the Supreme Court.

But the granting of almost complete autonomy satisfied neither the Filipinos nor their "friends" in the United States. Independence was the goal, the Democratic party was pledged to grant the boon immediately and the leader of that party, the President of the United States, sought to compel his government to redeem its pledge. The party, however, weakened, as parties often will when faced with the responsibility of making actual decisions. The "Philippine Autonomy Act, 1916," popularly known as the Jones Bill, was the best that it felt able to do for the colony which for seventeen years it had insisted should be at once set free.

#### THE JONES ACT

As enacted the Jones Act was regarded by Congress simply as a logical step towards the goal of Philippine self-government which the United States had kept in view from the beginning of its Philippine experiment. Within it, however, lay potentialities which were quite beyond the reach of the Congressional imagination. In a perfect world, a universe in which Filipino politicians and American administrators were patient, unselfish and filled with sweet confidence in the



benevolence of all mankind, it might possibly have done what Congress expected it to do. In such a world it might have transferred a large share of power in the government of the Philippines from American to Filipino hands, retained final control and responsibility in many important matters in the office of Governor-General, and resulted in the hearty co-operation of the American chief executive and the Filipino legislature. What it actually did was to set up a government in which a Filipino legislature representing the people of the Philippines was associated with a chief executive representing the government of the United States. All history which bears upon the subject tells us that associations of this character are unpleasant and that they usually end either in hopeless deadlock or in legislative control of the government concerned, including the executive branch thereof. The unique feature of the situation which developed in the Philippines was that from the outset the responsible American officials deliberately interpreted and applied the law in such a way that unpleasantness was avoided and legislative control at once achieved. To understand how these ends were attained it will be necessary to sketch briefly the chief provisions of the act itself.

The most important change affected by the Jones Act in the legislative department of the government was the abolition of the appointive upper chamber, the Philippine Commission, and the substitution in its stead of an elective senate of twenty-four members. This meant that every member of the legislature was to be a Filipino and, with the possible exception of two senators and nine representatives appointed by the Governor-General to represent the non-Christian tribes, was to be responsible to the Filipino

people. To this legislature was given a general grant of legislative power, with certain reservations intended to protect the fundamental rights of individuals and the natural resources of the country.

In the executive department sweeping changes were made. The governor-generalship was retained and in the holder of the office was vested the "supreme executive authority" of the government. To this official, appointed by the President of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate, was given "general supervision and control of all of the departments and bureaus of the government." The Philippine legislature was authorized to organize the executive departments as it saw fit, but the law required it to provide for "the appointment and removal of the heads of the executive departments by the Governor-General," and also that "all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor-General or within one of the departments under the supervision and control of the Governor-General." The power of appointment was to be exercised with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. The qualified veto power (with an appeal to the President of the United States), the power of pardon, in fact the usual powers of the American chief executive were vested in the chief representative of American sovereignty in the Philippines. The reorganization act, passed in the Philippines, provided for six executive departments. Except for the Secretary of Public Instruction (who is also the Vice-Governor and is appointed by the President of the United States) their heads were to be appointed by the Governor-General, by and with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. The act sought to make these secretaries re-

sponsible to the Philippine Legislature, rather than to the chief executive.

Thus, in its general form (the Jones Act left the judiciary untouched), the government of the Philippines was organized very much as is the government of the United States, or of one of the states of the Union, or as were the governments of the older type of American territory. The executive and the legislative functions were separated in accordance with the theory of checks and balances, which Woodrow Wilson had long since shown to have distinct limitations in practice, even in America. Only the Congressional mind could have expected such a system to be operated according to theory in a colony inhabited by an alien people among whom a tremendous nationalistic sentiment had been developed. The Secretary of War, Mr. Newton D. Baker, in a personal letter written to Governor-General Harrison at the time the law was forwarded to that official, cautioned him to construe the act strictly and to allow no further Filipino encroachment upon the powers still retained in American hands. Mr. Harrison, however, pursued the opposite course. No attempt was made during his administration to carry out those provisions of the law which placed power and responsibility in the hands of the Governor-General, and whenever and wherever possible the government was placed under Filipino control.

The reduction of the supreme representative of the United States in the Philippines to the position of a figure-head, or to the status of the titular chief of the government of a British dominion, proceeded along two main lines. With the approval of Mr. Harrison more than eighty acts were passed which curtailed or made impossible of exercise powers granted to the Governor-General by the Jones Act. Most of

these ravished powers were vested by the Philippine Legislature either in the Council of State, a cabinet created in 1918 by executive order, or in the "committee of three," a super-cabinet composed of the Governor-General and the heads of the two chambers of the legislature, or in the departmental heads, or in the legislature itself.

In addition to co-operating in the accomplishment of this program by signing the bills which stripped him of many powers, Governor-General Harrison further secured "harmony" between his department and the Filipino legislature by usually exercising the authority which remained to him in accordance with the accepted principles of responsible, or parliamentary government. It was for the purpose of providing a recognized organ for the operation of this system of government that the Council of State was created.

It has been stated that from the beginning of his administration Mr. Harrison usually acted upon the advice of the Filipino leaders, as, indeed, his predecessors in office had done when possible. Prior to the creation of the Philippine Senate this advice was ordinarily tendered by the Filipino heads of the executive departments, who composed an informal cabinet, and by the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly. The latter official, was, however, the undisputed leader of the Filipino element in the government and of the people at large. From the creation of the Assembly in 1907 its presiding officer had been accepted as the personification of the Filipino people in their dealings with their American rulers. During all of this time one man, Sergio Osmeña, had been speaker; and Mr. Osmeña was also the president and practically the dictator of the political party which from 1907 on had enjoyed a complete monopoly of power. During the first years of Mr. Harrison's

administration acting upon the advice of the Filipino leaders meant acting upon the advice of Sergio Osmeña.

With the reorganization of the government under the Jones Law, however, the situation changed. The newly created Senate was jealous of the power exercised by the Speaker of the House. It felt itself to be entitled to at least an equal share of influence in the government, especially in the matter of appointments. And the first President of the Senate was Manuel E. Quezon, the ambitious young *estadista* who had brought home the autonomy act and who was an inevitable rival of Mr. Osmeña for first place among the Filipino leaders. Further, it was genuinely felt by many Filipinos that the existing system in which Mr. Osmeña, without holding any executive office, actually exercised the dominant power in the government chiefly because he was the leader of the *Nacionalista* party was wrong in theory and dangerous in practice.

Upon the suggestion of Mr. Osmeña himself the problem of Filipino leadership was solved, for the time being, by the creation of the Council of State. The Council is composed of the Governor-General, the heads of the six executive departments, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Originally created, in October, 1918, by executive order, "to advise the Governor-General on public matters," it subsequently received many additional powers through legislation enacted by the Philippine legislature. It brought to the council board officially and openly the two men who actually controlled the government, Messrs. Osmeña and Quezon. It provided for the expression of the will of the Filipino people regarding their government through officials who, in their capacity of councilors, were responsible to the legislature. In short,

the Council of State played the rôle of the European cabinet, or of the cabinet in a self-governing dominion of the British Empire; but the premiership was actually divided between Mr. Osmeña and Mr. Quezon.

#### WOOD-FORBES MISSION

Enough has been written to indicate the policy which the United States carried out in the Philippines between 1913 and 1921 and the system of government which was developed during those years. Concerning the results of that policy opinions differ widely. The views of the present government of the United States are substantially those expressed in the report of the Special Mission to the Philippines which thoroughly investigated conditions in the Islands soon after the advent of the Harding administration. This mission was composed of Major-General Leonard Wood and the Hon. W. Cameron Forbes, a former Governor-General of the Philippines. It reported, among other things, that under the Osmeña-Quezon-Harrison régime the government had become relatively inefficient and unnecessarily expensive; that the Courts, with the exception of the Supreme Court, were in deplorable condition, and that the people had lost confidence in the administration of justice; that "inefficiency and dishonesty" in the management of the national fiscal system, including the Philippine National Bank, had resulted in the outright loss of many millions of dollars of public funds, the practical bankruptcy of the bank, the depreciation of the currency and the serious impairment of the credit of the Philippines.

The Filipino rebuttal to these charges is ably presented in a statement issued by the "Philippine Parliamentary Mission" which came to Washington in 1922. In addition to denying the

truth of the findings of the Wood-Forbes report or seeking to evade responsibility for evils which are admitted to have developed while Filipinos were in control, this statement calls attention to many constructive achievements of their régime. Among these are the establishment of a modern budget system, a tremendous expansion of the system of popular education, an extension of the public roads of the Islands, the maintenance of a condition of law and order, the successful conduct of national and local elections, and a great improvement in the economic condition of the country.

It is the opinion of the writer, formed after extensive investigation and study in the Philippines, that the findings of the Wood-Forbes report are justified by facts and that the report presents a remarkably accurate picture of the situation in the Islands in 1921. On the other hand, much of the substantial progress described in the Filipino statement was actually made, and, indeed, is recognized by General Wood and Mr. Forbes.

Just as there are differences of opinion regarding the quality of the government during the administration of Mr. Harrison, so do experts differ as to the effect of the rapid transfer of power from Americans to Filipinos upon the political education of the Filipino people. Mr. Harrison has stated that although "the extension of self-government and spread of democracy may in themselves have impaired somewhat the efficiency of administration," yet "that disadvantage has been more than offset by the gain in contentment of the people, the growth of respect and friendship for the United States, and the valuable lessons in self-government secured by the Filipinos." Other Americans feel that most of the lessons learned by the Filipinos during the Harrison régime were bad and will have

to be unlearned before progress can be resumed. The writer is strongly of the opinion that tremendous strides in the art of self-government were made during the period both by the masses of the people and by their leaders, and that much of this political education could not have been gained had not the Filipinos been entrusted with almost complete control of their own affairs. The price that was paid was high and a necessary part of it has been a temporary loss of some of the political power enjoyed by the Filipinos between 1913 and 1921. The ultimate decision as to whether it was too high may well be left to the future historian.

#### RISE AND GROWTH OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Thus far this paper has dealt almost exclusively with governmental, or administrative, developments in the Philippines between 1899 and 1921. Preliminary to a discussion of more recent events in the Islands it now becomes necessary to sketch briefly the growth of Filipino political parties and the movement for Philippine independence. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 not one of the many Filipino rebellions against Spanish authority had for its purpose independence from "Mother Spain." Before it was quelled, however, the uprising of 1896 had developed into a definite movement in that direction. When the Americans destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, the principal revolutionary leaders were in foreign lands. Between May 1 and the ratification of the Treaty of Paris early the following January, many of these exiles returned to the Philippines, some of them with the assistance of the American naval authorities. During this period a Filipino government was established, the independence of the Islands solemnly proclaimed, a congress



organized, provision made for despatching envoys to several foreign states, and a constitution adopted for the "Philippine Republic." The government thus set up was strong enough to destroy or capture most of the Spanish garrison outside of Manila, but despite an elaborate paper organization of provincial and local units its authority was regularly exercised in a constitutional manner only in occasional provinces in Luzon and in a relatively small area immediately adjacent to Manila.

At that time no decision had been reached by the United States as to the eventual disposition of the Philippines, and the military and political activities of the Filipinos were carried on with the expressed or tacit approval of the American commanders at Manila. With the signature of the Treaty of Paris, however, it became apparent to the Filipinos that the United States intended to substitute its sovereignty over the Islands for that of Spain, and when the Treaty was ratified by the Senate, January 4, 1899, a fierce revolt against American authority had already broken out. Before the insurrection was finally quelled several hundred thousand Filipinos had been killed or had died of disease, hardships or starvation which could be traced to the war.

The degree of unanimity with which the Filipino people participated in this rebellion and supported the Republic of Aguinaldo has always been a disputed question. The actual revolt was confined chiefly to Luzon and several adjacent islands. Undoubtedly many of the rich *mestizo* families of Manila and elsewhere were indifferent or hostile to the revolutionary cause. On the other hand, the evidence strongly supports the Filipino contention that this element was smaller than it usually is in countries fighting for

freedom against superior force. The struggle was, in fact, a war for independence. In retrospect it has been made to appear to Filipinos as a genuinely national struggle for that end. Certainly its most important permanent result was to intensify and fix the spirit of nationalism of which it was the expression. Its memories have been kept vivid by skillful advocates of Philippine independence, who do not forget the Jeffersonian dictum that, "The tree of liberty is watered by the blood of martyrs."

Once the rebellion had been suppressed practically all of the Filipinos, from Aguinaldo down, accepted American sovereignty and proceeded to co-operate in the upbuilding of their country. A large majority of the politically minded among them still cherished the ideal of independence and were resolved to secure it through constitutional means. A minority, headed by many of the most distinguished leaders of the older generation, before long abandoned the cause of independence in favor of that of ultimate statehood in the American Union. With the encouragement and assistance of the American Government in the Islands this group formed the *Federalista* party. Two *Federalista* leaders were given seats on the Philippine Commission as early as 1901 and the advice of the party leaders was sought and often followed in many matters, including the appointment of Filipinos to office. The organization of the party extended into many of the provinces and it is said to have had some 150,000 active members.

During these years legislation which made it a criminal offense to advocate Philippine independence prevented the creation of an organized party by the nationalistic majority. Prior to the elections for the first Philippine Assembly in 1907, however, these laws were



repealed, and at the polls in that year the *Federalistas*, although they had abandoned the idea of permanent retention by the United States, were overwhelmingly defeated by the immediate independence party, the *Nacionalistas*. Later the *Federalistas* were succeeded by a group called the *Progresistas*, who, in turn became the *Democratas*. From 1907 on, however, the *Nacionalistas* enjoyed an almost complete monopoly of power in the national, provincial and municipal governments. They won this position of dominance chiefly because they were the most advanced and determined advocates of immediate independence. They retained it partially for this reason, partially because their members occupied and ruthlessly used for political purposes practically all of the offices of government which were in the hands of the Filipinos, and partially because their leaders were the most virile and able Filipinos of their time.

Both of the Filipino parties possessed an organization of municipal and provincial colleges, or committees, with each of which were associated executive officials. Prior to 1922, however, the organization of both parties was incomplete and rested in the hands of a very small number of men, who, in the case of the *Nacionalistas*, were almost invariably office holders. The dominant party did not have to build up a strong organization embracing the rank and file of the voters because, independence being the sole issue of importance, it never had to face a real contest with the party which was branded as being lukewarm in this matter. The minority group lacked the prestige and the spoils of public office, and contained a relatively small number of wealthy members. Thus it was unable to create an efficient or a popular or-

ganization. It has already been stated that until 1917 Speaker Sergio Osmeña was practically the dictator of the *Nacionalista* party, but that toward the end of the Harrison régime Mr. Quezon, President of the Senate, became a leader of almost equal power.

The actualities of the governmental and political situation which existed at the end of the Harrison administration can best be stated in the words of Mr. Quezon. This gentleman broke with Speaker Osmeña during 1921, and in the course of the political struggle which followed wrote an open letter to his rival in which he said, in part:

Since the government of the Philippines was established by the provisions of the Jones Law . . . it may be said that practically all measures which received your approval were transferred into laws, and no law could be approved without your consent. The department secretaries, individually and collectively guided their course of action under your inspiration, and nothing against your opinion was ever performed by them. Recommendations on appointments made by the secretaries to the Governor-General were made upon your initiative, or at least with your consent. Your veto in these cases was final and definite. . . .

Such practises put the executive and legislative powers of the government of the Philippines in the hands of one, or at the utmost, in the hands of two men. I say two because all of this was allowed to go on with my knowledge and consent, or at least with my tolerance. Thus there was erected without provision that would authorize it, and merely with our consent, not as legislators, but as members of the same party, a truly supreme authority over the Cabinet and the Legislature. . . .

Except that it grossly understates the power of Mr. Quezon this declaration is substantially accurate in its description of the real seat of control in the government of the Philippines between 1917 and 1921. The system of

responsible government set up with the Council of State as its pivotal part was democratic in form and in theory because the center of power was supposed to lie in the elective legislature. It was undemocratic in operation because Messrs. Osmeña and Quezon absolutely controlled this body. They controlled it because a normal political party system, the only means by which a great people can control its government, had not developed in the Philippines.

The outstanding reason for the failure of Philippine parties to function normally is the subordination by the Filipino people of all other issues to the cause of independence. Men, measures and parties have been judged almost solely in relation to this question. Until 1922 the *Nacionalista* party held almost every seat in the legislature and its two leaders, sitting in the Council of State, were joint dictators of the government because the people were reluctant to divide those governmental powers which had been granted to them by their foreign sovereign. The *Nacionalista* chiefs were genuine national leaders and opposition to them was made to seem disloyalty to the cause of independence and treason to the Filipino nation.

This abnormal situation was made relatively easy to maintain, moreover, by several other conditions. One of these factors was the absence of any general, or widespread conception of popular government, a heritage alike from three centuries of Spanish rule and from Malay antecedents. Many local *caciques* found it as easy to exploit the people about them politically as it always had been to dominate them economically and socially. The idea that it is the duty of a citizen in a free state to stand up and fight for his rights is quite foreign to the Filipino, as, indeed, it is to every Oriental mind.

Furthermore, an informed and alert public opinion does not exist in the Philippines. The circulation of daily newspapers in the Islands is only about 140,000, while that of weekly and other publications is not more than 250,000. Practically all of the daily papers and a large proportion of the weeklies are read in Manila and the larger provincial towns, and in these centers the press has great influence. But the masses of the people are unreached and unrepresented by the chief instrumentalities through which public opinion must be created and expressed. Most Filipino voters derive their political information by the ancient word-of-mouth method. They have scant means of checking the honesty or the accuracy of what they are told by the local politicians, and their lack of knowledge and experience makes it easy to appeal with success to their cupidity, prejudices or patriotism.

On the other hand, the masses of the Filipino people undoubtedly possess one of the first requisites for citizenship, a keen interest in political affairs. In the election of 1919, ninety-two per cent of the 717,295 registered voters actually cast their ballots, while in 1922 the percentage was almost equally high. In the election of the latter year the independence issue was cast into the background because all parties espoused the cause with equal ardour, by divisions within the *Nacionalista* ranks, and by the revelations of the Wood-Forbes report. The result was an independence of voting which astonished the old-time politicians and offered the best assurance which has yet been given that the Filipino people will be able to develop a genuinely popular government. The same phenomena were observed in the election of June, 1925, and the majority party in the Philippines is now faced by a well organized and powerful opposition.

One important factor in the growth of the independence movement which has thus far dominated Philippine politics is the countenance and support that it has received from the United States. Every American school teacher automatically became an apostle of the cause when he taught the fundamental principles of American government and the stories of American history. As a prominent member of the younger generation which is now coming into power said to the writer: "When I stood up in school and recited, 'Give me liberty or give me death!', I was not thinking of Patrick Henry and the English. I was thinking of the Filipinos and America." Nor have the highest officials of the United States Government ever seriously sought to lead the Filipino people to adopt any other national ideal than that of independence. Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, chairman of the First Philippine Commission, construed American policy to mean; "Ever-increasing liberty and self-government . . . and it is the nature of such continually expanding liberty to issue in independence." In 1903 Governor Taft declared: "Whether an autonomy or independence shall ultimately follow in these Islands ought to depend solely upon the question: Is it best for the Filipino people and their welfare?" When, as Secretary of War, Mr. Taft opened the Philippine Assembly in 1907, he stated: "The policy looks to the improvement of the people industrially and in self-governing capacity. As this policy of extending control continues, it must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands, unless it shall seem wise to the American and the Filipino peoples . . . that the bond shall not be completely severed." In 1908 President Roosevelt said in his message to Con-

gress: "I trust that within a generation the time will arrive when the Filipinos can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent or to continue under the protection of a strong and disinterested power, able to guarantee the Islands order at home and protection against foreign invasion." President Wilson informed the people of the Philippines in 1913 that: "Every step we take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the Islands and as a preparation for that independence."

Congress, however, exercises final control over American dependencies and in 1916, in the Preamble to the Jones Act, Congress made this declaration of the purpose of the United States as to the future status of the Philippines:

*Whereas* it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of the war with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and

*Whereas* it is, as it always has been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and

*Whereas*, for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose, it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without in the meantime impairing the exercise of the rights of sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all of the privileges of complete independence; Therefore . . .

Republicans in the Congress which passed the Jones Act strongly opposed this declaration. They declared that a preamble had no proper place in a law, and that if Congress wished to

express its intentions as to the future of the Philippines it should do so in a resolution. They pointed out that this preamble simply expressed past Democratic party policy and that it could not bind future Congresses. They predicted that endless trouble would arise from its ambiguous phrases. The Filipinos hailed the statements in these introductory sentences as the promise of their immediate autonomy and their speedy independence. When they established a system of responsible government in 1918 they justified the violation of the letter of the Jones Act by appealing to its "spirit," as expressed in the preamble. In 1922, when demanding the immediate fulfillment of this promise their representatives declared: "The Jones Law has become a virtual constitutional compact between the American and Filipino peoples, by means of which the Filipinos have accepted a temporary government under American sovereignty" . . .

It is obvious that from the legal standpoint the Jones Law was nothing of this sort; that the preamble was not a "promise" to the Filipino people, but simply a declaration of purpose made by a legislative body which had no power to bind its successors in this, or any other matter. But the Filipinos say, "This is quibbling. This is hair-splitting unworthy of a great nation. Whatever may be the law in the matter, that declaration is an actual promise which we accepted in good faith. We have fulfilled the only condition set up as prerequisite to independence, the establishment of a stable government. President Wilson declared as much in his farewell message to Congress. We demand that you keep your word even though there may have been technical errors in the execution of the bond."

Looking back over the entire period of the American occupation, it is evi-

dent that the United States has given ample basis for hopes and expectations of Philippine independence; and that from 1913 to 1920 the Filipino people had reason to believe that their demands for separation from the United States would be met within a comparatively short time.

#### PRESENT RÉGIME

When cast against the background which has been sketched, the main outlines of political events in the Philippines since 1921 stand out with some distinctness. The immediate problems which faced the Wood administration when it assumed office were those involved in remedying the unfortunate conditions which had been pointed out in the Wood-Forbes Report. Within two years most of these problems had been solved, so far as their solution was possible under existing conditions. In most matters the Filipino leaders co-operated heartily with the Governor-General. They were as anxious as he was that the government should be rendered more efficient and economical, that the national finances should be put on a sound basis, and that the administration of justice should be improved. They desired good government for itself and they realized that their chances for either increased autonomy or independence were slight until conditions had been greatly improved.

The great administrative ability, incessant industry and tremendous driving power of General Wood thus had a fairly free field of action, and the results of his leadership and of the Filipino response were remarkable. In October, 1922, he stated to the Legislature:

I have found a spirit of cheerful co-operation with the policy of the government and comparatively few serious derelictions in the discharge of public duty and few



issues of public funds through fraud or dishonesty—in short, a steady improvement in the conduct of Government as compared with the conditions found by the Special Mission, a condition and a record of achievement you may well be proud of.

By July, 1923, the work of rehabilitation had gone so far that the administration of the government and the general condition of its affairs would have been considered at least fairly satisfactory even if judged by the standards of Western states. The fame as an administrator which General Wood had gained in Cuba was justified by his accomplishments in the Philippines.

During this constructive period of the Wood administration the relations between the Governor-General and the Filipino leaders were cordial. In March, 1923, Senator Osmeña said to the writer:

When General Wood took office it was feared that he was prejudiced against the Filipinos and that he would be arbitrary and high-handed as Governor-General. He has, however, shown the desire and the ability to co-operate with the Filipinos. Consequently we are co-operating with him. He is a tremendous worker and we know that he has the interests of the Filipino people at heart. We are satisfied with General Wood.

Speaker Manuel Roxas, of the House of Representatives, used almost the same words in describing the relations which had existed between General Wood and the Filipino officials. After speaking of the apprehension with which the news of General Wood's appointment had been received, he concluded by saying:

Both sides have given ground very frequently and now there is the best understanding and heartiest co-operation between the Governor-General and ourselves. We could not have a better chief executive at this time than General Wood.

#### OPPOSITION TO WOOD AND ENSUING CONFLICTS

Yet within three months of the time that these utterances, and many more of similar tenor were made, the Philippine legislature was petitioning Congress for the recall of the Governor-General and these very politicians were describing him as a military autocrat who was attempting to govern the Filipino people tyrannically and in defiance of the law of the land. That such statements were absolutely false every Filipino and American who possesses first-hand knowledge of the manner in which the government of the Philippines has been conducted is fully aware. General Wood has declared that he never appointed an official in any department without the approval of the department head. He has entered no department for the purpose of making an inspection or of intervening in its affairs. The Secretary of Justice stated at the time of the resignation of the Council of State that no recommendation of his had ever been disapproved. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said the same thing. This does not mean that the Governor-General blindly approved all departmental recommendations, but it does mean that where there was doubt in his mind he conferred with departmental heads and succeeded in getting the matter put into proper shape, or received a satisfactory explanation which enabled him to carry out the recommendation.

In certain larger matters of general policy the Governor-General and the Filipino leaders were in genuine opposition from the outset. Nothing more clearly reveals the present position of the United States in the Islands, however, than the fact that in practically every matter in which the Filipinos were opposed to the American



chief executive, the latter failed to accomplish his announced purpose. Outstanding among these defeats is the failure of the Governor-General to "get the government out of business." This he has been quite unable to do for the simple reason that the Philippine legislature has refused to pass the necessary legislation. In this as in other matters, however, General Wood showed no disposition to tyrannize in administrative affairs largely within his control, while in larger matters of policy the power of making final decisions has rested not with him but with the Filipino element in the government of the Philippines. Unlike the Viceroy of India the Governor-General of the Philippines has no power of "certification."

But if no cause for a deadlock between the American Governor-General and the Filipino statesmen was to be found in connection with the actual administration of the government, there was another matter in which an irrepressible conflict inevitably arose between them. This conflict was over the system of responsible government which had been built up between 1916 and 1921 upon the foundation of the Jones Act. Although the existing machinery of government, including the Council of State (which rests upon executive order only) was continued, General Wood refused to consider himself bound by the "conventions" which had transferred to other agencies many of the powers of his office. Whatever may have been the "spirit" of the preamble of the Act of 1916, and however it may have been applied by Mr. Harrison and the Filipinos, the language of the Act and the intent of the Congress which passed it are plain. The Act provided for the establishment of a government essentially similar to that which had been given to American territories for more than one hundred

years. Nothing in the law and nothing in the congressional debates which preceded its passage give the slightest warrant for the reduction of the Governor-General to a position of practical impotence and the establishment of a system of responsible government. The Osmeña-Quezon-Harrison system was extra-legal, if not illegal, and was a perversion of the expressed will of Congress, whatever may have been its political merits or demerits. General Wood has tersely stated his position with reference to the interpretation and application of the Jones Act, as follows: "I have literally interpreted the Jones Act as the constitution of the Islands, which cannot be loosely interpreted. I have carried out the law and intent of Congress."

Although General Wood is right both as to law and to fact, it was inevitable that his course should precipitate the conflict between the Filipino and the American elements in the Philippine Government which the earlier interpretation of the Act had avoided. The struggle was postponed for almost two years because the Filipino leaders realized that they were in no position to wage the battle until their government had been thoroughly "cleaned up" and their financial affairs put on a sound basis. It was precipitated in July, 1923, not only because a large proportion of the reconstructive work had been accomplished by that time, but also because the two leaders of the dominant party and the party itself were then being threatened with defeat at the polls by the resurgent *Democratas*. The one sure way to preserve their political lives was to break with the American Governor-General, "wave the bloody shirt," and appeal to the people upon nationalistic and patriotic grounds against the opposition party which was known to be more friendly to him.

In the Philippines the popular leaders were perfectly frank about what they were attempting to do. President Quezon told his people: "I will not be betraying any secret here if I say that our object is to reduce the Governor-General of the Philippines to a figure-head." From the same platform Speaker Roxas declared:

Filipino members of the Cabinet and our other representatives in the Government have encroached upon the powers and prerogatives of the Governor-General. We have encroached upon the rights of the Governor-General because in that guise liberties are won.

In July, 1923, the Filipino members of the Cabinet and the Council of State dramatically resigned in a body. The immediate cause of their action they stated to be the "illegal" reinstatement of a member of the secret service of the city of Manila who had been legally suspended from office. This incident, however, they declared to be the culmination of the general policy of the Governor-General, "to intervene in and control even to the smallest details, the affairs of our government, both insular and local, in utter disregard of the authority and responsibility of the department heads and other officials concerned."

General Wood regretfully but promptly accepted the proffered resignations. In reporting his action to the Secretary of War he declared:

This concerted action was the result of prearrangement and was evidently made for the purpose of securing a restriction of the exercise by the Governor-General of his powers of supervision and control under the Organic Act and to force by irregular means a further curtailment of American authority in the Philippine Islands. There is no occasion whatever for this action. Cooperation by the chiefs of departments and the council of state has been most satisfactory, both personally and officially, all of

which convinces me that ulterior and political motives are behind the move. Senator Quezon has been the leader in this movement and for some time has been announcing his intention of taking issue with the Governor-General."

The Philippine legislature immediately supported the resigning members of the Council of State by passing resolutions addressed to Congress and the President demanding the removal of General Wood from office. The issue was thus transferred from Manila to Washington.

#### U. S. APPROVAL AND BACKING

There the government stood squarely behind the Governor-General, despite the fact that in 1921 the late President Harding assured the Filipinos that, "No backward step in diminution of your domestic control is to be sought." The Secretary of War, after conference with the President, addressed a letter to General Wood in which it was stated that the parliamentary government which the Filipinos assert was established is contrary to the Organic Act; that legislation which encroaches upon the authority of the Governor-General in violation of the provisions of the act is null and void and in no way binding upon that official; that the silence of Congress has not given its consent to acts of the legislature modifying or amending the Organic Act; that the veto power of the Governor-General is applicable to all legislation, whether it be local or otherwise; that the powers of the Governor-General had not been exceeded or misused by General Wood in any instance of which the War Department was advised. The Secretary also declared that the controversy between the American chief-executive and the Filipino leaders was regarded as, "at bottom, a legal one."

From the viewpoint of the Filipinos, however, their controversy with the

American Government is fundamentally a political one. To them the promise of President Harding that there should be no retrogression from the autonomy which they had attained under the Harrison régime is far more significant than the fact that from the legal viewpoint they obtained this liberty by stretching the Jones Act until it cracked. During the winter of 1923 they sent a special mission to Washington to urge upon Congress and the President the removal of General Wood and the granting of immediate independence. Hearings were held before Congressional committees, but Congress took no action in the case. The President, however, in reply to the bill of complaints filed against the Governor-General, again expressed his unqualified support of the Wood administration. President Coolidge declared:

It has been charged that the present Governor-General has in some matters exceeded his proper authority, but an examination of the facts seems rather to support the charge that the legislative branch of the insular government has been the real offender through seeking to extend its own authority into some areas of what should properly be the executive realm.

The Government of the United States has full confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness and sincerity of the present Governor-General. It is convinced that he has intended to act and has acted within the scope of his proper constitutional authority. Thus convinced, it is determined to sustain him and its purpose will be to encourage the broadest and most intelligent co-operation of the Filipino people in this policy.

Looking at the situation fairly and impartially, one cannot but feel that if the Filipino people cannot co-operate in the support and encouragement of as good an administration as has been afforded under General Wood, their failure will be rather a testimony of unpreparedness for

the full obligations of citizenship than as evidence of patriotic eagerness to advance their country.

I am convinced that Governor-General Wood has at no time been other than a hard-working, painstaking and conscientious administrator. I have found no evidence that he had exceeded his proper authority or that he has acted with any other than the purpose of serving the real interest of the Filipino people. Thus believing, I feel that I am serving those same interests by saying frankly that it is not possible to consider the extension of a larger measure of autonomy to the Filipino people until they shall have demonstrated a readiness and capacity to co-operate fully and effectively with the American Government and authorities. For such co-operation I earnestly appeal to every friend of the Islands and their people.

With reference to independence the President declared:

If the time comes when it is apparent that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines, from the point of view both of their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and if when that time comes the Filipino people desire complete independence, it is not possible to doubt that the American Government and people will gladly accord it.

Frankly, it is not felt that that time has come.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> President Coolidge to Special Commissioner Manuel Roxas, Feb. 21, 1924. This and other documents concerning the differences between the Governor-General and certain Filipinos are printed in the *Annual Report of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, 1923*.

## RESULTS TO DATE

Dire predictions were made in certain quarters as to the effect which this presidential statement would have upon Filipino-American relations. The event proved that they were quite unjustified. On the contrary, it was generally recognized in the Islands that Senator Quezon and one or two fol-

lowers had set out to "get" the Governor-General and that they had failed, and failed rather ignominiously. The undersecretaries of the executive departments, "the real technical men of the government," as acting secretaries, automatically took the places of the secretaries who had resigned. Government proceeded harmoniously and efficiently. There was no genuine popular outburst of resentment. A little later Mr. Felipe Agoncillo, a Filipino with a distinguished record extending back into Spanish days, accepted the position of Secretary of the Interior, the department most closely concerned with government as it actually touches the masses of the people. The Council of State continued to function smoothly despite the absence of the two legislative members. The legislature itself continued to co-operate with the Governor-General by passing an unusually large number of much needed measures during its next session. Certain highly contentious appointments by the Governor-General were confirmed by the Philippine Senate. The only advantage which the revolvers gained was a narrow victory in the Senatorial by-election, which they probably would have lost had they not created the issue raised by their break with General Wood.

The lack of genuine popular feeling behind the attack on the American chief-executive and his legal prerogatives was finally demonstrated by the elections of June, 1925. The voting left the *Democrata* party, which during the crisis had resolved to co-operate with the Governor-General, as a strong and growing party of opposition. True, its representation in the House of Representatives was reduced, but this is accounted for by the fact that while in 1922 the Quezon and Osmeña wings of the *Nacionalista* party were fighting each other, in 1925 they were

united against the common enemy, the *Democratas*. In the Senate the *Democratas* made distinct gains. Especially significant is the fact that in the Tagalog provinces about Manila, the Quezon stronghold, there was a distinct drift away from that leader. The capital itself, as in 1922, went overwhelmingly *Democrata*.

Constitutional and political consequences of the highest importance have resulted from the events which have been described. In the Philippines the parliamentary system of government established under the Harrison régime has been replaced by one based more nearly upon the separation of powers in accordance with the provisions of the Organic Act and the intent of Congress. The Governor-General has assumed and maintained the position assigned to him by law, although he has not regained and probably never will regain all of the powers abdicated by his predecessor in office. The cause of democratic self-government in the Islands has been tremendously helped by a clear demonstration that even by specious appeals to their patriotism and intense nationalism a few leaders are unable to stampede the masses of the people into action against their true interests; and by the strengthening of that *sine qua non* of successful representative government, a genuine party of opposition.

In the United States the statement of President Coolidge has set forth a principle of action with reference to Philippine independence which is very different from that expressed by Congress in the preamble to the Jones Act. In 1916 Congress declared it to be the intention of the United States to recognize the independence of the Philippines, "as soon as a stable government can be established therein." In 1924 the President informed the authorized



representative of the Philippines that:

It is not possible to doubt that the American government and people will gladly accord independence, *if* the time comes when it is apparent that independence would be better for the people of the Philippines, from the point of view both of their domestic concerns and their status in the world, and *if* when that time comes the Filipino people desire complete independence.\*

The Presidential declaration makes the complete severance of the ties between the United States and the Philippines dependent upon two things: the welfare and the desire of the Filipino

\*The author has supplied the italics and inverted the clause order.

people. The Congressional statement declares that it is intended that separation shall take place as soon as a stable government can be established in the Islands. President Coolidge's words simply re-state clearly and emphatically the traditional Republican position with reference to Philippine independence. They may, I believe, be fairly interpreted as serving notice that the Government of the United States, at least when in the control of the Republican party, will not be bound by the Congressional pronunciamiento of 1916. Not improbably they will constitute one of the most important statements of policy ever made with reference to the Philippine Islands.



# Development of Transportation in Japan

By J. TAKAKU, M.B.A.

General Passenger Agent, Tokyo Division, Government Railways of Japan, Tokyo, Japan

JAPAN is a country whose territory is mostly composed of islands which group themselves together along the far eastern coast of the Asiatic continent, and transportation facilities by sea would have made a greater development than they have actually done, had it not been for the following reasons:

First, the development of transportation is usually expected where there is trade either actually or at least in prospect. As Japan is situated far from Europe and America, and was closed for communications with Western countries under the Tokugawa régime, which terminated only some sixty years ago, she was left for many years in her slumber, ignorant of the rapid progress of modern industry in the West, and was seriously handicapped when she found herself competing for international trade with countries in Europe and America.

Moreover, unlike Great Britain, Japan has no overseas territories upon which she may draw for the supply of material and to which she may send her manufactures obtained from such material. Even domestic trading among districts was not very active until recently as, on account of feudalism, each district was in many cases self-supporting, with little development of manufacturing industry.

Lastly, most of the Japanese are not sea-faring. This is perhaps due to the long secluded life in home districts under the feudal system, which only passed away with the termination of the Tokugawa régime.

It is true that during the European War, taking advantage of the shortage of ships, and of the comparatively low

wages, Japan succeeded in developing her ocean transportation throughout the world; but with the restoration of normal industrial activities in Europe and America, and with the fall in trade of Japanese goods, she had to withdraw most of her ships from her world overseas transportation enterprise.

With regard to domestic transportation either by land or water, owing to the geographical conditions of the country, which is largely covered with mountains, most rivers are not navigable and there is little room for the development of canals. Facilities of communications between islands, of which the country is composed, are not yet ideal.

As to land transportation, the government has been making a special effort for its development and the whole country is now fairly well supplied with railways and highways. Motor car transportation, though still in its very infancy, is on the line of steady development in spite of the high cost of gasoline and motors.

## WATER TRANSPORTATION

As stated in the introduction, canal and river transportation is quite insignificant and not worth mentioning, although on a few rivers, small steamers and motor boats, as well as sailing boats, carry passengers and freight to some extent. Canal constructions can be chartered to private companies or individuals, but no development has been witnessed recently.

There are in Japan 780 commercial ports of which thirty-nine are open for foreign trade. For the improvement

of these ports much has been spent by the state and local governments, and the total cost will amount to more than 225 million yen<sup>1</sup> by the end of 1933, when the present scheme is to be completed. Most of these ports, however, are not deep enough for ocean liners to be moored alongside piers, and in many ports even steamers for coastwise services are approached from land by launches and lighters. By far the most important are Yokohama, Osaka and Kobe, and in 1922, the year before the earthquake, trade, both foreign and domestic, worth 2,450,000,000 yen, 2,415,000,000 yen and 1,779,000,000 yen respectively, passed through these ports. Yokohama is mainly for American trade, and Kobe is for the trade with Asiatic countries, especially with China, while Osaka has more business with Chosen and Manchuria, as well as the other districts in the country, than with distant foreign countries.

The port of Yokohama was entirely destroyed by the earthquake and her business heavily declined for some time, but with the progress of the rehabilitation work of the city and the port, it has recovered considerably. All the Pacific liners — both Japanese and foreign — outbound and homebound, call at Yokohama, and most of them at Kobe.

Moji and Shimonoseki are on the channel between the Main Island and Kyushu and hold an important position of ports of entry and exit for business with North China and Manchuria, and Nagasaki is kept in close touch with Shanghai, while Tsuruga on the Japan Sea stands as a port for trade with Vladivostok.

In 1923 there were in Japan 2003 steamers and 2708 sailing boats with respective tonnages of 3,604,000 and

399,000. In the total tonnage Japan ranks third for the whole world, but the number of Japanese sailing boats stands highest. The companies which owned ships having a tonnage of more than fifty thousand were as follows:

	No. of Ships	Gross Tonnage
Nippon Yusen Kaisha (N. Y. K.) . . . . .	85	514,391
Osaka Shosen Kaisha (O.S.K.) . . . . .	95	402,462
Kokusai Kisen Kaisha (K. K. K.) . . . . .	58	311,071
Toyo Kisan Kaisha (T. K. K.) . . . . .	18	141,148
Kawasaki Ship-building Yard . . . . .	21	125,203
Kinkai Yusen Kaisha . . . . .	40	98,423
Mitsui & Company . . . . .	20	70,729
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha . . . . .	18	68,059

The Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the Kinkai Yusen Kaisha are sister companies, the latter having been created by the former for their services on the near sea.

The regular lines for foreign ports operated by some of these companies and other steamship companies are as shown in the table on page 51.

Besides these regular line services, irregular services and tramp boats are operated by various companies in different parts of the world.

For domestic trade there are coastal services, and also transfer services between islands, some of the important of which are maintained by the Government Railways. The island of Taiwan which lies far out in the south and the Peninsula of Chosen are served by regular steamers starting from ports in Japan proper.

The government has been subsidizing some of the companies engaged in some of the above mentioned regular line services for foreign ports and also in a few domestic lines. This policy is considered to be responsible for the development of ocean transportation by Japanese steamers.

In such ports as Yokohama and Kobe, modern port facilities are ex-

<sup>1</sup> A yen is worth about fifty cents in American money.

	<i>No. of Voyages per Annum</i>	<i>Names of S.S. Companies</i>
San Francisco Line . . . . .	14	Toyo Kisen Kaisha
South American East Coast Line . . . . .	10	Osaka Shosen Kaisha
South American West Coast Line . . . . .	12	Toyo Kisen Kaisha
Seattle Line . . . . .	34 or more	Nippon Yusen Kaisha
European Line . . . . .	26 " "	" " "
Hongkong Line . . . . .	17 " "	" " "
Australian Line . . . . .	12 " "	" " "
Java Line . . . . .	18 " "	Nanyo Yusen Kaisha
Java Bankoku Line . . . . .	20 " "	Osaka Shosen Kaisha
South China Coastal Line . . . . .	36 " "	Nisshin Kisen Kaisha
Yangtze Line . . . . .	270 " "	" " "
Dairen Line . . . . .	104 " "	Osaka Shosen Kaisha
Shanghai Line . . . . .	104 " "	Nippon Yusen Kaisha
North China Line . . . . .	35 " "	Kinkai Yusen Kaisha
Tsingtao Line . . . . .	72 " "	Nippon Yusen Kaisha
		Osaka Shosen Kaisha
		Hara Kisen Kaisha
Vladivostok Line . . . . .	18 " "	Osaka Shosen Kaisha
Nicolaevsk Line . . . . .	10 " "	Kita Nihon Kisen Kaisha
Petropavlovsk Line . . . . .	70 " "	Kuribayashi Kisen Kaisha

tensively provided with roomy warehouses, cranes, harbor rail lines, and boat trains can run to and from alongside the boat anchoring in the dock; but in most of the ports, loading and unloading facilities are lacking and connecting arrangements between the steamer and the railway are quite inadequate. As Japan is surrounded by sea and is naturally endowed with fine ports in different places, a greater advantage should be taken of sea transportation for heavy and voluminous freight which does not particularly demand speed, by improving ports so that fair-sized boats may be drawn up to the pier and the transfer of freight from steamer to railway or vice versa done easily and without much loss of time.

The ship-building industry developed at a bound during the war, and though it has lost much of its former activity, there were in 1923, 316 ship-building yards throughout the country. The more important are the Mitsubishi Yard at Nagasaki and Kobe, Kawasaki Yard at Kobe, Asano Yard near Yokohama, and Uruga Dock at Kanagawa.

#### LAND TRANSPORTATION

During the Tokugawa régime, provincial lords were required to come once a year up to Edo, the then seat of the Central Government, and now renamed Tokyo, and this practice made it necessary to build highways leading to the capital from different parts of the country. These highways, though not perfect, served as important means of communications and still form the arteries of the highway net of the country. From train windows passengers will notice long lines of old pine trees or ciptmelias, between villages or on mountain sides. These are the shade trees planted by the builders of the roads for the benefit of travelers who had to walk or go in paranquines for many a day and night to reach their goal.

At present roads are divided into four classes, *i.e.*, state road, prefectural road, municipal road, and town and village road. The first two classes are built and taken care of by prefectural governments, though the expenditure for the building and improvement of

some of the more important state roads is defrayed by the state and a subsidy is allowed for the building of other state roads and in special cases for prefectural roads also. The construction and maintenance of roads of the other two classes are in charge of cities, towns or villages as the case may be. The prescribed widths of different classes of roads are as follows:

State roads more than 24 feet
Prefectural roads more than 18 feet
Municipal roads more than 18 feet
Town and village roads more than 12 feet

State roads connect Tokyo with seats of prefectural governments, places where military divisions or admiralities are located, and also with important foreign trade ports. State roads are also built for military reasons. Prefectural roads are those linking up places of importance in the prefecture as viewed from either administrative or commercial standpoints. The approximate mileages of roads were as follows in 1924:

State roads .....	5,290
Prefectural roads .....	55,800
Municipal roads .....	9,450
Town and village roads .....	475,370
Total .....	545,910

The above figures do not include the mileages of roads in Taiwan, Chosen and Kabafuto, where each local government is spending a considerable amount of money in providing the territory with highways.

*Road Conveyances.*—Conveyances used on roads are carts drawn by horses, cows and human power, rickshaw (properly Jinrikisha or human-power vehicles), bicycles, tricycles, motor-cycles and motor cars. The use of bicycles is astounding. There were 2,812,500 bicycles in use in 1923. Motor cars for either passenger or freight service are rapidly increasing in number, although the per mile cost

in Tokyo of a two-ton truck is about eighty yen, making an average work of fifty miles per day. In 1924, there were approximately 4000 private passenger cars, 15,000 business passenger cars, 3200 trucks for private use and 5000 trucks used for business purposes, the total being about 27,200.

With the rapid increase of motor car traffic, necessity is now felt for paving all the state and leading prefectural roads, which are at present mostly macademized or graveled. When the advantage of motor cars for short distance conveyance is more fully realized, extension of railways into remote districts may wisely be replaced by the building of paved highways for motor car traffic. This was once proposed by one of the transportation authorities, and many people believe in it, in consideration of the heavy cost of constructing new railways in out of the way districts where there is no prospect of getting enough business to pay the interest for the investment. The only question is the supply of gasoline and motors at a lower cost, and unless this question is satisfactorily solved, the development of motor car traffic will have a very difficult future.

Another kind of conveyance which uses roads is what is known as tramway lines, which reached 1500 miles in length in 1924. The power of these lines is mostly electric, as the supply of water power for the generation of electricity is ample throughout the country. Most of these lines are built in and about large cities and are doing fairly good business. Some of them carry freight as well as passengers.

*Railway System.*—Now we come to the railway system which forms the most important factor for communications all over the country.

The first railway was built in 1872 between Tokyo and Yokohama, more than four decades later than the first



line built in the United States. For the last fifty-three years, during which the country has been busy in developing all lines of modern industry, Japan has succeeded in getting about 10,000 miles of railways, exclusive of the lines in Taiwan, Chosen and Kabafuto. In these outlying territories there are respectively 800 miles, 1450 miles and 138 miles of railways.

Railways in Japan are mostly owned and operated by the government. In Japan proper or in her outlying territories, only local lines are left in the hands of private companies.

When the first line was built, it was by the government, and the principle that was laid down by the government at that time was the state ownership and operation plan, but this ideal could not be made to bear fruit, owing to the financial difficulty of the government, and charters were granted to several companies with a reservation of buying their lines up after a certain period of time.

Twenty years later the railway nationalization question was brought up to Parliament and after years of deliberation over the question, the Railway Nationalization Law was passed in 1906, the year following the restoration of peace with Russia after the Russo-Japanese War. By virtue of that law seventeen private railways were acquired by the government in two years, and in 1907 all the main lines of about 4400 miles were placed under the direct management of the government. Since then the mileage has steadily increased until at present there are about 7400 miles of government lines in Japan proper.

The Nationalization Law allows railways of local interest to be built and operated by private companies, and the mileage of these private railways has recently grown considerably, having already reached nearly 3000

miles, with a total investment of 540 million yen.

The Government Railways are in charge of the Minister of Railways, who is one of the cabinet members. In the Department headed by the Minister of Railways there are two distinct sections, one for the administration of private railways and the other for the operation of the Government Railways. Besides the bureaus in the Department where the general administrative work as well as the construction of new lines and heavy improvements is carried on, there are six divisions into which the system is divided for actual operation.

The accounting of the Department of Railways is independent of the general accounts for the state, but the financing by public loans can be made only through the regular channel of the Treasury Department. The Department of Railways is not allowed to raise money by public loans upon their own credit. The construction of new lines and the work of improvements are financed by general loans issued by the Treasury Department, as well as by the net profit. Had the Department of Railways been allowed a free hand for raising loans, extension and improvement of lines would have been faster, but when consideration is directed to the effect upon the market for general government loans, one might be convinced of the necessity of controlling in one department the whole scheme of raising loans for all government purposes.

A program of new lines is laid in the new Railway Construction Law for approximately 10,000 miles, of which those of local interest may be built by private companies. The Government Railways have been adding to the mileage of their lines for the last few years at the rate of about 200 miles a year.



The gauge of the Government Railways is three feet, six inches. The question of a broader gauge has often been taken up by different cabinets but never been brought to any conclusion. The unit of trade in Japan is small, and heavy and voluminous freight may be turned over for transportation by sea. Moreover, even with the present three feet, six inch gauge, heavy trains can be operated with thirty-ton freight cars and passenger cars nearly as large as coaches on English railways. It seems, therefore, wise for the country to leave the gauge as it is and enlarge their freight capacity through the improvement of ports for the use of large ships and for better connection with railways and other means of transportation on land.

Another question of the Government Railways is the electrification of their lines. Japan is not furnished with enough coal for her industrial development, but water power is available to a large extent. Even now 1,500,000 h. p. is utilized and an estimate is made for 3,500,000 h. p. still available. Moreover, there are many heavy grade and tunnel sections, and electric locomotives will remove many difficulties in operation over heavy grade sections, and the discomfort in traveling through smoky tunnels. The advantage of electrification is therefore generally recognized, but the reinvestment of capital is a question which deserves a serious consideration.

Just at present there are only sixty miles of electrified sections, the largest portion of which is in and about Tokyo for intra and suburban services and interurban services between Tokyo and Yokohama. Part of the Tokaido Main Line which extends from Tokyo to Kobe is soon to be electrified, and the trial run of electric locomotives which have been ordered from abroad is now taking place on a branch line.

A noteworthy improvement has been very recently accomplished. Like English railways, Japanese cars, except those in Hokkaido to the north of the Main Island, were hooked together by screws and links instead of automatic couplers. The change to couplers was decided upon a long time ago, but largely owing to financial difficulties it could not be realized until this year. All the couplers of freight cars were changed into automatic couplers in two days, on July 17 for the Main Island and Shikoku and on July 20 for Kyushu, stopping all freight trains on those days in each respective region. As for passenger cars, the change was done for the first half of July without affecting the regular services in the least. The work was carried out most satisfactorily, and the new couplers have never shown any defects since their installation. This change of couplers cost the government 25,000,000 yen, and the revenue from freight for those two days when freight trains were stopped, but the advantage gained by the adoption of automatic couplers is great. Safety in coupling cars is ensured so that losses of lives and injuries, which formerly numbered 220 on a year average, will be entirely removed. The strength of couplers has been more than doubled and the length of couplers has been shortened so that more cars can be handled, as locomotives now in use can haul a heavier load.

As traffic has considerably outgrown the existing facilities and accommodations, additions and improvements are necessary in many respects, and the building of new stations, adding of tracks, installation of air brakes in place of vacuum brakes, etc., are now being contemplated.

As explained elsewhere the Government Railways operate connecting steamers between their lines on different islands. The steamers plying

between  
Chosen  
of mor  
porta  
between  
four b  
than  
put in  
Main  
kaido,  
carry  
type,  
The  
sixty  
opera  
three  
size,  
Seco  
is the  
gene  
a ne  
Seco  
To  
the  
finan  
the  
men  
Mar

Mile  
Num  
Num  
Cap  
Rec  
P  
F  
M

Wo  
Oth  
e  
Ne  
Op  
Pa  
Mi  
Re  
To  
M  
Re

between Shimonoseki and Fusan in Chosen are fine boats with a tonnage of more than 3000. For freight transportation car ferries are in operation between Shimonoseki and Moji, and between Uno and Takamatsu. Those four boats, each with a tonnage of more than 3400, which have recently been put in service between Aomori of the Main Island and Hakodate of Hokkaido, are train ferries. They can carry twenty-five cars of fifteen-ton type, besides about 930 passengers. The distance between these ports is sixty nautical miles. Train ferries are operated for such a distance in only three other places in the world. As to size, these boats rank next to the *Second Ontario* on Lake Ontario, which is the largest in the world. However, generally speaking these boats being of a new build are superior even to the *Second Ontario*.

To show the size of business done by the Government Railways and also the financial result of operation, some of the statistics published by the Government Railways for one year ending March 31, 1924, are shown below:

*Amounts in Money  
All in Yen*

Miles operated.....	7,341.2
Number of stations.....	2,147
Number of employes.....	188,783
Capital.....	2,149,783,769
Receipts	
Passengers.....	255,284,051
Freight.....	181,182,470
Miscellaneous.....	688,260
Total.....	443,354,781
Working expenses.....	261,242,250
Other expenses including interest on loans.....	71,848,436
Net profit.....	110,264,095
Operating ratio.....	69.7%
Passenger miles.....	10,669,134,204
Miles traveled per passenger...	18.5
Revenue per passenger mile....	0.0201
Ton miles.....	6,392,328,633
Miles carried per ton.....	98.7
Revenue per ton mile.....	0.0276

From the above figures one may easily see that the Government Railways are doing fairly good business. Average revenues per passenger and per ton show that fares and rates are not very heavy, as compared with those in Europe and America. A striking feature of the business is the fact that passenger revenue is exceedingly more than freight revenue, the proportion of these two kinds of revenue being just the reverse of that in the United States. There is, however, still a large field for passenger traffic development, considering the high density of population. With regard to freight traffic, it is needless to say that there is still much to be done for the increase, but the business policy on this point should be decided in due consideration of sea transportation, so that the country as a whole may not lose, without fully utilizing the advantage naturally given to Japan.

When making a comment on the Japanese Government Railways, people often wonder if there are not too many employes. The necessity of employing a comparatively large force is partly due to the scarcity of mechanical appliances, but mainly to the nature and amount of business to be handled, which can be seen even from the number of stations shown in the above list.

It need scarcely be added that the Government Railways have joint traffic arrangements with private railways in Japan proper and railways in Taiwan, Chosen, South Manchuria and Khabarovsk, and also with some of the steamship companies.

Mention may be made of the attempt of the Government Railways to contribute to the development of international traffic of passengers and freight. Realizing the geographical position of the country in world communications, the Government Railways have been trying to make Japan a centre of in-

ternational communications in the Far East.

Before the European War the Government Railways had an arrangement with Russian railways for through booking of passengers and baggage and for the conveyance of Japanese silk to Moscow, all via Siberia. Similar arrangements were in existence for points in North Manchuria and the maritime province of Siberia and also for points in Western Europe. People then could buy through tickets in Tokyo for London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, etc. These through booking arrangements via Siberia were discontinued on account of the war, except for North Manchuria. Commercial relations with Russia having been recovered, however, the Government Railways are negotiating with Soviet Russia for the re-establishment of the former arrangements.

Through traffic arrangements with the Chinese Government Railways have been in existence more than ten years, and are developing year after year. Time will come in the near future when the Japanese Government Railways will be brought in touch for through booking with railways in America, Australia and India with a medium of steamship services.

#### IN CONCLUSION

Transportation facilities are the essential factors for the development of commerce and industry, and Japan has as yet a great deal to do for improving

and developing means of transportation of all kinds; but what demands an immediate attention is a greater co-ordination of all kinds of transportation on land and sea. It is necessary for the country to form a net of transportation routes on land and sea and improve connecting facilities at points where two or more different means of transportation meet together.

There are people who argue that, had the railways in Japan been left in the management of private companies, they would have made a greater progress to a greater development of business and industry in general. This might be true, but from the public nature of railways, private ownership has its serious defects, while government ownership has a great advantage in being fair and just in doing business as well as in extending services all over the country. However, the Government Railways are apt to be unbusinesslike, and to become too standardized in doing business to the loss of flexibility, which is a necessity for freer development of all kinds of business and industry. These weaknesses should be cured and the management should be on pure business principles, always remembering that the railways serve the public in general and not particular individuals.

Air services in Japan are not yet in such a state as to deserve mention. Though there are air mail services between Tokyo and Osaka no passenger or freight service is in existence as yet.

THE  
pri  
Japane  
in bring  
tion.  
1896, i  
suspici  
keeping  
anxiety  
miles  
about  
the Cl  
tainly  
any of  
Firs  
such  
Easte  
misch  
tion.  
the e  
China  
privil  
jurisc  
foreign  
the C  
—a s  
unde  
empl  
ber o  
the n  
juris  
wher  
zone  
ing  
alien  
into  
fore  
vent  
bad  
wer  
juri  
ana  
bey  
mo

# The Chinese Eastern Railway

By CHIN-CHUN WANG, C.E., Ph.D., LL.D.

Peking, China

THE Chinese Eastern Railway was primarily the cause of the Russo-Japanese War, and was instrumental in bringing about the Russian Revolution. Ever since its conception in 1896, it has been constantly creating suspicion among the Great Powers and keeping all concerned in a state of anxiety. With a length of only 1067 miles and an average gross earning of about 30 million dollars per annum, the Chinese Eastern Railway has certainly acquired more notoriety than any other railway of its length.

First of all, it may be asked, why such a small railroad as the Chinese Eastern should have created so much mischief and attracted so much attention. The foremost reason seems to be the existence of extraterritoriality in China. On account of extraterritorial privileges, China could not exercise any jurisdiction over foreign citizens or foreign firms in China. Consequently, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company—a stock company originally registered under Russian law—and its Russian employees, together with the large number of other Russians who came with the railway, carried with them Russian jurisdiction and Russian police everywhere they went. Thus the whole zone traversed by this system, including the South Manchuria Railway, was alienated and virtually transformed into Russian territory. Not only all foreigners, including all sorts of adventurers, opium-smugglers, and other bad characters within this long zone were free from Chinese law and Chinese jurisdiction, but even Chinese bandits, anarchists, criminals, etc., were at once beyond the reach of Chinese law the moment they managed to escape into

this long zone or into any of the numerous towns within this zone. This fact, together with the abusive use made of the Chinese Eastern Railway for colonization and exploitation purposes, which we shall examine further, seriously jeopardized China's integrity.

A comparison may help to make this situation clear. If we imagine that the Boston and Maine and the New York, New Haven, and Hartford railroads were a Russian corporation and that these railroads and all their employees, together with all other foreigners along the railroad, etc., were under Russian law with Russian courts and police (the number of such police being increased as Russia saw fit) and that all sorts of bandits, bootleggers, etc., within the railroad zone would be free from American jurisdiction, we could see what would be the effect upon the states traversed by these railroads and what would be the repercussion of such a state of affairs upon Washington. And this was exactly the state of affairs in the Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) until 1924, when Russia's extraterritorial rights were cancelled.

The second reason seems to be geographical. A glance at any map will show that China, like her homes and her cities, is "walled in" on all sides by immense barriers. On the east and south is the China Sea; on the west and southwest we have the Yunnan and Tibet mountains; on the north we have the Mongolia deserts; while the Three Eastern Provinces with their deserts and mountain ranges serve as a "helmet" to China's capital. Thus "walled in"



and protected from her neighbors, China's political and economic systems have been accordingly developed through the past centuries. Once the Chinese Eastern Railway was built, it immediately broke the barrier between China and the West. Her "helmet" was pierced. Europe was brought to Peking within seven days. Such a penetration as that made by the Chinese Eastern must have had an effect upon China no less immediate and far-reaching than the penetration made by the steamship through the seas, as shown by the fact that, following the construction of the Chinese Eastern, China's foreign relations became far more important and complicated in the northeast, where there had never been much difficulty, than in other directions. A cursory review of China's foreign relations since 1896 will at once bear this out.

The Three Eastern Provinces, through which the Chinese Eastern runs, have an area equal to that of Germany and France combined, rich in forests, mines and fertile land, with a population of over fifteen millions. So long as they were left alone, Peking felt safe. Potentially and strategically, the Three Eastern Provinces are so situated that any predominating foreign influence there would have an immediate repercussion upon Peking, because they are so vast, so rich, and so near. The seizure by a foreign power of such an important province as Canton or Fuk'ien would perhaps have less effect upon Peking than a similar catastrophe in the Three Eastern Provinces. Therefore, what happens there not only constantly causes alarm in all China, but also creates uneasiness among those powers whose belief and interest it is to preserve China's integrity.

But a railroad itself, as understood here in America, could never have done so much mischief and caused so

much concern as the Chinese Eastern. Besides the two former reasons, it is largely the abusive use of the railroad as a means of exploitation and conquest that has made the Chinese Eastern notorious. As in the past, when disasters associated with the railway were either due to the defects of the agreements concerning the railway, or were the result of improper interpretation or abuse of these agreements, so in the future either the phraseology of the railway's existing agreements or any improper execution or abuse of them may yet lead to further difficulties. We shall, therefore, endeavor to examine, briefly, the origin and the principal vicissitudes of this railroad, as well as its agreements in so far as they have had any immediate bearings upon international relations.

#### RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST

The late Tzar Nicholas, upon his ascension to the throne, was anxious to spread Russia's influence in the Far East. With this in view, the gigantic scheme of the Trans-Siberia Railway was carried out with amazing vigor and speed. A few years from its conception, the whole railway, with a total length of more than 5000 miles over the vast territory of unknown Siberia, was pushed through to Vladivostok. As the left bank of the Amur River is Chinese territory, the railroad had to be built along the right bank of the river, thus describing a big semi-circle from Chita to its eastern terminus. The idea soon came to the mind of the Tzar and his ministers that if the road could be carried from Chita directly southeast to the sea through Chinese territory, the distance between Vladivostok and St. Petersburg could be reduced by about 500 miles. Moreover, the operating and maintenance

difficult  
conditio  
greatly  
carryin  
In 18  
China  
burg i  
corona  
Russia  
ject of  
rally  
Russia  
phasize  
reducin  
difficul  
way a  
clusive  
cultur  
much  
upon  
him u  
own v  
conces  
the r  
owned  
due to  
privat  
Easte  
ganize  
As  
Chine  
China  
about  
as her  
consi  
comm  
fyin  
mana  
loss,  
tion

In  
signe  
Chin  
to th  
struc  
East  
Tran

difficulties due to climatic and other conditions of the country would be greatly reduced. No time was lost in carrying out this idea.

In 1896 Li-Hung-Chang was sent by China as Special Envoy to St. Petersburg in connection with the Tzar's coronation. Soon after his arrival in Russia, he was approached on the subject of the proposed short cut. Naturally Li hesitated to agree. The Russian authorities emphatically emphasized that the scheme was only for reducing the distance and the operating difficulties of the Trans-Siberia Railway and that the line should be exclusively devoted to commercial and cultural purposes. It was not until much pressure was brought to bear upon him, even to the extent of making him understand that it was the Tzar's own wish, that Li agreed to grant the concession. At first Russia wanted the railroad to be constructed and owned by the government, and it was due to Li's determined objection that a private corporation, called the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, was organized specially for the purpose.

As a preliminary step, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized, in which China invested five million taels, or about \$4,000,000 gold at that time, as her share of capital. An agreement consisting of five articles along general commercial lines was adopted, specifying that China should share in the management, as well as the profit and loss, of the bank's business in proportion to her share of capital.

#### THE FATEFUL CONCESSIONS

In turn, another agreement was signed between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank, by which China granted to the bank the concession for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which connects the Trans-Siberia Railway at Manchuli on

the west and links up with the Oussuri Railway on the east. The bank was made the *entrepreneur*, or undertaking company, which was sometimes found in early English practice.

Again, in this agreement with the bank, it was provided that a separate stock company should be organized for the construction and operation of the railway, which should be called the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. This stock company should

- (1) issue its own shares to the extent of five million roubles;
- (2) the president of the company should be Chinese;
- (3) the seal of the company, which is the sign of authority, should be issued by the Chinese Government;
- (4) China should be responsible for the protection of the employees of the railway;
- (5) all government land required by the railway should be granted free to the company;
- (6) all materials for construction should be free from duty and all railway land should be free of tax;
- (7) Russian troops might be transported through Chinese territory by the railway, but such troops should not stop over en route.

The agreement further provided

- (1) that the shareholders of the company should be Chinese and Russians only;
- (2) that on the expiration of eighty years from the commencement of traffic the whole railway should revert, without payment, to the Chinese Government;
- (3) that China should have the right, at the expiration of thirty-six years from the date of operation, to redeem the railway on the payment of the actual cost of the railway, together with all the debts incurred therefrom;
- (4) that all surplus of the railway, minus the percentage paid to shareholders, should be deducted from the cost of the line, to be ultimately paid by China for redemption;

- (5) and that upon completion of the line, the company should pay the Chinese Government five million taels.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, summarizing the above, it will be seen that the following steps were taken:

- (1) the organization of the Russo-Chinese Bank, of which China was a principal shareholder;
- (2) the agreement between China and the bank governing the concession of construction and operation of the railroad; and
- (3) the formation of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which was to take over from the bank the concession granted by China.

It would appear at once that the whole arrangement suggested a series of wheels within wheels.

The terms of the concession granted by China were considered by St. Petersburg as very favorable to Russia. China at the time only cherished the pious hope that the peaceful spirit of the agreement, as repeatedly asserted by the Russian authorities, would guide the execution of the agreement.

An analysis of the agreement will show that for an enterprise of such importance there is much lack of clearness in the text. Yet, ambiguous as it was, there was ample room for co-operation along commercial lines for the benefit of both. Unfortunately, advantage seems to have been taken from this lack of clearness in the agreement to make things even less palatable to China. While the agreement provided that the shares of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company should be bought only by Chinese and Russians, the issue of the shares was handled in such

<sup>1</sup> This amount has never been paid in spite of repeated representations made by the Chinese Government from time to time.

a way that no Chinese was permitted to enjoy this provision. As a matter of fact, it was said that the shares were opened for sale at one o'clock on a certain Saturday in St. Petersburg and closed at five minutes past one after the announcement of the sale. The agreement says that the surplus of the company, after what may be divided among shareholders as dividends, should be applied to the redemption of the road in China's behalf; but it does not say to what extent the surplus may be divided as dividends. As the total share capital is only five million roubles, and as a railway of such length and importance as the Chinese Eastern may, under proper management, earn a surplus equal to two or three times the amount of the total share capital, the question of division might develop into an important question as the surplus of the railway grew. It is understood that this point was raised in 1920, and that by an exchange of letters between the representatives of the shareholders and the Chinese Government a certain scale was agreed to, whereby certain proportions of the surplus were to be divided as dividends and certain proportions should be applied to the redemption fund in behalf of China.

#### RUSSIA'S BREACH OF FAITH

Construction of the Chinese Eastern was begun in 1897 and was pushed with unusual speed. In the meantime a new phase of Russia's scheme was introduced. In March, 1898, that is about one year and a half after the signing of the original agreement, Russia secured under duress from China the lease of Liaotung Peninsula for thirty-six years, as well as the right to construct a branch line from Harbin, a central point on the Chinese Eastern, directly southward to Ta-Lien-Wan (Dairen), with the proviso that the

agreement of 1896 between China and the Russo-Chinese Bank should apply with equal force to this branch line. This step, as was acknowledged by Count Witte, who originally negotiated the Chinese Eastern Agreement, was diametrically contrary to the understanding given in 1896, when Russia definitely assured Li that the Chinese Eastern would not go southward from a straight line connecting Chita and Vladivostok. It was understood that there was much opposition in Russia to this breach of good faith with China. But the jingoistic elements had their way. The Russians themselves, to use Count Witte's words, "broke the agreement and brought about the situation from which they suffered humiliation and disgrace."<sup>2</sup> The original agreement of 1896, one-sided as it was, was not bad enough to expose Russia's naked designs in the Far East, had she made any attempt to honor it. It was the scrapping of that agreement, which was dictated on her own terms, that led to her expansion southward where she, within the period of five years, met her humiliation.

Another dangerous step was the introduction of Russian civil and military administration along the railway. Large areas of land, which were obtained at numerous places under the pretext of being required by the railway, were set aside and mapped out for cities, towns and villages for the settlement of Russian immigrants. These municipalities were all governed by Russian administration, and were under Russian law and police. Thus the whole zone penetrated by the railway was made into a Russian colony, and China's integrity violated.

In 1900 the Boxer uprising gave a further excuse to Russia for extending her imperialistic designs. Taking as a pretext the suppression of the Boxers,

<sup>2</sup> *Memoirs of Count Witte, 1920.*

Russia sent a large army to occupy the Three Eastern Provinces. At the outset, the whole Chinese population of Blagovieschensk, a Chinese settlement on the right bank of the Amur, of about 5000 men, women and children, were driven into the Amur at the point of the bayonet. In consequence, the Three Eastern Provinces were soon over-run by Russian troops. Proclamations were posted by Russian commanders which amounted to declarations of conquest. As a Russian engineer of the Chinese Eastern then wrote: "Punitive expeditions were made with no other end in view than to furnish an excuse for new promotion and new looting." Peking being occupied by foreign troops, the Chinese Government was helpless.

I may be permitted to digress here by remarking that these brutalities have not been forgotten by the Chinese. When the Russian Government collapsed in 1918, and the Russians along the Chinese Eastern were helpless, there was considerable talk among certain quarters of the Chinese people to retaliate the Blagovieschensk atrocity by driving an equal number of Russians into the Amur. It was forgiveness and not forgetfulness that prevented such a retaliation. As a matter of fact, the leading authorities made it a special point to protect, with equal vigor, the Russians of all parties and all "colors," believing that two big neighbors like China and Russia, with a contiguous frontier of some four thousand miles, cannot live happily by returning a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye. In spite of the Chinese authorities' shortcomings, which were many, in their handling of the Russians during these trying years since 1918, one thing I can vouch for, and that is that generally speaking they tried to treat the Russians fairly and with sympathy during their days of distress. Relief



measures were adopted by the authorities, in spite of their own financial and other difficulties; and the absence of any serious conflicts between the Chinese and Russians during these years constitutes some of the results.

Russia occupied the Three Eastern Provinces ostensibly for the purpose of helping Peking to quell the Boxers. The Boxer disturbance soon ended, but the Russian troops continued to remain. The result was widespread distrust on the part of China, jealousy and malevolence in Europe and alarm in Japan. The Chinese Eastern and its southern branch were pushed through just in time to witness the Russo-Japanese War, which was declared in 1903.

#### JAPANESE ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

What happened afterwards must be fresh in the minds of all. Russia was defeated with no small credit due the local Chinese, who helped in numerous ways. By the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty it was arranged that, subject to China's consent, Japan should take over the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway up to Chang-Chun, a point approximately half way between Mukden and Harbin, together with all rights connected therewith. In December of the same year, Japan secured China's consent to the Russo-Japanese arrangements, with the further right of constructing a branch line from Mukden to Antung, a point near the western border of Korea. The Mukden-Antung line was to be operated by Japan for a period of eighteen years, beginning December 22, 1905, and on the expiration of this date China had the right to redeem it at a price to be settled by arbitration. By the famous twenty-one demands, which Japan made upon China in 1915, China has up to now been prevented

from exercising this option, although she reminds Japan of it repeatedly.

#### CONSTRUCTION AND MANAGEMENT

A word about the construction and cost of the railway may be of interest. With the exception of the tunnel under the Hingan Mountains and the bridge over the Sungari at Harbin, the Chinese Eastern runs through very easy and flat country. The bridges and tunnels were well built from an engineering point of view. But the question of economy, as shown by the accounts of the railway, did not seem to have entered into the minds of the railway authorities. On the contrary, there seems to be much evidence to fortify the impression that unnecessary lavishness in the spending of money was generally encouraged. Enormous sums were spent for the erecting of magnificent residences, numerous barracks, palatial club-houses, magnificent churches and schools, etc., all with the idea of inducing Russians to settle along the Chinese Eastern. All these expenditures were charged to the accounts of the railway, thus swelling the cost of construction to something like 400,000,000 roubles, or about \$200,000 gold per mile!

A comparison of this figure with the average cost of \$63,000 per mile for the Chinese Government Railways may be illuminating, in view of the fact that, on the whole, the construction and engineering features of the Chinese Eastern were not more difficult than those of the Chinese Government Railways. As the latter were constructed by foreign engineers with imported materials and borrowed money, and with a consequent expenditure considerably higher than under ordinary circumstances, this high cost of the Chinese Eastern will at once appear significant. Extravagance and other irregularities were said to be responsible

for this  
struction  
Space  
study  
Eastern  
Suffice  
mouth  
effort  
north  
other  
Russia  
second  
ern Ad  
made  
military  
ivities  
scheme  
ization  
way Ac  
those y  
charact  
First  
the Civ  
which  
taxes, a  
etc. B  
partme  
police,  
pal cou  
schools  
this De  
roubles  
churche  
issued  
lomatic  
adminis  
as comp  
tive act  
Genera  
peared  
viceroy  
executi  
observ  
cial stu  
early y  
in the p  
the rai  
garded  
The res

for this abnormally high cost of construction.

Space will not permit any detailed study of Russia's use of the Chinese Eastern during the years 1905-17. Suffice it to say that since the Portsmouth Treaty Russia has exerted every effort to consolidate her position in north Manchuria by colonization and other methods. It was said that Russia intended to make Manchuria a second Bokhara. The Chinese Eastern Administrative departments were made the headquarters of all civil, military, political and religious activities of the whole colonization scheme. A cursory analysis of the organization of the Chinese Eastern Railway Administration and its budget of those years will show at once the unusual character of that railway in those days.

First of all there was what was called the Civil Administration Department, which took charge of the local land taxes, as well as taxes on wine, tobacco, etc. Besides other activities this Department had supervision over the police, the law courts, and the municipal councils of towns. Churches and schools of all grades were also under this Department. About one million roubles was expended annually for the churches and schools. At times it issued passports and maintained "diplomatic" agents. In short, the actual administrative work of the railway, as compared with the extra-administrative activities, were insignificant. The General Manager of the railway appeared to the people much more like a viceroy of the province than a railway executive. "The railway officials," observed an English writer after a special study of the situation during these early years of the railway, "engrossed in the political and strategic aspects of the railway, seemed to have disregarded its commercial possibilities. The result was the imposition of pro-

hibitive tariffs. The railway has thus far done nothing to prosper trade, although the western and eastern sections pass through a country that promises at least reasonable returns on any well-managed line that serves it."<sup>3</sup>

All these administrative and extra-administrative expenses were charged to the books of the railway. This, together with the lack of the development of traffic, which meant reduced earnings, accumulated a net loss of about 450,000,000 roubles as the result of twelve years of operation from 1905 to 1917. In consequence, at the end of the Tzarist régime the books of the railway showed a total liability of about 850,000,000 roubles against that property. There was a story at the time that the Tzarist Government considered it good policy to swell the cost and debt of the railway so as to make it unattractive for China to redeem at the end of thirty-six years. If this story was true, the Tzarist authorities certainly succeeded splendidly.

#### ACUTE SITUATION FROM ROUBLE DEPRECIATION

Following the fall of the Tzarist Government in 1918, the enormous annual subsidies no longer came to the railroad. In order to meet the ensuing difficulties, the General Manager therefore resorted to the issue of bank notes in the name of the railway. In the meantime, the rouble began to depreciate rapidly. It must be remarked here that ever since 1900 rouble notes had flooded the northern part of the Three Eastern Provinces. It is said that Russia really spent little gold in the Far East, and simply shipped car loads of rouble notes to carry on the business. Chinese land, Chinese labor, and Chinese materials for the construction of the railway were paid for in these notes.

<sup>3</sup>P. H. Kent—*Railway Enterprises in China*, p. 78, 1907.

Chinese goods were bought and shipped to Russia with these notes. As a matter of fact, following the occupation of Manchuria by Russian troops, rouble notes became the currency in the northern part of the Three Eastern Provinces. All business was transacted with them. So a tremendous amount of these notes were absorbed in the country. As the situation in Russia became worse and worse, so the value of the rouble notes depreciated more and more towards zero as a limit.

The effect can readily be appreciated. Everyone in that part of the country suffered in proportion to the number of rouble notes which he was unable to get rid of, as well as in proportion to the loss in value of the notes resulting from his success in passing them out of his hands. There was general suffering all over. Many business houses collapsed; many well-to-do people became paupers. The savings of years from the hard labor of the multitudes of working and farming people were wiped out by this process. Judging from the amount of rouble notes held by the Chinese population alone, it almost appears reasonable for the local people to say that in reality Russia built the Chinese Eastern Railway with paper instead of real money.

As the situation in Russia and Siberia became more acute, the Chinese Eastern was affected more and more. There was general chaos and disorder. Strikes and partisan fights became frequent. Murders and assassinations were numerous. Following the fashion of the time, the General Manager of the railway, one day, rode out to a place just outside of Chinese territory and there in his private car declared independence and proclaimed himself the Supreme Ruler of the Russian Far Eastern territory. This briefly shows the general situation of the Chinese Eastern from 1917 to 1920.

Meanwhile the Allied Powers began their expedition into Siberia and eastern Russia. For the latter purpose and for the evacuation of the Czechoslovakian prisoners of war, the Inter-Allied Technical Board was organized, with its headquarters at Harbin, to supervise the technical and economic operation of the Siberia and the Chinese Eastern railways. The eminent American engineer and railroad administrator, John F. Stevens, was made the president of the Board, with a representative each from China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and Czechoslovakia as members. Some two hundred American railroad men were distributed along the line from Vladivostok to the Ural Mountains, while about fifty Chinese railroad engineers and operating men were appointed by the Board to co-operate with the Americans to supervise the Chinese Eastern section. As the Board was not authorized to discipline the railway employes, and as its orders had to be executed through the old railway staff, naturally many difficulties arose. It was largely due to the ability and personality of Mr. Stevens and the co-operation of the other members of the Board that the duties of the said Board were carried out so well, as was generally recognized by the Allied Governments. About \$5,000,000 in gold was spent by the Board for the benefit of the Chinese Eastern and about the same amount was charged by the Chinese Eastern against the Allied Governments for the transportation of the Allied and Czechoslovakian troops. Every now and then, some of the Allied Governments would call the attention of the Chinese Eastern to the amount which the Technical Board was spending for its benefit; and periodically the Chinese Eastern would ask the Allied Governments, which were considered responsible for the handling

of the Czechs, to settle the transportation account. And there the matter stands.

#### THE SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

As the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely Russo-Chinese enterprise, running through Chinese territory, and as the chaotic condition of the railway was causing China much trouble, the Chinese Government could not but assume some responsibility of control over the railway. Were it in any other country, the Government would perhaps have summarily taken over the railway and run it pending final settlement. China, however, took a rather more circuitous course. As the original agreement was signed with the Russo-Chinese Bank, the Government, in October, 1920, signed a supplementary agreement with the said bank for the temporary management of the railway. This was done on the assumption that the bank was a shareholder of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, although no one seemed to have seen any shares. It was only the Statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company which made the assumption feasible; because those Statutes provided that, on the presentation of a certificate of that bank or the Bank of Russia, any Chinese or Russian may be recognized as a shareholder at the shareholders' meetings. This is perhaps another one of those wheels within the whole system, as originally arranged in St. Petersburg.

This supplementary agreement, first of all, declared that the activities of the Chinese Eastern Railway should be limited and devoted exclusively to commercial purposes. The Civil Administration, police, etc., were abolished and the work transferred to the local Chinese authorities. Of the ten members of the Board of Directors of the railway, five, including the President

of the railway, were to be Chinese and the other five, including the Vice-President, Russians. A Chinese Assistant General Manager was to be appointed and a certain number of Chinese railway men added to the different departments as assistant chiefs. Vacancies in the future were to be filled by Chinese and Russians in an *equitable* manner. All important questions were to be decided by the Board of Directors by the affirmative vote of at least seven members. The payment of five million taels, as required by the original agreement, upon the completion of the line, was to be made good in bonds.

Under this agreement, a new Board of Directors was organized. In October, 1920, for the first time in the railway's history, a regular board meeting of ten members was held at the headquarters of the railway at Harbin. To save the railway from further degeneration and to face the complicated situation of 1920 was a job hard enough for any ten men, especially when these men were mostly new to the work as well as new to each other. The first effort of the Board was to face the financial situation. The rouble notes were depreciating rapidly. Up to that time the railway receipts were still in these roubles.

#### BENEFITS FROM REORGANIZATION

The first and perhaps the most effective and beneficial act of the Board was to officially replace the rouble with the Chinese silver dollar which had a steady face value. This step at once put the revenue of the railway on a more stable basis, and gradually reduced the sufferings of the employees from the depreciation of the rouble. Up to that time, as the railway receipts were in roubles, the employees were also paid in roubles, the value of which often diminished by some fifty per cent from



the time an employe received his pay until the time he succeeded in spending it. The accounts of the railway were also changed into the Chinese dollar or the gold rouble as the unit. As about seventy-five per cent of the shippers and passengers are Chinese and an equally large proportion of the expenses of the railway are local, there is no question that the unit of the railway should be the Chinese dollar, which is the currency of the place.

Gradually other administrative problems were taken up, chief among them the question of tariff and fares. In order to stimulate trade and encourage travel, a considerable reduction was introduced, bringing the tariff and fares, which were doubled during the period from 1918 to 1920, to a general level of about ten per cent to forty per cent higher than the pre-war figures. The volume of business was considerably increased to the benefit of the shippers. The locomotives and rolling stock, which were in a most deplorable condition, were gradually repaired, and the train service gradually improved. The current debts of the railway were regularized a little each year. In spite of numerous shortcomings, the result of the four years' work, under the supplementary agreement, showed much improvement in the railway both financially and from an operative point of view. This general improvement was, of course, made possible by the advancement made in the political and military conditions in the country. Although the Chinese and Russian members of the railway sometimes had misunderstandings and differences in their point of view, on the whole most of them worked for the good of the railway.

My five years' experience with the Chinese Eastern leads me to believe that among the Russians, with whom I had the opportunity to associate, there

were a large number of level-headed and well-meaning men, who showed a high degree of tenacity for what they believed to be their principles. So far as my Russian colleagues and the railway staff are concerned, I found among them many able and well-informed gentlemen. There were indeed exceptions, but one finds exceptions everywhere. On the whole, I think the Russians are a great people with a large heart and a great future. If they will only devote their efforts to the development of their own immense land and to the advancement of their own enormous population, they are bound to progress in all directions.

During the Washington Conference on Disarmament, the Chinese Eastern Railway received considerable attention. Various schemes were discussed. Finally it was agreed among all the participating powers at the Conference that it was to the advantage of all interested parties to have better protection given the railway and the persons engaged in its operation, and by a more careful selection of personnel to secure a more efficient service and more economic use of funds, in order to prevent waste of property. These provisions are definite and clear, in contrast to the negative wording so frequently used in resolutions of such a nature.

Another resolution regarding the Chinese Eastern adopted by the powers, exclusive of China, states that these powers reserve the right to insist upon the responsibility of China for performance and non-performance of obligations towards the foreign shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, which obligations the powers deem to result from the contracts under which the railroad was built. This resolution is not so clear as the previous one. It is not definitely known

by whom is meant the foreign stockholders and bondholders. As Russia was not represented in the Conference, it may be inferred that these stockholders and bondholders had reference to foreigners other than Russians. But the very contract referred to in the resolution clearly stated that only Russians and Chinese could be stockholders and bondholders of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company. So far as is known, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company never issued any stocks or bonds in its name to any parties other than Chinese and Russians. So far as the foreign creditors of the railway are concerned, there are but few and the amounts due too insignificant to deserve the attention of such an important body as the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore it may be presumed that the real motive back of the Chinese Eastern Railway question at Washington was not stated in the resolutions, but was to be found in the fact that the railway had been, and was at that time an important factor affecting the peace of the Far East.

In May, 1924, an "agreement on general principles," with English as the official text, was signed between the Chinese and the Soviet Governments. First of all this agreement provides for holding a conference, within one month after the signing of the agreement, which "shall conclude to carry out detailed arrangements relative to the Chinese Eastern Railway and other questions, and such detailed arrangements shall be completed . . . in any case not later than six months from the date of the opening of the conference." Article 9 of the "agreement on general principles" is devoted entirely to the Chinese Eastern question. As this article puts the railway on an entirely new basis and is bound to have far-reaching effects, I quote the entire text as follows:

**Article IX.** The two Governments of the Contracting Parties agree to settle at the aforementioned Conference the question of the Chinese Eastern Railway in conformity with the principles as hereafter provided:

(1) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties declare that the Chinese Eastern Railway is a purely commercial enterprise.

The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually declare that with the exception of matters pertaining to the business operations, which are under the direct control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, all other matters affecting the rights of the National and the Local Governments of the Republic of China—such as judicial matters, matters relating to civil administration, military administration, police, municipal government, taxation and land property (with the exception of lands required by the said railway)—shall be administered by the Chinese authorities.

(2) The Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic agrees to the redemption by the Government of the Republic of China, with Chinese capital, of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as all appurtenant properties, and to the transfer to China of all shares and bonds of the said railway.

(3) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties shall settle at the Conference, as provided in Article 11 of the present Agreement, the amount and conditions governing the redemption as well as the procedure for the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

(4) The Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic agrees to be responsible for the entire claims of the shareholders, bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern Railway incurred prior to the Revolution of March 9, 1917.

(5) The Governments of the Contracting Parties mutually agree that the future of the Chinese Eastern Railway shall be determined by the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic and the Republic of China, to the exclusion of any third party or parties.

(6) The Governments of the two Contracting Parties agree to draw up an arrangement for the provisional management of the Chinese Eastern Railway, pending the settlement of the questions as provided under section (3) of the present Article.

(7) Until the various questions relating to the Chinese Eastern Railway are settled at the Conference, as provided in Article 11 of the present Agreement, the rights of the two Governments arising out of the Contract of August 27, 1896, for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern, which do not conflict with the present Agreement and the Agreement for the provincial management of the said railway and which do not prejudice China's right of sovereignty, shall be maintained.

The question of redemption will naturally form one of the most important topics in the coming conference. Russia definitely pledges that China may redeem the railway, but leaves the amount and conditions governing the redemption to be arranged in the conference. No principle to govern the conditions and amount of redemption was laid down in this "agreement on general principles." This latter provision was altered a trifle by the agreement signed between the Soviet Government and the Three Eastern Provinces, which was later embodied in the Governmental agreements. By this, the Soviet Government "agrees . . . to the redemption by China of the said railway with Chinese capital, the actual and fair cost of which to be fixed by the two contracting parties."

A careful reading of these articles will lead one to feel that it must have required much skill to frame the terms in such a pleasant way and yet make them so elastic, if not ambiguous. The circumstances which lead to the adoption of such elastic language must have been extraordinary, if not interesting. Indeed, much will depend

upon what takes place in the promised conference. One thing we can prophesy: That is that whatever difficulties may lie in the agreement will be found not in what has been said, but in what has *not* been said!

The arrangement for the provisional administration of the railway, as referred to in section (6), article 9, of the "agreement on general principles," consists of eleven articles. The provisions of this arrangement, as modified by the Soviet-Mukden agreement, very much resemble those of the supplementary agreement of 1920, with the Soviet Government taking the place of the Russo-Chinese Bank. The main differences are: that the time limit for the railway's return to China, free of charge, be reduced from eighty to sixty years; that all positions of the railway should be filled by Chinese and Russians in *equal* numbers; that, pending final settlement of the railway, as provided in article 9, the net profits of the railway should be held by the Board of Directors; and that all questions of the railway, which the Board of Directors cannot decide, must be referred to the two Governments for settlement.

A careful study of this agreement will suggest at once that, unless the Chinese and Russian members of the Board of Directors are properly selected and given full power and definite instruction to manage the railway as a purely commercial business, with the sole aim of serving the public and making a fair return to the railway, much difficulty may arise. The fact that all questions will have to be decided by the affirmative vote of six members of the Board in practice amounts to the mutual agreement of all the Chinese and Russian members. This will require that they must have a common point of view and a common interest in which both parties share

equally. They must consider the railway as their own business and their own property and exert every effort to make the railway a business success. Any other motive, or any effort on the part of either party to "edge out" the other will result in loggerheads.

Two other provisions of the agreement may create difficulties. First, the provision that all disagreements between the Chinese and Russian members of the Board of Directors should be referred to the two Governments for solution, will likely prove unwholesome, if not mischievous. There are numerous chances for a board so constituted to disagree; and when such disagreement will have to be settled by two governments through diplomatic channels, the railway's business is liable to degenerate into a whirlpool of diplomatic squabbles. Arbitration would certainly have been a much better method of settling such differences, if the two Governments are eager to prevent the railway from giving constant irritation.

The provision that the articles of the old agreement of 1896 and the Chinese Eastern Railway Statutes, which do not conflict with the present instruments, shall remain valid, is also misleading. These old Statutes were so long, so involved, so complicated, and so out of date, that there will be ample room for the two parties to disagree as to which article does or does not conflict with the present agreement. Fortunately, there is a clause in the new agreement calling for the revision of these Statutes within six months. This revision should have

been the first duty of the new Board of Directors. The latter have taken charge of the railway since October, 1924. So far as it is known, no successful attempt has yet been made to carry out this most important provision. Therefore, they must have been working without any definite rules for guidance. Under such circumstances conflicts of opinion should be inevitable.

To have two Governments as partners in a railway business, on a half and half basis, is a new experiment. To date China has had enough trouble with the Chinese Eastern. Russia gained but little from her efforts in reading extraordinary meanings into the Chinese Eastern Railway Agreements in the past. It is to be hoped that in the future good faith on both sides will prove to the world that the experiment is a success, and that it will once for all put an end to the anxiety, suspicion and mischief which the Chinese Eastern has created in the past. If this new experiment should fail, it would seem that a totally different experiment will have to be tried, in order to prevent a repetition of what has happened in the last thirty years. At any rate and under all circumstances, all the extraordinary activities of the Chinese Eastern and other railways in the Three Eastern Provinces should be eliminated. All the railways in the Three Eastern Provinces should be managed entirely for commercial purposes and run as highways open to all foreign business on an equal basis. Otherwise China's integrity will remain violated and the open door meaningless.



# The Cable Situation in the Pacific Ocean, with Special Reference to the Far East

By GEORGE ATCHESON, JR. \*

THE significant relation which cable communications in general bear to the welfare and security of nations forms a necessary background to a review of the situation in any particular region of the world. This relation may be contemplated briefly in three general aspects, bare statements of fact being sufficient as comprehending obvious considerations.

Politically the cable has become indispensable to the furtherance of peace; through its facilities misunderstandings find adjustment before irresponsible or hasty popular feeling might destroy the possibility of amicable arbitration which usually exists at the inception of a dispute. Adequate low rate facilities also automatically combat propaganda through the resultant generous interchange of news and by alleviating the financial necessity for accepting subsidies which now, with but few exceptions, partially support and control most news agencies outside the United States. Again, comprehensive facilities lessen the possibility of misunderstandings arising out of compressed news reports and rumors which cannot be given full and prompt press denial.

An adequate system of cable communications is vital from a military point of view. The general military uses of the cable—in augmenting the effectiveness of navies, in the control of military and other news, in providing a means of secret communication—are too extensive for brief description, but, as an outstanding example, it may be mentioned that without an adequate system of communications many months would have elapsed before the British

Dominions could have been brought effectively into the war.

The value of the cable to commerce cannot be overestimated. The effective economic movement of shipping depends largely upon cable communications. Transactions in commodities whose prices tend to fluctuate are based upon cable exchanges. Similarly, the volume of general international transactions depends upon the presence or absence of adequate communications services at reasonable rates.

In regard to electrical communications in general, the policy of the American Government may be said to have been enunciated by President Harding in his message to Congress, April 12, 1921, as embracing three principles:

(1) The Government of the United States stands for the development of American-owned communication facilities, cables, radios, telegraphs and telephones, to meet the strategical and practical needs of the United States, its insular possessions and Alaska. The Government proposes to encourage the extension of communication facilities in connection with the enterprises under the control of its various departments, the Navy and War Departments in particular, and those of private cable, radio, telegraph and telephone companies.

(2) Since it has been demonstrated by experience that effective regulation is necessary for the fullest development of the art of electrical communications and for the most successful operation of such utilities, this Government accordingly stands for the support of equal opportunity for all and the suppression of private monopolies in this field.

(3) The Government of the United States stands for the friendliest co-opera-

\* Mr. Atcheson has long been a student of foreign affairs and is recognized as an authority on this subject. The Editor.

tion with foreign countries with a view to perfecting arrangements for direct communication with all parts of the world.

#### IN THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST

The importance to the United States of cable communications<sup>1</sup> in the Pacific and the Far East arises primarily out of needs contingent upon the ownership of insular possessions; because of interests in, and commitments concerning, the application in China of the principle of the open door; and because of increasing economic contact with that section of the world.

Certain particular considerations merit notation here:

The supremacy of British trade is directly related to, and influenced by, the fact that London is the cable center of the world; similarly, Manila cannot develop into a great American port unless it is made the focus of low rate cable services adequate to meet the needs of shipping and to stimulate trade.

Were a foreign power to obtain cable dominance in the Pacific, not only

would American commerce and prestige suffer, but, in the event of war, American naval and military operations would be greatly handicapped.

Press reports published in Japan from the United States are sometimes meagre and fragmentary; a generous flow of news between the two peoples, possible only through adequate low rate communications facilities, would greatly enhance their mutual understanding and sympathy, already founded upon a traditional friendship.

In China news concerning the United States is frequently colored and often obviously designed for propaganda purposes. Adequate low rate cable communications between the United States and China would, of course, greatly alleviate these conditions.

#### FAR EASTERN CABLE ENTERPRISES, NEGOTIATIONS AND MONOPOLIES

In 1854<sup>2</sup> the apparent impossibility of spanning the Atlantic by cable gave rise to a plan for establishing communication between Europe and America by means of landlines through Siberia and Alaska,<sup>3</sup> connected by a cable in Bering Sea. Prolonged negotiations postponed the initial operations until 1865 when the Russian Government granted the Western Union Telegraph Company a concession to construct the Alaskan lines and the cable. The final success of the 1865 and 1866 trans-Atlantic cable forced the Americans to abandon their work, but the Russians, in order to utilize the Siberian landlines, augmented by cable, for communication with Japan, granted a concession to the Great Northern Telegraph Company<sup>4</sup> to lay

<sup>2</sup> *Submarine Telegraphs*, by Charles Bright, contains an account of the early history of submarine cables.

<sup>3</sup> Then Russian territory.

<sup>4</sup> Danish—an amalgamation of the Danish, Norwegian and English, the Danish-Russian, and the Norwegian-English Telegraph Companies.

<sup>1</sup> Existing trans-Pacific electrical communications are: (a) A cable San Francisco-Honolulu-Midway-Guam-Manila-Shanghai, and a cable Guam-Bonin Islands-Japan; Bonin-Japan section is operated by Japanese Government; the main cable and the Guam-Bonin section are operated by the Commercial Pacific Cable Company, an American corporation with three-fourths of its stock owned by foreign cable interests; (b) commercial radio between San Francisco-Honolulu-Japan; San Francisco and Honolulu stations are operated by Radio Corporation of America; Japanese stations by Government; (c) a British Government cable Vancouver-Fanning Island-Fiji-Norfolk Island-Doubtless Bay (New Zealand) and Norfolk Island-Brisbane (Australia); (d) American naval radio, principal stations at San Francisco, Honolulu and Manila, with secondary stations at the American Legation, Peking, and various other places; commercial activities limited by statutes; (e) former German cables Guam-Yap, Yap-Menado, and Yap-Shanghai; Guam-Yap-Menado cables served as route between United States and Dutch East Indies; Guam-Yap-Shanghai as an alternative route between China and the United States via Guam.

cables (completed in 1872) connecting Possiet,<sup>5</sup> Bay-Nagasaki, Nagasaki-Shanghai, and Shanghai-Hongkong (via Amoy).

That this company received no special grant from the Chinese Government is clearly indicated in the following language from a despatch<sup>6</sup> addressed, under date of January 7, 1874, by the Danish Legation at Washington to the Department of State:

Although the company has not, for this reason, received a special and official authorization to lay cables along the coasts of China and to establish lines and stations in the aforesaid Chinese ports,<sup>7</sup> the local authorities have, nevertheless, tacitly recognized that the operations of the company are authorized.

Enclosed with this despatch and described by it as a "satisfactory reply" was a copy of a letter, addressed by the Honorable Anson Burlingame<sup>8</sup> on October 22, 1869, to a competent official<sup>9</sup> of the company, which gives further proof of the lack of any grant or unusual privilege and is of interest as evidencing the historic position of the United States, at the very beginning, with regard to cable or other monopolies in China—a position based upon the incontrovertible fact that (1) exclusive cable monopolies are derogatory to the best interests of China and (2) are in

defiance of rights of equal treatment stipulated in the treaties:<sup>10</sup>

In response to your inquiry in relation to telegraphs in China, I have to say that in 1865, as United States Minister, the Chinese Government, refusing to grant a right of way over land, consented that if a line should be laid in the sea it might be landed at the ports. This assent is attested by two interpreters, Dr. W. A. P. Martin and Dr. Williams, eminent sinologists.

By the favored nation clause<sup>11</sup> in the treaties with China, what is granted to one is granted to all, so that with the connection you propose by way of Possiet with Shanghai may be securely made."

It was not until 1874, however, that the American Government had occasion to state,<sup>12</sup> categorically, its disapproval of special consideration as based upon a monopoly, for the cables of any one country, following an attempt by the Great Northern Company to obtain the assistance of the Treaty Powers in securing Chinese Government protection for the company's lines in China. Subsequently the question, in its international aspects, of exclusive cable monopolies appears to have rested until 1881, when there came into the possession of the American Minister at Peking, the Honorable James B. Angell, a copy of an agreement<sup>13</sup> already signed (June 8, 1881) by Li Hung-chang, then the Viceroy of Chihli Province which, *inter alia*:

<sup>10</sup> The treaty obligations of the Chinese Government preclude it from creating any monopolies. In its treaty of 1858 (Tientsin) with the United States, the Chinese Government furthermore specifically agrees (*vide* Art. XXX, a "most-favored-nation" clause) that should it at any time "grant to any nation, or the merchants or citizens of any nation, any right, privilege, or favour connected, either with navigation, commerce, political or other intercourse, which is not conferred by this Treaty, such right, privilege and favour shall at once freely enure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants and citizens."

<sup>11</sup> *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1875, No. 146, p. 274.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* (1881), No. 164, p. 275.

<sup>5</sup> Near Vladivostok, the Asiatic terminus of the landlines. The Eastern Extension (British) cable Singapore-Hongkong was also laid in 1871; thenceforth the cable history of the Orient largely revolves about the activities of these two companies, their various extensions, inter-relations and agreements with Japan and particularly with China.

<sup>6</sup> *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1874, pp. 378-9, No. 193 and Inclosure.

<sup>7</sup> Shanghai and Amoy.

<sup>8</sup> Formerly American Minister to China and at that time the plenipotentiary head of a Chinese diplomatic mission to various foreign countries. The letter was addressed from the Chinese Legation, Copenhagen—*vide U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1874, pp. 379-80.

<sup>9</sup> Tietgen.

(1) Pledged the Chinese Government, for twenty years, to forbid any person or corporation, except the Great Northern Telegraph Company, to land telegraph cables anywhere in the Empire, including all foreign settlements and the Island of Formosa.

(2) Pledged the Chinese Government for the same period not to construct or permit others to construct submarine cables or telegraph lines in opposition to any of the Company's cables;

(3) Pledged the Chinese Government that should the Government decide upon establishing new telegraph lines preference should be given to the Great Northern Telegraph Company to do the work for the Government;

and

(4) Provided that all telegrams, if not otherwise directed by the senders, were to be transmitted by the northern route, *i.e.*, the route of the Great Northern Telegraph Company.

In a prompt protest Mr. Angell pointed out that such exclusive privileges would enable the company to maintain a high tariff to burden Chinese and foreign merchants, and would prevent the development of competing and alternate routes and the laying of a cable between China and the United States. In reporting his protest,<sup>13</sup> which received the approval of the American Government, Mr. Angell, under date of June 20, 1881, wrote:

Remembering that it was largely due to the hearty co-operation of the representatives of other Powers than Denmark with the accomplished Minister from that state, who first came here to secure a concession for the Northern Company, that his effort was successful, and that it has been the uniform policy of the Western Powers to secure for all nations the commercial advantages gained in China for any one, you may well believe that the news of this attempt of the Danish Company to secure a twenty years'

monopoly awakened in the Legations at Peking other feelings than mere surprise.

Mr. Angell continued to protest vigorously, with the result that Prince Kung, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs, addressed a communication<sup>14</sup> to him on August 7, 1881, which stated:

The request made by the Great Northern Telegraph Company has special reference to their cable already landed in China. If your country proposes to lay a cable across the Pacific Ocean to China, it will of course not come under these rules. Your despatch also says the Danish Company has never proposed to lay a line between America and China. This is true. A line from America to China would be a different route. The northern and southern cables of the Great Northern Telegraph Company are lines from China to Europe and are different from an American line. If hereafter an American company lays a cable from San Francisco via the Sandwich Islands to Japan it can in no way concern the Great Northern Telegraph Company; but when a cable from Japan to China is contemplated it will be well to communicate in advance with this office that we may write to the Viceroy Li, who will order the Great Northern Telegraph Company to consult thereon and make a compromise. It never was intended, as your despatch intimates, to make a compromise, by treating the Danish company generously to the exclusion of an American company.

In a further communication<sup>15</sup> of August 14, 1881, and in the course of a reply, dated December 14, 1881, to a communication from the American Chargé d'Affaires, Prince Kung reaffirmed his promises concerning possible further American cable projects. Nevertheless, in 1882, he refused permission sought by a company of foreign merchants (with the support of the English, French, German and American Legations), to lay a cable Shanghai-Foochow-Amoy-Swato-Hongkong, on

<sup>14</sup> *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1881, No. 173, p. 294.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 173, p. 295.

<sup>13</sup> *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1881, No. 164, p. 275.



the ground that it would conflict with the agreement<sup>16</sup> entered into with the Great Northern Company, although, in the same communication, he again promised that satisfactory arrangements would be made in the event that an American company should desire to lay a cable from Japan to China.<sup>17</sup>

Shortly thereafter the Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Company (British), which in 1871 had laid a cable Singapore-Hongkong and which apparently considered the move for an independent cable an interference with its rights, ordered the laying of a cable from Hongkong to Shanghai and, despite great opposition by the Great Northern, persuaded the latter not only to permit the accomplishment of the project, but also to revise the relations between the two companies in favor of the Eastern Extension Company.

This company also laid a cable in 1884, under a grant from the Spanish Government, from Hongkong to the Island of Luzon which was later augmented by various extensions in the Philippines, and in 1887 notified its shareholders that it had come to an understanding<sup>18</sup> with the Chinese Foreign Office and that "for the next sixteen years we shall be able to look at the growth in the China trade without any fear of undue competition."

The next important development occurred in 1896. Under date of July 11 of that year an agreement,<sup>19</sup> to remain

in force until December 31, 1910, was entered into between both companies and the Chinese Telegraph Administration, providing that rates on messages between China (including Hongkong), Europe (Russia excepted), America and (when transiting Europe) all countries beyond Europe, were to be the same by all routes of the companies and of the Administration, and providing for a joint purse arrangement shared by all parties to the agreement. On May 13 of the following year, China and the Great Northern Company arranged a telegraph convention, to be identically enduring, and also providing for a joint purse, with a view "to equalize the total charges by their respective routes in Asia between China and Russia." A further article<sup>20</sup> was added to this convention under date of March 6, 1899, providing:

That in the interest of both parties to the Agreement, dated the 13th May, 1897, and for the same term of years, that is, until the 31st December, 1910, no other party will be allowed without the consent of both the said parties to land telegraph cables on the coast of China and islands belonging thereto, or to work such cables in connection with the Chinese lines, or otherwise to establish telegraph connection which might create competition with or injure the interests of the existing lines belonging to China or to the Great Northern Telegraph Company of Copenhagen. This shall, however, not prevent the Chinese Government from establishing local internal cables where no competition can arise, nor from consenting to the junction by cable of Port Arthur with the Russian telegraph system for the exchange of limitrophe local traffic; neither shall it prevent the transmission of terminal Formosa traffic over the Foochow-Formosa cable now belonging to Japan, whilst other traffic must not be exchanged by this line except with the consent of China and of the Great Northern Telegraph Company of Copenhagen.

<sup>16</sup> *U. S. Foreign Relations*, 1883, No. 68, pp. 142-152.

<sup>17</sup> In Japan telegraphs and cables are a government monopoly and the Great Northern's agreement with Japan would probably have prevented the laying of such a cable.

<sup>18</sup> There is, however, no available record of the terms of this understanding or knowledge of its ratification.

<sup>19</sup> MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, No. 1896/3, pp. 58, et seq.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 1897/2, p. 103.

In the fall of 1899, the disastrous conditions in China growing out of the Boxer uprising made imperative an extension northward of the British company's cables then terminating at Woosung.<sup>21</sup> The British Government approached the Eastern Extension Company with regard to a desired Chefoo-Weihaiwei<sup>22</sup> cable, but the company intimated that it had already been requested<sup>23</sup> by the local Chinese Telegraph Administration to extend the company's system to Chefoo and Taku<sup>24</sup> and the negotiations accordingly

resulted in the conclusion between the Chinese Administration and the Great Northern and Eastern Extension Companies of an arrangement [subsequently embodied in Agreements dated 4th August and 27th October, 1900] for the establishment of cable communications under the complete control of the companies between Shanghai, Chefoo and Taku, with the right to lay branch lines from Chefoo to Weihaiwei, Port Arthur and Kiao-Chau to meet the requirements of the British, Russian and German Governments respectively. The Chinese Administration further agreed to extend up to the 31st December, 1930, all existing Agreements and Concessions between it and the Companies.

These agreements (one made while foreigners were besieged in Peking and there existed no government competent to make such an agreement, and the other while Peking was occupied by a joint international military force) may perhaps be considered of questionable

validity and, so far as is known, have never been published, although what purports to be their substance is set forth in the agreement<sup>25</sup> of April 23, 1901, indicating that their net result was to provide the cable companies, at Chinese expense, with a cable Shanghai (Woosung)-Chefoo-Taku, and to extend the alleged monopolies until December 31, 1930.

The agreements were further fortified under date of December 22, 1913, when an article was added to the agreement of July 11, 1896, between the Chinese Telegraph Administration and the Great Northern and Eastern Extension Companies, reading:

... till the 31st December, 1930, no other party will be allowed without the consent of both the said parties to land telegraph cables on the coast of China and islands belonging thereto, or to work such cables in connection with the Chinese lines, or otherwise to establish telegraph connections which might create competition with, or injure the interests of the existing lines belonging to China or to the cable companies. This shall, however, not prevent . . . the transmission of terminal Formosa traffic over the Foochow-Formosa cable now belonging to Japan, whilst other traffic must not be exchanged by this line except with the consent of China and of the cable companies.<sup>26</sup>

This article, which closely follows the text, and is an extension for twenty years of the agreement of March 6, 1899, is obviously a confirmation of the agreements made in the turbulent times of August and October, 1900.

Several other telegraph agreements have been concluded between the Chinese Government (or its administrative departments) and the Great Northern and Eastern Extension Companies and various governments, providing for

<sup>21</sup> Near Shanghai.

<sup>22</sup> In the negotiations for the rendition to the Chinese Government of the British Leased Territory of Weihaiwei, begun in September, 1922, but not yet concluded, the British have offered the Chefoo-Weihaiwei cable to the Chinese Government as a "free gift."

<sup>23</sup> MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, No. 1901/1 (*British Treasury Minute*), p. 273.

<sup>24</sup> At the mouth of the North River (Pei Ho), connecting Tientsin with the Gulf of Chihli.

<sup>25</sup> MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, No. 1901/1, p. 269.

<sup>26</sup> MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, No. 1896/3, p. 67.

loans, arrangements for the leasing of wires, exchange of traffic at frontiers, etc., and, while the provisions of all the agreements are not known, the texts of those which are available indicate that every effort has been made to protect and strengthen the alleged monopolies.

#### THE TRANS-PACIFIC CABLE

Throughout the latter part of the 19th century the United States was becoming cognizant of the needs of a trans-Pacific cable and for a number of years various projects were placed before Congress for a government cable to the Philippines or the granting of a cable subsidy, which culminated in a bill passed by the Senate on April 11, 1900, providing that the government lay a trans-Pacific cable at public expense.

That the British company had been looking with apprehension at the possibility of finding its high-rate traffic from Europe to Asia undermined by a lower-rate trans-Pacific cable, and was closely following these developments, was evidenced the following year by the appearance before the House Committee on Inter-state and Foreign Commerce of a representative of the British interests who claimed that, under a Spanish concession, the Eastern Extension possessed a monopoly of cable communications with and between the former Spanish islands in the Pacific Ocean.<sup>27</sup>

Meanwhile (October 6, 1900), Great Britain and Germany concluded an

agreement<sup>28</sup> which the United States was invited to accept and which, in the first "principle," stated:

It is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade, and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction; and the two Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory as far as they can exercise influence.

Secretary Hay's reply,<sup>29</sup> dated October 16, 1900, is of interest as indicating both the American Government's ignorance of the alleged monopolies in China and the previously professed adherence of various powers to the principle of the open door which the monopoly agreements attempt to violate:

The United States have heretofore made known their adoption of both these principles. During the last year this Government invited<sup>30</sup> the Powers interested in China to join in an expression of views and purposes in the direction of impartial trade with that country, and received satisfactory assurances to that effect from all of them. When the recent troubles were at their height this Government, on the 3rd July, once more made an announcement of its policy regarding impartial trade and the integrity of the Chinese Empire and had the gratification of learning that all the Powers held similar views. And since that time the most gratifying harmony has existed among all the nations concerned as to the ends to be pursued, and there has been little divergence of opinion as to the details of the course to be followed.

Subsequently (October 31, 1902) the

<sup>27</sup> Later the company unsuccessfully brought certain suits against the United States (231 U. S. 326; 251 U. S. 355). A Spanish concession also gave the Eastern Extension a monopoly until May 8, 1940, of the operation of cables between Manila and Hongkong which the United States has, of course, never recognized. Telegraphs and radio in the Philippines are operated by the Insular Government.

<sup>28</sup> MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, No. 1900/5, p. 263.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 1900/5, p. 265.

<sup>30</sup> For texts of communications and replies vide MacMurray, *Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China*, No. 1900/2, p. 221, et seq.

British cable<sup>31</sup> from Vancouver to Doubtless Bay, New Zealand, and Brisbane, Australia, was completed, so that when Congress again considered the trans-Pacific cable situation the government faced what was practically a *fait accompli*. A cable from American territory to the Far East was inevitable, however, and private projects were not abandoned. The Commercial Pacific Cable Company was formed and in 1902, 1903 and 1906 laid cables resulting in the present system<sup>32</sup> which, of course, further precluded the possibility, at that time, of a government trans-Pacific cable. In connection with these enterprises and the much discussed possibility of a government-owned or subsidized cable, it is of particular interest that in 1921 the president of this company, Mr. Clarence H. Mackay, testified<sup>33</sup> before a Congressional committee that one-fourth of the company's stock was owned by the Great Northern Company, one-fourth by the Eastern Telegraph Company, and one-fourth by the Eastern Extension—in other words by the very company (and its parent company) which had protested against the American Government project and the two companies claiming exclusive cable privileges in China!

The first actual penetration by "outside" interests of the field of the alleged monopolies occurred in 1904. On July 26 of that year, contracts (to run for thirty years) were made between the companies asserting the

monopolies, the Commercial Pacific and a Dutch-German company,<sup>34</sup> under which the latter were permitted to land cables at Shanghai from Manila and Yap, respectively, and the necessary revision of existing contracts between the Great Northern and the Eastern Extension and the Chinese Telegraph Administration was accomplished. Although none of the agreements were made public, it is understood that the Commercial Pacific and the Dutch-German Company were admitted to a joint purse arrangement and the two companies agreed neither to extend their cable system on Chinese territory, construct telegraph lines, use wireless, nor by any other means attempt any competition with the Chinese Administration's inland or coast traffic. The American landing license accepted by the Commercial Pacific provides for the possible purchase of the cable by the United States, but a clause of the contract also provides for the termination of the agreement in the event of government purchase.

Further Dutch-German cables, laid in 1905 under subsidies from the Dutch and German governments, comprise the most recent cable enterprise in the Western Pacific. These cables, Menado-Yap, Yap-Shanghai and Yap-Guam,<sup>35</sup> connected China with the Dutch Government's extensive East India system and connect with the Commercial Pacific cable at Guam. Since that time various other projects have been contemplated but apparently without material result.

<sup>31</sup> Owned by the British Government, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and operated by a joint cable board. See Footnote No. 1, p. 71.

<sup>32</sup> See Footnote No. 1, p. 71.

<sup>33</sup> *Hearings on S. 4301 before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 1921, p. 269.*

<sup>34</sup> *Deutsch-Niederlaendische Telegraphen-Gesellschaft.*

<sup>35</sup> The Dutch-German cables were ceded to the Principal Allied and Associated Governments by Part VIII, Annex VII, Treaty of Versailles.



# Electrical Communications in the Pacific

By WALTER S. ROGERS

Chairman, of a Committee Appointed by National Social Research Council, to Inquire into International Communications and Opinion

PUT as briefly as possible the facilities now providing services across the Pacific are: (1) a commercial cable system operating a cable San Francisco-Honolulu-Guam, a cable Guam-Bonin Islands (Japan), a cable Guam-Manila-Shanghai, and making connection at Guam with a cable that at Yap connects with a cable to the Dutch East Indies; (2) commercial radiostations at San Francisco and Honolulu that exchange traffic mainly with Japanese government stations; (3) American government radio stations providing services mainly between continental United States, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Philippines, but narrowly restricted by Congress with regard to handling commercial traffic; (4) a cable system, connecting Canada with Australasia, owned and operated by Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Looked at from the broad point of view that communication facilities are highways that should be ample in capacity and operated at rates sufficiently low to stimulate commerce and to encourage a generous stream of news, the situation as to communications between the United States and the Orient is far from satisfactory. Aside from the question as to whether, under the particular conditions, private enterprise is ever likely to meet needs so broadly conceived, the present situation is traceable in a large part to concessions granted by China.

## CHINESE MONOPOLY CONCESSIONS

A British and a Danish cable company together claim a monopoly over

Chinese external communications until the beginning of the year 1931. This monopoly first appeared in agreements dated August 4, and October 27, 1900. The agreements were negotiated in secret and were kept secret. The dates are important, for on the former date the foreign legations in Peking were being besieged and on the latter date an Allied military force was in occupation of the city. China was in chaos, and it is difficult to conceive of any Chinese official or body in position to grant such sweeping rights. Although the Allied Powers were presumably acting together and in good faith, there is evidence that the British Government at least knew what was going on and was quite ready to give its blessing.

The substance of the agreements first became known publicly through a Treasury Minute that came before Parliament in reference to an agreement between the Government and the British cable company. In the course of the discussion, May, 1901, in the British Parliament, Sir Charles Dilke said:

The effect of the agreement would be that the Governments were binding themselves to maintain for the two companies concerned—the Eastern Extension and the Great Northern—a monopoly in the work of all Chinese submarine lines. But the declared policy of the United States Government is to establish direct communication with China, and this agreement would bind the British Government to resist that.

With the acquisition by the United States of the Hawaiian Islands and of the Philippines, it became apparent that a trans-Pacific cable was inevi-

table. Such a cable had been talked of for many years. In 1899 President McKinley directed the attention of Congress to the need for a cable. The subject was taken up by committees of the House and of the Senate.

The British and Danish companies were following developments, and they, naturally enough, sought the monopoly concession with a view to strengthening their position in the Far East and to preventing the laying of a cable to China, except upon such terms as they might determine. As part of their "digging-in" efforts, the British cable company secured at Madrid, only a few months before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, a monopoly concession covering the Philippines.

There is no doubt that the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States led to grave apprehension in British official circles as to the part America would in future play in the Far East. And it was evident that a direct cable between the United States and the Orient, providing services at low rates, would undoubtedly help extend American political, press and commercial influence.

#### U. S. CABLE ACTIVITIES IN ORIENT

When in 1902 Congress again took up the subject of a trans-Pacific cable, a representative of certain American telegraph-cable interests informed a committee that a cable would be laid and that no subsidy would be asked. The subject, therefore, was dropped. So far as the writer is aware, no one in Congress knew of the Chinese monopoly grant or that the American company to be organized for the purpose of laying and operating a Pacific cable would in fact be a creature of the British and Danish cable companies. The first public admission of the fact of foreign stock ownership in the company—again so far as the writer knows—was made

by an official of the company before a committee of the Senate in 1921.

The cable monopoly agreements of 1900 were reaffirmed in 1913—again secretly. The circumstances under which the monopoly was first obtained and the secrecy about its reaffirmation have resulted in the creation of a particularly sore spot in Anglo-American relations.

In 1918 a contract and certain supplemental agreements were made by the Chinese Ministry of the Navy and the Japanese firm of Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., for the construction of a radio station in the neighborhood of Peking capable of direct communication with Japan, America and Europe. A provision in one of the supplemental agreements reads:

During the period of 30 years mentioned in Article 4 of the Contract, the Government shall not permit any other person or firm to erect, nor shall it erect by itself any wireless station in China for the purpose of communicating with any foreign country.

Reference is made to the cable monopoly, the idea apparently being that either the Mitsui would come to some agreement with the cable companies or the radio station would not be used to compete with them until after the expiration of their monopoly.

In the following year the Chinese Ministry of War and Marconi's Wireless Telegraph Company, Ltd. (British), entered into an agreement that led to the formation of the Chinese National Wireless Telegraph Company, a joint stock company owned by the Chinese Government and the Marconi company. The object of the company is given as being to manufacture and deal in wireless telegraph and telephone apparatus, etc., and to repair and maintain wireless installations, but not to operate stations.

It is further provided that

if goods supplied by the Chinese company are not lower in quality nor higher in price than those offered by other companies, the Government will purchase exclusively from the Chinese company all its present and future requirements in wireless telegraph and telephone apparatus, materials and supplies, and further if the Government suffers no loss by giving such work to the Chinese company, the Chinese company shall be exclusively entrusted with the repair and maintenance of all wireless telegraph and telephone apparatus and equipment in China.

The agreement is to run twenty years.

Early in 1921 an agreement was entered into between the Chinese Minister of Communications and an American company, the Federal Telegraph Company of California, providing for the construction and operation of a high-power radio station capable of communication with the United States and of certain secondary stations. The agreement, which has since been modified, is complicated and not easy to summarize. Reduced to lowest terms it provides both for the construction of the stations for the account of the Chinese Government and for their operation for a period of years by a "China-Federal Radio Administration" representative of both the government and the company. The agreement, with the consent of the Chinese Government, has been transferred from the Federal Telegraph Company of California to the Federal Telegraph Company of Delaware, in which the California company and the Radio Corporation of America are interested, with the latter predominating.

The British, Danish and Japanese governments, acting in behalf of their respective nationals who claim exclusive or preferential rights, have protested vigorously against the Federal

Agreement and have used their influence to prevent its being carried into effect. The American Government has given diplomatic support to the Federal, insisting that the monopolistic provisions are violative of American treaty rights and of the principle of the open door.

The opposition has been sufficiently strong to prevent the erection of the Federal stations. In the American view, China in not carrying out its part of the Federal Agreement is not living up to its legal and moral obligations. The station provided by the Mitsui agreement has been erected but does not handle trans-Pacific traffic.

#### AT THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The subject of trans-Pacific communication—what was really meant was the controversy over the Chinese concessions—was on the Agenda of the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament, but for a variety of reasons was not taken up for definite consideration. A suggestion was made to the American delegation that certain British, French, American and Japanese radio interests be permitted, working in conjunction, to develop Chinese high-power radio, but the suggestion did not meet with approval. M. Viviani offered a resolution covering substantially the same idea. It was side-tracked.

Immediately following the Conference, representatives of Great Britain, France, Japan and the United States, acting informally, undertook to devise a scheme that would iron out the conflicting interests and would be fair to the interested companies and to the public. While the representatives agreed upon a plan, nothing much has come of it.

The conflicts between the various commercial interests involved go on, as do the conflicts between the govern-

ments supporting their respective nationals. Without first-hand knowledge of the correspondence exchanged between the powers and of current negotiations between the various interests, it is quite impossible to appraise the present situation.

Should the Mitsui radio monopoly be sustained it would result in a Japanese company straddling wireless communication between the United States and China. This would be flatly contrary to a policy that the American Government has come to adopt with regard to international communications. In part as a result of discussions over the distribution of the German cables that were seized during the war and over the landing of an American cable at Miami that gave entrance into the United States to a British cable system operating in South America, the State Department now presses for direct communication, wherever possible, between the United States and other countries, free from control of intermediate interests.

A settlement of the Chinese radio issue along the lines proposed at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, namely, a development jointly by American, British, French and Japanese commercial radio interests, would not be in harmony with this policy. The two European interests would probably seek to secure preferential services and rates for Far Eastern-European traffic. Japanese interests would favor low rates between China and Japan and high rates between China and other countries. What the American Government is really aiming at is direct radio services between China and the United States free from any extraneous control and providing services that will further Chinese-American trade and political relations.

#### DESIRE FOR PREFERENTIAL CONTACTS

Obviously underneath the struggles for control of Chinese external communications is the desire on the part of the various nations to secure preferential communication contacts. This is particularly important in regard to press messages. Nominal press rates, for example, between the United States and China would undoubtedly greatly increase the volume of news moving between the two countries and would free both countries from considerable dependence on British, French, Japanese and other outside news services.

No settlement that comes from adjustment of the present conflicting interests is likely to result in the north Pacific area having a broadly conceived communication system—cable and radio—operated in the interests of all with a view to furthering trade and news intercourse. Such a system could be devised and developed were the countries concerned disposed to cooperate in a constructive endeavor. It would not necessarily involve government operation, though it might involve the countries singly or together providing certain of the more expensive and basic facilities.

There is no inherent reason why the countries concerned cannot develop their communication contacts according to plan and by common action. This is precisely what has been done in connection with the Canadian-Australasian cable system which, as stated above, is owned and operated by Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The cables of the system are being duplicated. Rates are very much lower than those charged for roughly similar services on the north Pacific cable system. The British system is an outstanding social fact, contributing day by day to empire unity and to the development of Australasia.



# China's Post-War Trade

By JULEAN ARNOLD

American Commercial Attaché to China, U. S. Department of Commerce

IN considering the subject of China's post-war trade, it is necessary to cover in some detail the conditions prior thereto. The Portuguese as early as 1516 entered into direct trade contact with China. Spanish, Dutch and British traders followed. With the inception of the American Republic, the American clipper ship became an important factor in South China waters. It was not, however, until the middle of the 19th century that China was formally opened to the trade of the Western world. In fact, it may be said that the foreign trader's contact with China prior to the year 1870 was limited to certain coast and river ports accessible thereto. In exports to China, this trade prior to 1870 consisted in the main of opium and cotton goods. In imports from China, tea and silk constituted the bulk of the commerce.

Although treaties of trade and commerce were consummated between China and Western nations during the years 1842 and 1843 and as a result certain designated ports were formally opened to foreign trade, yet it was not until the last decade of the 19th century that the Chinese themselves exhibited an interest in commercial intercourse with the outside world. China's geographical isolation, its huge continental proportions, its tendency to wall itself off from the outside world, the self-sufficient nature of its society, its racial homogeneity, the uniqueness of its civilization and its lack of adequate internal communications, all militated against an expeditious develop-

ment of contact with the outside world.

Chinese imports for 1880, valued at Haikuan taels 80,000,000, comprised: opium 40 per cent; cotton goods 30 per cent; metals 5 per cent; and sundries 25 per cent. Of exports for that year aggregating taels 78,000,000, tea comprised 50 per cent and silk 40 per cent. It was not until the decade preceding 1890 that Japanese goods achieved a position of consequence in the Chinese market. Simultaneously, Indian cotton yarn and Russian kerosene oil entered the China market. Chinese imports of kerosene oil which began with the year 1870 had by 1890 increased to 35,000,000 gallons, a ten-fold advance over the kerosene oil imports of 1880.

It was during 1890 that the smoke stacks of modern factories first appeared on the Chinese horizon. The early development of modern industrial plants in China had been under official or semi-official auspices rather than as private capital ventures. By 1890 Japan became a serious competitor with China in the world's silk trade and Japan, India and Ceylon in the world's tea trade.

China's imports for 1890 had increased 60 per cent over those of the previous decade while exports had advanced 12 per cent. Opium in 1890 represented 25 per cent of China's total imports. The Chinese Customs trade reports for 1890 comment freely upon the substantial advances in the sales of American cotton drills, sheetings and jeans in the various ports of China. Had the American cotton manufacturers followed this lead they

could have undoubtedly occupied a very strong position in the cotton piece goods trade of China to-day, but British and Japanese competition eventually overcame the strong position which the American cotton manufacturers had achieved in the Chinese market at the end of the 19th century.

China's trade for the year 1910 aggregated tael 844,000,000 or three times the totals for the twenty years' previous. Table 1 exhibits an interesting contrast between the nature of China's imports for 1910 as compared with those for the year 1923. It is interesting to note that the aggregate of China's imports for 1910 were tael 463,000,000 as compared with tael 923,000,000 for 1923, an increase of 100 per cent.

#### COTTON INDUSTRY

The prominent position occupied by cotton yarn and cotton goods in China's foreign trade of this period is noteworthy. Cotton yarn, however, fell in its relative position of importance from first place to sixth place in Chinese exports; and dropped in value from tael 61,000,000 to tael 42,000,000. On the other hand China's consumption of cotton yarn during the thirteen years in question increased very considerably. The development of the modern cotton spinning industry in China accounts for the change. This is borne out by the increased importance of China's imports of raw cotton which in 1910 amounted to tael 4,500,000 and in 1923 increased to tael 54,000,000. In other words, raw cotton advanced from Item No. 17 to Item No. 4 in relative importance in China's imports during this period. The war gave a very considerable impetus to the development of the cotton spinning industry in China. Prior to the war, there were but 500,000 spindles in operation in the country, whereas there

are now over 3,000,000 in modern cotton spinning plants. Of these, 40 per cent represent Japanese-owned or controlled mills and about 10 per cent British owned or controlled, the balance being under Chinese capital and operation. The highly inflated industrial situation which developed in Japan as a result of the war lent a considerable impetus to the investments of Japanese capital, in the cotton manufacturing industry of China. Furthermore, the Japanese government encourages investments of Japanese capital in China. In addition to the stimulus of high prices accompanying the war conditions, the anti-Japanese boycott in China helped to popularize home industry among the Chinese masses with the result that the native cotton industry profited by a condition incident to the war.

In 1910 cotton goods followed close after cotton yarn in relative importance in Chinese import trade. By 1923, however, cotton piece goods advanced to first place, representing 14 per cent of the total of imports and netted tael 132,000,000 or more than 100 per cent advance over the imports of 1910. It is interesting to note, however, that Chinese imports of cotton piece goods for 1920 netted tael 147,000,000; thus while the manufacture of cotton piece goods in China has not advanced with the same strides which have marked the development of the cotton spinning industry, yet it has achieved a place now which indicates that China is rapidly forging ahead in supplying her domestic needs of this commodity. Of the 22,500 modern power looms now in operation in China, 60 per cent are Chinese-owned and controlled and about 25 per cent Japanese; the remainder represent mainly British investment and control. It is well, however, to bear in mind that with the improvement of economic

TABLE 1—CHINA'S IMPORTS IN 1910 AND 1923

No. of Item	Principal Items of 1910 Imports	Per Cent of Total Trade	Value in Haikuan Taels	No. of Item	Principal Items of 1923 Imports	Per Cent of Total Trade	Value in Haikuan Taels
1	Cotton yarn	13%	61,500,000	1'	Cotton goods	14%	132,000,000
2	Cotton goods	13%	60,000,000	2'	Rice	10½%	98,000,000
3	Opium	12%	55,500,000	3'	Kerosene	6%	58,000,000
4	Rice	7%	31,000,000	4'	Raw cotton	6%	54,000,000
5	Metals	6%	26,000,000	5'	Sugar	5½%	50,000,000
6	Kerosene (161,000,000 gal.)	5%	22,000,000	6'	Cotton yarn	4½%	42,000,000
7	Sugar	4½%	21,000,000	7'	Cigarettes and tobacco	4½%	41,000,000
8	Railway materials	3%	15,000,000	7'	Metals	4½%	41,000,000
9	Marine products	2%	12,500,000	8'	Machinery	4%	35,700,000
10	Machinery	2%	9,000,000	9'	Flour	3%	27,200,000
11	Cigarettes and tobacco	2%	9,000,000	10'	Marine products	3%	25,000,000
12	Coal	2%	8,000,000	11'	Dyes	2½%	22,100,000
13	Dyes	1½%	7,600,000	12'	Woollen goods	2%	19,000,000
14	Matches	1%	5,300,000	13'	Paper	2%	16,600,000
15	Woollen goods		5,300,000	14'	Coal	1½%	13,000,000
16	Leather		5,000,000	15'	Clothing and hats	1½%	12,800,000
17	Cotton, raw		4,500,000	16'	Lumber	1%	9,600,000
18	Paper		4,200,000	17'	Wheat	1%	9,100,000
19	Flour		3,500,000	18'	Railway materials	1%	9,000,000
20	Tea		3,300,000	19'	Medicines		7,700,000
21	Medicines		3,000,000	20'	Leather		7,000,000
22	Wines, beers, etc.		3,000,000	21'	Copper ingots and slabs		3,800,000
23	Clothing and hats		2,500,000	22'	Wines, beers, etc.		5,200,000
24	Soap		2,000,000	23'	Bags		4,300,000
25	Cement		1,500,000	24'	Paraffine Wax		4,000,000
26	Building materials		1,300,000	25'	Fertilizers		4,000,000
27	Hardware		1,200,000	26'	Building materials		3,400,000
28	Needles		1,000,000	27'	Lubricating oil		3,300,000
29	Glass ware		1,000,000	28'	Soda		3,300,000
30	Hosiery		1,000,000	29'	Cement		3,300,000
31	Soda		1,000,000	30'	Chemicals		3,200,000
32	Stationery		1,000,000	31'	Sugar candy		3,200,000
33	Candles		1,000,000	32'	Soap		2,900,000
34	Window glass		900,000	33'	Perfumes		2,800,000
35	Haberdashery		900,000	34'	Tinfoil		2,600,000
36	Lamps and lampware		800,000	35'	Paints		2,500,000
37	Ginseng		800,000	36'	Stationery		2,300,000
38	Paint		700,000	37'	Motor cars		2,200,000
39	Boots and shoes		600,000	38'	Window glass		2,000,000
40	Clocks and watches		700,000	39'	Rubber		2,000,000
41	Condensed milk		500,000	40'	Clocks and watches		2,000,000
				41'	Ginseng		1,800,000
				42'	Lamps and lampware		1,600,000
				43'	Condensed milk		1,600,000
				44'	Glass and glassware		1,500,000
				45'	Hand tools		1,400,000
				46'	Photographic materials		1,300,000
				47'	Hosiery		1,100,000
				48'	Printing and lithographing materials		1,100,000
				49'	Needles		1,100,000
				50'	Matches		1,000,000
				51'	Telephone and telegraph materials		1,000,000
				52'	Scientific instruments		1,000,000
				53'	Cigars		900,000

Note: For the year 1910, one tael is equivalent to U. S. gold \$0.66  
 " " " 1923. " " " " " " " " \$0.80





has now upwards of 400 electric light plants, the majority, however, being of small capacity but aggregating a total of 250,000 k.w. units. With the further industrialization of the country we shall witness increasing imports in electrical machinery and equipment. It is significant that China has not yet developed one horse power of hydro-electric power despite its latent resources in this direction.

China's increased imports of sugar advancing from taels 21,000,000 in 1910 to taels 50,000,000 in 1923 are also indicative of the improved economic conditions and increased purchasing power on the part of the masses. To a certain extent this may also be said of its increased imports of cigarettes and tobacco, which advanced in value from an aggregate of taels 9,000,000 in 1910 to taels 41,000,000 in 1923. Thirty years ago, China was not a consequential importer of tobacco and was not then a consumer of cigarettes. It is estimated that the people of China now consume annually about 60 thousand million cigarettes. Large quantities of these are being manufactured in China with tobacco imported from the United States and improved tobacco produced in China from American seed. The development of the cigarette trade in China demonstrates the increasing purchasing power of the masses.

Although Chinese imports of coal in actual value increased in 1923 by 60 per cent over those of 1910, yet by 1923, its exports of coal exceeded its imports, which was not true for the year 1910. The coal mines of China produce from 20 to 25 million tons annually compared to America's 500,000,000 tons. In coal resources China is estimated to be the richest country on the Pacific, excepting the United States. The opening of China's resources in coal await economic internal transportation, and organized capital.

In dyes, especially artificial indigo, Chinese imports advanced from taels 7,600,000 in 1910 to taels 22,000,000 in 1923. During the war years the country reverted to the production and consumption of vegetable dyes, but with the conclusion of the war, this industry has again given way to the imported coal tar products, the imports of which will undoubtedly increase from year to year.

In no one item is the development of modern industry better exemplified than in that of matches. In 1910 matches were fourteenth in importance in China's imports, amounting to taels 5,000,000, whereas in 1923 they fell to fifty-one in relative importance with aggregate imports of about taels 1,000,000. In fact China may now be regarded as an exporter rather than an importer of this commodity.

The increasing importance of such items as metals, machinery, hardware, window glass, paint, building materials, scientific instruments, lubricating oil, hand tools, etc., are indicative of the modern industrial development which is at its inception in this mediaeval economic society. Modern cities are arising in this ancient civilization. Shanghai, a city of two million inhabitants, presents the appearance of a very modern commercial metropolis with its luxurious modern bank, business, industrial and residential buildings.

The fourfold increase in China's imports of paper for 1923 as compared with those for the year 1910 are due in the main to the growth of the modern newspaper in China. This is in keeping with the advance of nationalism and improved educational methods.

During the war years, China became a large exporter of wheat and flour and the flour milling industry made great strides, but with the lowered prices of wheat and flour, following the war, China again became an importer of

these commodities. It is interesting to note that China's flour imports for 1923 aggregated tael 27,000,000, ninth in importance on the list of imported commodities. The 1924 figures indicate still further increases, the flour imports for that year aggregating 4,530,000 barrels valued at tael 30,000,000. However, this trade depends upon the wheat crop conditions in China as well as several other variable factors, so that it may be expected there will be heavy fluctuations from time to time. Bad internal communications, unfavorable political conditions, and antiquated farming methods militate against China's rapid emergence into the category of a regular exporter of flour. The aggregate daily capacity of its one hundred and sixty modern flour mills is 120,000 barrels. Manchuria, with Harbin as a center, represents the largest aggregate output. Kiang-su Province, with Shanghai and Wusih as centers, is second in importance; Tsinan in Shantung is rapidly forging to the front in the flour milling industry. Tientsin and Hankow follow as fourth and fifth in order of importance. The bulk of the capital in the industry is Chinese. Russian, Japanese and British owned mills follow in the order mentioned.

In the 1923 table of imports, lumber assumes a position of considerable importance, aggregating for the year nearly tael 10,000,000. Chinese resources in available, accessible timber are very poor. It will undoubtedly be some years before the Manchurian and Siberian stands of timber are brought into contact with economic transportation so as to make them available for the increasing consumption of lumber in China.

#### TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES

While the gospel of good roads is being preached throughout the length and breadth of the country, yet the chaotic internal political conditions are

delaying extensive work in this direction. There are probably 10,000 miles of graded roads over which motor transportation can be operated. In the aggregate there are not more than 15,000 motor vehicles in use in the whole of China, but the numbers are increasing year after year.

The European war put a damper upon continued railway construction in China. Internal disorders and chaotic conditions of the government finances have militated against the resumption of a railway building program since the war. However, in spite of this condition, Belgian capitalists are constructing in Central China 1200 miles of strategic commercial railways. The international banking consortium was organized in October, 1920, primarily to assist China in its needed railway construction, but has not yet functioned.

China has but 7000 miles of railways compared to America's 265,000. The country is larger in area and population than is the United States. It is estimated that China will require at least 100,000 miles of railways to meet its pressing transportation needs. This presents probably the most extensive undeveloped field for railway enterprise anywhere in the world. Six-sevenths of China's population is confined to one-third of the area of the country, due to lack of the economic transportation necessary to the opening of vast regions for settlement and development. Thus with the resumption of more favorable internal conditions and a straightening out of China's national finances, we may expect large importations of railway materials, which will undoubtedly have to be accompanied with importation of considerable of foreign capital to aid in financing these projects.

#### ANALYSIS OF CHINA'S EXPORTS

Table 2 presents a comparison between China's export trade for the

TABLE 2—CHINA'S EXPORTS 1910 AND 1923

No. of Item	Principal Items of 1910 Exports	Per Cent of Total Trade	Value in Haikuan Taels	No. of Item	Principal Items of 1923 Exports	Per Cent of Total Trade	Value in Haikuan Taels
1	Silk	21%	85,000,000	1'	Silk and silk goods	23%	170,000,000
2	Tea	9%	35,000,000	2'	Beans, bean cake and bean oil	15%	127,400,000
3	Raw cotton	8%	28,000,000	3'	Raw cotton	4%	32,600,000
4	Beans and bean cake	8%	27,000,000	4'	Eggs and egg products	4%	29,600,000
5	Hides and skins	4%	16,000,000	5'	Tea	3%	23,000,000
6	Sesamun seed	4%	14,500,000	6'	Timber	3%	20,700,000
7	Vegetable oils	3½%	13,200,000	7'	Coal	3%	20,300,000
8	Provisions and vegetables	3%	11,300,000	8'	Hides and skins	2½%	19,100,000
9	Straw broad	2%	7,700,000	9'	Peanuts and peanut oil	2½%	18,000,000
10	Tin	1½%	5,000,000	10'	Wood oil	2½%	17,500,000
11	Wool	1½%	5,000,000	11'	Wool	1½%	12,900,000
12	Bristles		4,500,000	12'	Sesamun seed	1½%	12,200,000
13	Cattle		4,500,000	13'	Millet and kaoliang	1½%	12,000,000
14	Mats and matting		4,300,000	14'	Pig iron and iron ore	1%	8,800,000
15	Fire crackers		4,000,000	15'	Bristles	1%	7,800,000
16	Eggs and egg products		4,000,000	16'	Tin slabs	1%	8,000,000
17	Paper		3,500,000	17'	Furs		5,600,000
18	Flour		3,500,000	18'	Straw braid		5,400,000
19	Peanuts		3,000,000	19'	Bran		5,000,000
20	Hair, human		3,000,000	20'	Hair nets		4,800,000
21	Tobacco, leaf and prepared		3,000,000	21'	Carpets		4,700,000
22	Furs		2,000,000	22'	Nankeens		4,700,000
23	China-ware		2,000,000	23'	Paper (Chinese)		4,500,000
24	Ramie Fiber		2,000,000	24'	Mats and matting		4,500,000
25	Nankeens		2,000,000	25'	Cotton yarn		4,400,000
26	Rape seed		2,000,000	26'	Lace		4,100,000
27	Coal		1,700,000	27'	Medicines		4,000,000
28	Vegetable tallow		1,600,000	28'	China-ware		3,300,000
29	Pig iron		1,500,000	29'	Intestines		3,300,000
30	Lard		1,300,000	30'	Frozen meats and game		3,100,000
31	Animal tallow		1,000,000	31'	Fire crackers		2,900,000
32	Nutgalls		1,000,000	32'	Ramie fiber		2,800,000
33	Antimony		1,000,000	33'	Grass cloth		2,500,000
				34'	Wheat		2,100,000
				35'	Rape seed		2,000,000
				36'	Cattle		1,600,000
				37'	Hemp		1,600,000
				38'	Antimony		1,500,000
				39'	Nutgalls		1,400,000
				40'	Watches		1,400,000
				41'	Camphor		1,400,000
				42'	Varnish		1,400,000
				43'	Feathers		1,300,000
				44'	Vegetable tallow		1,100,000
				45'	Licorice		1,000,000
				46'	Lard		1,000,000
				47'	Umbrellas		1,000,000

Note: For the year 1910, one tael is equivalent to U. S. gold \$0.66  
 " " " 1923, " " " " " " " " \$0.80

year 1910 and that for the year 1923. It will be noted in a perusal of this table that many new commodities are featured in the 1923 returns which did not appear in those for the year 1910. Probably the most interesting development in China's export trade during the past few decades has been the advancement of beans and bean products to a position of second in importance in the whole list of export commodities. For 1923 the aggregate value of soya beans, bean cake and bean oil amounted to taels 127,000,000 or 15 per cent of the total exports. Seventy per cent of China's soya beans are produced in Manchuria. The European war was partially responsible for the very considerable advance in China's vegetable oil trade. Peanuts and peanut oil, sesamun seed and sesamun seed oil and wood oil have also advanced to places of prominence in China's list of exports for 1923.

It is strange that China should be an exporter of raw cotton and at the same time consume increasingly larger quantities of foreign cotton. China's cotton is a short staple of kinky fiber, well adapted to the manufacture of blankets, hence finds a ready market in the United States for blanket manufacture. Furthermore, Japanese cotton mills draw upon Chinese cotton resources for short staple cotton for mixture with Indian and American cottons.

During the European war, China became an important source of supply for certain food products. Eggs and egg products, various seeds and nuts, frozen meats and wild game, lard and pork, all became prominently identified with China's list of export commodities. The egg and egg products trade has continued to grow, representing fourth now in the list of importance, aggregating taels 30,000,000 in value. This trade represents probably as many as one thousand million eggs a year.

There is no poultry industry in China, the eggs being collected in small quantities from market centers to which they are carried from the family farms, each of which keep but a few hens.

Incident to the war and more particularly to the Russian Revolution, China became an important source of supply for flour and grains for the Siberian population. Thus we witness a noticeable increase in exports of grains and flour from Manchuria over the border into Siberia. The raising of the economic level of Japan, attendant upon the European War, raised the Japanese standard of living to such an extent that Japan became a much heavier buyer of China's food products. Hence eggs, beef and other food products entered far more extensively into China's export trade with Japan as a result of the war than would have been possible otherwise. The disruption of the Russian bristle trade with the outside world has very materially advanced Chinese bristles in markets formerly supplied by Russia. It has also meant the substitution of black for the white Russian bristles.

The war assisted in advancing Chinese laces, embroideries and rugs to a position of prominence in the American market.

The paint and varnish industry of the United States has come to depend upon China as a source of supply for wood oil which is now used extensively in paint and varnish manufacture. China's wood oil exports now amount to nearly taels 20,000,000 the bulk of which goes to the United States.

Although China's exports of pig iron and iron ore, tin slabs and antimony are gradually increasing, yet the development of the mineral resources of the country are only at their inception and depend to a considerable extent upon improved internal communications. Probably nothing more clearly



indicates China's present day backwardness in the modern industrial and economic sense than does the fact that the country consumes only 1/180th as much iron and steel as does the United States and but 1/30th of the average for the world at large.

#### CHINA'S TRADE WITH VARIOUS FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In analyzing the customs returns of trade and allocating to various countries the shares due them, one is confronted with the anomalous position which the British colony at Hongkong occupies in China's foreign trade. Hongkong is merely a trans-shipping port. Exports from China to Hongkong are destined to other ports of the world, but in the customs returns of trade are accredited to Hongkong. Similarly imports landed at Hongkong and trans-shipped into China are in the customs returns of trade accredited as imports from Hongkong. This assists very materially in giving to Great Britain a degree of prominence in China's foreign trade to which it is not in reality entitled. In a smaller way, certain American goods trans-shipped from Japan to China are accredited to Japan and certain Chinese goods shipped to Japan and trans-shipped to the United States are accredited to Chinese export trade with Japan. Making allowance for the American trade with China through Hongkong we may credit America with 20 per cent of China's imports and 30 per cent of its exports for the year 1923. This means that the United States has increased its trade with China in the ten years from 1913 to 1923 nearly fourfold, aggregating in 1923 nearly tael 400,000,000 for combined exports and imports. The American population in China has increased fourfold since 1900, now aggregating 12,000 with a total of 600 American business

and professional firms throughout the country. The recent enactment of the China Trade Act by the U. S. Congress is calculated to place American business in China in a position better to be able to compete with the concerns of other nationalities in this country.

Japan may be credited with having advanced its trade with China nearly 300 per cent during that period. During the decade the aggregate foreign trade of China increased nearly 100 per cent. British trade with China during that period apparently did not keep pace with the general trade increase. In actual trade with China it is difficult to make the readjustments necessary on account of the anomalous position of Hongkong, but it would seem that Great Britain, Japan and the United States would, if this readjustment were properly made, be nearly on a plane of equality in the aggregate value of their respective trades with the Chinese republic. Germany is gradually recovering its pre-war position but is still far behind the three principal trading countries above mentioned.

#### SHIPPING TRADE WITH CHINA

Table 3 sets forth the share taken by each nationality in China's carrying trade. It is interesting to note that America's share in this tonnage increased 680 per cent for 1923 as compared with the figures for 1913, whereas British shipping during this period increased but 41 per cent and Japanese but 70 per cent. During 1923 America carried 10 per cent, Great Britain 35 per cent and Japan 32 per cent. In this connection it is necessary again to take cognizance of the anomalous position of Hongkong. Considerable American shipping destined to China entered the port of Hongkong. The cargo was disembarked there and carried on other than American ships

TABLE

1. Am  
2. Br  
3. D  
4. D  
5. F  
6. G  
7. It  
8. J  
9. N  
10. P  
11. R  
12. S  
13. S  
14. M  
15. C

Ame  
Dan  
Dut  
Port  
Chi  
Brit  
Tot

Ger  
Ru  
Ch

im  
the  
in

to  
to  
ac  
fo  
n  
E

TABLE 3—SHARE TAKEN BY EACH NATIONALITY IN CHINA'S CARRYING TRADE TO AND FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES  
*Foreign Import Trade*

Nationality (Flag)	Tonnage of Entries—1923 compared with 1913				
	Tonnage of Entries 1913	Proportion to the Total Tonnage	Tonnage of Entries 1923	Proportion to the Total Tonnage	Per Cent of Inc. or Dec.
1. American . . . . .	269,091	1.85%	2,100,926	10.22%	680% Inc.
2. British . . . . .	5,127,578	35.32%	7,259,706	35.31%	41.5% "
3. Danish . . . . .	43,338	0.29%	140,196	0.68%	200.4% "
4. Dutch . . . . .	161,779	1.04%	507,118	2.42%	213.5% "
5. French . . . . .	469,450	3.23%	600,212	2.91%	28% "
6. German . . . . .	1,405,086	9.68%	377,236	1.83%	73% Dec.
7. Italian . . . . .			83,944	0.40%	.....
8. Japanese . . . . .	3,882,664	26.74%	6,596,025	32.08%	70% Inc.
9. Norwegian . . . . .	167,196	1.15%	200,729	0.97%	20% "
10. Portuguese . . . . .	63,451	0.44%	177,266	0.86%	179% "
11. Russian . . . . .	422,274	2.91%	59,497	0.29%	86% Dec.
12. Spanish . . . . .			12,007	0.06%	.....
13. Swedish . . . . .	34,344	0.23%	55,617	0.27%	62% Inc.
14. Non-Treaty Powers . . . . .	135,167	0.93%	141,220	0.69%	0.4% Inc.
15. Chinese . . . . .	2,336,806	16.09%	2,247,366	10.93%	3.8% Dec.
Total . . . . .	14,518,224	100%	20,559,065	100%	41.6% Inc.

Noted increases in China's foreign import trade between 1913 and 1923 were:

American . . . . .	680%	in tonnage of entries and 2,203%	in value of imports
Danish . . . . .	200%	" " " " " "	402% " " " "
Dutch . . . . .	213%	" " " " " "	155% " " " "
Portuguese . . . . .	179%	" " " " " "	11,150% " " " "
Chinese . . . . .			60% " " " "
British . . . . .	41%	" " " " " "	33% " " " "
Total foreign trade . . . . .	41%	" " " " " "	60% " " " "

Noted decreases in China's foreign import trade between 1913 and 1923 were:

German . . . . .	73%	in tonnage of entries and 55%	in value of imports
Russian . . . . .	86%	" " " " " "	" " " " " "
Chinese . . . . .	4%	" " " " " "	" " " " " "

Austria became a Non-Treaty Power after the Great War. Chili did not enter into the foreign import trade of China until a commercial treaty was signed in 1923. Polish and Spanish flags made their first appearances in China's carrying trade in 1923. German flags reappeared after the war in 1921.

to Chinese ports. Hence in the customs returns of trade, it was not accredited to American shipping. The following table shows the aggregate net tonnage of steamers entered at Hongkong in 1913 and 1923:

	1913 (tons)	1923 (tons)
American . . . . .	290,987	1,421,962
British . . . . .	4,215,369	5,572,944
Japanese . . . . .	1,907,307	3,129,156
Others . . . . .	2,460,143	2,854,981
Total . . . . .	8,873,806	12,979,033

According to the tonnage entries for 1923 for the port of Hongkong it is worthy of note that the average tonnage for American ships entered was 5300; British 2000; Japanese ships 2300 and for all others 1400, which is further indication of the fact that a larger relative American percentage of shipping at Hongkong was in transoceanic bottoms. In the export trade of China, the relative position of America in the carrying trade corresponds quite closely with that in China's import trade. Probably the most significant phase of the post-war situation in China's shipping trade is the decrease of 73 per cent in German shipping in 1923 from the figures for 1913. It is anticipated, however, that during the next decade German shipping will recover its former position.

#### CHINA'S TRADING PORTS

There are 69 treaty ports in China in which foreigners may reside, purchase property and locate business establishments. In addition thereto, there are eleven trade marts voluntarily opened by the Chinese Government to foreign trade, but in which foreigners may reside, lease premises for business or residential purposes in certain designated areas in accord with special regulations governing these voluntarily opened ports. Shanghai's foreign imports for 1913 represented 41 7/10 per cent of the whole import trade of China and for 1923, 44 per cent. Tientsin's in 1913 were 8/76 per cent and in 1923, 8 per cent; Canton in 1913 held 5.4 per cent and in 1923, 7.8 per cent; Dairen in 1913 held 4.9 per cent and in 1923, 7.2 per cent. In actual aggregate increase in import trade during the ten years the ports in order of their relative importance were: Shanghai, Canton, Dairen, Tientsin, Antung and Tsingtau. Of these Antung showed the greatest percentage of increase and

Dairen second. Antung's rapid rise in direct import trade may be attributed to the especially favored position which this port occupies, for the reason that rail-borne goods coming down through Japan and Korea into China receive a special duty consideration of one-third less than the regular 5 per cent import tariff imposition. This special treatment is estimated to be equivalent to the railway freight expenses in transporting cargo from Japan to Manchuria.

In regard to China's export trade for the years 1913 and 1923 the following comments may be of interest:

(A) For 1913 Shanghai enjoyed 43.8 per cent of this trade, Canton 13.9 per cent, Dairen 7.4 per cent, Harbin 4.6 per cent, Hankow 4.2 per cent and Kiaochow (Tsingtau) 3.2 per cent; while for 1923 Shanghai enjoyed 36.8 per cent, Dairen 15.1 per cent, Canton 12 per cent, Tientsin 6.6 per cent, Antung 5.5 per cent, Harbin 4.5 per cent and Kiaochow (Tsingtau) 3.3 per cent.

(B) Thus while Shanghai increased its relative position in the import trade of China, in the export trade it enjoyed 7 per cent less of the total trade of China, in spite of the fact that exports from Shanghai increased during the decade by about taels 100,000,000.

(C) Dairen's increase from 7.4 per cent of China's export trade in 1913 to 15.1 per cent with a total increase of taels 84,000,000 is distinct evidence of the Japanese enterprise in Manchuria. In this connection it is also worthy of note that Antung, which in 1913 had about 1 per cent of China's export trade, in 1923 enjoyed 5.6 per cent of this trade, with an increase of taels 38,000,000, or over a thousand per cent. The especially favored position of Antung in duty treatment, whereby one-third of the export duty is remitted, is accountable for considerable of this advance, otherwise Dairen would prob-

ably have taken a large percentage of this trade.

(D) The fact that Tientsin, which in 1913 enjoyed 2 per cent of China's direct export trade, in 1923 claimed 6.6 per cent of China's exports, with an aggregate increase of tael 42,000,000, indicates a tendency on the part of the North China ports to enter into direct trade with foreign countries rather than trans-ship these goods through Shanghai. Tientsin's increase in exports for the period under consideration amounted to 514 per cent.

#### THE FOREIGN TRADER IN CHINA

There is some apprehension on the part of foreign concerns engaged in the import and export business in China that the Chinese will develop import and export houses and handle the trade direct, rather than through the intermediary of the foreign establishments. Some are inclined to draw an analogy between China and Japan and contend that because the Japanese have developed their own foreign trading establishments, that the Chinese will do likewise. Cognizance must be taken of the fact that China is a huge continental country and Japan is a maritime country. The Chinese will have to develop their internal resources before they become a factor themselves in direct foreign trade. The United States was prior to the Civil War in a similar position. There will be more for Chinese capital and Chinese enterprise in domestic developments than in foreign trade. While Japan has developed its mercantile marine reaching to the corners of the earth and has established its banks and trading companies abroad, there are no evidences of a similar development by Chinese interests. Thus it will be left to the foreign traders to handle the larger bulk of China's foreign trade, both imports and exports.

It is true that conditions in China are changing very considerably as affecting the operations of the foreign traders in that country. The comprador is no longer the all-important intermediary between the foreign traders and the Chinese dealers. It is no longer possible to secure compradores for the guaranteeing of 100 per cent of the credit accounts of the firm's business with Chinese. Furthermore, it is no longer wise to depend entirely upon a comprador for contacts with Chinese dealers. It is, however, necessary that the foreign concern train a corps of Chinese assistants as helpful in making closer contacts with both the Chinese producer and the Chinese consumer. The foreign trader may deal through a syndicate of Chinese buyers or Chinese sellers, but even then he must know these buyers and sellers more intimately than was necessary a decade or two ago.

There is also a marked tendency to get away from the old idea of the general commission import and export house and confine one's activities to a certain designated line or allied lines. The costs of doing business in China have advanced very materially, hence the question of overhead has become one of greater consideration and importance. Service and sales management enter into the situation in a much more prominent way than they did formerly. The increasing number of Chinese newspapers and the improved methods of reaching the Chinese consuming public, make possible a better system of advertising.

The foreign trader finds it necessary now to penetrate further into the interior both for the sale of his commodities and for the purchase of Chinese products. Increasingly larger numbers of centers are being opened to foreign trade and closer contact with the interior of the country either through



trained native assistants or through foreign members of the firm is becoming more imperative.

The question of credits is also one which is a matter of more concern than formerly. Under the old comprador system the accounts were guaranteed by the comprador which left the foreign trader very little responsibility in this direction. Within recent years conditions have undergone considerable change so that it is advisable to exercise greater care in safeguarding one's interests in accounts with Chinese dealers.

As China develops modern industries and as the purchasing power of the masses increases, the country presents improved markets for greater varieties of commodities, particularly manufactured products. Often, in this connection, it is necessary to accompany the article sold with expert knowledge as to putting it into condition for use. This is particularly true as regards industrial machinery and equipment. Foreign technical skill becomes a necessary complement to the successful sales of industrial equipment, but the added expense for this service must be incorporated in the contract of sale, as the Chinese are not yet appreciative of the money value of engineering counsel. It is also often necessary to share in the financing of some of these projects.

Thus with the transition of China from a mediaeval economic society to a modern economic order not only a greater variety and larger quantity of commodities from the West enter into the import trade of China, but changed methods of doing business with the Chinese people are necessary to meet these adjustments.

#### PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

There is much concern over the political situation as affecting foreign

interests in China. It is true that since the war China's internal political situation has become more complex and more chaotic. On the other hand, the Chinese people are rapidly developing a sense of nationalism. Public opinion is being crystallized; modern education is changing the ideas and aspirations of the people and we are confronted with what is commonly called the New China. Such questions as the abolition of extraterritoriality, tariff autonomy, the recession of foreign concessions, are being agitated with greater interest and fervor on the part of the thinking masses of China as the spirit of nationalism becomes more manifest. The China of the 19th century is gone and we are to-day confronted with a New China, influenced by the thoughts and aspirations of those thousands of China's sons and daughters who during the past few decades have enjoyed an opportunity of coming into close contact with the teachings of the Occident.

In spite of the chaos, turbulence and disorder which characterizes China to-day, beneath the surface there are forces at play which should make for a consolidated and well administered modern social and economic society. It is well to bear in mind that the Chinese represent a racial homogeneity stronger probably than that of any other race the world has ever produced. The people enjoy a distinctly rich heritage in a civilization antedating that of any other nation extant. The Chinese are naturally industrious. There are no indolent elements among their hundreds of millions. Society is essentially democratic and the lowliest seem to possess the potentialities of the highest, being separated by lack of the opportunity for education or unfavorable economic conditions rather than by an unbridgeable gulf of mental or caste inferiority. The Chinese makes

a splendid mechanic in a modern industrial sense. He can prosper in the tropics or in the Arctic regions. The grim law of the survival of the fittest has operated over a longer period among the Chinese than among any other peoples, with the result that there has been produced in China a race with a greater degree of endurance under unfavorable physical conditions than obtains elsewhere.

On the other hand it is well that we do no overlook the obstacles which China must surmount to effect a modern economic and social order. The nepotism incident to that oldest of Chinese institutions, the family, offers many difficulties to a transition from an individual to a corporate society. That newer and broader conception, the responsibility of trusteeship, so essential to the success of modern industry and modern government administration, is now only at the inception of its development in China. Yet the Chinese have demonstrated their ability to organize effectively and to succeed in corporate business. Adherence for many centuries to an ancient stereotyped system of education tended to cast the intellect of the nation in a mold and to rob the individual of initiative or discourage independent research. The Chinese student is naturally more academic than practical, hence experiences difficulties in putting his modern education to practical use. The institution commonly known as "face" militates seriously against the young men and women starting at the bottom in business or industry and blazing a way for themselves. The fact that the son in a family remains the son of his father living under his father's roof and subject to the orders of his father during the lifetime of the father has also discouraged the development of initiative in the young men of the

country. In a physical sense, poor and lamentably inadequate internal communications constitute the greatest single obstacle to China's transition from a mediaeval to a modern economic and social order.

However, New China is receptive to all the outside world has to offer. It is prepared to scrap the old and take on the new. It has no old machinery or vested interests in a modern sense to scrap, hence may take from without that which it finds most to its liking. It is in a state of flux and what it takes from without and the sort of a structure which arises therefrom will to a considerable degree depend upon what is offered and the spirit in which it is tendered. The fact which confronts us is that China to-day presents the greatest undeveloped market, in a modern trade sense, which the world has to offer. The ever rising tide of increasing consumption on the part of the masses among a people who constitute one-quarter of the world's population, and who may boast of the greatest asset in man-power of any nation on the face of the earth, is worthy of every possible consideration by those peoples who would share in the trade of New China.

To America, the bigger opportunities will come with the employment of American capital in aiding the Chinese to develop their wealth of latent resources. The Washington Conference agreements contemplated assisting the Chinese to put their house in order, to the end that foreign co-operation in a program of reconstruction may be facilitated.

NOTE. 1 tael, Chinese currency,

For the year 1880 equaled 1 shilling 9½ pence				
"	"	1910	"	\$0.66 U. S. gold
"	"	1913	"	\$0.73 " "
"	"	1920	"	\$1.24 " "
"	"	1923	"	\$0.80 " "
"	"	1924	"	\$0.81 " "

# The Natural Resources of Japan

By HIROSI SAITO

Consul General of Japan to the United States

**J**APAN is meagerly endowed with natural resources. An archipelago of volcanic islands with a total area of less than 142,000 square miles (smaller than the state of California), she has to rely greatly upon foreign imports to feed, clothe and shelter her fifty-six million inhabitants. Japan may well be likened to the British Isles, minus coal, iron and wool.

## AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES

The Japanese are rice-eaters. In the face of the stern law of diminishing returns, patient tillers of the soil, who, in all, represent 5,500,000 families, or fifty-two per cent of the total number of families in Japan, are producing a normal yield (average of five consecutive years up to 1923) of 59,074,000 *koku*<sup>1</sup> from slightly more than 3,000,000 *cho*<sup>2</sup> of paddy fields. Since per capita consumption of rice ranges around 1.1 and 1.2 *koku* every year, the domestic yield falls short of the demand, and, moreover, the brewers crash yearly some 3,700,000 *koku* of the best grade of rice into the national beverage of *sake*. So importation of the article from abroad is necessitated, and the general tendency is for an increased amount every year.

Apart from her colonies, *i.e.* Taiwan and Chosen, Siam, French Indo-China, British India and China supplied Japan with 61,300,000 yen worth of rice to fill the deficiency in 1922, although to be exact, the amount is to be subtracted by 1,700,000 yen exported to various foreign countries chiefly for the use of Japanese residents abroad.

<sup>1</sup> One *koku* equals 5.11902 bushels.

<sup>2</sup> One *cho* equals 2.45065 acres.

Outside of rice, which is by far the most important staple product, the Japanese farms produce an annual yield of the following:

### Average of Five Years Ending 1923

	<i>Koku</i>
Barley.....	8,704,000
Rye.....	7,192,000
Wheat.....	5,493,000

### Average of Five Years Ending 1922

	<i>Koku</i>
Soya bean.....	3,916,000
Small red bean.....	980,000
Proso millet.....	1,844,000
Foxtail millet.....	800,000
True millet.....	328,000
Buckwheat.....	1,088,000
Indian corn.....	741,000
	<i>Kan</i> <sup>1</sup>
Sweet potato.....	1,110,731
Potato.....	326,836,000
Carrot.....	649,000
Rape seed.....	884,000

Under the government monopoly system, tobacco leaves were produced to the amount of 14,923,000 *kan* during the same period.

Japan is climatically and agronomically unfavorable for producing cotton. Only 830,000 *kan* of crop is registered for 1920. Chosen has sometimes been considered as a promising field for cotton growing, but very little has as yet been attained in the enterprise. Consequently, Japan has to supply her most prosperous industry, cotton textile manufacture, with raw materials imported from India, the United States, China, French Indo-China and a few other countries.

Peculiar to her colonies are such products as camphor, sugar and ginseng. The two former articles are

<sup>1</sup> One *kan* equals 826,783 pounds.

produced in Taiwan to the amounts of 1,281,000 *kin*<sup>4</sup> of camphor oil, and of 6,753,000 *kin* of sugar. The major portion of the world's demand for camphor is supplied by Taiwan, although the production has been decidedly curtailed since the World War. Again, the production of sugar is not sufficient to feed the 50,000 mills of Japan, which import crude sugar freely from Java and Sumatra. Ginseng, the fabled panacea of Cathay, is almost exclusively indigenous to Chosen. It is under government monopoly and has represented a gross revenue of 2,000,000 yen in recent years.

Tea leaves from which is elicited "the cordial of nations," that soft, sober, sage and venerable beverage, are counted among the main products of Japanese soil. About 10,000,000 *kan* in weight or 30,000,000 yen in value of teas, including green, black and Oolong teas, are produced yearly.

The most important single item in the economic life of Japan now is silk. It takes the lion's share of her yearly exportation and greatly helps to balance her foreign trade by offsetting heavy importations in cotton, lumber, foodstuffs and machinery. Except in the extreme northern parts of the island empire, climatic conditions are generally favorable to mulberry farms, which are found all over the country, and now even in Chosen and Taiwan, though still in the infantile stage. The amount of cocoons produced in Japan proper in 1920 represented 6,178,000 *koku*, or 584,000,000 yen in value.

Old Japan knew very little about the uses of live-stock. Steeds and coursers were invaluable in war and hunting, and cows have always been farmers' friends. But milk was seldom used as food and the fields were furrowed by human labor. Moreover, the tenets of Buddhism forbade eating the meat

of the "four-legged beasts." Such history has naturally militated against the rising of a prosperous live-stock industry in the country, but, during the last half century, the industry has been given impetus by the government and in 1920 there numbered 1,534,000 horses and 1,380,000 cattle, with a fair stock of foreign breeds, especially in the case of the former.

Sheep-raising was practically unknown in Japan until after the World War. It had been thought impracticable, if not impossible, to raise sheep in Japan, owing to the presence of certain vegetation, inimical to their health, which grew in meadows all over the country. The first attempt to raise sheep in the early eighties proved a failure. At present, with the encouragement and help of the government, the industry is showing every promise of successful development. There are now something like 10,000 sheep in Japan.

#### MINERAL RESOURCES

A paucity in natural resources is shown in Japan's mineral deposits. She sadly lacks those essential materials of modern industry, *i.e.* iron and coal.

Iron ores found in Japan proper are magnetite (including magnetic sand), hematite and limonite. Sidelite occurs very rarely. The yearly yield is very small, being 378,000 tons in 1918, when the steel industry was at the zenith of its prosperity on account of the war, and registering only 755,000 tons in 1923. Chosen offers some contribution in this mineral to the amount of 431,000 tons in 1918 and 306,000 tons in 1923. But Japan's steel industry has to rely mainly upon imported ores and pig irons for the maintenance of its activities. Han Yeh Ping in South China, and Penhsihiu and Anshanchan in Manchuria, meet the needs in some measure, but the

<sup>4</sup>One *kin* equals 132,277 pounds.



United States is an important purveyor of pig and ingot iron.

Coal is found largely in Hokkaido and Kyushu, bituminous and lignite most frequently, while anthracite occurs very rarely. In 1923, 28,949,000 tons were produced domestically. In 1923 Japan had to import 1,713,000 tons of coal from China, Kwantung Leased Territory, French Indo-China and other countries. This was, however, nearly offset by the exportation of 1,587,000 tons to China, Hongkong, Straits Settlements, the Philippines and other countries. Coal from Fushun, Yentai and Penhsihu mines in Manchuria forms an important part of importations from China.

While the demand for oil is yearly increasing, amounting to 3,400,000 barrels (42 gallons) in 1923, the home production is showing a tendency to decrease, the figures for the same year standing at 1,695,000 barrels, necessitating an importation of more than an equal amount from the United States, Java, Borneo and other countries. Japan is hoping to lessen the shortage by working wells in northern Saghaline, where she has obtained concessions from the Soviet Government through the Russo-Japanese Treaty of January, 1925.

Copper is the mineral with which Japan is more or less richly endowed. The ore occurs mostly in the form of chalcophrite and bornite. Before the war, Japan was second to the United States as a copper exporting country, but in the post-war days the cost of producing the metal has radically increased in Japan—so much so that her importation, mostly from the United States, exceeds her exportation. The figures for 1922 are: production, 53,780 tons; imports, 22,167 tons and exports, 410 tons.

There are a few gold mines in Japan, Taiwan and Chosen, and about \$6,000,-

000 worth of gold is produced yearly. Placer beds were discovered at the end of the 19th century, but they proved to be of no significant value economically.

Neither is the production of silver important, the annual yield averaging something like \$5,000,000.

As to other minerals, Japan has lead, sulphur, manganese, antimony, tin, mercury, arsenic, tungsten, molybdenum, etc., but the amount produced is insignificant.

#### MARINE AND FLUVIAL RESOURCES

Surrounded by water and having a coastline of 18,000 miles, Japan has learned to exploit her marine resources to a remarkable extent. Fishing is the occupation of 1,400,000 citizens or 600,000 family units. Annual catches aggregated 246,000,000 yen in 1922, and herring, sardines, anchovy, bonito, mackerel, tunny-fish, yellow-tails, sea breams, flat-fish, cybium, grey-mullet, salmon, eels, sea-eels, cuttle-fish, squids, crabs, shrimps, prawns and lobsters are found in abundance in her waters.

As a form of pelagic adventure may be mentioned whaling, which augments the Japanese national earnings by 2,000,000 yen. The hunting of fur-seals is under the control of the International Fur-Seal Treaty of 1911. The animals on Roben Island number each year some 15,000 at the height of the season.

Japanese fishermen do not confine their activities to the waters off the main island of Japan, but fish in distant parts as well. Fishing off Chosen accumulates yearly from ten to twenty million yen and along the coasts of the Maritime Province and Kamchatka, the annual catch of salmon, trout, cod and crabs is about ten million yen. In the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, between Russia and Japan, there was a

stipulation allowing the Japanese to engage in fishing in those waters, and the agreement was substantially revived in the recent Peking Treaty between the two countries.

In marine products Japan is exporting dried cuttle-fish, canned crabs, seaweed, fish and whale oil and isinglass to the United States, China and other Oriental countries.

Salt is another important item. There are some salt ponds in the Inland Sea, but climatic conditions there are not suitable for using the natural heating system and the resultant high cost of production works as a check to further development of the industry. In Taiwan a successful beginning in the salt industry has been made. In 1923, about 800,000,000 pounds of salt were produced in Japan proper, Taiwan adding 118,000,000 pounds for inland consumption. There was, however, a deficiency of some 252,000,000 pounds, which amount was supplied by importation from abroad. An arrangement was made between China and Japan for the importation of Tsingtao salt to the latter country, at the time of the Washington Conference of 1922.

#### FOREST RESOURCES

Japan has nineteen million *cho* of crown, state, communal, temple and private forests, yielding some 150,000,000 yen of lumber and 100,000,000 yen of fagots yearly. The principal kinds of useful trees are cryptomaria japonica, pine, picea ajanensis, abies, maeoyparis obtusa, serrata, chestnut, zelkova, guercus glandulifera, mongolia oak, paulownia imperialis, camphor, etc.

In spite of assiduous afforestation, the area of wooded land is gradually dwindling and Japan is now importing lumber from the United States, China, Siberia and the South Sea Islands.

In 1924, the year after the Great Earthquake, an enormous amount of Douglas fir and spruce lumber came to Japan from the Pacific Northwest in the United States, representing no less than 10,000,000 yen in value.

Among the wild animals indigenous to the country are foxes, badgers, minks, deer, weasels, otters, sables, wolves, bears, etc., but they are not in sufficient numbers to be of much economic value. There occur very few tigers and no aboriginal lions or elephants.

#### WATER-POWER RESOURCES

Nevertheless, the dark cloud of economic pessimism in Japan is not without its silver lining. The extraordinary hilliness of Japan leaves her only sixteen per cent of the whole land as arable, in contrast to Great Britain's seventy-seven per cent, Italy's seventy-six per cent, or Germany's sixty-eight per cent. It does, however, give her not only scenic views of surpassing beauty, but a possibility of developing 10,000,000 h. p. of hydro-electricity. At present only one-fifth of that amount, *i.e.* 2,000,000 h. p. is being generated. Capital invested so far in the enterprise aggregates 400,000,000 yen, of which some portion has been supplied by American capitalists in the form of loans.

This is the branch of industry that promises untold developments in Japan and is expected to be a unique blessing to her economic life.

It is sometimes stated that Japan proper may be able to bring 2,000,000 more *cho* of land under tillage, but the margin of cultivation can be extended only at a high cost of production. Japan's economic salvation will have to be sought in water,—in reaping and utilizing marine products on the one hand and in advancing hydro-electric enterprises on the other.

# China's New System of Schools<sup>1</sup>

By CHI-PAO CHENG

Executive Secretary, National Southeastern University, Nanking, China

and

W. T. TAO

Director, National Association for the Advancement of Education

CHINA has been in the process of modernizing her education during the last two decades, but no greater progress has ever been made at any time during the period than that of the last five or six years. Prior to 1919, roughly speaking, education in China was on a cross-road of foreign influences, owing to the fact that she had never possessed as a background any system of schools in the modern sense of the term. At one time she had to model after the Japanese system; at another, the German system; and at still another, the American system. All these imported models have, however, one after another proved very unsatisfactory, the reason being that after all they do not fit into Chinese needs and conditions. It was not until very recently that Chinese educators and people in general began to realize that they must thoroughly study and examine their own needs and problems before they could adequately work out a system of education which would be truly Chinese and of real service to China. But in order to understand fully the effects of this realization and of its subsequent deliberations and solutions, as set down in the following pages, it will be well here to enumerate some of the preponderant influences that have brought about this change.

<sup>1</sup> This article consists of extracts from a pamphlet, *Education in China*, written by the same authors.

## THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE

Perhaps the most profound influence is undoubtedly the so-called Chinese Renaissance. The Renaissance began in 1917 as a "literary revolution," when Dr. Hu Suh and his followers declared that the old classical language had outlived its usefulness and that *Pei-hua*, or the spoken language, should be its legitimate heir. The "literary revolution" met with astonishing success. In spite of the strong opposition on the part of the old conservative scholars, the younger generation received it with overwhelming enthusiasm. This rediscovery of a living language for the Chinese has enabled them to produce a new literature fitted for the new age, has revolutionized elementary school reading materials as well as methods of teaching them, and has made it possible for the popular educational movement to go on with its program of eliminating the illiterates in the country.

But the influence of the Renaissance is more than this. It is a movement through which all the old traditional values, including the educational, are judged from a new standpoint and with a new standard. Only too often, as the result of changes, tradition is thrown overboard, authority cast aside, old beliefs undermined.

In the words of Dr. Hu, this systematization of the national heritage is a revival or rebirth of that spirit of criticism and research which animated the

works of the Han Hsueh scholars of the last three centuries.

In former years China followed her neighbors rather blindly, but once started on her new program, she sacrificed at first everything old for the new. Gradually, however, she is beginning to realize that the old is not necessarily bad nor the new necessarily good. The reaction of the Chinese people toward new theories and practices is no longer imitative adoption, but question, examination, experimentation and selection. This undoubtedly is a wholesome attitude, and its logical outcome in the field of education is the creation of a new system which is best fitted for the need of a New China.

#### INFLUENCE OF FOREIGN LEADERS

In the last few years another influence that has had much significance upon thought and education in China is the bringing together of a host of great leaders representing the best of other countries in China. John Dewey and Paul Monroe, of America, Bertrand Russell, of England, Henrich Von Driesch, of Germany, Painleve, of France, and Rabindranath Tagore, of India—all have made their visits to China. Through their lectures and intimate contacts with our intellectual leaders and students, they have exerted a great influence upon Chinese thought-life. Special mention should be made of the visits of Dr. Dewey and Dr. Monroe because of their unique significance in the reconstruction of Chinese education. Dr. Dewey's pragmatic philosophy has been one of the guiding principles in the reform of our elementary education. A number of experiments have been made in elementary education since his visit. His philosophy has stimulated many students of education to work out technique and mechanism for their realization.

Education as an application and not as an acquisition of ideas is the unique message brought to us by Dr. Monroe. His recommendations, resulting from careful investigation in 1921, have aroused serious deliberation on various problems and hastened especially the reforms in secondary education and scientific teaching.

#### PRESENT SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

China has had at least four systems of schools within the last twenty years. The newest one was adopted in 1922, as a result of three years' deliberation initiated by the Seventh Conference of the National Federation of Provincial Educational Associations in 1919. There is no space for us to discuss the historical development of the system. The issues that have been evolved in its make-up will be touched upon in connection with the discussion of the grades and types of schools which follows. Since 1922, committees have been organized and kept busy in drawing up new courses of study and curricula in order to place the flesh upon this skeleton. This year (1925) has witnessed the completion of all the new courses of study except a small part in vocational education. These courses were voted upon and approved by the Tenth Conference of the National Federation of Provincial Educational Associations and were submitted to the Ministry of Education for promulgation.


In the diagrammatical representation of the new system of schools adopted by the Twenty-third Ordinance of the Ministry of Education, it will be noted that the left column in the diagram represents the standard ages at which a student should enter the different grades. In practice, however, these are to be determined according to intelligence, record and other considerations.



(a) *Pre-School and Kindergarten Education*

Kindergarten education has been given a place in the new system and admits children under six years of age. The practice schools of the normal schools, especially the normal schools for women, usually have kindergartens attached to them. There are also kindergartens conducted by private persons and by the missions. But the combined number of kindergartens is

DIAGRAM OF CHINESE SYSTEMS OF SCHOOLS



as yet very small. As kindergarten training gives the children an opportunity for active self-expression and also for the interaction between the child and the teacher, it is very necessary to have first adequate institutions for the training of kindergarten teachers. The resolution for more trained kindergarteners, passed in January, 1924, by the Kiangsu Conference of Educational Administrators, is a recognition of this need. The Hunan Education Association has also this year advocated the establishment of more kindergartens in cities and towns. The Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association has even recommended the adoption of kindergarten methods in the lowest grade in the elementary schools.

Another very encouraging and more significant fact is the experiment in kindergarten education conducted by Professor H. C. Chen, of the National Southeastern University. Impressed by the fact that the subject-matter and methods used in the kindergarten are borrowed from foreign countries and that some of them may not be suitable for Chinese children, he and his staff began in the fall of 1923 experimenting with the native self-made toys, Chinese Mother Goose stories, and other materials. He is also trying to make the kindergarten a mother-training center as well as a center for the education of young children. The National Association for the Advancement of Education and Professor Chen have agreed to co-operate for the purpose of including in the plan an experiment, at the least possible cost, for conducting kindergarten education so that it may be duplicated in the largest number of communities.

(b) *Elementary Education*

According to the new system, attendance in the elementary school is limited to six years, but it may be extended for another year in order to fit local situations. The elementary school is to be divided into the lower primary and the higher primary grades. The former consists of four years and may be established separately.

The courses of study drawn up by the Committee of Eighteen for elementary schools are shown by the table on the next page.

It is further recommended that there should be at least 1080 minutes per week for the first two years, 1260 minutes per week for the third and fourth years and 1440 minutes for the two higher primary grades. The number of minutes are to be distributed into suitable periods for the six days

Subjects	Percentage of Time Devoted to Each Subject	
	In Lower Primary Grades	In Higher Primary Grades
National Language	Conversation . . . . .	6 per cent
	Reading . . . . .	12 " "
	Composition . . . . .	8 " "
	Penmanship . . . . .	4 " "
Arithmetic . . . . .	10 per cent	
Social Science	Hygiene . . . . .	4 per cent
	Citizenship . . . . .	4 " "
	History . . . . .	6 " "
	Geography . . . . .	6 " "
Nature study . . . . .	12 per cent	8 per cent
Gardening . . . . .		4 " "
Industrial arts . . . . .	7 per cent	
Imagery arts . . . . .	5 " "	
Music . . . . .	6 " "	
Physical education . . . . .	10 " "	

work. In village schools the subjects may be combined and simplified, but the time allotted to national language and arithmetic should by no means be reduced.

According to the new system, compulsory education is temporarily limited to four years. If the local circumstances are more favorable, the period may be extended. The school age for compulsory education is left to the determination of the different provinces and special districts in accordance with local situations.

Compulsory education has been contemplated by the central authority ever since the Tsing Dynasty, but it was not until 1920 that the Ministry of Education mapped out definite steps for its enforcement in different communities at specific times. The specifications are as follows:

- (1921) Provincial capitals and open ports.  
 (1922) County seats and cities.  
 (1923) Towns above five hundred families.

(1924) Towns containing above three hundred families.

(1925 and 1926) Towns containing above two hundred families.

(1927) Villages containing above one hundred families.

(1928) Villages containing below one hundred families.

On account of the political disturbances in recent years, the above program has rarely been vigorously enforced. The province of Shansi alone, however, stands out most prominently in its achievements. The Shansi program had seven steps to be completed in seven half-years, from 1918 to 1921. Although complete success has yet to be achieved, the latest return of statistics shows that more than 72 per cent of the children of school age are now in schools. Illiterate adults below twenty-five years of age are also required to attend continuation schools to study common Chinese, arithmetic, and facts which a citizen ought to know.

Another phase in connection with elementary education which may be mentioned here is the village school movement. As more than 80 per cent of the total population live in villages, it is of the greatest importance that village education should receive our closest attention. Recently, the "Back-to-the-Country" movement has gathered much strength. The National Association for the Advancement of Education has created a special committee on rural education. The Tenth Conference of the National Federation of the Provincial Education Associations, which met in Kaifeng last October, also devoted considerable time to this important matter. The Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association, which met in August in Wusih, spent three days in drawing up seven practical suggestions for the development of the village schools. Beginnings of special investigations of typical village schools in typical communities have been conducted by the Kiangsu Compulsory Education Association and the National Association for the Advancement of Education. The reports, fragmentary as they are, have already stirred up great interest in and enthusiasm for village education. As the average village generally cannot support an expensive educational system, the National Association for the Advancement of Education has selected a few village schools, where the principals have shown genius in new village leadership, to conduct experiments as to the best possible village education at the lowest possible cost. It is hoped that in the course of a few years types or standards of village education can be developed for nationwide adoption.

The language problem has practically been settled, after China's struggle through centuries against the diversity of dialects throughout the

country. Dr. Hu Suh's "literary revolution" has exerted the most profound influence on the elementary schools. The vernacular language or the "living language" is now welcomed by most of the elementary schools. The Fengtien authority, however, has shown somewhat its reaction against the use of the vernacular language. Kwangtung is still hesitating to adopt this change. But in the long run, the living vernacular language is destined to prevail in all the elementary schools.

### (c) *Secondary Education*

Attendance at the middle school is limited to six years, divided into two periods of three years each—the junior middle school and the senior middle school. The junior middle school offers general education, but it may give various vocational subjects according to local needs. The senior middle school is divided into the general, the agricultural, the technical, the commercial and the normal courses. These courses may be given independently or severally in one school at a time.

In the secondary schools, the credit system is adopted. A credit is defined as one hour of class work plus preparation. Subjects with no preparation will have a proportionate reduction in credits. The junior middle school requires the satisfactory completion of 180 credits for graduation, of which 164 credits are for required work. The required courses of study for the junior middle school as drawn up by the Committee of Twelve are shown by the table on the next page.

The courses of study drawn up for the senior middle school by the Committee of Nine are composed of three years of study: (1) General study required of all students should occupy about 43 per cent of the credits; (2) studies required of students who

Subjects		Credits
Social Science	Citizenship.....	6
	History.....	8
	Geography.....	8
Language and Literature	National Language.....	32
	Foreign Language.....	36
Mathematics.....		30
Nature Study.....		16
Arts	Drawing.....	12
	Manual Arts.....	
	Music.....	
Physical Education	Physiology and Hygiene.....	4
	Physical Exercises.....	12
Total.....		164

take the course of the special group vary with the course of the group; (3) pure elective studies should not exceed 20 per cent of the credits. The vocational courses of study for the senior middle school have not yet been published. The liberal courses of study are of two groups: that of the Arts and Social Science group and that of the Mathematics and Natural Science group. These two courses of study are shown by the tables on the next page.

Secondary education, as pointed out by Dr. Paul Monroe after his general survey of Chinese education in 1921, is the weakest spot in the entire Chinese educational system. Since then, two national organizations, the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education and the Chinese Federation of Secondary Education, have given much time to the study of different phases of this grade of education. The attention of the adminis-

trators as well as of the secondary school teachers and officers has also been concentrated in this direction. Some of the more important problems and tendencies in regard to the present day Chinese secondary education may be briefly mentioned here.

First, the improvement of scientific teaching in the secondary schools now occupies a most important place in the mind of the students of education and also of the secondary school officers and teachers. Of all the weak spots in the secondary schools, the weakest is the teaching of science. Here science has been taught through lectures and textbooks with very little opportunity for the students to engage actively in laboratory work. Scientific study that results in the function of an experimental attitude and in the acquisition of effective control of nature has been greatly neglected. In view of this fact, the National Association for the Advancement of Education sent an invitation through Dr. Paul Monroe to Professor G. R. Twiss, of Ohio State University, to make a special study of scientific teaching in China and make recommendations for improvement. Professor Twiss, after a careful investigation of 187 schools in ten provinces, left with us a most comprehensive report with constructive recommendations, which is now in process of publication.

It is also very encouraging to mention that the Science Society is including the improvement of the teaching of science as a part of its regular work. This Society has among its members nearly all the prominent students of science in this country and will be able to exert great influence in the promotion of scientific education. Kiangsu Province has been selected as a starting point for their investigation and experimentation.

Another subject that has received



## A. COURSES OF STUDY FOR THE ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE GROUP

		Subjects	Credits
<b>General Requirements</b>		1. National Language ..... 16 2. Foreign Language ..... 16 3. Philosophy of Life ..... 4 4. Social Problems ..... 6 5. History of Civilization ..... 6 6. General Principles of Science ..... 6 7. Physical Education ..... 10	
<b>Group Requirements</b>	<b>Prescribed</b>	1. Special Chinese Literature ..... 8 2. Beginner's Psychology ..... 3 3. Beginner's Logic ..... 3 4. One course of Social Science ..... 4 at least 5. One course of Natural Science or Mathematics ..... 6 at least	
	<b>Electives</b>	32 or more	
<b>Pure Electives</b>			30 or more
<b>Total</b>			150

## B. COURSES OF STUDY FOR MATHEMATICS AND NATURAL SCIENCE GROUP

		Subjects	Credits
<b>General Requirements</b>		1. National Language ..... 16 2. Foreign Language ..... 16 3. Philosophy of Life ..... 4 4. Social Problems ..... 6 5. History of Civilization ..... 6 6. General Principles of Science ..... 6 7. Physical Education ..... 10	
<b>Group Requirements</b>	<b>Prescribed</b>	1. Trigonometry ..... 3 2. Senior Geometry ..... 6 3. Senior Algebra ..... 6 4. Analytic Geometry ..... 3 5. Mechanical Drawing ..... 4 6. Physics, Chemistry, Biology (any two of the three subjects with six credits for each) ..... 12 at least	
	<b>Electives</b>		23
<b>Pure electives</b>			30
<b>Total</b>			150

much attention in recent years is the teaching of the national language in the secondary schools. This important subject previously has been taught in a very unscientific and uninteresting way. Teachers without training in education and psychology have had to rely on the pour-in and word-by-word methods. For the first time, national attention was called to the needed reform in teaching this subject when Dr. Hu Suh read his paper on the "Teaching of Chinese Language and Literature" at the Tsinan Conference of the National Federation of the Provincial Education Associations in 1922. Following Dr. Hu's address, there have been more than thirty articles written on the improvement of teaching Chinese, most of which have been published in the last two years. The discussions are now passing from that of a subjective and empirical nature to an objective and experimental basis. The place of the vernacular language in secondary schools is different from that in the elementary schools. The tendency is to have less and less vernacular language as the students go along and each decrease is made up by the classical language.

The second tendency is the increasing emphasis on school discipline in the secondary schools. Since the May-Fourth movement, there has been much relaxation in school discipline. Many principals and teachers have simply lost control over their students. A reaction has, however, set in during the last two years. On the one hand, there is a tendency toward negative control, prohibiting the students from participating in a number of activities in which they have hitherto taken an active part. On the other, the students are encouraged to organize themselves for self-control, naturally under the supervision of the school authority. Many forms have now been tried to

substantiate these two tendencies, and there is every hope for the improved conduct of the students.

The third tendency is the nationalistic feeling that has found expression in a very strong opposition to foreign languages as a required study in the junior middle schools. Although thirty-six credits have been put down as a requirement for foreign languages, yet in the presence of such vigorous attacks it is questionable whether such a standard can be maintained in the future.

The fourth tendency is the increasing emphasis on vocational training in the secondary schools. As shown by the entrance examination statistics of the National University of Peking and the National Southeastern University at Nanking, less than ten per cent of the applicants could be admitted, and this ratio has remained for the last few years without much change. The vocational advocates feel it imperative that the preparatory nature of the secondary schools should be greatly reduced. The schools have answered this call by adopting more vocational courses. Just how these courses can fit the students for work and furnish them with life positions is a question whose satisfactory answer is yet to be sought.

The fifth tendency is the segregation of sexes in the secondary schools. Some middle schools have tried the co-educational system in recent years. But these are very few in number. Despite the fact that there is a favorable attitude toward co-education in institutions of higher learning and in the elementary schools, there is a decided opposition to co-education in the middle schools. Hunan in March and Shangtung in August of this year have actually prohibited the middle schools from becoming co-educational. Kiangsu takes a milder attitude. It authorizes the normal schools for men

to admit women students and permits city middle schools to become co-educational on the condition that adequate provisions are made.

(d) *Higher Education*

According to the new system of schools,

the institutions for higher learning may consist of several colleges or of one college. Attendance at the college or university is limited to four or six years.

At the top, there is the post-graduate school, which is an institution of research for college and university graduates and students similarly prepared.

The following tables will give some idea as to the extent of higher education in China:

A. PROFESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF COLLEGES

Kinds of Schools	Number of Schools
University.....	35
Teachers' College.....	8
Agricultural College.....	7
Technical College.....	13
Commercial College.....	8
Medical College.....	7
Law College.....	33
Total.....	111

B. DISTRIBUTION OF COLLEGES ACCORDING TO SUPPORT

Source of Support	Number of Schools
National.....	30
Provincial.....	48
Private.....	29
Mission and Foreign.....	18
Total.....	125

A few more universities have been added to this list this year and the more important among them are the Kwangtung Government University and the Northwestern University at Shensi.

As to the modern tendencies of Chinese university education, we may take

Chancellor Tsai's statement as an indication of the first tendency in scientific research. He says:

The university is not merely intended to offer ready-made courses for students to attend at fixed hours, but primarily to be an institution for corporate work in scientific research. And by research I mean not merely the introduction of European culture, but original contribution on the basis of what is already done in the West; not merely the preservation of our national cultural heritage, but seeking by means of methods of scientific research to show what that heritage has actually been.

The second tendency which may be mentioned is the demand for academic freedom, for no scientific thought and research can ever be properly de-

veloped if exterior interference is too strong. Government intervention has always been resented and repelled by the institutions of higher learning. This year, when the Ministry of Education announced the new university regulations, severe opposition was encountered from the professors of the

National University of Peking, and the rules were finally withdrawn.

There is also a tendency for closer co-operation on the part of the universities and colleges in the country. In July, 1924, when the National Association for the Advancement of Education met in Nanking, a Chinese Federation of Universities was formally organized, dealing with problems of common interest in regard to higher education. It is believed that such an organization, if properly functioned, will raise the general standard of university work.

A fourth tendency is the extension of higher education to women. Most of the Chinese universities have opened their doors to women and have been made co-educational. The Peking Higher Normal College for Women has also been promoted to the university rank.

Finally, there is an abnormal increase of private colleges. In Peking alone; about ten private colleges came into existence during the fall of 1924. Similar conditions may be found in other big cities. The government, however, has refused to recognize those institutions, the purpose of whose existence is questionable.

#### (e) *Trade and Vocational Education*

Vocational education has been given an important place in the new system of schools.

The curriculum of the elementary schools may include pre-vocational training. . . . The junior middle school . . . may carry on various vocational courses. . . . The senior middle school is divided into the general, the agricultural, the technical, the commercial and the normal courses (domestic science being added later). . . . The year limit and the standing of the vocational schools may be determined in accordance with local needs and situations.

On the basis of these provisions, the Committee on the Courses of Study for

Vocational Education has spent three years in drawing up sixteen different courses of study. These are practically completed. Beside the pre-vocational course in elementary schools and special vocational courses in colleges, three steps of vocational education have been worked out: (1) vocational courses for graduates of four-year lower primary schools; (2) vocational courses for graduates of the six-year elementary schools; (3) vocational courses for graduates of junior middle schools.

In regard to the distribution of time for practice and non-vocational studies, the Federation of Vocational Schools has made the following recommendations which have been duly accepted: (1) The time allotment for practice should not be less than that for class work, which should be from eighteen to twenty-four hours per week. (2) The subjects of study in vocational schools should be of three kinds; the vocational, subjects as pre-requisites to vocational, and the non-vocational. The non-vocational subjects should occupy at least 20 per cent of the total time allotment.

Among the important developments of vocational education in recent years, we may mention the following: Szechuan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Chekiang and Fukien have promulgated plans for the reconstruction of vocational education according to the new system. Shansi has organized a provincial committee on vocational education and appointed one supervisor for each of the twenty educational districts to take charge of vocational education, compulsory education, and popular education. Yunnan has set aside the tobacco tax for the development of vocational education. Hupeh has ordered all the counties to appropriate 20 per cent of the educational fund for the promotion of vocational training. The One-Week Campaign for Vocational Guidance conducted in Shanghai,



Nanking, Tsinan and Wuchang has aroused much interest in this type of education. Lastly, the Ministry of Education has ordered all the girls' middle schools to offer practice opportunities for domestic science. There is also a special fund raised by the National Association of Vocational Education for the special purpose of promoting vocational education for girls.

(f) *Missionary Education*

According to the statement of Dr. Wallace, the Associate General Secretary of the China Christian Educational Association, it is probable that the total number of students in the Protestant missionary institutions at present is nearly 300,000, and the number is still increasing. The college students have increased in the four years from 1920 to 1924 by 76 per cent. Archbishop Celso Costantini gives 258,953 as the number of students under the training of the Catholic churches. Thus, out of every hundred students in China, there are eight in the missionary schools.

The outstanding event of the year in regard to missionary education has been the organization of the China Association for Christian Higher Education. This Association has appointed a Council to act as an *ad interim* body, also as the Council of Higher Education of the China Christian Education Association, thus linking up higher education with other activities of the latter organization. Rev. E. C. Lobenstine, the Council's Secretary, is now engaged in making a study of the institutions, particularly with reference to their financial position and the possibilities of co-ordinating their efforts. The chief purpose of the Council is to enable the Christian institutions of higher learning with their limited resources to make the most effective contribution to the needs of China.

Missionary education, despite its good record, has been attacked on three different grounds. First, it is frequently charged that these Christian institutions are entirely under foreign control. Even qualified Chinese Christians are rarely given opportunity for holding responsible positions. Second, there is much opposition to the teaching of religion to young children who are not mature enough to make intelligent decision for themselves. Finally, there is serious suspicion on the part of the Chinese that the missions are organizing a system of Christian education parallel to the Chinese government system, which might become in time an irreconcilable group within a larger group.

As a result we have witnessed two successive attacks on missionary education in the two national educational conferences held in July and October of 1924. The more conservative Chinese, however, think that in this transitional stage, missionary education of the more liberal type does have a unique contribution to make by way of supplementing the government in providing wider educational opportunities for the students and setting up a better example in school discipline. They also believe that missionary education should be more socialized, liberalized and made more Chinese. Finally, they feel that the missions would be able to make a better contribution if they would concentrate their efforts and resources in a few institutions of higher learning, and not attempt to establish secondary and elementary schools of inferior calibre. They believe that secondary and elementary schools of a purely experimental nature might be opened by the missions as well as by other private agencies, but that any attempt to multiply them and build a system out of them is bound to conflict sooner or later with the government system.

# Education in Japan<sup>1</sup>

By HON. IGNACIO VILLAMOR

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines

## EDUCATION IN JAPAN

**I**N the study of the causes which have contributed to the rapid development and transformation of Japan, the fact that the Japanese people have assimilated the sciences, arts and industries of Western peoples should be mentioned. They established public schools, organized a system of instruction, founded colleges and universities and adopted American and European methods to the extent that was possible under the special conditions and circumstances of the country. Their experience, therefore, as an Oriental people, should be interesting to us, and the study of their educational institutions instructive.

In this monograph I shall summarize my observations on education in that empire in its different aspects: elementary, special, technical (commerce, industry and agriculture), secondary and university education.

## ELEMENTARY EDUCATION

According to the Japanese system of education, children from their sixth year enter the primary schools to receive for six years an elementary education in morality, Japanese reading and writing, arithmetic, Japanese geography and history, drawing, music and physical culture. Upon the completion of this elementary education, the students are admitted to the middle schools, to receive secondary educa-

tion for a period of five years in the following subjects: morality, Japanese and Chinese literature, one foreign language (English, German or French), geography, history, mathematics, natural sciences, physics and chemistry, principles of law and economy, drawing, singing and gymnastics.

Moral and military education occupy a great part in the plan of the system of public education in the whole empire. Education is compulsory during the entire school age, after which the young men enter active military service for two years and then join the reserves. The method of teaching is essentially objective. To give the children an idea of how a street car runs and how useful it is, the teachers take them on car rides; take them to the wharves, railroad stations, etc., to give them an idea of ships and trains. They take them on excursions to commercial establishments, factories, fairs, historic places, or to the monuments of their national heroes. Thus is kept alive the enthusiasm of the youth for all that is genuinely Japanese. Moreover, special attention is given to military education. From the primary to high school classes, all the pupils perform military drill under the command of a physical instructor. Military discipline is a part of the character of that people, and, thanks to it, everything is done in perfect order. With what respectful attitude a young man approaches an old man! University students do not pass by a professor without reverently bowing to him, and whenever spoken to, if seated, they rise, taking off the cap which they wear as part of their uniform.

<sup>1</sup>The following article was written by the author as a result of his survey of Japanese educational conditions while he was President of the University of the Philippines. The study was made for the purpose of comparing the Japanese educational system with that of the Philippines.

Thanks to this discipline, made vigorous by obedience and the habit of sacrifice which characterizes Japanese society, the principle of authority, which begins with the Emperor and ends with the policeman, is unalterably maintained, and thus their orders are obeyed without protest. To the same civic virtue of the Japanese people their rapid progress can be traced. For example, when the Mikado, after the bombardments of Shimonoseki and Kagoshima, which opened Japan to foreign commerce, made the people understand that the only way for them to be able some day to face the Western powers was to take hold by means of constant study of their sciences, arts and industries, hundreds of Japanese immediately went to the most powerful countries of Europe and America to learn their discipline and their methods, particularly military science and tactics, and to observe the workings of their institutions. According to Lafcadio Hearn, there were pathetic cases of young men who lost their health and even their lives in their anxiety to equip themselves with higher learning which their mental power could not grasp, and there were beautiful examples of boys and girls who, after earthquakes and panics, used the detached roofs of their ruined homes as slates for their school work, together with pieces of chalk that had fallen down.

What I am going to relate seems insignificant, but it shows the discipline of that people. Frequently, travelers take *jinrikishas*, forming a party of some length. The *kurumaya*, who is at the head, is considered by his companions as the leader and they follow him at all times during the trip. It was striking to note that not one of them dared to go ahead of another after the march began. If the man in front walks rather slowly, the next one

helps him, but never tries to outstrip him. Thus the *kurumayas* forming the caravan are united, they help each other when necessary, and thus avoid injuries to pedestrians.

Another thing about the *kurumayas*: In railroad stations and public squares it will be observed that they do not try to take away the passengers from one another; the one nearest to the man who needs a *jinrikisha* steps forward and the others leave him alone without snatching away from him the benefit of his work. Thus diligence is rewarded, for naturally the most diligent *kurumayas* who arrive first at the waiting stations occupy the best places.

#### SPECIAL EDUCATION

Students who have finished their studies in the middle schools are eligible for admission to special colleges where elementary training in agriculture, commerce and industry is given. They may also be admitted to the special colleges of art, music and foreign languages, and even to certain professional colleges of not very high standard.

Without including the military and naval schools, the normal schools, and the high schools for women, there are special schools of fine arts, music and foreign languages, and elementary schools of commerce, agriculture and industry in all their branches.

(a) In speaking of artistic education, it should be noted that what is most remarkable in Japan is her great development industrially. The Japanese are great lovers of painting and great impetus has been given to their industries through applying this art to the needs of modern life. By creating a market for the articles thus painted, such as fans, pictures, postal cards and a thousand other things of this kind, we are making possible the continuous expansion and development of Japanese art.

The Imperial School of Fine Arts offers many things which we should study in connection with our School of Fine Arts. The school is situated in Uyeno Park near the imperial museum and the library. In this school complete training is given to those who desire to take up an artistic career, and there is a special course for those who aspire to become teachers of drawing in middle or similar schools, whether public or private.

For artistic professions there are seven departments; Japanese painting, European painting, sculpture, drawing, modeling, engraving (high and bas-relief) lacquering, lithography and photography.

The course of study in each department lasts four years, aside from a preparatory course. Only graduates of middle schools are admitted, if they possess the other qualifications required by the regulations. In the school there are twenty-three professors, ten assistant professors, fifteen lecturers, three instructors in athletics, and six assistants. There are about 450 students in all the departments. It receives an annual appropriation from the Imperial Government for its expenses and obtains money from donations, sales of articles produced by the school, matriculation fees, etc.

How Japanese painting has such an influence on the industrial and commercial development of the country is easy to understand. The Japanese people, being of curious temperament, like to behold the beauties of nature, and for this reason the gardens, parks, museums, cascades, lakes and hills are always full of visitors who observe and imitate everything. Their flowers, their landscapes, their mountains, their historic figures are reproduced in a thousand ways in fans, kimonos, screens, cups, dishes, vases, tapestries, paintings, etc. The importance given

to the study of these subjects is such that there is a department—the department of Japanese painting, which is one of the most important in the school—where painting with a stamp characteristically Japanese, which cannot be mistaken for any other kind of painting, is taught, and where the main task of the students consists in copying natural plants with their flowers, backgrounds, etc. In the department of sculpture there are models of the great European masters, and students also copy from natural models. In the departments of lithography and photography the school is thoroughly up-to-date. The artistic lacquer articles challenge special attention, but Filipinos who have gone to Japan to specialize in this industry have been unable to discover its secret, which is kept with steadfast caution.

In order to turn out good artists, the Imperial School admits only those who have finished the middle school courses and further requires the completion of regular courses, in order that the proper diploma may be issued. The student in this school, like the attendant of any other center of higher education, wears a university uniform and pursues his studies with the same regularity observed in an industrial school, for example. A student registers with the determination of following an artistic profession.

(b) We will now consider another special school, the Academy of Music, located in Tokyo. This academy is designed not only for the study and teaching of native and foreign music, but also to prepare music teachers for public schools. There are two courses of study: the principal and the normal courses, the latter being divided into the "A" normal course and "B" normal course. Besides, there are preparatory, post-graduate, and elective courses. The period of study extends from three



to five years in the principal courses; three in the "A" normal course, and one in the "B" normal course; two in the preparatory course; from two to three in the post-graduate course; and five in the elective course for one subject.

The subjects given in the different courses of study are as follows:

In the preparatory course: Ethics, singing, music for solo instruments (piano, organ or violin), elements of music, Japanese, foreign language (English or German), and gymnastics.

There are two departments in the principal course, vocal and instrumental. The subjects given in the vocal department are ethics, singing (solo and choral), piano, harmony, elemental forms of music, history of music, Japanese and foreign language (English or German), and gymnastics.

In the instrumental department: ethics, music for solo instruments (piano, organ, violin, viola, violoncello, contrabass, flute, oboe, clarinet, bassoon, bombardon, trombone or trumpet), choral singing, instrumental music (chamber music and orchestral practice), harmony, elementary forms of music, history of music, Japanese, foreign language (English or German) and gymnastics.

The post-graduate course is divided into three departments—the vocal, the instrumental, and the composition departments. The subjects given in each department are:

Vocal department: vocal music (solo and choral singing), piano, foreign language (English or Italian), native and foreign literature and esthetics.

Instrumental department: music for solo instruments (piano, organ, violin, viola, violoncello, contrabass, flute, oboe, clarinet, bassoon, bombardon, trombone or trumpet), instrumental music (chamber music and orchestral practice), foreign language (English or German), esthetics and acoustics.

Composition department: theory of music, piano or choral singing, foreign

language (English or German), native and foreign literature, esthetics and acoustics.

"A" class normal course: ethics, singing, music for solo instruments (organ or piano), elements of music, harmony, history of music, pedagogy, method of teaching music, Japanese, English, gymnastics and games.

"B" class normal course: ethics, singing, organ, elements of music, method of teaching singing, Japanese, gymnastics and games.

About 200 students, a majority of whom are women, are enrolled in the Tokyo Academy of Music. This is the only school in Japan where coeducation is permitted.

It is observed that musically the Japanese are not so far advanced as in other studies, but in spite of this one can see the great interest which is being taken in this branch of study. Without abandoning, but on the contrary, always improving their national airs, they are beginning to familiarize themselves with Italian and German music; in the schools the students are taught Western songs and there are already young men and women who sing Schumann, Mendelssohn or Mozart (Figaro); or play the compositions of Beethoven, Weber, Schubert, on the piano; or the creations of Berriot, Goddard, Bach, on the violin.

#### TECHNICAL COMMERCIAL EDUCATION

That the study of commerce is widespread in the whole Empire is shown by the number of commercial schools. In Japan there are five higher commercial schools established by imperial ordinance and supported by the Imperial Government, except that of Osaka, which receives a subsidy from the municipality of Osaka. These schools are found in Tokyo, Kobe, Yamaguchi, Nagasaki and Osaka.

The Kobe Higher Commercial School, founded in 1903 by Imperial

Order No. 98, series of 1902, lies to the east of the city on a hill not far from Nunobiki Waterfall, from which the Tansan factory gets its water supply. This institution, like others of its kind, is under the control of the minister of education and has the same curriculum as that of Tokyo. The school has fourteen Japanese professors, one assistant professor, eight lecturers, five instructors, and eight professors of foreign languages. It has 600 students who pay 30 yens for matriculation. It also has eight large buildings, one commercial museum and one large library with 10,500 volumes in Japanese or Chinese and 5649 volumes in foreign languages.

The Higher Commercial School of Tokyo is under the control of a director, advised by a board of councilors. It has thirty-four professors, thirteen assistant professors, and ten clerks. There are 1200 students, which number constitutes only one-third of the applicants. The students pay matriculation fees, this being the case with other schools and universities which I have visited. They are admitted after a competitive examination of all applicants who possess the qualifications required by the rules, which qualifications are by no means few. The list of subjects taught is as follows:

In the preparatory course: commercial ethics, Japanese writing and composition, mathematics, bookkeeping, applied physics, applied chemistry, elementary law, fundamental principles of economics, English, French, Spanish, German, Italian, Chinese, Russian, Korean and gymnastics. As for the foreign languages, English is obligatory, the others being elective. Of course, in order to be admitted to the preparatory course, one must be a middle school graduate.

For the regular course, the following subjects are given in three years: commercial ethics, commercial correspondence, commercial arithmetic, commercial geog-

raphy, commercial history, bookkeeping, mechanical engineering, commercial products, economics, finance, statistics, private law, insolvency law, administrative commercial law, international law, languages (those of the preparatory course), commercial science, commercial practice and gymnastics.

Graduates who wish to obtain a higher professional degree have to study the following subjects for two more years; economics, civil law, commercial law and comparative commercial law, public law, international law, economic conditions of the Orient, history of modern diplomacy, penal law, English and other foreign languages, banking, exchange and communications, insurance, commercial economy and consular service.

The enumeration of these subjects, together with the fact that in 1906 there were in Japan fifty-two similar schools, and fourteen others of less importance, will show the great emphasis which is given there to commercial studies. By thus cultivating business spirit, that country has formed great merchants who with the great manufacturers are daily promoting the progress of Japan. Besides the laboratories and libraries, the Higher Commercial School of Tokyo has a great commercial museum which the students visit every day under the direction of the proper professor, who explains to them the subjects which they wish to study. In it are arranged and exhibited all the things which are the object of commerce all over the world. Nearly all nations are beautifully represented.

Among the different departments of the school one's interest is specially aroused by the department of commercial scientific investigation, where all the works on commerce and commercial magazines, articles, statistics, daily reports of the press, etc., are systematically catalogued by subject so that any professor or student who wishes to

write on any subject can have all the data which he needs.

#### TECHNICAL INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION

Industrial studies are as extensively and intensively given in Japan as commercial courses. In addition to fifty-seven elementary industrial schools in the year 1906, the majority of which were for weaving, there were thirty higher schools of technology, established by prefectures and subprefectures and by some private citizens. The departments usually established in such schools are civil engineering, metal work, ship building, electrical engineering, carpentry, drawing and decorative arts. Of the nine colleges of technology maintained by the department of education, the Higher Technological School of Tokyo deserves special mention.

The Higher Technological School of Tokyo is a model industrial school. It has eight departments: dyeing, weaving, ceramics, applied chemistry, electricity, electrical chemistry, mechanical engineering and architecture. The course is for three years and one must be a middle-school graduate in order to be admitted to this school. But there are also three-year courses for apprentices, to which those who pass special examination may be admitted. About 1000 students attend this school of technology, where all kinds of industries are taught: leather, crystal, porcelain, perfume, etc. The textile department is worthy of special mention. It has all the necessary machinery, from the cleaning of the cotton, linen, silk or wool, as the case may be, to its washing and ironing, ready for sale.

As I have said, these industrial schools are the ones that accelerate the progress of the people. The country produces all it needs and more. What they cannot make by their own inven-

tion, they imitate from Europeans and Americans, but they are always producing. Only to mention toys, ingenious toys, it is hard to estimate what is produced there. This is true not only in the great factories, but there are an infinite number of small producers who have graduated from the industrial schools. Their products are so considerable and so varied that it is incredible to understand how they manage to sell them. In their commercial streets one wonders how a market can be found for the various stores, restaurants and stands of all kinds. There are no public markets, indeed, they are not necessary, for every business street is a great public market where the purchaser can find anything he wants in the way of victuals or wearing apparel.

Leaving for the latter part of this article the agricultural education, let us see something of the higher education.

#### HIGHER EDUCATION

To pursue higher studies in agriculture, science, pharmacy and engineering, and to be admitted to the higher special colleges and universities, students are required to graduate from high schools or other colleges where equivalent subjects are taught.

The question as to whether high schools should be considered as designed to prepare students for the universities is one upon which educators have not been able to agree. In Japan it has been settled in the affirmative. There, only the central government can establish and maintain high schools, and the reason given is that in these schools no definite career is completed but the schools are intended to prepare students for the universities, and, consequently, the number of graduates who can be admitted to the university should be limited. Moreover, the cost of high schools is greater than the local governments can bear, while

in private schools the matriculation fees which can be obtained from the students would not be sufficient for their maintenance.

In Japan there are eight high schools, established in Tokyo, Sendai, Kyoto, Kanasawa, Kumamoto, Okayama, Kagoshima and Nagoya. The students pay 30 yens per school year.

The duration of the high-school courses is three years, in the three sections preparatory to the following colleges: (1) law and literature; (2) science, engineering, agriculture and pharmacy; and (3) medicine.

The first section is intended to prepare students for the College of Law and Literature, and embraces the following subjects: morals, Japanese and Chinese literature, foreign languages (English, French and German, Latin being optional), history, logic and psychology, general principles of law, elements of economics, and gymnastics.

The section preparatory to colleges of science, engineering, agriculture and pharmacy includes the following subjects: morals, Japanese literature, two foreign languages, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology and mineralogy, drawing and gymnastics. Of the foreign languages, English is compulsory, while German or French is elective.

The subjects comprised in the third section, which is preparatory to colleges of medicine, are: morals, Japanese literature, two foreign languages (German is compulsory while French or English is elective), Latin, mathematics, physics, chemistry, zoölogy and botany, and gymnastics.

Let us now see the organization of colleges and universities in Japan.

#### UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

There are in Japan five special colleges of medicine established and maintained by the department of edu-

cation. Aside from five colleges of medicine, three being established and maintained by the prefectures of Kyoto, Osaka and Nagoya and two by private citizens in Tokyo and Kumamoto, there are thirty-seven private colleges, making up a total of forty-two, of which twenty-eight are in Tokyo, seven in Kyoto, three in Osaka, and one in each of the cities of Miye, Nagoya, Sendai and Kumamoto. Of these colleges, many of which are called universities, five are devoted to medicine, nine to law, three to law and literature, nine to literature, and sixteen to theology.

Among the four imperial universities, those of Tokyo and Kyoto take the lead.

(a) The Imperial University of Tokyo, founded in 1886, has six colleges: law, medicine, engineering, literature, sciences and agriculture, with 180 professors, seventy-four assistant professors, and 113 lecturers. The number of students in 1912 totaled as high as 4984 in all colleges. The university council is made up of the professors and directors of colleges, and is presided over by the president. The faculty is formed by the directors of the different colleges, the professors and assistant professors.

The following matters are under the jurisdiction of the university council: the establishment and abolition of courses of study in each college; the establishment of new chairs and promulgation of internal regulations for the university; the granting of degrees and settlement of all questions which may be submitted by the minister of education or by the president.

The faculty council has jurisdiction over the following matters: program of study, examination of students, qualifications of candidates for degrees, and other questions which may be proposed by the minister of education or the president of the university.



The salaries of the Japanese professors in this university are rather moderate, as they also are in the University of Kyoto and other universities and colleges.

However, the professors of languages, who are foreigners, are generously compensated. Of course, it is a well-known fact that Japanese professors are underpaid, but they accept a university position because of the honor and social consideration that it carries, and especially because they believe that to serve a university or college is to serve the state, and to serve the Japanese state one should be willing to make sacrifices.

The annual appropriation for the university is 1,380,000 yens, in addition to donations and gifts and matriculation fees of 50 yens for every academic year.

The university has at present eighty-one large buildings: nine for administrative offices, treasury, assembly hall, students' club, gymnasium and library; seven for the Colleges of Law and Literature; twelve for the College of Engineering; nine for the College of Science; twenty-two for the College of Medicine; and twenty-two for the College of Agriculture.

Three years of study is prescribed for the different courses, with the exception of those in medicine and law, which require four years.

The hospital connected with the College of Medicine and under the supervision of its director, as well as the dispensary and its chief, are under the authority of the president of the university in the same way as they are in Kyoto. There are in the hospital 546 beds for charity patients and 124 beds distributed in ten wards for pay patients.

The following courses are given in the College of Law: law, political science, political economy and commerce.

The College of Literature is divided into three courses: philosophy, history and literature. The literature course includes the Japanese, Chinese, Sanskrit, English, German and French literatures, as well as the study of philosophy.

The College of Science gives courses in mathematics, astronomy, theoretical and experimental physics, chemistry, physiology, botany, zoölogy, geology and mineralogy. This college performs a function similar to that of our own Bureau of Science and Weather Bureau.

The College of Engineering gives courses in civil, mechanical, electrical and mining engineering; in architecture and naval construction; applied chemistry; foundry; metallurgy; and the manufacture of explosives.

The technical aspect of the work of our Bureau of Public Works is done in this college. Graduates of this college and like colleges are responsible for the development of industries in Japan by acting as technical experts, as directors of paper, porcelain and glassware factories, as well as of textile mills.

The progress made in Japan in modern city construction, especially in Tokyo, in ship repairing and building, in railroad building and in the exploitation of mineral resources, is all due to the work of these colleges of engineering. A naval exposition was recently held in Tokyo and the objects exhibited there show very plainly the result of the studies given in the colleges of engineering. Even the Panama Canal with all its details was reproduced in miniature by Japanese engineers, showing the differences in level between the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. There was also a diminutive steamboat which ran back and forth through the canal, the movements of which were controlled by an electric button.

The College of Agriculture gives the following courses: agriculture, agricul-

tural chemistry, forestry, veterinary science and fish raising. It is thus seen that neither the College of Veterinary Science nor the School of Forestry is independent of the College of Agriculture. There are also experimental stations under the supervision of the director of the college, besides others which are under the control of the director of the Bureau of Agriculture. Tokyo issues a bulletin prepared by the College of Agriculture in which general information regarding the results of investigation in the cultivation of plants and care of animals and other information necessary for the development of agriculture are published and spread for the benefit of the people.

The College of Agriculture also gives three-year courses for those who have only graduated from the middle schools and who desire to become experts in agriculture, in veterinary science and forestry.

The Bureau of Agriculture is doing a good deal of publicity work, although its special function is the collection of statistics on the development of agriculture, the importation and exportation of agricultural products, quarantine, etc. The important work of this Bureau is the encouragement of agriculture, since agricultural methods are already so well developed throughout the country. Every available space, even the mountain sides, are cultivated; and the Japanese, on account of the climatic conditions and economic necessities of his country, cultivates the soil industriously without any encouragement whatsoever from outside sources. Rinderpest and locusts are unknown. The irrigation system is also good. For the cultivation of the fields, the Japanese rarely use animals. Man does everything with his pick and shovel. In my journey in May, 1915, from Nagasaki to Yokohama, a distance of 862 miles, observing both sides

of the railroad track, I saw only three bulls and two horses being used in the cultivation of the soil.

(b) The organization of the Imperial University of Kyoto, founded in 1897, is similar to that of Tokyo. It is composed of five colleges: law, medicine, engineering, literature and science. The College of Law has two departments: the department of law and political science and the department of political economy. The College of Medicine has schools of nursing, of midwifery and a hospital. The College of Engineering has five departments: civil, mechanical, electrical, mining, industrial chemistry and metallurgy. The College of Literature is made up of the departments of philosophy, history and literature. And the College of Science is formed by the departments of mathematics, physics and chemistry. There is a director in each college, and the directors, together with the oldest professors in each college, form the university council, presided over by the president of the university. There is a committee on finance, composed of the college directors and the directors of the bureau of special schools of the department of education; of the director of the treasury bureau; and of the secretary of the university. The university is governed by the president under the supervision of the minister of education. The president issues regulations for each college, including regulations for the hospital of the College of Medicine. In regard to appointments, promotions, etc., of the higher officers of the university, as the directors and professors, the president makes his recommendation to the minister of education for the issue of the corresponding imperial order. The appointments, promotions, etc., of other employees are made by the president.

The university has eighty-eight professors, forty-seven assistant professors,

and fifty-nine lecturers. The faculty of each college is made up of the director and professors, although the director may call upon the assistant professors and other lower officers for consultation.

The librarian of the university deserves mention. He is the man in charge of the general library of the university and of the different colleges, which contains about 300,000 volumes. The chief of the hospital of the College of Medicine and the chief pharmacist of the dispensary should also be mentioned. Both of these officers are under the supervision of the president.

The government appropriates annually 1,100,000 yens for the support of this institution in addition to private donations and the matriculation fees of students. The number of students in 1912 was 1226. They pay 50 yens as tuition fee for each academic year, which begins on September 11 of each year and ends on July 10 of the succeeding year.

In all the colleges three years are prescribed for the different courses with the exception of the course in medicine, which lasts four years. The preparatory course of one year is required for entrance to all the courses, unless the student has taken preparatory studies in the high school which are equivalent to the ones given in the college he wishes to enter. High grades in the high-school studies are required as one of the conditions for admission into a college of the university.

The university has sixty-one buildings, many of which are of two stories. The buildings for the laboratories of anatomy, pathology, chemistry and hygiene which I visited were excellent. The College of Engineering is completely equipped with all kinds of machinery for teaching purposes. The

arrangement of the hospital and its dispensary was admirable. I visited for an hour some departments and wards and became fatigued after having seen only part of it. The director of the hospital informed me that I would need several hours to visit all the departments. The same thing could be said of the hospital under the College of Medicine of the Tokyo Imperial University.

In Nagasaki, Kobe and Tokyo the buildings of these great institutions of learning are of wood on brick foundations. They are buildings *ad hoc*, have plenty of light, are well ventilated, and not very expensive.

(c) Among the private universities the Keiogijuku and Waseda are worthy of mention. The University of Keio is a private institution and has a different organization from the Imperial University. It was founded in 1858 by the famous Fukusawa, a distinguished writer and statesman, and one of the great educators of Japan. From his system of physical, moral and intellectual education there has been derived a compilation of twenty-nine rules known as the Moral Code of Fukusawa. This university has more than 5000 students. It has elementary, intermediate and preparatory classes, courses in commerce and industries, and four professional departments: namely, economics, law, political science and literature. It has two large dormitories, one for the students of elementary classes and the other for the students of middle classes, about 4000 students in all. Among its twenty buildings located on the hill which overlooks the bay of Sinagawa, the library and declamation buildings should be mentioned. The administration of the university is in the hands of a committee composed of the president of the university, the secretary and the treasurer. The

general inspection of the university is in the hands of thirty councilors elected among the graduates of the university, the professors, instructors and other employes of the university not being eligible. There is an executive committee, formed by the president himself and four members elected by the councilors from their own number. The president is elected by the councilors. His term of office lasts four years, but he may be re-elected. The president has the authority of appointing and discharging professors, instructors and other employes with the approval of the executive committee. There is, moreover, a chancellor called *Shato* elected by the alumni association from their own membership and a principal, whose main duty is to look out for the prosperity of the institution. The records of this university for the year 1912 show that there were about 2400 students in the different university departments and 2300 in the elementary and intermediate classes, and in the courses in commerce and industries.

(d) The University of Waseda, founded in 1882, and supported by Count Okuma, Prime Minister of the Empire, competes with the Imperial University of Tokyo in importance. In 1913, Waseda had 9000 students, including the students in the normal school, intermediate classes and classes in commerce. It has five colleges: political science and economics, law, literature, commerce and sciences. There is also a normal school for the training of teachers; in addition, there are preparatory schools for different colleges, and a technical school which has departments of industrial, civil, electrical and mining engineering, as well as architecture. Each college is under the direction of a dean, and the deans, together with the professors appointed by the president of the uni-

versity, form the faculty council or what we call the university council. The council meets two or more times during the academic year to discuss questions relating to the program of studies, methods of teaching, examinations and other problems of general interest to the different colleges. The president of the university, with the co-operation of the deans and other administrative officers, is responsible for the administration of the institution.

The board of trustees is composed of seven life members and eight others whose terms of office are five years. The vacancies on account of resignation or death are filled by a two-thirds vote of the board. This board meets once a month to settle financial questions, questions of administration and organization, and questions of general interest. The board elects a chairman and executive officers among its own members. These are in charge of the enforcement of the decisions of the board.

There is a board of inspectors composed of the following members: (a) No more than thirty members recommended by the honorary president, Count Okuma, and the board of trustees among those who have shown deep interest in the university; (b) no more than twenty members elected by the Tokyo Alumni Association among its own members.

The policy which the University of Waseda pursues was expressed at the time of its foundation in the following terms:

The efforts of this academy (its original name) will be directed to prevent the danger of producing so many theorists, dogmatists and dreamers; it will be its constant endeavor to produce a perfect and model citizen who, with full knowledge of theory and its application, possesses an elevated ideal as well as common sense.



In other words, as President Takota recently said:

The object of this institution is the perfection of man and his education in specialized branches of higher knowledge.

All instruction is given in the Japanese language and, with but few exceptions, its professors are Japanese. In the beginning the instruction was given in foreign languages, but afterwards they found out that the native professors were losing a good deal of time in the study of foreign languages before they could do any research work. Then Marquis Okuma, the founder of this university, determined to change the method, and attained a complete success. As he says:

The independence of a nation, in its true sense, must have as its base the efficient use of its own language, so that higher studies may be pursued in the vernacular language.

The idea was enthusiastically approved by several professors, who made all efforts to develop the College of Literature and very soon were able to give instruction in their native tongue.

There is as much attention given to intellectual education as to physical culture. Native as well as foreign games are played among the university students. To develop the character of the students the honor system has been adopted. There are several student organizations established with the help of the university and the professors. For example, the Waseda Society of Public Morality, Bible Class, Religious Association, etc. By means of these associations, the graduates of Waseda have gained the respect of the public.

The spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to the university by the professors should be especially mentioned. Many of them have a great reputation in Japan for their knowledge and in-

dustry, and although they can easily find better remunerated positions, they prefer to work for the aggrandizement of Waseda, even when their salaries are not commensurate with the value of their work. And to further show their love for their Alma Mater, they contribute to the support of athletic games, social reunions of students, and for similar purposes. They give prizes for scholastic competitions, and many of them support the poor but bright students so that they may continue their studies. Some professors donate books to the university, while others contribute money for their purchase.

In regard to the students, it will be noted that they take pride in keeping their honor unsullied and they see to it that their brothers and companions choose the right path in life. I believe that the university students in Japan are respectful and well disciplined. One can see in their behavior a refined courtesy in manners within the university walls, as well as in the streets and public places. They live modestly on their allowances of 12 yens and on less sometimes. They wear only the university uniform and those who go about in their Japanese costumes (which is allowed on certain occasions) wear their university cap with its corresponding insignia as a distinctive badge of the university. In this way students are recognized everywhere they go and are not allowed in undesirable places. A certain number are under the supervision of an inspector who investigates their moral conduct, honesty, and studiousness and informs the professor of the results of the investigation. In general, grave offenses in discipline are punished by expulsion. The Japanese students' only amusement is athletics. They do not dance, because nobody dances except the geishas; neither do they go very much to the theater.

College spirit, as well as university spirit, is well developed among the Japanese students. The director of the Higher Technological School of Tokyo, who took me around to the different buildings of the school, pointed out the library building which was constructed with funds amounting to 120,000 yens donated by graduates of the school. There is one alumnus who started as a common commission merchant and later became a shipowner with over 6,000,000 yens' worth of property. This man recently donated 150,000 yens for the construction of a building to be used as a students' club. At that time there was under way a laboratory building which will cost 200,000 yens, donated by the multimillionaire Mr. Mitsui. The wealthy people of Japan frequently make donations to universities, colleges and schools. Some of them establish and support colleges as Marquis Okuma and Baron Takaki have done, and for

their patriotic liberality they are given titles of nobility, such as baron, viscount and count, and monuments are erected in their honor.

All the inventive ability of the Japanese has been fostered and trained in their universities. The four I have described have alone turned out since their establishment up to the year 1913, 29,598 graduates from the different faculties (13,141 from the University of Tokyo, 2928 from the University of Kyoto, 3500 from the University of Keiogijuku, and 10,029 from the Waseda University), many of whom have become leaders in their respective fields of activity, and have contributed in some way or other to the progress of their country.

The nations that occupy the foremost place in human progress deem it a bounden duty of the state and of its citizens to promote and advance every form of education, from the primary school to the university.

# The Equipment of American Students for Foreign Service

By W. B. CARPENTER, B.A., M.A., LL.B.

Lately lecturer in Peking Law College

Henceforth European commerce, European politics, European thought, European activities, although actually gaining in force, and European connections, although actually becoming more intimate, will nevertheless sink in importance; while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond, will become the chief theatre of events in the world's great hereafter.

SO spoke William H. Seward (1852),<sup>1</sup> seventy-three years ago, before railways took passengers to the Pacific Ocean or cables were laid across the bed of the Pacific Ocean; before any regular line of steamers kept open the avenues of commerce between those Oriental and American countries which fringe the Pacific Coast.

The changes wrought in these seventy-three years have been immense and varied. Areas, which were called territories of the United States, are now states of the Federal Union. Canada, then largely unknown and unmapped, is now one of the growing markets and rapidly developing areas of the American Continent. Across the Pacific, the dominion and enterprise of the United States stretches for some 7000 miles from San Francisco to Hawaii, Guam, Yap, the Philippines. Japan, which then sought tranquility for its government and harmony among its Daimyos, and was an unknown civilization and empire, is now a formidable first class power. China, though then smarting under the defeat administered to her by the British, was practically an unimpaired and un-

fered realm, but to-day, though much diminished in extent and population, is a seething mass of discontent, produced partly by the vain-glorious jealousies of the subordinate officers and captains of the last army of the Manchus, and partly by the play of international jealousies. The Spanish flag, which floated in the Eastern Pacific Archipelago, has bowed to the Stars and Stripes; while Dutch traders still creep doggedly along the Malay, the Cochin-China and Chinese coasts, plying a profitable trade.

The Pacific trade has entered upon its challenging career with that of the Atlantic. To-day, some fifteen to twenty steamship lines regularly plow their furrows across the Pacific Ocean. Telegraphic communication, cable and wireless cover the ocean as with a nervous system. Innumerable railroads and rivers pour into and collect from Pacific ports, not only commerce, but streams of tourists, government officials, students, commercial magnates, which contacts create that interchange of thought from which mutual knowledge and progress proceed.

There are among America's sons, those who prophesy that what we to-day see of American and Pacific trade, shipping, banking, is but a slight indication of what the future holds in store for us as a people, provided only that our enterprise, our energy, our financial acumen, and trade knowledge, combined with a comprehending sympathy for Asiatic peoples and their problems, equals that of the men who opened up our Western

<sup>1</sup> H. H. Bancroft—*New Pacific*, p. 8.

seashore states and laid the foundations of that trade which we, to-day, enjoy.

Since 1900, our total trade has increased three and a half-fold, but our Pacific trade, seven-fold. Or, put in another form, in 1900, one in every 17.50 dollars of our trade was the Pacific's contribution; to-day, one in every 8.60 dollars represents the Pacific trade.

But commerce, banking, and national policy rest on training, equipment and a perpetual study of the markets and the habits of customers. Just as a medical man spends years in learning the science and practice of his art, and when fully fledged as a doctor still reads the technical papers and lectures of his particular section of medicine or surgery, so must the young merchant, the consul, the commercial attaché, spend years in equipping themselves for Foreign Service and trade. Even when appointed to positions of honour and importance, they must continue the process of keeping abreast of commercial progress and development of trade combinations and banking methods, while studying steadily the political history, the local habits, customs and manners of the people among whom they, as a merchant, or consul, or commercial attaché, live.

It has been said that the largest room in the world is that of improvement. Perhaps we modern folk would prefer the word development. But development rests on exact knowledge of the problem.

Since, then, the study of the Pacific and its problems has been added to those of the Atlantic; and since the United States lies between the Old World trade and the new, but rapidly expanding commerce of the Pacific, it becomes apparent that the study of national policy, the forms of trade, the

many varying conventions of life, and the diversities of language, indicate the major portion of our problem.

#### HOW THE U. S. MEETS CHANGING CONDITIONS

What has been done to meet the constantly changing conditions? The growth of the Department of Commerce plainly indicates the caution, yet expanding understanding of the problem before the United States Government. As early as 1820, the Treasury Department had a Division of Statistics in the section of Commerce and Navigation; in 1866, it was made obligatory that the Secretary of State should report annually to Congress commercial information from consuls and diplomatic officers. But, since the opening of the 20th century, the plan of placing all commercial matters in one Department, and under a cabinet minister, has been considered proper.

Thus, to-day, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, the Bureau of Statistics, have been transferred to the Department of Commerce.

But there are still adjustments and transfers to be made, so that finally all commercial matters shall be given a habitat in the Department of Commerce.

The work done by the Department of State and Commerce constitutes one aspect of the problem of equipping our young students for Foreign Service. But certain Departments with the consent of Congress have been developing changes in their methods. When the Department of State seeks alterations in the Consular and Diplomatic Services, while the Department of Commerce seeks equally for larger powers of collecting commercial information, it does seem, from a purely national point of view, a profound pity that the President does not appoint a small committee of three, not more



than five, to inquire into the overlapping of efforts and to seek adjustments of the present methods; even if this involved the suggestion that officials of one Department should be given equality of status with another Department; and even if this equality of status compelled a universal change in diplomatic conventions. What was achieved at the Congress of Vienna in rearranging the diplomatic status of ministers, can easily be sought and accomplished in a conference of powers in Washington on the position of attachés, military, naval, commercial, whose position or status, due to the expansion of national activities in matters which these attachés handle, and to the contraction of the world as a diplomatic area, still remains not only irregular, but wanting in dignity.

What difference is there really between a consul or diplomatic agent collecting political information in China, and a commercial attaché collecting trade information in China? Both are officers of their own government; both are doing something of advantage to their government; both are fulfilling the terms of their appointment. Why, then, should a consul or a diplomatic agent rank mysteriously above the commercial attaché in prestige, right of *entrée*, or diplomatic convention?

Behind the position and grievance of the commercial attaché lurk two points: One, that it is the survival in diplomatic circles of the old stigma supposed to adhere to traders and men of commerce. Again, just as there are commercial attachés to-day, so will there be in the near future, officials to study and report on education, public health and such kindred aspects of national life. These constitute the demand for equality of treatment for all classes of officials and grades of employees serving abroad.

The recent hearings (H. R. 4517) disclosed the fact that 95 per cent of the business of the Department of State is non-commercial. From this it would appear that the defining of the duties of the Department of State and those of the Department of Commerce is being brought about, not by a system of deliberate design, but by the force of every day life.

The reason is not far to seek. It lies in the training and equipment of the consuls. These, naturally, are without any special economic or commercial training; neither do they possess that precise and specialized knowledge on which trade promotion, and commercial intelligence depend.

Again, the "105 duties of what your consuls do" is, alone, the most condemning document of a system, which demands that a consul shall be a birth, death and marriage compiler, an estate broker, an attorney on extradition, an expert on marine law, a trade specialist, a health officer, and then find leisure moments in which to sit down and describe accurately the social, the economic, the trade factors and conditions of his post, provided always that he is permitted to remain long enough to learn the language, so that he may really study these points.

To equip men for Foreign Service, there must be first, adequate, detailed, precise information as to what this service implies. Then there must be real effective subdivision of areas and matters which come before foreign officers, so that all grades and classes of officers may have exact duties assigned to them; while these officials must be placed in diplomatic rank and position, so that no unnecessary hindrances shall prevent them from performing their work. By some such system of subdivision, there will be prevented such unfortunate incidents as those of an Argentine Cabinet

Minis  
tives  
the U  
called  
askin  
tion,  
how  
State  
depar  
down  
lems  
incid  
direc

At  
thes  
equi  
in t  
that  
inau  
unti  
on  
trai  
wil  
of t

T  
kin  
nev  
pin  
litt  
bec  
ter  
Un  
cul  
Se  
to  
liv  
sit  
pr  
be  
in  
pl  
F  
B  
of  
n  
S

Minister,<sup>2</sup> who, after the representatives of four different Departments of the United States Government had called upon him in one week, each asking for the same type of information, exclaimed in desperation: "Just how many governments of the United States are there? Why do your various departments feel at liberty to come down and inflict on me the same problems continually?" Does such an incident indicate efficiency or well-directed effort?

#### ATTEMPTS TO EQUIP STUDENTS

Attempts are being made, in spite of these stumbling blocks to efficiency, to equip young American students. Within the Department of State, it is said that a new School of Training has been inaugurated for Foreign Service, but until the public have a series of reports on this school, and see the newly trained persons therefrom in office, it will be impossible to assess the utility of this new venture.

There are rumours that Johns Hopkins University is to found, under a new endowment, a school for equipping students for Foreign Service, but little of the details of this scheme has been made public. A creditable attempt has been made at Georgetown University, under considerable difficulties, to maintain a School of Foreign Service, but like all universities, Georgetown suffers from the high cost of living. George Washington University, under its new and enterprising president, hopes to found a school, because the faculty believe that Washington City is the ideal and obvious place for a School of Diplomacy and Foreign Service. Again, under the Board of Education, there is a council of fifteen, whose duty is to consider methods of preparation for Foreign Service. But it is not publicly known

what this body has as yet achieved. There appear to be seventy-two institutions which give foreign trade courses and nineteen which give also diplomatic and consular courses.<sup>3</sup> All are estimable signs, but none apparently are sufficiently financed or systematized to perform the functions which the young American, in the three main classes, demands.

#### DIVISIONS IN SERVICE AND REQUIREMENTS

There is the diplomatic career, pure and simple, that of the commercial attaché, and that of the foreign trader. The mental outlook of each is different. The first tends more and more towards the study of national politics, ambitions, expansionist aims; the tendency being to study deeply, in order to form a wide, but general view of the national movements and their possibilities. The diplomat endeavours to form an opinion of the congeries of subjects and their immediate, and future effects on the national policy of the state in which he lives. He is not engaged in explaining or assessing the use and future developments of an individual trade or section of it.

The commercial attaché, while he surveys, as a whole, the trade of a country in which he is residing, studies equally the ramifications of a particular trade or industry, so as to know its requirements; from which study he can give to the manufacturer at home or merchant that information which will lead to increased knowledge, contact and business between merchant and merchant, importer and exporter.

The foreign trader or merchant, while studying his own particular trade, seeks with the information and the aid of the commercial attaché to expand his knowledge and business.

Each of these three officials, the

<sup>2</sup> H. R. 4517, p. 104.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide* Commercial Education No. 23.

commercial attaché, the foreign trader, the official of the State Department, have in common, these requirements:

- (a) An exact knowledge of the language (for reading, writing and speaking) of the country in which they are temporarily residing;
- (b) Such a knowledge of the manners, the customs, habits and religion of the people, as will assist them in the conduct of their daily life and business.

But there is an essential difference between the commercial attaché, the official of the State Department, and the foreign trader, in that the first two are government employes, acting under definite rules and orders from their departments; while the last named has to be a man of affairs, depending on his own knowledge of human nature and its variations of temperament, for the successful conduct and development of trade. The prestige of work and position in the foreign community rests on his own personality and his firm's record.

Thus, any school to equip youth for Foreign Service must be ready to teach thoroughly the foreign languages used commonly in diplomacy and commerce; besides which, history of foreign nations, the geography of commerce, and the geographical problems which modern industrialization has created. These with the principles of international relations and trade must be explained so that the differences of methods and principles may be understood.

Wherever the school or schools may be placed, a determined attempt must be made to benefit by the experiences of other countries. The English Government has an Oriental School in London; the German Government used to employ two high caste Indians to explain to German officials and traders

the manners, customs and habits of the races of the Indian Peninsula. Prior to the War, there was in Berlin a school of Oriental languages at which officials going to Japan and China were instructed, so that on arrival in the Orient, these officials could converse with Oriental traders and bankers or local officials.

Since, then, the Federal Government must be interested in the teaching of languages and other forms of general education of officers for Foreign Services, it should either establish an examining committee under Civil Service Commission, which should conduct oral and written examinations of all who apply for Foreign Service, or the Federal authorities should come to terms with such bodies as the Chamber of Commerce to establish and maintain in Washington a school of languages and such subjects as are necessary for anyone proceeding on Foreign Service.

The question of making use of the universities for such particular training for Foreign Services, rests on the financial capacity of each university. Perhaps the realization of this undoubted need, and the growing importance of the Oriental trade may move some wide and farseeing mind to endow, especially at one or two universities, a school of Western and Oriental languages and history.

#### MISTAKE OF SHORT-SERVICE TERMS

There are so many angles from which this equipping for Foreign Service can be viewed, that the want of space and fear of tiring a generous reader prohibits the discussion of them. But there is one aspect of the question often passed over unnoticed or unmentioned. The tendency in the State Department to move men frequently from post to post is perhaps understandable from the point of view of giving an official a change of climate, and of work, or

because promotion is due. But it seems to lose sight of the fact that terms of short residence in many countries, with continual changes of post, will not produce the deep student of foreign affairs, but may end in giving us a large and varied assortment of officials, whose information is of the snippit character.

To illustrate this system, take the case of 1921, September, to 1925, February, where in the Peking Embassy in under four years, some fifteen transfers in personnel took place alone. Against which must be put the expense to the tax-payer of this system (of continuous movement) and the apparent fact that a study of the practice of foreign nations does not indicate a similar condition. Sir Henry Parkes was in Japan from 1865 to 1883, then in China for three years, twenty-one years in the Orient; Sir Ernest Satow was eleven years in Tokyo, then in Peking; Sir John Jordan was fourteen years in Peking; Sir Claude MacDonald, twelve years in Tokyo; Monsieur Jusserand was so long in Washington that he was considered a permanent ambassador. Equally in trade, the late Mr. Hillyer was over thirty years in the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank in China; Mr. Mayers has been over twenty years in China as a consul, and then official representative of a British organization.

The comparison of these differing methods brings up the question, do we not want a system in the Foreign Service under which young men will agree to remain a fixed number of years in the field of Foreign Service in a particular section, whether in America or abroad, coupled with a change in the Home Department of the Divisions of Foreign Service such as: (1) All Asia and Oceania, except Turkey, Asia Minor, Persia, Egypt. (2) All Europe, except Balkans, Russia. (3) Russia,

Balkans, Turkey, Persia, Asia Minor, Arabia, Egypt. (4) All Africa, except Egypt. (5) All America, North, South, Central and West Indies. A student or young official could select the Orient and Oceania and agree to remain ten to twenty years in this field, thoroughly learning trade,—diplomatic problems, and governmental ambitions, so that when brought home to work in the higher positions of the head office, he would be so experienced and well grounded in Oriental affairs as to be invaluable to his government. It should be noted that the size of these five divisions of the world gives ample room for variation of post and an adequate opportunity for promotion.

It may be claimed that much of this is now being done. Suppose it is, there still remains the initial equipping of the student at some particular centre; the amending of the plan of perpetual movement of officials; the realization that as regards the Oriental languages, the number of officials who really can read, write and speak them is but a small percentage of the staff of the Department of State and Commerce.

Consideration of these points must direct the farseeing and business mind to demand that some well coördinated effort be made to build, at once, a sound system not only of equipping young men and women for Foreign Service, but also instilling into them a pride in remaining in a particular field of employment.

#### ADEQUATE PAY

To the cry, what about salaries, pensions, allowances, the reply must be made that once the educational plan is thoroughly developed and passed into operation, the joint recommendations of the Departments of State and Commerce, with the work of their friends and the Chambers of Commerce, will create such a volume of sentiment and



opinion as will insure that the employes are paid a scale of salaries which will, by gradation according to years of service and promotion, prove adequate to the dignity of the Foreign Service of America. Generally, it may be said that the present salaries are much too low, when the actual work and responsibility of the position are considered. This is true of the Army, the Navy, the Departments of State and of Commerce. Again, reference must be made to the H. R. 4517, where cases are set out that employes had to pay out of their own pocket traveling and maintenance expenses when staying in hotels while doing official work. It is a monstrous shame to so strain the loyalty of the official by such a display of Congressional parsimony.

#### IN CONCLUSION

All these thoughts presuppose that if the American youth is equipped for

foreign trade, and if the Federal authorities mean to protect foreign trade, then these two functions of national life must be supported and definitely upheld by means of a deliberately thought out and consistently applied foreign policy.

Just as manners are more important than laws, so also is consistency of aim better than the spasmodic effort of genius.

During the present period of the reconstruction of Europe and the constitutional developments of the many new states in that area, it is well to keep in mind the saying of Theodore Roosevelt:

The Mediterranean Era died with the Discovery of America. The Atlantic Era is now at the height of its development and must soon exhaust the resources at its command. The Pacific Era, destined to be the greatest of all . . . is just at the Dawn.

Are we wise enough to prepare?

# The Significance of Foreign Financial Control in China

By FREDERIC E. LEE, Ph.D.

Executive Dean, University of Maryland; former American Economist Consul in China

THE significance of foreign financial control in China can hardly be understood without a brief résumé of the conditions which made possible the establishment of such foreign control, and without a clear and distinct definition of certain of the terms involved in the consideration of this subject.

## FOREIGN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Before 1894, China had practically no foreign debt. Such foreign financial assistance as the Imperial Government had desired from time to time had been furnished by a foreign bank (British) with its headquarters in the Far East, in the form of short-term loans which were paid off as they became due. For the waging of the Chino-Japanese War, however, in 1894-95, and the payment of the indemnity of 230,000,000 taels exacted by Japan, China was forced to enter the foreign financial market for assistance. With the conclusion of that war in 1895, there was ushered in a new era in the Far East, an era characterized as one "of rapid encroachment on China by powerful Western nations and by Japan."<sup>1</sup> France, Russia, Great Britain and Germany rushed to China's "aid" and by March, 1896, these four powers had loaned China Fr. 400,000,000 and £16,000,000, respectively. Belgium, the United States and Japan soon followed with proffers of foreign capital to be used by China in railway and industrial development.

China is notably an economically backward area of the world, and as such it has excited the keenest competition among various nations or their

nationals, each desiring to have a share in its economic exploitation or development. Western powers have sought for "spheres of interest" or strategic bases on Chinese territory where control might be exercised through the medium of railways and other economic developments. Railway concessions and the right to make public loans were eagerly sought by various foreign groups as the instruments of possible future foreign control.

Several writers<sup>2</sup> have emphasized the close relationship between railway concessions and railway loans in China and the systems of foreign control which have been adopted. In the struggle for control in China there has, in many instances, been the closest possible co-operation between foreign finance and foreign policy, in which foreign legations in China have been known to take a very active part in supporting their nationals in connection with the "control" features of a railway concession or a foreign loan. "Conquest by railways and banks," "Dollar Diplomacy," etc., have been the characterizations applied to this close relationship between foreign control of a political nature and diplomacy in China.

MacMurray, the present American minister at Peking, has recently pointed out<sup>3</sup> that China is peculiar among the economically less-advanced areas of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Kent, P. H.—*Railway Enterprises in China*, p. 24 ff; Morse, H. B.—Chapter on "Railways" in Vol. III, *International Relations of the Chinese Empire*; Willoughby, W. W.—*Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, Chap. XX, "Railway Loans and Foreign Control"; MacMurray, J. V. A.—"Problems of Foreign Capital in China," in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1925.

<sup>2</sup> In *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1925.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Overlach, T. W.—*Foreign Financial Control in China*, p. I.

the world in that its development through foreign capital has been undertaken, not by nationals of any single power, but by various nationalities simultaneously—some of them inspired by political at least as much as by economic motives. Among these powers the Chinese Government has intrigued, playing off one set of foreign influence against another, and offsetting "concession" to one set of interests by "compensations" to other interests.

#### SCRAMBLES FOR "SPHERES OF INTEREST"

In the period of China's need following 1895, the various industrial nations of the West began to bid against each other for railway and other concessions. This competition led to a clearer definition of the spheres of interest of the several powers. To clearly distinguish between "spheres of interest" and "spheres of influence" it is necessary to define these terms.

"Spheres of interest" are areas officially earmarked by nonalienation treaties or agreements, which have been extracted from the Chinese Government, and officially delineated and set up by an agreement between the two powers. Such areas are frequently adjacent to a protected or leased area. Within such "sphere" the foreign power claims the primary right of economic exploitation. Foreign "spheres" in China are legally only economic spheres in contrast to the political spheres in Africa. As Overlach<sup>4</sup> and Willoughby<sup>5</sup> have pointed out, the essential element of a "sphere of interest" is a negative one; namely, that no other power except the one in whose favor the "sphere of interest"

is created shall be permitted to acquire concessions or to exert any form of control in the area, and, at the same time, giving the privileged power a monopoly of the right to such concessions and of economic exploitation.

Cobbett<sup>6</sup> has defined the "sphere of influence" as follows:

A sphere of influence, so far as it can be said to possess a definite meaning, indicates a region, generally inhabited by races of inferior civilization, over which a State seeks, by compact with some other State or States that might otherwise compete with it, to secure to itself an exclusive right of making future acquisitions of territory (whether by annexation or by the establishment of protectorates), and, generally, also, the direction and control of the native inhabitants.

The spheres of interest in China have almost invariably taken the form of the so-called railway or mining "concession." Here again there is a confusion of terms, as the term "concession" is used both to designate a section of a treaty port set aside for residential purposes for a given nationality, and for industrial concessions such as a railway concession, which is an agreement conferring on the foreigner certain rights of financing, building and managing a railway. The grantor of such concessions is the Chinese Government.

But while to strong and reliable governments money is entrusted unconditionally, China's political insecurity, together with her financial inexperience, forced the foreign financier to maintain a great amount of control over his investments. The principal feature of all railroad agreements (or concessions) then are the "control clauses, and the word "control" in this connection is being used "to denote certain financial safeguards for the protection of loan funds" in the interest of the owners and the bondholders.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Overlach, T. W.—*Foreign Financial Control in China*, pp. IV-VI.

<sup>5</sup> Willoughby, W. W.—*Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, pp. 270-309.

<sup>6</sup> Cases and Opinions on International Law, Vol. I, p. 113, from Willoughby, *loc. cit.*, p. 271.

<sup>7</sup> Overlach, *loc. cit.* p. VIII. Cf. Straight, W. D.—*Recent Developments in China*, p. 131 ff.

### "CONTROL" DEFINED

In distinguishing between financial control and political control in China, Overlach<sup>8</sup> says, *inter alia*:

Political control, however, has to stop short of changing the sphere of influence into a protectorate.

As long as control consists merely of a legitimate protection of the financier, subject to agreements of an exclusively financial nature, no objection can be raised by anybody. But as soon as the exercise of a reasonable financial control changes into the exercise of an administrative control or an assumption of territorial supremacy by a foreign power, without any sanction on the side of the Chinese, such control would seriously menace the supreme sovereign authority, in other words, the independence, of China. For one of the marks of an independent state is that "it is independent of external control." "In the interest of the territorial supremacy of other states, a state is not allowed to send its troops . . . or its police forces into . . . foreign territory, or to exercise an act of administration or jurisdiction on foreign territory without permission."

The wielding of a political control would also be violating the so-called "open door" policy. For this policy aims to be an instrument for the maintenance of the integrity of China and the preservation of an "equal opportunity for all." It is mainly directed against the assumption of an undue administrative control or territorial supremacy within a "sphere." It is, however, not explicitly opposed to the policy of "spheres of interest," and not necessarily to the "sphere of influence" as long as influence means financial control within reasonable bounds. Indeed, the "open door" principle recognizes the "vested rights" and "special interests" within such spheres as long as a certain amount of opportunity for others is preserved; that is, as long as the Chinese treaty tariff is indiscriminately applied, as long as treaty ports are kept open and as long as no harbor dues or railroad charges are levied higher than those im-

posed upon subjects of the country in whose favor the "sphere" exists. The principle is also more or less opposed to the acquisition of a monopoly in the supply of railway materials and rolling stock.

The word "control" similarly refers to loans, in which connection it signifies certain "guarantees against improper loan fund expenditure," and secures principal and interest by some special hypothecation and the supervision or management thereof—as, for instance, when the revenue of customs, taxes or some monopoly is pledged.

### LOCATION OF SPHERES

In the "Battle for Concessions" in China, in which foreign control might be exercised, great rivalry existed among the Western powers. Russia, balked in her aims in Korea, turned to Manchuria in 1895, not as a "sphere of interest," but as a "sphere of influence," to be open to Russia for exploitation but to no other power. In 1896 the sphere was definitely set up by an agreement with China which permitted Russia to furnish capital and build the Transiberian Railway across Manchuria. By 1898 it was recognized that Russia had special and exclusive interests in Manchuria and claimed similar privileges in North China.<sup>9</sup> England and Germany followed suit, claiming respectively special interests and privileges in the Yangtze Valley and the Province of Shantung. To definitely establish such spheres, a convention was entered into by German and British financial interests on September 1 and 2, 1898, in London. In the text of the convention is found the following:

#### (1) British Sphere of Interest, viz:

The Yangtze Valley subject to the connection of the Shantung lines to the Yangtze at Chinkiang, the province south of the Yangtze; the Province of Shansi

<sup>8</sup> *Loc. cit.* pp. V-VI.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Morse, H. B.—*Trade and Administration of China*, pp. 437-438.



with connection to the Peking-Hankow line at a point south of Chengting and a connecting line to the Yangtze Valley, crossing the Hoangho Valley.

(2) German Sphere of Interest, viz:

The Province of Shantung and the Hoangho Valley with connection to Tientsin and Chengting, or other point on the Peking-Hankow line, in the south with connection to the Yangtze at Chinkiang or Nanking. The Hoangho Valley is understood to be subject to the connecting lines in Shansi, forming part of the British sphere of interest and to the connecting line to the Yangtze Valley, also belonging to the said sphere of interest.

Later it was agreed between these powers that the railway from Tientsin to Chinkiang or to Nanking should be financed jointly, but constructed separately according to the spheres through which the line was to run, and on completion to be worked for joint account. This was the method by which the Tientsin-Pukow line was eventually constructed.

France claimed exclusive rights and interests in the provinces of South China bordering on Tonkin, and also certain privileges in Szechuan Province. Japan claimed preferential rights in Fukien Province and the hinterland, and later took over part of Russia's sphere in South Manchuria. Italy undertook to establish similar claims in Chekiang Province, but China in her depths stiffened her back and successfully resisted the Italian pretensions.

Belgium and the United States came in for railway concessions in Central and South China in which certain "control" features were included.

Nominally all such "spheres of interest" were given up at the Washington Conference in 1921, but actually many control measures still exist in railway and other industrial concessions.

# CONTROL IN RAILWAY CONCESSIONS

In connection with "control" in railway concessions it has been found<sup>10</sup> that it extends, or has extended, to the following matters: the supervision of construction of the railway; the purchase of materials for construction, rolling stock, and other operating equipment; the audit or other supervision of expenditures and receipts; and the actual operation of the roads.

The exercise of this control in railway concessions is brought about by one of several ways. The syndicate making the loan is, in certain instances, made the purchasing agent of the railway and is allowed a commission on all purchases. In other cases, the chief engineer is of the nationality of the lending power, while in other contracts provision is made for the audit or control over revenues or expenditures of the railway during the currency of the loan.

The Peking-Mukden Railway loan contract of 1898 shows the character of the control desired by the lending concern, and the methods by which this control has been obtained. This "control" contract became the model for a number of later railway loan contracts. Willoughby<sup>11</sup> summarizes the "control" features of this contract as follows:

## The loan was made

a first charge upon the security of the permanent way, rolling stock, and entire property, with the freight and earnings of the existing lines between Peking and Shanhaikuan, and on the freights and earnings of the new lines when constructed.

Undertaking was given by the Chinese Government that the roads, buildings, rolling stock, etc., would be kept in good condition. If the construction of

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Willoughby, W. W.—*Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, p. 524.

<sup>11</sup> Willoughby, *loc. cit.*, pp. 527-28.

branch lines or extensions connecting with the lines concerned should be later proposed, the British and Chinese Corporation was to be applied to for loans if foreign capital was needed.

The principal and interest of the loan was further declared to be a direct obligation of the Imperial Government of China. In case of default, the railways were to be handed over to the Corporation to be managed by its representatives until the loan and interest charges were paid in full.

No further loan was to be charged upon the security named, until the loan was redeemed, nor were the roads to be parted with by the Chinese Government.

During the currency of the loan, the chief engineer of the road was to be a British subject; and the principal members of the railway staff to be capable and experienced Europeans, appointed by the Chinese Administrator-General of the railways, and subject to dismissal by him for misconduct or incompetency after consultation with the chief engineer. If Chinese with sufficient engineering or traffic experience could be found they were to be appointed as well as Europeans.

A capable and efficient European railway accountant was to be appointed "with full powers to organize and direct the keeping of the railway accounts, and to act with the Administrator-General and the chief engineer of the railway in the supervision of receipts and expenditures." Details were added as to the manner in which revenues were to be handled and disbursements made.

Thus through such "control" measures foreign banks and foreign construction companies have established a very definite control over the railways which have been built as "concession lines" or by the use of foreign capital. When it is realized that of

China's 6700 miles of railways some 5700 have been built as concession lines or with foreign loans, the extent of foreign control in this connection becomes more or less apparent.

Attempts to internationalize such control brought into being the old Six-Power Consortium, and through the original four powers of this group—Great Britain, the United States, France and Germany—one international loan for railway construction was made to China. The Hukuang Railway loan of £6,000,000 is the only joint railway financing enterprise of this group, in which international co-operation and control are substituted for international financial competition. It is interesting to note that in the contract for this loan many control features similar to those of the Peking-Mukden loan terms persist, with the privileges under such measures mutually shared by the four contracting powers or groups.

#### FOREIGN CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT REVENUES

Of equal importance with railway control in China is the foreign control of the chief revenue producing sources of the Chinese Government—the Maritime Customs and the Salt Administration. First and foremost of the financial resources of the Chinese Government are the Customs Revenues, collected and expended under the Customs Administration under the direction of Sir Francis Aglen, Inspector General. The terms "Maritime Customs" or "Foreign Customs" came into use to distinguish the customs levied on foreign imports and exports from the "Native Customs" levied on purely domestic trade. Later, however, the native customs within fifteen miles of the Treaty Ports came under the administration of the Maritime Customs Administration.

The control of the "foreign customs"

came into existence, according to Morse,<sup>12</sup> by "the necessities of the Chinese Government and not in any demand by the foreign merchant that an improved revenue service should be provided for them." In the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 the duties leviable upon foreign exports and imports were placed upon a fairly definite basis. By a "Declaration" issued by the Chinese Government, June 26, 1843, the tariff rate was fixed at approximately five per cent *ad valorem* for both exports and imports. By the Treaties of Tientsin in 1858 the five per cent rate was retained but converted into schedules of specific duties based upon this *ad valorem* rate.

The levying and collection of the duties agreed upon in the Treaty of Nanking remained for some time in the hands of the Chinese local officials. In this connection Willoughby points out that:<sup>13</sup>

Owing, however, to the incompetency and still more to the venality of these officials, many evils arose. Smuggling was carried on in a wholesale manner, and corrupt bargains between the Chinese officials and merchants as to the amounts of duties to be paid became common. Finally, in 1853, the whole system of collection at Shanghai broke down when the Taiping rebels occupied the city.

In the absence of customs officials, thus brought about, the foreign merchants agreed among themselves to declare their goods before their respective consuls and to pay to them, or to give bond for their payment, the five per cent duties, the amounts thus paid to be accounted for to the Chinese Government.

This plan, however, did not work very satisfactorily, throwing as it did a very considerable amount of extra work upon the consuls, and the result was that in 1854 an agreement was entered into between the local official, the "Taotai" of Shanghai,

and the British, French and American consuls, according to which the whole matter of administering the maritime customs at Shanghai was to be handled by three foreigners, to be appointed by the Taotai and to be termed Inspectors of Customs.

The first appointees under this arrangement were Captain Thomas Wade (British), Mr. L. Carr (American), and Mr. Arthur Smith (French). After a year Mr. Wade resigned and was succeeded by Mr. H. N. Lay who, in 1859, received the title Inspector General and was also given by the Chinese Government supervision over the system of lights and buoys.

In 1863 Mr. Lay quarreled with the Chinese Government about a matter not connected with the customs, and was dismissed by that government and Mr. Robert Hart appointed in his place—a position which he held until 1908. Since then Mr. F. A. Aglen has been the Inspector General. Replying to a letter from the British Minister, the Chinese Foreign Office in May, 1908, gave assurance that as long as British trade should predominate in China a British subject would be appointed to the Inspectorate General. . . .

This system now applies to the collection of duties on foreign goods, exported and imported, at all the Treaty Ports of China, and also embraces the control of some of the "native customs." For a time also, 1896 to 1911, the Chinese Post Office was within its jurisdiction. . . .

Because of the disorder attendant upon the Revolution of 1911, the customs receipts, for greater safety, were deposited in foreign banks and could not be drawn upon except under the signature of the Inspector General or his representative.

Since 1914, however, the Bank of China, which is nominally a government institution, has been made a depository bank for customs funds.

When China came into the international market for financial assistance the Maritime Customs Service was, and had been for a long period, under expert foreign supervision and control. The Franco-Russian loan of 1895, the

<sup>12</sup> *Trade and Administration of China*, p. 366, ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, p. 135, ff.

two Anglo-German loans of 1896 and 1898, were therefore secured upon the Maritime Customs Revenue. The second Anglo-German loan was secured also by certain *likin*, or internal barrier revenues, which were collected by the Maritime Customs Service. Thus the loan service of these first three foreign loans of China came automatically under foreign control.

When, following the Boxer uprising, an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels was levied against China, this also became a charge upon the balance of the foreign-controlled Customs Revenues, and was secured in addition by the Native Customs Revenues at the open ports of China, and, in part, upon the revenues of the Salt Gabelle.

Next to the Customs Revenues the revenues from the Salt Gabelle are the most important in the present Chinese revenue system. These also have been under foreign control since 1913. Salt taxes have been an important item of the revenue of most oriental countries for an indefinitely long period. In the China system salt taxes were collected by the provincial governments prior to 1909, under the Salt Revenue Administration. The rates of duty, the lines on which the Administration was to be run, and the general policy of the organization, were fixed by the Imperial Government at Peking, by which the Salt Commissioners were appointed.

The early status of the organization has been described as follows:<sup>14</sup>

The Administration was under the control of the Ministry of Finance, and the Viceroys and Governors of the Provinces by virtue of their offices were Chief Controllers General of the Provincial Salt Administration. The Provinces deducted the cost of the administration, and remitted a portion of the net revenue annually to Peking. The total revenue received by Peking never appears to have exceeded

(Kuping) Taels 12,000,000 in any one year. An attempt to reform the Salt Administration was made in the year 1910, when a Central Salt Bureau with Duke Tsai Tze at its head was formed. The Revolution broke out before the change had produced any effect, and at the end of 1911 the Central Salt Bureau was abolished, and the Salt Administration was placed under the control of a special department of the Ministry of Finance, which was also responsible for the collection of the duties on tea and opium.

In April, 1911, a few months prior to the Chinese Revolution, an agreement had been signed between the Chinese Government and the "four-power" syndicate for a loan of £10,000,000 for the purpose of currency reform and of industrial development in Manchuria. It was to be secured in part upon a recently imposed surtax on salt. Up to this time, practically all foreign loans had been "Administrative" loans for indemnities which had to be paid abroad. The lenders had no occasion, therefore, to seek to control the expenditures under such loans. This proposed Currency Loan, however, which never was completed by reason of the revolution intervening, gave rise to a new type of "control,"—the control of the expenditures under the loan. While this loan was to be secured in part upon the salt taxes it did not provide for a reorganization of the Salt Administration under foreign control; and the only "control" involved was the type of control that the Chinese from this time on strenuously objected to, i.e. the control of expenditures of loan funds to make sure the proceeds of such loans would be used to carry out the purpose of the loans.

The currency loan was for the purpose of carrying out a definite program. The "four-power" banking syndicate believed that some form of control and supervision was necessary if this purpose was to be achieved. According to

<sup>14</sup> Cf., *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 792-93.



Williard Straight,<sup>13</sup> the representative of the syndicate,

it was thought that the "control" machinery devised for railway loans, could, with certain modifications, be utilized for assuring the proper applications of the borrowed funds under the currency reform program.

The Chinese had reluctantly agreed to various control provisions in railway loan agreements, but they feared that to admit the principle of supervision over administrative expenditures would be to pave the way for foreign control over China's general finances. An arrangement was finally made, however, whereby China submitted to the groups her program of currency reform for their acceptance, and agreed to expend the loan funds only in accordance therewith, to publish quarterly reports of disbursements made, and to engage a foreign expert to assist the Bureau of Currency Reform.

The loan has not been issued; but it is open to question whether this "control," in practice, would have prevented speculation, and insured the proper expenditure of loan funds, and the effective operation of the currency reform program.

The real control of the Salt Revenue came with a loan immediately following the revolution. The Chinese authorities approached the Old Consortium for a £60,000,000 loan for the reorganization of the demoralized administrative services of the Republican Government. Negotiations followed and as a result the five powers—America having withdrawn from the Consortium—agreed upon a loan of £25,000,000 for reorganization purposes. One clause of the loan contract provided for the reorganization of the Salt Administration. The loan was made a direct liability of the Chinese Government and was secured both as to principal and interest "by a charge upon the entire revenue of the Salt Administration of China," subject to previous charges thereon.

<sup>13</sup> W. D. Straight—*Recent Developments in China*, p. 135.

The loan contract provided that the Chinese Government was

to take immediate steps for the reorganization with the assistance of foreigners of the system of collection of the salt revenues of China assigned as security for this loan, according to a general plan which the loan agreement outlined. This included the establishment at Peking of a Central Salt Administration, under the control of the Minister of Finance, but administered by a Chinese chief inspector, who was to constitute the chief authority for the superintendence of the issue of licenses and the compilation of reports and returns of revenue. Revenues from salt dues were to be lodged with the banks or with depositors approved by them and placed to the Chinese Government Salt Revenue Account, which account was not to be drawn upon except under the joint signatures of the Chief Inspectors, whose duty, it was declared, should be to protect the priority of the several obligations secured upon the salt revenues. Unless and until there should be default in the payments called for by the loan, the Salt Administration was not to be interfered with, but if default occurred the administration was to be forthwith incorporated with the Maritime Customs and administered for the benefit of the bondholders representing the Reorganization Loan. By regulations issued for the administration of the salt revenue, the foreign Associate Chief Inspector was designated as "Advisor of the Central Salt Administration," and his duties and authority defined.

The reasons for the withdrawal of the American group from the old Consortium were mainly President Wilson's objections to the terms of the proposed reorganization loan. Overlach points out that these objections were exclusively directed against the "control" clauses of this contract. In a public announcement on March 13, 1913, President Wilson said, in part:

The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this Admin-

istration does not feel that it ought, even if by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go to the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs of that Great Oriental State, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people. The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them antiquated and burdensome, to secure the loan but also the administration of those taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our Government implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the Government of our people rests. . . .

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous of promoting the most extended and intimate trade relationship between this country and the Chinese Republic. The present Administration will urge and support the legislative measures necessary to give American merchants, manufacturers, contractors and engineers the banking and other financial facilities which they now lack and without which they are at a serious disadvantage as compared with their industrial and commercial rivals. This is its duty. This is the main material interest of its citizens in the development of China. Our interests are those of the "Open Door"—a door of friendship and mutual advantage. This is the only door we care to enter.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN CONTROL

There is not much question in the minds of those who have analyzed the financial situation in China but that the efficient foreign administration and control of the revenues of the Customs Administration and the Salt Gabelle have been of untold benefit to the Chinese themselves as well as to foreign creditors. These revenues were to serve as securities for international loans, and the fact that they were under expert foreign supervision made

it possible for the Chinese Government thus to utilize them.

Much has been written on the subject of the nature and results of foreign financial control in China.<sup>16</sup> Some writers have stated that the financial and political chaos which has characterized China since the Revolution in 1911 has been due in no small measure to the foreign political and financial control of China's railways and revenue producing sources. An unbiased study of the facts would, in spite of glaring instances of the abuse of control, particularly in connection with railways, lead one to the opposite conclusion. Without adequate foreign supervision and control of such revenues as the Maritime Customs, the Salt Tax, and later, the Postal revenues, it is difficult to try to picture the further chaos which doubtless would prevail in Chinese finance.

The Chinese Information Bureau in London recently replied to a statement of the China Association, London, in which reply there is indicated the attitude of certain Chinese toward certain features of foreign financial control.<sup>17</sup>

The China Association minimise the grip which foreigners have on China. They make no mention of leased territories (why is Wei-Hai-Wei still in British hands?); of penetration by railway concessions; of control by means of loans, often raised against the wishes of all but a small clique; of the fact that China is still not free to fix her own Customs Tariff nor to collect her Customs revenue, which is controlled by the foreigners under a British Inspector-General of Customs (so long as British trade in China predominates). Nor do they refer to the large question of the ex-

<sup>16</sup> Cf. Overlach, T. W.—*Foreign Financial Control in China*; Willoughby, W. W.—*Foreign Rights and Interests in China*; Morse, H. B.—*International Relations of the Chinese Empire*; etc.

<sup>17</sup> *The China Express and Telegraph*, London, July 23, 1925, p. 515.

clusive financial control of the Consortium of British, American, French and Japanese banking groups, preventing China from raising money in the open market.

Reference is made in the preceding paragraph to the financial control exercised by the New Consortium. In 1920 the American Government proposed to the governments of Great Britain, France and Japan, that the Consortium be reconstituted, or a new consortium formed, which should insure international co-operation of a friendly sort rather than international competition in making administrative loans to China and loans for industrial developments such as railways. The several national groups were called upon to pool such rights as they had acquired for the construction of railways on which substantial progress had not already been made. The New Consortium, therefore, sought to make future railway construction a matter of international concern,<sup>18</sup> divorced from the obnoxious features of earlier "control" accompanied by political pretensions.

The objections of the Chinese Government toward availing itself of the facilities offered by the Consortium

<sup>18</sup> Ch. MacMurray, J. V. A.—in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1925, p. 420.

have been mainly on the ground of the policy of the Consortium to definitely control the expenditures of such loans as are made to the Chinese Government. In view of the comparatively recent experiences of China in connection with the famous "Nishihara" loans, and other internal and foreign loans of a similar character, where only a small fraction of the proceeds of such loans were used for the purposes for which the loans were nominally contracted, the wisdom of the New Consortium in adhering to this policy can hardly be questioned. The Chinese who have the real interests of their country at heart should not object to this type of control of expenditures of loan funds; they should rather welcome and encourage it.

In the opinion of the writer, not less but more foreign financial assistance and control will be necessary if China is to speedily extricate herself from the political and financial chaos in which she now finds herself. This control, however, should be international rather than national, and divorced from all political preferential rights and pretensions. It should be exercised at all times for the benefit of and not to the detriment of the Chinese people, and not in a manner subversive to Chinese sovereignty.

# Sources of Revenue in Japan

By TADAO WIKAWA

Assistant Financial Commissioner from the Japanese Government to the United States<sup>1</sup>

THE budget system of the central government of Japan is very complicated. The existence of thirty-one Special Accounts in addition to a General Account makes the study of the budget system much more difficult than that of the United States.

The relation of the two kinds of accounts are so closely interwoven that it is impossible to get at the true state of things unless all the duplicated items therein are eliminated. It was only on July 1 of this year (1925) that the Bureau of the Budget of our Finance Department gave out for the first time in our *Official Gazette* an article entitled "The Net Budget for the Fiscal Year 1925." This article showed the net revenue and expenditures in the following manner:

central and local governments combined. The last is, in my opinion, the only datum upon which any discussion on sources of revenue in Japan can be accurately based.

In this connection a few words about what constitutes our expenditures would not be out of place. The argument that the greater percentage of our expenditures is for military rather than for civilian purposes is not quite correct. By studying the net expenditures of the combined central and local budgets, it becomes evident that most of our civil expenditures are defrayed from the Special Accounts of the central government and by the General and Special Accounts of the local communities.

Almost all the accounts are divided

	Revenue	Expenditures
	Yen	Yen
General account.....	1,549,814,786	1,549,804,786
Special accounts.....	3,296,642,444	2,986,183,290
Gross amount.....	4,846,457,230	4,536,008,076
Duplicated items to be deducted.....	1,417,790,106	1,133,437,592
Net amount.....	3,428,667,124	3,402,550,484

The budget systems of our prefectures, cities, towns and villages are also complicated, as they are modeled, to a certain extent, after that of the central government. So far as I know, nothing authentic has ever been published on the net budget of the local bodies, to say nothing of a net budget of both

into *ordinary* and *extraordinary* in the case of revenues as well as expenditures. Taking all sources of revenue of the central government into account, the percentage of receipts under classified headings are approximately as follows:

	Per Cent
Taxes and stamp receipts.....	35
Receipts from public undertakings and public domains.....	40
Other miscellaneous receipts.....	25

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Wikawa has written this article not as an official of the Japanese Government, but in his private capacity.—THE EDITOR.



Our local revenues in recent years, though more or less inaccurate for the reasons mentioned, may be roughly estimated in percentages as follows:

	Per Cent
Taxes .....	55
Receipts from public undertakings and public domains .....	15
Other miscellaneous receipts .....	30

#### PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF REVENUE

1. *Taxes and Stamp Receipts.* The tax system of Japan is often called by its students a group of various taxes created to meet the financial need from time to time, rather than an organization of taxes established in accordance with certain principles. Whether this is true or not, at present it has two remarkable features. The first is that the total revenue from indirect taxes exceeds that from direct taxes. The second is that, though the direct tax system has the income tax as its center and the business and land taxes as supplements to it, for the purpose of taxing property incomes more heavily than other forms of incomes, yet this purpose is not really accomplished, for it fails in fact to tax other property incomes proportionately.

The trend of public opinion may be summarized as follows: to reduce the indirect taxes excepting those on luxuries and to reduce the direct taxes on incomes earned, even though such reduction may make it necessary to increase those on property incomes. Naturally our present system<sup>2</sup> is expected before long to undergo a considerable transformation.

A national tax reform plan was proposed by our Finance Minister Hamaguchi to the cabinet members at the end of July of this year (1925). The cabinet ministers failed to reach any agreement and consequently the life

<sup>2</sup> For detailed description, see *Financial and Economic Annual of Japan*, 1924, pp. 20-33.

of the Kato coalition cabinet ended. Immediately afterwards, however, Viscount Kato was ordered to form his own cabinet, which soon adopted the reform proposals. It is understood that, if no political changes arise in the meanwhile, the plan will be submitted at the coming session of the Imperial Diet. As it indicates the direction our taxation system may take within the near future, it may be worth while to give a brief description of it.

According to a statement given out, the plan has been so drafted that no considerable change in the amount of our revenue will occur. It has three distinct objects: namely, (1) to reorganize the present system to insure a more equitable distribution of the tax burden among various social classes; (2) to suit the administrative convenience; (3) and finally to meet the present economic and financial conditions.

With these objects in view the following proposals are made:

(1) The present direct taxation system shall be allowed to remain as a whole, but with some minor alterations. A new direct tax at a very low rate on interest from securities, bank deposits, etc., shall be created. No new national tax on houses shall be established, so that a source of revenue shall be left intact for the local governments.

(2) In order to strengthen general business foundations and to promote industries, the following revisions of direct taxes shall be made:

(a) A flat rate of five per cent on the undistributed income of corporations shall be substituted for the present progressive rates.

(b) The basis of assessment of the business tax shall be the net profit of every business instead of the present complicated basis of assessment on capital, sales, commissions, etc. A flat tax rate will be applied here also.

(c) The basis of assessment of the land tax shall be changed from the assessed value of the land to its actual rental

value. The rate on rice and other cultivated fields shall be lowered. This is to go into effect in 1928. Meanwhile, as a transitory measure, there shall be a one per cent (in Hokkaido 0.7 per cent) reduction in the tax rate on these fields.

(3) In order to obtain greater economic justice, the burden of taxation on the middle and lower classes shall be reduced in the ways mentioned below:

(a) The minimum amount of income liable to taxation under Class III (individual incomes) shall be raised from 800 yen to 1200 yen.

(b) Land below a minimum valuation shall not be subject to the land tax. The minimum shall temporarily be in the case of rice and other cultivated fields, 200 yen of the assessed value of land, until the assessment based on the rental value goes into effect.

(c) The minimum taxable net profit shall be 400 yen per annum in the case of the business tax.

(d) The minimum taxable inheritance shall be in the case of succession to the headship of a family (in other words, succession to all the rights and obligations) 5000 yen, and in the case of succession to property (succession to the property right and obligation only) 1000 yen.

(e) The consumption tax on cotton textiles shall be abolished. So shall be the traveling tax, taxes on soy, and stamp duties on patent medicines.

(4) Though the creation of new taxes is to be avoided as far as possible, in order to attain the object of the present tax reform and to cover the deficit in the revenue caused by the foregoing abolitions or reductions, two kinds of new taxes shall be established:

(a) Tax on interest derived from securities and bank deposits, etc., at a flat rate of two per cent.

(b) Tax on soft drinks of ten yen per one *koku* (47.65389 gallons).

(5) To cover the decrease of revenue caused by the above mentioned (2) and (3), there shall be the following tax increases:

(a) Inheritance tax; in the case of succession to the headship of a family, pro-

gressively higher rates shall be applied on the taxable property of more than 40,000 yen, scaling up to the maximum of thirteen per cent on such property in excess of 5,000,000 yen.

(b) As for the tax on *sake* (rice wine), the rate on the so-called "seishu" (refined *sake*) shall be increased from thirty-three yen to forty yen per *koku*.

(c) The rate on alcohol and alcoholic liquors shall be increased as in the case of the tax on *sake*.

(d) The beer tax shall be increased from eighteen yen to twenty-five yen per *koku*.

(6) No new monopolies shall be established.

(7) The decrease in revenue, caused by the abolition or reduction of direct taxes, shall be covered as far as possible by the increased revenue from the same taxes and the balance shall be made good, to a certain extent, by the natural increase in customs revenue resulting from the revision of the tariff, which is now under discussion, and concerning which I herewith will not mention more than to say that it is one of the important sources of revenue.

This reform plan was opposed by the dissenting cabinet members for several reasons. Perhaps the main reason was that they thought, so far as the thirty million yen reduction of tax burden was involved, the national tax system should be reframed in connection with the reform of the local tax system.

As to the number of individual income taxpayers, assuming for convenience's sake that there is one taxpayer per each household, only about sixteen per cent of over eleven million households in Japan proper are paying the tax. Considering the wages paid, the expenditures of families and many other things, it is hardly believable that almost eighty-four per cent of the total households have incomes below the minimum taxable amount. As in all countries, it is impossible to devise any system of income taxation which will please everybody. "Hidden assets" are as

difficult to ascertain in Japan as in any European or American country possessing an income tax system. However, the number of the tax payers is increasing slowly but steadily.

As for our local tax system, it is complexity itself. Besides several surtaxes on the national and prefectural taxes, there are many so-called "Miscellaneous and Special taxes." The last two, which are the subjects of much discussion, include taxes on vehicles, theatres, entertainments, transfer of real estate, etc., totaling 114 various kinds. According to the budget for the fiscal year 1924, the revenue from these taxes was as follows:

	Prefectures	Cities	Towns, Etc.
	(Unit: 1000 Yen)		
Surtaxes on national taxes .....	100,855	33,770	59,210
Household and house taxes .....	56,519	.....	.....
Prefectural business tax .....	8,482	.....	.....
Prefectural "miscellaneous" taxes .....	48,030	.....	.....
Surtaxes on prefectural taxes .....	.....	37,086	166,521
"Special" community taxes .....	.....	17,010	5,388
Others .....	8,107	.....	28,606
Total .....	221,993	87,866	259,725

A reform plan, which has been for many years an outstanding issue, was finally submitted by the Home Minister Wakatsuki at a cabinet meeting in August of this year (1925). According to the official announcement, the approved plan has the following six features:

(1) A house tax as a provincial tax shall be created, so as to make good the deficit resulting from the abolition of the household tax.

(2) The household tax shall be abolished as a provincial tax, but be created as a city, town or village tax.

(3) The provincial business tax and miscellaneous taxes shall be readjusted.

(4) A special land tax shall be created. It shall be levied only on the land below the minimum subject to the national land tax, within the margin of the present local surtax on it. Its basis of assessment shall be the same as the national land tax; namely, the renting value of land.

(5) The local surtax system on the national income tax shall be revised. The surtax shall be abolished as a city, town or village tax, except in the case where there is no household tax. The surtax as a provincial tax shall be increased, if it is necessary to cover the deficit in revenue caused by the abolition of the household tax.

(6) The help resulting from an increased national subsidy to local communities for compulsory education shall be employed in

the readjustment of city, town or village taxes.

With this intention the detailed program is under discussion by the authorities concerned. The three tables on next page give a general idea as to the revenue from the principal national taxes, their flexibility, the per capita burden and the combined local revenues based on the budgets for the fiscal year 1924.

2. *Public Undertakings and Domains.* Perhaps the Japanese Government conducts more monopolies and public utilities than any other country in the world. Railroads and postal, telegraph

## PRINCIPAL NATIONAL TAX INCOMES

(Unit: 1000 Yen)

Taxes	1902 (Settled account)	1914 (Settled account)	1924 (Working Budget)
Income.....	7,460	37,157	166,625
Land.....	46,505	74,925	72,030
Business.....	6,777	28,594	57,308
Liquor.....	63,738	95,781	217,412
Sugar.....	4,145	23,384	68,442
Textile.....	.....	16,946	54,272
Customs.....	15,501	44,228	82,691
Total (including other tax receipts).....	151,084	343,708	762,426

## PER CAPITA TAX BURDEN

	1902	1914	1921
National:	<i>Yen</i>	<i>Yen</i>	<i>Yen</i>
Direct taxes.....	1.544	2.892	5.964
Indirect taxes.....	1.298	2.686	6.277
Total.....	2.842	5.578	12.241
Local:			
Prefectural taxes.....	0.995	1.273	3.955
Community taxes.....	1.265	2.021	6.395
Grand total.....	5.102	8.872	22.591
Total direct taxes.....	3.557	5.980	16.627

## LOCAL REVENUE FOR 1924

(1000 Yen)

	Taxes	Others	Total
Prefectures.....	221,993	113,011	335,004
Cities.....	87,866	464,428	552,294
Towns, etc.....	259,726	149,638	409,384
Grand total.....	569,585	627,097	1,296,682

and telephone systems are nationalized.

A similar policy is carried out in the colonies. Local communities, especially large municipalities, also conduct public utilities, such as supply of electricity and tramways, etc.

The monopolies (in a narrow sense) conducted by the central government include tobacco, salt and camphor. The government of Chosen (Korea) monopolizes tobacco, salt, carrots and opium. In Taiwan (Formosa) to-



bacco, salt, liquor, camphor and opium are on government monopolies. Some of them were established solely from the standpoint of public welfare. As government monopolies have proven successful in the past, there is now a demand from certain quarters to extend them to cover sugar, liquor and even rice; but the present cabinet has decided not to establish any new monopolies.

The iron and wool mills were originally established rather as model factories to promote the respective industries. As the purpose has now almost been attained, there are some people who advocate the transfer of them to private management and operations.

The postal (including postal savings), telegraph and telephone services, which are conducted to promote public welfare, are successfully operated and financially profitable, though the development of the telephone system is much slower than it is in the United States.

One of the most important departments of government business is, of course, the railroads, which have experienced a decided improvement since their nationalization. The net profit from them is used chiefly for the expansion and improvement of the system.

According to the most conservative official estimate, the total value of our central government's property amounts to 5,494 million yen. Of course, this does not include any national property for direct public use, such as roads, rivers, etc.

In the above total are included government buildings, land, railroads, etc., valued at 3,589 million yen; national domain, including forests, etc., at 1,595 million yen, and other property valued at 310 million yen. The forests furnish the largest share of revenue from the national domain.

Local governments are not destitute of forestry resources. The total forest-

ry area belonging to them is estimated to be about two-fifths as large as the area owned by the central government. Their resources are also well preserved.

3. *Miscellaneous Revenues.* Under this heading come all the revenues other than those derived from taxation, public undertakings and domain. It includes various receipts from local governments (of course in the case of the latter, vice versa) for joint public works, donations, proceeds of loans, income from various funds, indemnities and a number of other items. It includes also such an item as a surplus from the preceding fiscal year, which cannot properly be said to be derived from certain sources of revenue.

The proceeds of loans, which are one of the most important items, are estimated in the budget for the fiscal year 1924 as 100,000,000 yen for restoration works undertaken after the Great Earthquake, 40 million yen for the construction and improvement of railroads and 10 million yen for public works in Chosen (Korea).

Our national debt at the end of June, 1925, amounted to 4,521,876 thousand yen, consisting of 3,017,113 thousand yen of internal and 1,504,763 thousand yen of external obligations. Of this total, over one-quarter is self-supporting, as it has been incurred in connection with the construction, purchase and improvement of government railroads. There is, moreover, a considerable amount for telephone investments, etc.

Thus, we have probably the smallest so-called non-productive loan of all the world powers. This is due to the traditional policy of our financial leaders to increase the revenue from taxation or government undertakings and to resort to loans only as a last resort, as in case of emergencies such as war or great catastrophies.

The local bodies may raise loans for

various  
prova  
the H  
the ce

Natio  
Prefec  
Cities  
Town

\* In  
† In  
‡ In  
§ In

various purposes, subject to the approval of their legislative organs and the Home and Finance Ministers of the central government, though within

a certain limitation this provision may be waived.

The following table shows the outstanding loans at various times:

OUTSTANDING LOANS  
(Unit: 1000 Yen)

	1902	1914	1923
National . . . . .	2,243,895	2,560,778	4,208,895
Prefectural * . . . . .	11,225	51,505	193,205
Cities † . . . . .	35,130	254,718	624,845
Towns, villages ‡ . . . . .	4,043	20,379	106,483§

\* Including counties (which, as local bodies, have recently been abolished.)

† Including wards.

‡ Including water utilization associations, etc.

§ Per capita burden was approximately as follows:

	1914	1923
National loans . . . . .	46 Yen	79 Yen
Local loans . . . . .	5	16
Total . . . . .	51	95

# The Opium Problem

By WELLES A. GRAY

Instructor in Government, Cornell University

**D**URING the past year probably no international negotiations concerning the world as a whole aroused more interest in this country than the Geneva Opium Conferences of last winter, in which the delegation of the United States played an important, though apparently an ineffective, part. The object of these conferences was the control, not only of the opium traffic, but of narcotic drugs in general, and the plea of the American delegates for the complete abolition of the prepared opium trade and the limitation of the production of raw opium to the medical and scientific needs of the world, while unsuccessful, nevertheless had its influence in bringing the issue into open discussion.

The abuse of opium is confined very largely to the Far East, and there it takes two forms. In China, and among Chinese abroad, the drug is used for smoking; China is probably the largest single consumer of the drug. In India opium is eaten by a large portion of the populace, who regard it as an indispensable home remedy against heat and illnesses resulting therefrom. It is generally believed that the smoking of opium is injurious, but there is a difference of opinion as to the eating of the drug.<sup>1</sup> Abuse of manufactured narcotics, such as morphine, cocaine and heroin is not confined to any one quarter of the globe,

<sup>1</sup> It is the contention of the Indian Government, based upon the findings of the Royal Commission of 1893, which investigated the opium situation there, that the eating of opium, if practiced in moderation, is harmless. Other, and more recent investigators, have taken the opposite view.

and is universally recognized as harmful. Since 1911 international agreements concerning these matters have treated them as one general problem.

At the present time the production of opium is practically confined to eight countries, for its cultivation requires peculiar climactic conditions which exist only in a few localities. These countries, with the amounts of opium produced in 1922, are as follows:

	Pounds
China.....	4,400,000
India.....	1,954,836
Turkey.....	650,000
Persia.....	450,000
Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom....	235,732
Greece.....	50,000
Turkestan.....	44,000
Afghanistan.....	25,900 <sup>1</sup>

The consumption of the drug, on the other hand, is quite widespread. In the Far East opium is used for smoking in British North Borneo, Burma, Ceylon, China, Dutch East Indies, Maylay States, Formosa, French Indo-China, Hongkong, Kwantung, Siam and Straits Settlements. In these countries the habit is prevalent largely among the Chinese population, and to a lesser extent among the natives in

<sup>2</sup> *Minutes of the Fifth Session of the Advisory Committee (of the League) on Opium*, p. 178; cited in Raymond Leslie Buell: *The International Opium Conferences*, p. 47. (VIII, *World Peace Foundation Pamphlets* 2-3.) The opium production of China has been variously estimated in amounts ranging from the one given above up to 15,000,000 pounds. The reason for this variation is that this production is illegal, and consequently estimates of the amount have to be made by private investigators. The proportion of opium produced by China, therefore, is anywhere from 50 to 90 per cent of the total.

countries other than China. In many of these places the sale of prepared opium for smoking is a government monopoly; in Formosa this is done with the purpose of ultimately abolishing the traffic.<sup>3</sup>

#### USE OF OPIUM IN CHINA

The use of opium in China dates back to the 18th century, and since 1729 the Chinese Government has fought against it. Early efforts, however, were half hearted, with only an occasional period of strict enforcement of prohibitory legislation. By the close of the century, however, the traffic in opium had increased to such an extent that earnest efforts were made at suppression.<sup>4</sup> These attempts finally precipitated the First Opium War in 1839, and at the close of the Second Opium War the Chinese Government legalized the traffic in the Treaties of Tientsin in 1858, and it continued to grow.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile home production had set in to meet the increased demand, and it, too, grew rapidly.

By the beginning of the present century the traffic had reached such proportions that the very existence of China seemed to be threatened. Accordingly the government, in 1906, issued an edict ordering its complete abolition within ten years,<sup>6</sup> and an agreement was concluded with Great Britain in 1907 which provided for an annual reduction of 10 per cent in the exports of Indian opium to China, *pari passu* with the reduction of the

domestic production of opium by China.<sup>7</sup> Much to the surprise of many foreigners, who had thought the feat impossible,<sup>8</sup> China succeeded in eradicating completely the cultivation of the poppy by 1917, and she found herself practically free, for the first time in more than two centuries, from the opium curse.<sup>9</sup> Unfortunately, however, disorders in China during recent years have resulted in an illegal recrudescence of poppy growing, and the production of opium there is beginning to reach its former proportions, and amounts to more than 50 per cent of the annual world crop.<sup>10</sup>

Active American interest in the problem dates from the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898, where the smoking habit was found to be widespread among the Chinese population. The successful efforts of the United States to abolish the habit there led to the interest of government officials in the general problem, and President Taft took an active part in the summoning of the International Opium Commission, which met at Shanghai in February 1906.<sup>11</sup>

This Commission was the starting point of later international efforts at control of the drug traffic, for it resulted in the calling of the First Hague Opium Conference by the Netherlands Government at the suggestion of President Taft. This Conference convened at The Hague, December 1, 1911, to consider not only the opium traffic in its relation to the Far East, but also the general traffic in opium derivatives which had become a menace in the West. The work of this Conference

<sup>3</sup> O. C. 114. Documents of the League of Nations on the opium problem are listed as follows: Documents of the Advisory Committee, O. C., of the First Conference, C. O. P., of the Second, O. D. C., and followed by a number for identification.

<sup>4</sup> Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, p. 173-4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 175 ff.

<sup>6</sup> W. W. Willoughby, *Opium as an International Problem*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>7</sup> W. T. Dunn—*The Opium Traffic*, 53 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>10</sup> See *supra*, p. 2. Dunn gives (pp. 52-53) the total production for China in 1905 as between 18 and 20 thousand tons.

<sup>11</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 20 ff.



resulted in The Hague International Opium Convention, adopted on January 23, 1912, which was the first international agreement for the control of the drug traffic.

#### THE HAGUE CONVENTION

The provisions of this Convention dealt with raw and prepared opium, and with the traffic in manufactured narcotics. It was agreed to control the production of raw opium, and to prohibit its export to countries forbidding its import.<sup>12</sup> Gradual suppression of the manufacture and use of prepared opium was agreed upon, but temporary export of the commodity was authorized under certain conditions, in case a country was not yet ready to prohibit it.<sup>13</sup> The powers agreed to enact laws to prevent the use of manufactured drugs—medicinal opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin, etc.—for non-medicinal and illegitimate uses, and the sale and manufacture of these drugs was to be confined to licensed persons.<sup>14</sup> It was agreed between China and the powers having treaties with her that mutual steps should be taken to prevent the smuggling of prepared drugs. The powers agreed to suppress smoking in their leased territories, settlements and concessions in China, and to suppress with the Chinese Government any opium dens existing there. Measures were to be taken *parri passu* with China for the gradual reduction of the shops for the sale of raw and prepared opium in such territories.<sup>15</sup> A protocol recommended the investigation of the desirability of regulating the drug traffic through the mails, and emphasized the need for a study of Indian hemp and its derivative, hashish.

<sup>12</sup> *The Hague International Opium Convention*, O. C. 1 (1), Chapter I.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter II.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter III.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IV.

Due to the evident desirability of world-wide co-operation in this control of the drug traffic, the Convention provided that the powers not represented at the Conference be invited to sign and ratify the Convention.<sup>16</sup> In case of failure for all to sign, provision was made for an additional conference. After two other conferences had been held it was decided in June, 1914, to put the Convention into effect among those powers that had ratified without waiting for the rest to do so. At this time forty-four powers had signed the Convention, eleven had ratified, fourteen more were favorably inclined, and none of the remaining nineteen signatory powers regarded it unfavorably.<sup>17</sup>

#### OPIUM AND THE LEAGUE

But shortly after this the World War broke out, and in the resulting confusion little progress was made toward securing additional ratifications. The drug question, however, was taken up at the Peace Conference in 1919, and the Treaty of Versailles provided that its ratification by all powers that had not signed or ratified The Hague Convention should constitute a signature and ratification of the same.<sup>18</sup> Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided that the League should supervise the administration of all existing and future conventions and agreements concerning the drug traffic. Accordingly the League took charge of the administration of The Hague Convention. In order to carry on this function the League established in 1920 an "Advisory Committee on Opium" which

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter VI.

<sup>17</sup> Quoted in Willoughby, *op. cit.*, from a report of the British delegation to the Third Hague Conference.

<sup>18</sup> Treaty with Germany, Art. 295. Treaties with Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and Turkey contained similar provisions.

is composed of representatives from China, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Siam, Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, and the United States.<sup>19</sup>

#### WORK OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

By August, 1924, this Committee had held six sessions. Its work has been to study information as to the production, manufacture and trade in drugs, and to prepare and suggest further means of control of the traffic. It has urged upon the powers the ratification of The Hague Convention, worked out an import certificate plan, and studied various other means of preventing smuggling.<sup>20</sup>

In a discussion of The Hague Convention of 1912 at the fifth session of the Committee in June, 1923, Congressman Stephen G. Porter, of the American delegation, submitted the view of the United States as to the interpretation of the Convention, which was:

1. If the purpose of The Hague Opium Convention is to be achieved according to its spirit and true intent, it must be recognized that the use of opium products for other than medicinal and scientific purposes is an abuse and not legitimate.

2. In order to prevent the abuse of these products, it is necessary to exercise the control of the production of raw opium in such a manner that there will be no surplus available for nonmedicinal and nonscientific purposes.<sup>21</sup>

Other members of the Committee, however, held the view that The Hague Convention was not to be thus

<sup>19</sup> The Committee also has three assessors, or expert advisers. The United States and Germany were invited to participate due to their interest in The Hague Convention. The American delegates sit in an "advisory" or "consultative" capacity.

<sup>20</sup> League Pamphlet, March 1924, *Social and Humanitarian Work*, cited in Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-49.

<sup>21</sup> *Minutes of the Fifth Session*, p. 15, cited in Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

interpreted, and drew attention to the fact that it had authorized the smoking of opium temporarily, and that by its failure to mention the eating of opium that practice was still permitted.

It was finally decided by the Committee, in a resolution concurred in by the American delegation, to accept the American interpretations as the general principles upon which future steps taken to control the traffic should be based.<sup>22</sup> In order to carry the American proposals into effect it was proposed that the Council of the League call two conferences, one of governments in whose territory smoking still prevailed to confer for the purpose of abolishing this practice in accordance with Chapter II of The Hague Convention, and a second, of governments producing and manufacturing opium and drugs to confer for the purpose of limiting the production of opium and manufactured drugs for export purposes. The League Council, in accordance with a resolution of the Assembly,<sup>23</sup> decided to convene the two conferences as recommended by the Committee. The second conference was enlarged to include all League members and signatories to The Hague Convention, and it was decided, finally, to hold the conferences in November 1925.<sup>24</sup>

#### THE FIRST CONFERENCE

The Conference for the suppression of smoking convened at Geneva on November 3, 1924, attended by representatives from the following governments: British Empire, China, France,

<sup>22</sup> A reservation was made by most of the powers that the uses and production of opium should be in accordance with The Hague Convention, and India made the reservation that the eating of opium there was not illegal.

<sup>23</sup> Adopted September 27, 1923. Quoted Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-1.

<sup>24</sup> The first plan was to hold them in July, but this was changed, later, to November.

India, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal and Siam. Although opium smoking was prohibited by law within its territory, China was invited to attend because of the prevalence of smoking among the Chinese resident in the Far Eastern possessions of many European powers. The United States did not attend due to the fact that smoking had already been suppressed in the Philippines.

The agenda of this Conference included a study of the situation in regard to the application of Chapter II of The Hague Convention, the consideration of measures to carry this chapter into effect, and the embodying of such of these measures as might be agreed upon into a convention. With regard to China the powers were to consider the situation in China as to the production of opium and its effect upon the control over the use of the drug in neighboring territories, and such measures as China might take to bring about the suppression of the illegal production and use of opium in her territory.<sup>25</sup>

The first matter brought up was the abolition of the use of prepared opium (abolition of smoking) in places where it was temporarily permitted. The major portion of the powers represented contended that measures taken by them to suppress smoking would be ineffective as long as smuggling continued to exist, and would only serve to stimulate the illicit traffic. It was

contended that the chief source of illicit opium was China, where, despite prohibitory legislation, such a recrudescence of the growth of the poppy had occurred that the major portion of the world production of opium came from there.<sup>26</sup> Until illicit production of opium had been stopped, and all opium and drug manufacture was under the control of the various governments, smuggling of opium would continue, and the attempts of any government to abolish smoking would be futile.<sup>27</sup> The Chinese delegate, Dr. Alfred Sze, admitted that there had been a recrudescence of opium production in China, but maintained that China was not the chief purveyor of illicit opium as claimed by other delegates. He further insisted that the present state of affairs was due to the internal disorder prevalent in China, and promised on behalf of his government that as soon as it had again secured control of affairs the anti-opium legislation would be enforced. In view of the fact, then, that this was only a temporary condition, he urged that the powers should not allow it to be an excuse for nonaction, or in any way deter them from making every possible effort to put a stop to the smoking and export of opium.<sup>28</sup>

On this point, however, the Conference had reached a deadlock. The Chinese would give only general assurances that as soon as it was possible their government would abolish the production of opium, and would make no definite and specific proposals for more immediate action. The European representatives, on the other hand, contended that until the danger of smuggling from China was eliminated their governments could do nothing. It is interesting to note, however, that

<sup>25</sup> The agenda for this conference were prepared by a preparatory committee nominated by the Advisory Committee. For a transcription of the agenda see Willoughby, *op. cit.*, Chapter V. Dr. Willoughby was present at the Conferences as counsellor to the Chinese delegation, and had access to all the records, including the mimeographed draft minutes. Consequently his book, which is devoted to the work of the Conferences, is possibly a more accurate transcript of what transpired than the official edited minutes.

<sup>26</sup> For figures see *supra*, p. 2.

<sup>27</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-76.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

Japan, despite the prevalence of smuggling, has, by vigorous measures, abolished it, and brought the opium traffic completely under government control. As a result of this action the drug problem has almost been eliminated in Japan, while in Formosa, where the smoking habit was quite prevalent some years ago, this practice is in a fair way toward being abolished, and will be as soon as the confirmed addicts die off.<sup>29</sup> It would seem, therefore, as though other, though undeclared, motives may have actuated certain of the powers in this instance.<sup>30</sup> China, however, seems to have taken a strange position. General promises of an indefinite nature to put a stop to the growing of opium when a stable government is again established (at some unknown future date) would hardly seem consistent with the plea that definite steps be taken by other governments to abolish the use of prepared opium for the protection of Chinese nationals in their territories.

With no further progress possible along these lines, the Conference turned its attention to minor reforms which will be dealt with below.

#### THE SECOND CONFERENCE

The Second Conference, for the limitation of opium and drugs for export, convened at Geneva, Novem-

ber 17, 1924, attended by representatives from forty-one governments, all members of the League, or parties to The Hague Convention. The American delegates were: Congressman Stephen G. Porter, the Right Reverend Charles H. Brent, Assistant Surgeon-General Rupert Blue, Mrs. Hamilton Wright, and Mr. Edwin L. Neville. The agenda of this conference included consideration of measures to carry out The Hague Convention with regard to:

1. A limitation of the amounts of morphine, heroin or cocaine, and their respective salts to be manufactured.
2. A limitation of the amounts of raw opium and coca leaf to be imported for that purpose, and for other medicinal and scientific purposes.
3. A limitation of the production of raw opium and coca leaf for export to the amount required for such medicinal and scientific purposes.<sup>31</sup>

It should be noted that no reference was made in the agenda to the American principles adopted by the Advisory Committee as the general basis for the deliberations for the Conferences. The significance of this will be evident when the question of the competence of the Conference with regard to the limitation of the production of raw opium is considered. At the outset, the Conference had before it, as the means set forth in the agenda, the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, adopted at its sixth session, for the further control of the drug traffic,<sup>32</sup> and the proposals submitted by the delegations of the various powers. Of these the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and the proposals of the American delegation were the most important. These

<sup>29</sup> C. O. P. 1, p. 2. "The policy of gradual suppression is being pursued, licensed consumers decreasing from 169,064 in 1900 to 49,031 in 1920; non-issue of new licenses, and the decrease through the death of registered smokers justify the assumption 'that the complete suppression of licensed smokers may be effected within perhaps 15 years.'"

<sup>30</sup> At the fifth session of the Advisory Committee Bishop Brent said, "Money is indeed the root of all evil. As with individuals, so with governments. The crux is that narcotics are wealth as well as vice producing. Eliminate revenue and what government would have further interest in the cultivation of the poppy?" Quoted in Buell, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

<sup>31</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 248. These agenda were prepared by the Advisory Committee due to the inability of the Preparatory Committee to come to an agreement on the subject.

<sup>32</sup> O. C. 216 (5).



proposals, with the exception of Article 1, Article 9 A, Part II, and the Preamble of the American suggestions, which involved questions of the competence of the Conference, were referred to different committees for consideration.<sup>33</sup>

In view of the wording of the agenda there was considerable doubt in the minds of some of the delegates as to whether or not the Conference had the authority to consider the question of limiting the total production of raw opium and coca leaves. It was clear that the authority existed to limit the production for export, but certain delegations, the American in particular, felt that this could be accomplished only by a limitation of the production as a whole, upon which the agenda were silent. This issue was definitely brought before the Conference when Congressman Porter of the American delegation moved that the Conference consider the proposal of the United States that the production of raw opium and coca leaves be limited to the amounts necessary for strictly medical and scientific uses, and that this matter be referred to the proper committee. Acceptance of this motion would, of course, mean that the Conference had decided that it was competent to act in the matter.<sup>34</sup>

It was here that the first real issue of the Conference came up for debate. Ostensibly it was as to the competence of the Conference to consider the matter. In fact, the issue ran deeper, and amounted to the question as to whether or not such production should be so restricted. In the debate that followed Messrs. Campbell and Clayton of India took the lead for the opposition, closely seconded by Sir Malcolm Delevingne of Great Britain. The delegates from Portugal and the Nether-

lands also spoke against the motion, and the debate became very heated. Mr. Campbell even went so far as to charge the American delegation with bad faith, claiming that Mr. Porter had given assurance, in an unrecorded conversation between himself, and Lord Hardinge and Mr. Campbell that this proposal would not be brought before the Conference. This charge was indignantly denied by Bishop Brent. The motion was supported by Dr. Sze of China and Dr. Chodzko of Poland, as well as by the American delegates.<sup>35</sup> When the motion came up for a vote, it was carried 26 to 1, 9 nations not voting.<sup>36</sup>

At the fourteenth meeting of the Conference, the question of competence again arose when the American delegation moved that Chapter II of the American suggestions be referred to the appropriate committee for consideration. This proposal provided that countries importing prepared opium should reduce their imports of this commodity annually by 10 per cent; that they should not supplement this reduction by domestically prepared opium; and that at the end of ten years the import of raw opium should be prohibited.<sup>37</sup> It will be recalled that the First Conference had reached a deadlock on this issue and had failed to take any action. It was hoped, therefore, by certain of the delegations that steps might be taken by the

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 266-81.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 281. The vote was as follows: For: Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Danzig, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Persia, Poland, Siam, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Against: India.

Not voting: Australia, Bolivia, British Empire, France, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, and Turkey.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284.

<sup>33</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, 241-2.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 265.

Second Conference to fill the gap left by the First.

Considerable opposition immediately arose, especially from those states which had opposed restrictions in prepared opium at the First Conference, and which were, in the main, powers that gained revenues from the traffic in prepared opium. The first to speak was M. van Wettum of the Netherlands, who was followed by Sir Malcolm Delevingne. The Portuguese, French and Australian delegates also expressed the opinion that this matter was beyond the province of the Conference.<sup>38</sup> Vigorous support was given the motion by the Chinese and Cuban delegates as well as by Mr. Porter.<sup>39</sup>

The contention of those favoring the motion, as expressed by Mr. Porter, was that the powers signatory to The Hague Convention were bound by an absolute obligation to abolish the illicit trade in prepared opium. In order to do this successfully it was necessary that control be established over prepared opium and coca leaves. Resolution V of the League Assembly had directed the First Conference to consider measures for abolition of the use of prepared opium for smoking, and this the First Conference had failed to do. The Second Conference was called by the League for the purpose of giving effect to the principles enunciated by the American representatives on the Advisory Committee, which, it will be recalled, declared that the use of opium for other than medical or scientific purposes was an abuse. How could these principles be carried into effect without a consideration of the question of prepared opium? Of what avail would the proposed ma-

chinery for determining the medical and scientific needs of the world for drugs be unless the date on which the use of prepared opium would be definitely abolished were known? Since the First Conference had failed to take the necessary steps for the control of prepared opium, and since such control was essential, the consideration of such a step should certainly come within the competence of the Conference. The fact that the proposal had not been mentioned in the agenda should not deter the Conference from considering it, for the agenda were not limitations, but rather guides for the Conference in its work.<sup>40</sup>

The opponents of the proposal based their arguments largely upon a strict construction of the agenda, claiming that the Conference was bound to consider only the proposals outlined therein. To bring in other matters would be unprecedented in the history of international conferences. Furthermore, such a step would have the effect of nullifying the work of the First Conference, an entirely separate body.

If such a regrettable precedent were once established by a Conference held under the auspices of the League, most governments will in the future have grave and well justified misgivings regarding the desirability of being represented at such international meetings.<sup>41</sup>

Such arguments as this group put forth were very largely based upon legal technicalities, which, when considered in their broader aspects, do not give much weight to the argument.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 291 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Speech of M. van Wettum, *ibid.*, p. 285.

<sup>42</sup> It is interesting to note that the only studious survey of the legal aspects of this problem was made by Dr. Sze. He summarized the results of his investigation in a speech before the Conference, and effectively countered the technicalities brought up by the strict constructionists. This speech is given in full in Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 261-263.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 285 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 288 ff., 331. Statements of their support for the motion were also made by the delegations of Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Japan, Italy, Venezuela and Czechoslovakia.

and this action again suggests the possibility of undeclared motives actuating certain of the powers. As to nullification of the work of the First Conference, inasmuch as that body had not made any decision regarding this question, there could have been nothing to nullify.

The Conference adjourned over the Christmas holidays without having reached a decision on the matter, and when the sessions re-opened January 15, it was again brought up. Counter proposals, however, were made by the British and French delegations. The British proposed that the powers in whose possessions the use of prepared opium was temporarily authorized should agree to abolish its use gradually, within a period of fifteen years. This period was to commence when China had secured such control over the production of raw opium as would eliminate the danger of smuggling. The date when such control was reached was to be determined by a Commission appointed by the League Council.<sup>43</sup> The French proposal was similar in character, but set the period during which China was to gain control over the production of opium as three years.<sup>44</sup> These proposals were opposed by the American and Chinese delegations upon the grounds that they constituted a conditional obligation, contingent upon the abolition of the danger of smuggling, in place of the absolute obligations imposed by The Hague Convention. The American delegation also called attention to its instructions, forbidding them signing any agreement which did not effectively limit the production of raw and prepared opium and other drugs to the amounts necessary for medical and scientific uses, and served notice that they could not, therefore, sign any

agreement that did not contain such a provision.<sup>45</sup> Other delegations, those of Egypt, Poland, Ireland and Persia, declared themselves in favor of the American motion.<sup>46</sup>

It was evident that nothing could be accomplished without a compromise. So it was moved by Dr. Sjöstrand of Sweden that a joint committee composed of eight members from each Conference be appointed to determine a compromise declaration, and arrive at a result acceptable to all. This motion was adopted by the Conference and the First Conference agreed to participate.<sup>47</sup> This Committee of Sixteen, as it was called, held four meetings, but failed to agree on a proposal. It was suggested in the Committee that two protocols be submitted, one to be adopted by each Conference. These were substantially the same as the proposals of the British delegation, with the additional provision that the powers producing raw opium secure control of the industry in five years.<sup>48</sup> These protocols were opposed by the American members of the Committee for the reasons that were voiced before in opposition to the British proposals. The Committee, therefore, was forced to report a failure to the Conference.

At this time, the meeting of February 6, 1925, M. Zahle, the President of the Conference, read to that body memoranda of the withdrawal of the American and Chinese delegations. In the American memorandum, pre-

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 316-28.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 331.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 333-4. The First Conference was represented on the Committee by the chief delegate from each of the eight powers represented. The Second Conference chose representative powers that had not been members of the First Conference, and selected: the United States, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, Italy, Persia and Poland. M. Zahle, the President of the Second Conference, was chosen Chairman.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 335-38.

<sup>43</sup> Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 310-311.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 331-32.

pared by Mr. Porter, attention was called to the fact that the instructions of the delegation forbade them to sign any agreement which did not limit the production of opium and other drugs to the amounts necessary for medicinal and scientific purposes. Comment was made upon the proposals of the Conference, some of which were reviewed favorably. With regard to the control of production, however, Mr. Porter wrote:

There is, however, no likelihood of obtaining a complete control of all opium and coca leaf derivatives. In respect to the measure of control provided for manufactured drugs, it is believed that, by reason of the very small bulk, the ease of transportation with minimum risk of detection, and the large financial gains to be obtained from their illicit handling, such drugs and their derivatives can only be effectively handled if the production of raw opium and coca leaves from which they are obtained is strictly limited to medical and scientific purposes. This, the Conference is unable to accomplish.

In the circumstances, the Delegation of the United States, in pursuance of instructions received from its Government, has no alternative, under the terms of the Joint Resolution (of Congress) authorizing its participation in the Conference, other than to withdraw, as it could not sign the Agreement which it is proposed to conclude. . . .<sup>50</sup>

The Chinese memorandum stated that the withdrawal of that delegation was due to the fact that it could not sign the proposed agreement because it was unsatisfactory to its government. The hope was expressed that in the near future the powers would see their way to the adoption of measures that would bring about a total suppression of the opium trade and the co-operation of China was promised at such a time. The assertion of the Chinese Government was again reiterated

that as soon as internal conditions permitted it would strictly enforce its laws against opium.<sup>50</sup>

Regret at this action was expressed by certain of the delegations, and the Conference decided to continue its sessions in spite of what had occurred. It was finally decided to adopt the two protocols substantially as suggested in the Committee of Sixteen; the Conference again took up the consideration of other proposals that had been submitted, and an agreement was concluded shortly thereafter.

#### RESULTS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE

The deliberations of this Conference resulted in the adoption of an Agreement, a Protocol, and a Final Act. The Agreement consisted for the most part of minor changes and reforms. Opium farming is abolished,<sup>51</sup> and the sale of the drug to minors is forbidden.<sup>52</sup> The export of opium from importing territory is prohibited, as is the transit of prepared opium through such territory. The transit through of raw opium is likewise prohibited, except under an import certificate.<sup>53</sup>

The Protocol provides that when the poppy-growing countries have secured control over the production of raw opium so as to prevent illicit exportation and smuggling, the signatory powers are to take such measures as will suppress the consumption of prepared opium completely within fifteen years from the date of the establishing of such control. This date

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 346 ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Agreement*, Art. I. These documents are reprinted in full in Willoughby, *op. cit.*, Appendix IV.

<sup>52</sup> *Agreement*, Art. II, III.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, Art. VI. Other articles provided for government propaganda against opium, the limitation of divans, forbidding the sale of dross except to the monopoly of the government, and the consideration in the near future of the possibility of extraterritorial jurisdiction over nationals engaging in the forbidden traffic.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 344 ff.



is to be determined by a commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

The Final Act suggests to the powers the licensing and rationing of smokers as a possible means of control of the traffic. It mentions, however, that the danger of smuggling prevents its effectiveness, and it is left to each power to determine when the time has come to put the plan into practice.

These documents were signed at Geneva on February 11, 1925, by France, Great Britain, India, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal and Siam. China did not sign, as her delegates had withdrawn from both Conferences five days before.

#### RESULTS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE

The Second Conference, similar to the First, put the results of its deliberations in the form of a Convention, Protocol and Final Act. In the Convention the signatory powers agree to effectively control the production, distribution and export of raw opium, and the production of drugs (this of course does not include prepared opium, but only derivatives), with certain exceptions is to be limited to medical and scientific purposes.<sup>54</sup> The manufacture of drugs is to take place only on licensed premises, and their sale and manufacture is also to be licensed.<sup>55</sup> Control is to be secured over the production of Indian hemp and its derivative, hashish.<sup>56</sup> The international trade in drugs is to be controlled through the import certificate plan, much as worked out by the Advisory Committee.<sup>57</sup> In fact, the influence of the suggestions of this Committee

is evident throughout the Convention. In order to secure effective administration, a Permanent Central Board is created, to be composed of eight members chosen by the League Council, Germany and the United States. The chief functions of this board will be to determine the amounts of each drug necessary for the medical and scientific needs of the world, and to keep records of the manufacture and trade in drugs.<sup>58</sup>

In the Protocol the powers agree to establish such control over the production of raw opium as will prevent illicit traffic in that commodity within five years. At the end of the five-year period the effectiveness of that control is to be determined by a Commission appointed by the League Council. The Protocol is to come into force with the Convention, and the five-year period starts at that time for all powers, including those that shall subsequently ratify. Thus, should a power ratify a year after it comes into force, the period for securing control over opium will be only four years for that power, the five-year period ending for all at the same time.<sup>59</sup>

The Final Act included a statement of the purpose of the Conference, a list of the delegates, and a set of resolutions. These documents were signed at Geneva, February 19, 1925, the Protocol being signed by Albania, Australia, British Empire, Germany, Greece, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Persia, Portugal and Siam. The Convention was signed by the above mentioned powers, and in addition by Belgium, France and Poland. The Protocol and Convention were open for signature until September 30, 1925;

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter VI.

<sup>59</sup> This interpretation was given by M. Kircher of France when the Protocol was being discussed, and no dissent was made. Willoughby, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

<sup>54</sup> *Convention*, adopted by the Second Conference, Chapters II and III. The text of these documents is given in Willoughby, *op. cit.*, Appendix V.

<sup>55</sup> *Convention*, Chapter III.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter IV.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter V.

at present they may be acceded to by a communication to the League.

### CONCLUSIONS

Improvement over The Hague Convention is to be noted in these new agreements, in certain respects, and especially with regard to the traffic in prepared drugs, and the inclusion of Indian hemp on the prohibited list. A great step forward is the limitation of the production and trade in prepared drugs to strictly medical and scientific needs, and in the machinery created for the enforcement of this.

Considerable doubt, however, arises concerning the provisions which regulate the traffic in raw and prepared opium. The Hague Convention imposed a definite obligation upon the powers to abolish the traffic in prepared opium, but allowed it to continue in certain territories temporarily, and set no date for its complete abolition. The Protocols, on the other hand, impose a conditional obligation upon the powers to abolish this traffic, contingent upon the control of the production of raw opium. If this control is obtained in the time set, five

years, then the obligation becomes absolute. Thus it would seem that at least a tentative date for the ultimate abolition of the traffic in prepared opium is definitely established. However, the one power upon whose action all this hinges, China, did not sign. Furthermore, there is room for doubt as to whether conditions in China will be such in the near future that the Chinese Government can enforce its prohibition of the cultivation of the poppy. If this turns out to be the case, there will be no obligation upon the powers to abolish the traffic in prepared opium, and matters will be the same as before. The fact that no progress over the control of raw opium for domestic use has been made is regrettable.

At present then, the opium situation in the Far East with regard to smoking would seem to be as follows: The Western powers have made the entire matter of abolition contingent upon China. Should she become stabilized, all is well. If not, then the blame for their failure to abolish the traffic in their own dominions will rest upon her shoulders.

## Living Conditions in Japan<sup>1</sup>

By HERBERT H. GOWEN

Department of Oriental Languages, University of Washington

IN the U. S. Conference of Social Workers of 1924, the subject of living conditions was assumed to be one to be treated under ten different heads. These are as follows: (1) Children, (2) delinquency and correction, (3) health, (4) the family, (5) industrial and economic problems, (6) neighborhood and community life, (7) mental hygiene, (8) organization of social forces, (9) public officials and administration, (10) the immigrant. In a treatment of living conditions in Japan, such as is possible in a brief article, it will be plain that some of these heads must be entirely ignored and others compressed into one. Much which is pertinent to the inquiry must be left unsaid, the limits within which I write being a sufficient apology.

We may start with the rather obvious statement that the main clue to present living conditions in Japan is supplied in the historical fact that the industrialization of the country, which has been necessary to provide for the growing population, has been proceeding for some years at an increasingly rapid rate. At the time of the Restoration in 1867 this was probably the last result of the change anticipated by the daimios. To-day it is generally taken for granted that the chief remedy for the over-population of Japan is to be found in its industrial development. Thus the urbanization of the country, together with the consequences of urbanization, is the first thing forced

upon the attention of the visitor. Contact with the economics of the West has, however, involved much more than the urbanization of the population. It has brought about the substitution of large-scale production for the handicraft work of the former city artisans. Some things which were formerly made wholly by hand, such as wooden shoes, are now made partly by hand and partly in the factories. Other things, such as certain kinds of paper, once made by hand, are now not made at all, since the Paper Guild controls about 90 per cent of the paper produced. There has also been involved a large decrease in the production of native pottery, with a corresponding increase in the manufacture of foreign-style pottery.

Japan is seen to-day by the world largely through her vast tonnage in shipping, the expansion of her railway system, the building up of her huge factories, and in her efforts to secure raw materials for her manufactures. Some of these developments make an immediately good impression; some are seen to mask much that is unsatisfactory. The railways, nationalized since 1905-6, (with the exception of a few privately owned lines), are well managed and well patronized. The postal system and parcel post are good, especially in the cities. In Tokyo there are as many as six deliveries a day. Postal savings, commenced in 1875, has steadily increased in favor. The telephone system, in public use since 1890, is still very imperfect. Applications for telephones are still far

<sup>1</sup> For the figures in this article the writer is largely indebted to the *Japan Year Book* for 1925.

in excess of the supply. In September, 1922, it was estimated that there were over a quarter of a million applicants still waiting. Automobiles are hard to get and expensive to run, though somewhat increased since the earthquake. Their use is limited by the cost of gasoline and by the generally abominable roads. Sanitation is still very imperfect. Wells are the most common source of supply the country over, while in Tokyo till recently water has been conveyed from the Tama River, ten miles from the city, by open canals and conduits made three centuries ago. Great improvements, however, have been made recently and at the end of 1921 eighty-four civic corporations were supplied with modern water-works. Since the earthquake these have been extended. Sewers are still largely lacking, but this is partly due to the use of the night-soil for agricultural purposes. The thrifty farmer resents strongly the loss entailed by a sewerage system. Nevertheless, a sewerage system for Tokyo was begun as long ago as 1911 and is expected to be among the actualities of the reconstructed capital. Much is hoped for as the result of the survey made in 1923 by Dr. Charles Beard. The earthquake has given unexpected opportunity for the carrying out of some of Dr. Beard's recommendations.

These are the surface indications of living conditions in Japan to-day. One has to go to some other things in order to estimate rightly what these really are.

#### THE FACTORY SYSTEM

Perhaps the best avenue of approach is through the factory. The factory system has grown to enormous proportions, especially in such cities as Osaka and Tokyo. Where in 1883 there were only 125 modern factories

with some 25,000 employes, there are to-day over 30,000 employing an army of over two million men, women and children. Between 1903 and 1916 the industrial suburbs of Tokyo increased, it is said, about 415 per cent. As might have been expected, conditions in these factories have been until recently extraordinarily bad. Physically there was deterioration through transference from the healthy country life to the confinement of the city. Esthetically there was loss through the abandonment of handicrafts in favor of machine-made goods. Morally there was loss through the temptations to which a large number of factory employes were induced to succumb. In a certain period it was recently found that 49 per cent of the delinquent girls arrested in Osaka were factory workers. A great deal of the mischief has arisen from the large proportion of children, and particularly girl children, hitherto employed. Among these there has been a terrible increase in tuberculosis and other forms of preventible disease. The barrack-like dormitories provided for workers are still bad hygienically. In many cases no special provision is made but workers sleep in the attics or other parts of the factory building. In 357 factories no provision of a sick-room is made and a physician is in attendance only in eight establishments.<sup>2</sup>

Present conditions must of course take into consideration the factory law enacted in September, 1916, though it must also be remembered that this law applies only to establishments employing over fifteen persons regularly and to those engaged in dangerous and unhealthy occupations. Even in these cases the law is not always enforced. According to the law the maximum

<sup>2</sup> See Suzuki, quoted by Galen Fisher, *Creative Forces in Japan*, p. 70.



number of working hours is twelve, children under fifteen and women being regarded as protected workers and further relieved. At least two holidays a month must be allowed to the women and child workers and at least thirty minutes rest within the first six hours of labor,—sixty minutes altogether if the day's work extends to ten hours. Night work, which may be either "early work" up to 10 P.M. or "late work" from 10 P.M. to 4 A.M., is not permitted in the case of protected workers. Exception is made in the case of newspaper plants and for work which does not admit holding over, such as the dealing in meats and vegetables. Women who are suffering from sickness must not be employed except with the consent of the medical authorities. There is now in force a system of workman's compensation whereby the permanent invalid is paid not less than 170 times his daily wage, and, in case of death, has added 10 yen for the funeral expenses. At the close of 1920 there were over a million and a half factory workers working under this law.

The general improvement in the condition of factory workers is shown by the fact that there is a steady decline in the number of women operatives. These now form 53 per cent of the whole. The percentage of young girls is also decreasing. Of these there are 8.6 per cent under 15, 34 per cent between 15 and 20, and 57 per cent over 20. The children working under the law are, according to the most recent figures, 1,397,000, of whom 715,000 are boys and 682,000 girls. Of these again 187,000 are breadwinners for the family and are therefore almost of compulsion illiterate. The factories in which these little ones labor mainly are silk filatures, cotton and weaving factories, and smaller establishments for knitting, plaiting, ceramics, match-

making, confectionery, printing and binding. The reader may again be reminded that there is no law regulating the labor of children outside the factory.

In April, 1919, an official investigation made into the matter of living conditions in 534 factory establishments revealed, among other things, the following facts: that the bulk of the female workers were fed in the factory boarding houses; that in 43 per cent of the factories the food was chiefly boiled rice; that in others the rice was mixed with poorer ingredients, such as barley, millet and sweet potato; that in most cases meat or fish was supplied on the average eight times a month; that board was charged in eighty-nine factories, was free in 126 and partly free in 228.

It is fair to say that most workshops are much better equipped than formerly and as a rule the operatives are better cared for in the government establishments than in the privately owned concerns. The agitation for shorter hours, also, and other privileges sponsored by the Labor party have borne much fruit, particularly since the Great War.

Hitherto we have had in mind principally the situation as determined by the factory system. But, as Mr. Galen Fisher reminds us, "modern mines are almost as much a product of machine industry." Mr. Bunji Suzuki gives us a rather appalling picture of mining conditions in Japan as they existed as recently as 1921: "In 1917 the number of women employed in the mines of Japan was 70,000. To-day that number is greater by over 60,000. Most of these are between sixteen and twenty years of age, and they work in the pits along with the men. . . . Twenty per cent of all the laborers in the coal mines to-day are women. . . . They work in the bowels

of the earth, naked like the men, wearing only a little breech-clout. There is no ventilation and no discipline in their surroundings. They are so like animals that they can hardly be called human."

#### AGRICULTURE AND OTHER OCCUPATIONS

It is a relief to turn away from pictures of life in the factories and in mines to contemplate the infinitely less squalid condition of the Japanese agriculturist. It is difficult for one who sees only the great cities of Japan to realise that 70 per cent of the population of Japan are still cultivators of the land and that of this proportion "70 per cent are tenants each tilling an average of one and one-half acres." A number of people equal to half the population of the United States has to be supported on one-twentieth of the area of our own country. Even with the drift to the cities it will be seen that there is here to be faced a tremendous problem which the progress of intensive farming and the efforts to reclaim some five million acres by utilization projects cannot wholly solve. The farming is of course done mainly by human labor, with simple machinery and few animals. Special crops are being sought for such as may promise larger return. Beans, potatoes, sweet potatoes, tobacco, etc., are being cultivated in favorable localities. But the task is a gigantic one even for so thrifty an individual as the Japanese farmer. Labor conditions have in the last two or three years added vastly to the difficulty. There is general testimony to the effect that a great change has come over the relation of landlord and tenant in the rural districts. The tenants, once subservient, are now, through the higher wages offered in the cities, masters of the situation and the farmer now finds it

hard to get laborers at all except on their own terms. Of course one is not surprised at some measure of rebellion against unjust or unequal conditions, but the situation has, quite naturally, been exploited by the agitator. Here too the labor fight is on. "The result is that tenant-farmer unions have sprung up all over the Empire until there are now over five hundred."

It would be proper to the subject to say something of other occupations which affect living conditions on the large scale. There is, for instance, sericulture, employing in 1923 1,644,099 families. There is, again, fishing, employing in 1920, 1,335,555 persons and 383,565 boats. But it is necessary to restrict myself to the mention of a few features mainly concerning life in the city. Apart from the factories, in which the decrease has been already noted, female labor is somewhat on the decrease generally. The most recent figures show that out of some 12,770,000 women in different occupations, while 1¼ million are factory workers, 4 million are farm hands, 1 million are servants, 1,200,000 girls in business, and 320,000 are in the public service. Women doctors at present number less than 1000, though there are about 35,000 nurses and the same number of midwives.

#### ECONOMIC SITUATION

The wage situation is still unsatisfactory among workers irrespective of sex, though from 1920 to 1922 there has been considerable improvement, accompanied, however, with a corresponding rise in the cost of living. Stone-cutters get as high as 3.3 yen daily and male day-laborers 2.13. Female day-laborers average 1.14. Servants (male) earn 19.44 yen per month and female servants 16.46. Female reelers in the factories get 1.06 yen per day and female match-makers

.85. These are, however, probably better off than many grades in the professional classes. The present writer was struck in 1923 with the very low salaries of teachers and university professors. Some quite distinguished men were obliged to teach extra hours in several different institutions in order to make ends meet. It may be said to be generally true that the professional and public service classes feel the increased cost of living much more than do the laboring classes. The young engineer frequently gets less than the men under him and the policeman considerably less than the man in the street whom he once ordered about almost as an inferior being.

As in other countries, so in Japan the contrasts between the wealthy exploiters of labor (especially the *nouveaux riches* since the war) and the common laborer have brought about much discontent. This is shown particularly in the growth of the Labor Movement and in the increase of strikes. In 1914 there were only 50 strikes involving 7904 workers. In 1918 there were 417 strikes involving 66,457 workers. Since then there have been less, owing to the great increase in unemployment. After the war there was for a time a large increase in iron and steel production. Then came a slump which the government ameliorated for a time by its own intervention. The economic depression was first felt in the industrial and mining districts in 1920. Later on it extended to the office clerks and petty officials. The decision to curtail production made the situation much worse and in one year there were 934,315 workers discharged to 794,952 who were newly engaged. In 1922 the number employed exceeded those discharged, but the general situation was not improved. To a certain extent this was because of the reduction of naval construction

entailed by the decisions of the Washington Conference. Since the earthquake, of course, conditions have been abnormal, but a census taken by the Relief Bureau in November, 1923, showed that 36.6 per thousand workmen in the neighborhood of Tokyo were put out of work by the catastrophe.

#### LABOR ORGANIZATION AND WELFARE WORK

Labor organization began in 1890 with the formation of the Printer's Union, but it was seven years later that the Labor Union system properly so called was introduced into Japan. In 1912 the *Yuaikai* was founded, expanded later into the General Federation of Japanese Labor. At the end of 1922 there were 389 unions with a membership of 130,000. The principal objects which were pressed at the General Meeting of 1922 were: a forty-eight hour week, a minimum wage-scale, the abolition of night work, the recognition of Soviet Russia, and the May-day holiday. Some of these objects have since been attained. The passing of the Manhood Suffrage Act has also added immensely to the power and responsibility of the labor vote. It has also for the present increased the activity of the Socialist party, though discrimination must be made between the various types of Socialism at work in Japan—Marxist, State Socialist, Christian Socialist, Syndicalist and Anarchist. The last two types are "strictly controlled." It is to be feared that some of the methods used for the suppression of Socialism since the dissolution of the Union in 1921 have simply had the effect of driving it underground.

Intimately connected with the general urban situation is the slum question into which some elaborate investigations have been made by govern-

mental and other authorities. In one inquiry, covering a district of 497 families, it was found that the monthly income ran from 30 yen to 150 yen, averaging 72.26. As income increased, however, the adverse balance seemed to increase also. For example, as the family income increased the expenditure for food, rent, fire and lighting decreased, while there was increased expenditure for clothing and for such sundries as entertainment, medicine, education, taxes and amusement.

Many forms of welfare work are seeking the amelioration of the living conditions which have been described. Roughly, these agencies are threefold. There are first the Imperial charities which, for emergency occasions, are extraordinarily generous. Secondly, there are the Administrative agencies, providing for the insane, tubercular, the reform of refractory boys, care of lepers, blind, deaf mutes, discharged prisoners and for the medical treatment or funeral expenses of unclaimed travelers. Relief of this type is also given to the decrepit above seventy and to the physically disabled, to children (under thirteen) and to invalids. Under this head would come again the co-operative societies established under the law of 1900, credit societies, and the like. In April, 1924, the Central Bank of Co-operative Societies was established and promises to be of great value. Mutual Aid Associations are also organized in connection with almost all government establishments, disbursements being made for death, injury, diligent service, on leaving service and for medical expenses. On the government railways all employees pay 3 per cent of their monthly wages and the State adds 2 per cent of the aggregate.

The third type of welfare work is that carried on by private individuals or by voluntary associations, many of

them of a religious character. In this work both Christians and Buddhists are active, the latter using many of the methods which had been first introduced by the former. The St. Luke's International Hospital is a good illustration of the work established by Christian organizations. It may be said in this connection that there are now seventy-seven public hospitals, 1260 private (mostly quite small) and twenty-three charity hospitals with a considerable number in addition for the care of those suffering from infectious diseases. It should also be remembered, under this head, that an increasing number of the large mercantile establishments are now engaged in welfare work among their employees, by the provisions of doctors and nurses, playgrounds and entertainment halls, sick benefits, and the like. One of the most hopeful signs, in fact, in modern Japan is this growing sense of responsibility on the part of officials and employers of labor for the physical and moral well-being of the manhood and womanhood of the country.

To a visitor it is not easy to remember that in past times the standard of living has been far below the present Western mark. We are prone, therefore, to estimate present conditions rather by comparison with present American than with the Japanese standards of an earlier age. With a fair degree of judgment it should be plain that immense progress has been made in recent years. The two danger spots are, first, the growth of industrialism, and, second, the growing irreverence for the old sanctions of law and order. Yet so far the Japanese have always exhibited marvelous aptitude for making the difficult transitions of their history with skill and wisdom. In the light of the achievements of the past seventy-five years, one has no need to fear for the future. The prob-



lems of urban life are problems in which not Japan alone but most nations have to face and solve.

To sum up in a few words it may be said that, while living conditions in Japan bear many of the marks of struggle against old social facts as well as against the difficulty of readjusting

things to the new order, in both cases success is being won. The present test is probably the severest the empire has ever been called upon to meet, but the feeling is general that the worst is over and that improvement, though coming with a halting foot, is assured.

## Living Conditions in China

By MAUDE B. WARNER<sup>1</sup>

You can easily tell how long a man has been in China by how much he does not know about it. If he knows almost everything, he has just recently arrived; if he is in doubt, he has been there a few years; if he admits that he really knows nothing whatever about the Chinese people or their probable future, you may take it for granted that he has been out a very long time!

IT is a hazardous undertaking, therefore, to write on such an intimate subject as how the Chinese live. They have established themselves behind high walls, both physically and mentally. Rare is the Occidental who knows how to obtain free and natural entrée to the beauty or sordidness of what lies behind those barriers.

### FIRST AND SECOND IMPRESSIONS

First impressions leave but a superficial glare of squalor, ignorance and misery of the masses; or conglomerate dust-colored pictures of a narrow, crooked wall, enclosed streets, infested with droves of big black-bellied pigs, of unwashed yellow sheep and goats, of plodding donkeys, mules, oxen and camels—streets noisy with the minor calls of peripatic venders, barbers and carters—streets unsightly with creaking wheelbarrows of uncovered raw meat, of booths full of unsavory odors, of dogs eating refuse over your feet as you pass by—streets lined with deformed beggars, naked children, ill-kempt women and ash piles, with here the occasional glimpse of an elegant, red-lined cart carrying a wealthy lady dressed in purple or green brocaded

gown, flowers in her hair, paint on her face. The kaleidoscopic picture helps to form the all too familiar scene of Chinese life, out of port cities, to the hasty traveler.

Second impressions have brought to light three facts: *First*, that anything that comes into your mind about how people in general live is bound to be true somewhere in China. *Second*, that no generalization dare be made of how the Chinese live without subjecting oneself to severest criticism and successful contradiction by intelligent Chinese. *Third*, we are dealing with a civilized people not unlike ourselves, having the same physical need of food, and shelter, the same hunger for companionship, as shown in their strong desire for home and social life. Moreover, we are speaking of a race who were writing philosophies on how to live hundreds of years before the birth of Christ and whose predominant psychology from 400 B.C. down to the present is common sense with a strong moral bias.

The public is discussing the apparent trembling of China on the brink of economic and political ruin as well as the hopeless hodge-podge of chaos and corruption which seems to have swallowed up her people. Let us remember that China alone has survived all countries whose first existence was contemporary with hers; not only survived them but is yet the most numerous and virile race of people on the earth. The centuries of corrupt official life are one story. The stable Chinese in his home and community is another one entirely. In discussing his living conditions, we must think, then, of the main road, of where

<sup>1</sup> Mrs. Warner has been a close student of Chinese conditions, having spent several years as a missionary in North China.—THE EDITOR.

the Chinese came from and where they are bound, rather than of the cross-roads and deviations which so easily confuse the hasty observer.

#### CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

About 1100 B.C. Chinese society is reported as divided into the following classes:

- (1) Scholars.
- (2) Farmers.
- (3) Artisans.
- (4) Merchants.
- (5) Servants and soldiers.

This fundamental division is still made theoretically. The Chinese are a democratic people and have no special mark to distinguish one class from another. A member of Class 5 may work into Class 1 if he has the intellectual capacity to do so. Nor is there any particular mode of living characteristic of one class and not of another. He either lives "more so" or "less so," proportionate to the size of the family income and to his own educational advantages.

Living conditions in China are not based, then, upon social class strata but rather upon the industrial, commercial and educational life of its people. The Chinese do not delve into statistics nor are they communicative regarding the conditions we most want to know about. They are not natural lovers of foreigners and are suspicious of our motives. It is not the tactful thing, therefore, to ask a Chinese how many of his fourteen children have survived famine, plague, floods or earthquakes, or what caused their death. Nor shall we expect an accurate retort if we ask him how much his income is and from what source. But we may be sure of one thing—a courteous if not a truthful answer.

We must probe into his living conditions through indirect methods. We

must know ancient backgrounds that are after all the immediate cause of why he lives as he does to-day. One of their earliest proverbs says: "One generation plants the trees; another sits in their shade." To-day we could easily believe both planting and sitting are going on at the same time. We may ask ourselves why a country among the first to discover the advantages of a division of labor, first to establish a record of commerce, and which unquestionably boasts of the oldest system of government education known to history, which from the beginning emphasized home life and filial piety, universal law and obedience as fundamental virtues—we may ask why such a nation now appears before the eyes of the world as unstable and disrupted. On the other hand, we who have lived in interior China know how unaffected in his daily routine is the average Chinese by the big problems of his country. He may be thinking seriously about them—but we may be sure from an entirely different angle than you or I. He feels intuitively what we must learn from history.

#### POPULATION

The twenty-one provinces have an area of 1,896,436 square miles and a population estimated at 331,188,000 million. Because of mountains, arid regions and rivers, portions are densely populated. Shantung, for example, has 528 people to the square mile. We feel sorry for their state of congestion but they are a gregarious folk and like it. Several causes are given for her large population:

- (1) Her size.
- (2) Her large proportion of land capable of cultivation.
- (3) Because of her location in reference to the equator which gives her on the whole the best

climates of any large nation on earth.

- (4) Early marriage and desire for sons.

China has assumed she can sustain such a population because of: (1) The Chinese discovery, made centuries ago, of the superior value of grain diet as over against meat diet; (2) Chinese methods of preserving the soil; (3) intensive cultivation and prevention of weeds; (4) substitution of human for animal labor; (5) the big variety of grains, vegetables and fruits which the Chinese have developed.

#### INDUSTRIES

It is estimated that 80 per cent of China's population are included in the agricultural class. The average farm consists of four and one-half acres of land and looks like a checker board in its regularity of irrigation ditches. The income over and above living expenses is about thirty-four dollars per year. The Chinese farmer does not live on his farm but walks back and forth to his ancestral home in his village. He protects his crops (there are *no* fences) by building a shack of sorghum stalks and sleeps there with a shotgun and a dog during harvest seasons. Even at that, he loses a few melons every year. He works from daylight until dark. His family work with him—all illustrating the industry, intelligence, common sense and thoroughness with which the Chinese use their native resources and which enable them to secure such large results from their lands. We must omit the mass of details explaining their hardships.

When we contrast the manner in which the people of the United States live with conditions of the masses, it is patent that the Chinese people are lamentably poorly rewarded for their labors. Bashford says:

With our broad fields, our machinery and few people, their system appears to us crude and impossible; but cut our holdings to the size of theirs, and the same stroke makes our machines—even our plows—still more impossible, and so the more one studies the environment of these people, thus far unavoidable, their numbers, what they have done and are doing, against what odds they have succeeded, the more difficult it becomes to see what course might have been better.

A thousand years or so before Christ, the Chinese were making all sorts of things, such as mirrors, flatirons, umbrellas, pencils, etc. They were doing exquisite hand embroidery, fishing with lines, spinning, weaving, dyeing, rearing of silk worms, iron mining, tea trading, horse and cattle trading. They were making stone bridges, terraces and temples. Forks, spades, sickles, needles, beds, steamers, etc., were known.

What the Chinese were doing then, they are doing now. For the past two thousand years there has been little change in either articles of food, clothing or instruments of production, save for the one great change when cotton was introduced. China's resources lie untouched. Shansi alone could support the world several hundred years with her unexploited coal fields. China has continued these productions through the years due to the following causes:

- (1) Physical vitality. The Chinese can labor longer under all extremes of weather and inconvenience than any other peoples. A twenty-four hours' residence anywhere in China is all that is necessary to understand that statement.
- (2) Their natural love of industry. (Some housewives doubt this.)
- (3) Their habits of economy.
- (4) Their intelligence.



- (5) Their powers of adaptability and cheerfulness.
- (6) Their ability to co-operate into trade guilds.

#### COMMERCIAL LIFE

Chinese commercial life has been slow to respond to foreign influence. This makes the country appear more isolated and conservative than some other eastern countries. The Chinese have not loved foreigners and have not encouraged trade. There are other reasons for slow growth such as the problem of transportation of goods. Anyone who has ridden for days over China's rutty roads in springless carts, over mountain passes and barriers, knows the impossibility of transporting even small loads from one place to another. I have watched six animals pulling wagons of grain across flooded rivers, and have considered the safe arrival on the opposite bank nothing short of a miracle.

Canals have helped some. Railways are still scarce. Camel trains are too slow. New roads are being built and when the auto truck has been introduced thoroughly, the methods of transportation as well as communication will be partially solved. The Chinese have been able for centuries to live entirely apart from the main roads, due to geographical barriers, and have depended on natural resources and raw materials at hand. The homes in these sections are like institutions in that they have helped provide every need of the family.

The inaccuracy of Chinese money, of weights and standards, has not helped the cause of commerce with the outside world. "*Cha pu do*"—the Chinese says—or "*almost so*." This phrase fits admirably into all his dealings. What they lack in accuracy, they make up for in reliability.

#### EDUCATIONAL LIFE

This is too big a subject to do anything with but make a few statements here. Chinese scholars have always headed the list in their social classification. From the earliest beginnings, children have heard their old saying: "All pursuits are mean in comparison with learning." In spite of her precedence in establishment of a government educational system, the great masses of Chinese may still be called illiterate. Especially has this been true of the women. Corrupt official management seems to be the core of much of China's sorrows. While she has fostered and encouraged education in theory, in practise it has been impossible. We may say it is in an infant stage of evolution. Now schools are open to all, practical courses are emphasized; they are supported by the government and conducted in a democratic spirit. With the new era of woman's advancement, the intellectual life of all peoples will naturally be affected, and in China the mother has a strong hold on her sons.

#### STATUS OF WOMEN

Confucius said:

Women are indeed human beings but they are of a lower state than men. The aim of female education, therefore, is perfect submission—not cultivation and the development of the mind. It is a law of nature that women should be kept under the control of men and not allowed any will of their own.

He even adds: "In the other world the condition of affairs is exactly the same, for family laws govern there as well as here." This particular streak in Confucius was surely due to the fact that his own home life was unfortunate. While the Chinese women may have believed Confucius' saying to be true for a thousand years, the new Chinese

woman reigns as completely inside the home as in any other country. *Publicly*, she may be kept out of sight. In her own courtyard, she knows her powers. Anyone who has ever seen a Chinese mother-in-law at her best, in her supreme state of managing her household of daughter-in-laws and numerous grandchildren, cannot help but whisper: "*There is power!*"

All Chinese girls have the opportunity of marriage laid before them, and all look forward naturally to motherhood. The virility of the race these thousands of years has been due to the preservation of the physical and moral being of China's girls. In no country has there been greater stress laid on the chastity of women (divorce is no where more difficult to obtain) nor is there any other country which for centuries has had a law which made death the penalty for either man or woman in adultery. But laws are not always enforced and there is no more perfect state in China in regards to morality than is widespread in any other nation.

Man has considered woman's one and only aim to be the mother of his ever-desired large family. She, too, feels her day of exaltation has not come until she is a mother. This principle has helped stabilize the home and has protected it, while at the same time it has defied Kant's philosophy, who taught "that civilization never could reach its highest stage until every human being becomes an end in himself or herself." Chinese women must be more than a means of production—they must be ends in themselves. Dr. Arthur Smith writes of the change in woman's education now taking place in China:

The most comprehensive and far-reaching change of all, greatly transcending in importance the spectacular alterations in the form of government, is the potential,

and in part the actual, liberation of women in China—one of the great events in the social history of mankind.

#### CONTRASTS IN HOME CONDITIONS

Now we come into the home of the Chinese man, the Chinese woman, their children, their son's wives, the grandchildren and the nurses and amahs who are a part of the average Chinese home—all living under one roof—not always peacefully—but infinitely more so than Americans could. The house is like every other house in its simple structure of three rooms built first, and as the sons marry, rooms are added at right angles, finally making a square around the court. The very poorest Chinese may afford but one room, and so on up to the very wealthy who own veritable labyrinths of courts and servants. Excepting for the Chinese in the port cities who now prefer semi-foreign houses and live in semi-foreign style, the Chinese all live fundamentally alike. The quality of *k'ang* (bed) cover, of his food, of his clothing varies in proportion to what he can afford. The big gate leading into the private yard is heavily bolted. From the street you may not know what to expect upon knocking. I have been ushered in behind those black doors into beautiful vine-covered courtyards by well-groomed servants—in through yard after yard of flowers, of bowls of gold fish, of birds in cages—by children carefully dressed in bright flowered garments and cared for by nurse maids on into the main room of the mother-in-law. Rooms were so daintily and cleverly arranged with charming strong and capable women bowing to greet me. Such courteousness, such perfect poise and such refinement one could rarely find at home. Here one feels the security and stability of the Chinese home.

Again have I stumbled in over

snarling dogs into a pig pen: through the "donkey-grinding-the-flour"-yard over scrawny chickens and cats into tumbled down rooms—dark, grimy, foul and full of sickly people and disease. Dogs, lean and skulking, came in and licked up refuse from the floors; women, dirty and illiterate, stared at me; half-clothed children lay about sucking withered vegetables or nursing their mothers. Big children in school come home to nurse their mothers. Men idle and listless from use of opium were sprawled about. And here we see degenerate China.

#### THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST

I recall one time just as we approached a village, our mule fell sick. The carter called a veterinary who proceeded to stick long needles into its eyes. While the mule was surviving his treatments, I went into the home of a Chinese farmer whose son I had known. There were in all twenty mouths to be fed there. The daughter-in-laws were set to work at once, against my protests, to prepare meat dumplings for me. Chinese are ever solicitous of their guests' pleasures. As I sat on the best *k'ang*, looking out through the one tiny row of window panes, I saw a baby, naked, emaciated and too weak to sit up, lying down on the damp, dirty, brick floor of the courtyard. He was apparently unnoticed. His face was covered with black sticky sores. His mouth was open. Flies flew in and out and it seemed he could live surely but a few hours longer. Later I saw the young mother of seven, chewing vigorously on one of my partially eaten dumplings. She had garlic, cabbage, pork and oils and the boiled dough covering. She took out bite after bite and dropped into the child's throat. It lay there too weak to swallow and she took part of it out. As I passed by, I asked how

long the child had been sick. She replied: "Oh, always, but don't worry, he'll be all right when he gets teeth, for then he can eat; now he has nothing but squash juice." I passed the child and shuddered. A year later, I again passed there. A chubby, rosy-cheeked child greeted me. The mother said: "There's that boy you saw. I'm glad he got well. His other two brothers died, but they weren't comely and, anyway, we couldn't feed so many."

This is but one case in hundreds—of what we may call the survival of the fittest. Chinese are usually kind to their children and though they are brought up free from discipline, in the last word, obedience wins. They are fed according to no laws of diet and are held in abeyance by fear of the spirits. They are subject to many diseases, especially tuberculosis and fevers. Methods of sanitation are crude. Garbage is thrown out in a pile in front of the court. Children in lower classes play about in open sewers and heaps of refuse. Parks and grassy plots are unknown to them. Children and parents are often huddled into one dark room. Home life there is on a low scale. If children become too numerous, they are given away or sold. Several hundreds of children have come out from mountain cave homes, or from dark alleys, in my knowledge, who have never been bathed, never brushed their teeth, who, though shivering with cold and bodily discomfort, have cheerily smiled at me and gone on with their play.

Women have been brought into hospitals after days of cruelest suffering and tortures, brought on by methods the stupid midwives have used in childbirth. They make no complaints. They are excellent patients. They spend little time in introspection of the morbid conditions from which they came. They accept their lot as it is. Several times have I

seen two wives of the same husband come to the hospital, the first having suffered deepest humiliation because she could bear no son, still greater suffering because she must agree to a second wife in her home—and then eventually has helped the new wife in childbirth. She receives but one comfort, namely, the son then becomes hers—she *alone* is the recognized mother. According to law she must first be considered the ruler of the household, and her husband is bound to show her preference. Chinese women submit to this, but are human enough to experience many pangs of unhappiness. The more refined the woman is, the more she suffers. Fortunately this practise of second wives concubinage and slave girls is on the decrease. The average Chinese (not considering the principle of it) cannot afford to support so many mouths. With greater freedom in choosing wives, there are more congenial homes. But I know most men and women, whose marriage was arranged for them, and who perhaps had not even seen each other, have been able to assume the responsibilities of home life in a congenial and happy manner, and have proven in many respects, that their marriage system has been more successful than the American custom of liberty in choosing. The Chinese girl is brought up with the idea that it is her duty to marry and adapt herself to her husband. The American girl is not. It is not to be supposed, however, that the modern educated young Chinese boy or girl will allow his parents all powers of decision. The students want educated girls. Likewise the bright attractive young girls are now unwilling to cast their lot with an inferior. Even married men want

their illiterate wives to be educated. Married women's schools are an institution peculiar to China.

#### WHEN INSCRUTABLE CHINA AWAKES

Coming back to the main road, we may say living conditions in the interior of China have not yet experienced any decided radical changes, but when China's industrial resources are tapped, when commerce with foreign nations has become popular, when the masses of women become educated, then we may anticipate real changes. We see the Chinese now as a race who have proven their powers of adaptability, of endurance, of patience. A Chinese man is a factor distinct from his corrupt government. He is industrious, reliable and painstaking. He loves his home and supports his wife and children. While his literature and philosophy reflect a high type of purity, he does not live up to his standards. We have in Chinese civilization a case in which the morality inculcated in books is powerless to enforce itself. The Chinese women, though great masses are uneducated, are capable of the finest possible intellectual attainment, are on the whole modest and virtuous, and are natural home makers. The home is a stable factor and is built up for the purpose of rearing children.

What the Chinese thinks of the future of his people we do not know. He has *ages-old* wisdom upon his face. He knows how to abandon his worries at nightfall, go leisurely out under the open sky carrying his small son on his shoulder, perhaps a song bird on his thumb, and gaze out far beyond the blue pagoda on the nearby mountain—in deepest meditation or inchoate musings.



## Europeanization and the Ancient Culture in Pacific Asia

By UPTON CLOSE

(Josef Washington Hall, University of Washington)

THE most significant cultural development of the century is the Europeanization of Asia. Probably no contemporary movement of such dimension and such portent for the human race is so little studied. The white man of the business office, work shop or rostrum smugly assumed that his most important brother, the "yellow" man, is "becoming like us," or "getting civilized," or "learning sense," and with a bit of a warm feeling of complacency drops the matter.

Asia, on her part, is not complacent over the change at all. China, Japan and India are in a ferment of controversy as to whether they shall stay Asiatic or become, in material and thought life, Euroamerican. The issue is not, as the white man or even the denatured Asiatic fondly assumes, determined. On the contrary, the present is a moment of reaction, when profound and vitally concerned Asiatic minds are questioning the foundations and ends of cultures both their own and ours. They are endeavoring to fix, as man has never arbitrarily fixed before, the future state, evolution and destiny of their nations.

Such, in sketch, is the tremendous problem which our purely thoughtless adventuring, selfishly aggressing and humanitarian propagandizing have in combination forced upon the hitherto well-grooved and satisfied East. And the travail of it bids fair, by the way, to transform the conventional Asiatic mind into the most active intellectual instrument in this modern world. Those among us who boast

of intellectual supremacy should take thought!

### OCCIDENTALIZATION MEANS CLASH

Eastern culture is, by nature, defensive. That quality we have carelessly mistaken for effete. It is anything but effete, as those who have been in the foremost of the clash with it know. It is tenacious and vital. It has maintained a remarkable resistance to the aggressive Western culture which a half-century ago invaded its very hearth to attack it.

The foremost question to-day is, will this struggle drive Asiatic culture to throw off its passivity? Will the instinct of self-preservation inspire the East to transform itself into the likeness of its opponent? Such a change would mean the denaturing of Eastern culture as it is now distinguished. The line-up would no longer be Western Culture versus Eastern Culture. It would be Western Culture in the West versus Western Culture in the East. Those people would not love us because we had compelled them against their nature to become like us. They would be restless in their own souls, and they would hate us with reckless fury fed of spiritual dissatisfaction. The blindest sentiment behind our blind propaganda is the feeling that the more we make those people similar to us the more likely we and they are to get along with one another.

Asiatic culture has appeared to be transforming itself to meet exigency. It has been appropriating the material

weapons of its opponent. With these it may, even to the betrayal of its own inner spirit, take the offensive. Then the struggle between cultures, now a domestic Asian question, will become the struggle between races, a struggle for survival carrying—who knows—to our own shores and placing the controversy upon the lowest and most hopeless plane, brute force.

#### THE OBJECT LESSON OF JAPAN

Something dangerously near to this happened in Japan. Japan, of all Oriental nations, has come nearest to conversion to our culture. By nature and circumstance the transformation was easiest for her. And we have feared and hated her for her pains in emulating us. But that is another ramification.

A student of Japanese history cannot but be impressed at the national unaggressiveness of the Japanese people through the long centuries before they learned the shibboleths of Europe. From the dawn of their history, in the 6th century A.D., they waged a thousand-year fight with aborigines for the possession of their three principal islands. The long struggle merged into the later inter-clan wars which, in turn, resulted in Japan's amalgamation into a nation by a great triumvirate of leaders at the end of the 16th century. Yet during all this time and in spite of all this martial spirit, Japan was remarkably devoid of what we call imperialism. Once or twice egotistic chieftains led crusades to ravish Japan's ancient middleman of culture, Korea. (There is reason to believe that the nobility of Japan was Korean in origin. The situation and incentives to warfare were parallel to those existing between England and Normandy.)

But these campaigns came to hasty and unsatisfactory conclusions. The

sentiment of the Japanese people was against them. When the white man began his push against Japan she was so little "imperialistic" that she had never yet put forward definite claims to ownership of the great northern island of the group, Yezo—now called Hokkaido. Nor to the Kuriles, right at her doorstep. But Russia, possessed of the white man's recklessness, reached a six-thousand mile arm from Moscow and wrapped a finger around Yezo. Spain, a bit before, had plotted with friars to add the islands of Japan to her Philippine possessions. And Japan suddenly acquired interest, which later grew to enthusiasm, in the white man's doctrine of nobility of acquisition, or "place in the sun." By the time the European nations descended with their knives upon her immemorially respected—one might almost say worshiped—cultural parent China, Japan was ready to join with avidity in the carving. The most livid symptom of European culture, national ambition, had appeared in Japan.

#### CHINESE CULTURE IS UNIQUE

What is the historical background of the controversy between East and West? A few bold strokes will serve to lay it out.

While the "course of empire" was taking its way westward, another development, quite ignored by the writers of our "General Histories," was taking place toward the east from that central point which, in the day of Henry Fairfield Osborne and Roy Chapman Andrews, it was the fashion to locate in the Gobi. Civilizations developed in the valleys of the Ganges and the Huang Ho as well as in those of the Tigris-Euphrates, Nile or Etrusca. That of the upper Yellow River was especially unique. Here, about the acute angle made by the

river as it turns for the second time toward the sea, the fabulous "Hundred Forefathers" of the Chinese (whom the ideograph would lead us to believe were *mothers*) developed the remarkable civilization which has spread over Eastern Asia. Here they founded the world's one "Immortal Nation."

A few outstanding environmental facts help to account for the unique qualities of that culture.

It grew in the wondrously fertile loess soil, a wind-blown deposit from the Arctic tundras reaching a depth of four hundred feet over the upper Yellow River valley. The struggle of the pioneers was not against fellow-men, but against nature. It required less effort to scratch and plant a new field than to fight and take an improved one. But soil so light demanded constant, co-operative care. One man alone cannot erect engineering works against erosion. The individualist was soon buried under his shifting soil. Chinese society developed on a pacific, co-operative basis.

The great heroes of the early culture were pioneers in irrigation, terracing, house building, silk weaving, herbology and chronology. There is no warrior hero in early Chinese history. The only war tale in the *Shoo Jing* (Shu King), China's earliest historical document (cir. 2000 B.C.), concerns the continued failure of the chieftain against his enemies so long as he relied on physical force, and his prompt victory when he resorted to moral example. The book paints an idyllic picture of a patriarchal democracy, led by a chieftain selected by his predecessor and the council of elders for proved ability. He relied upon the patriarchs of each clan to provide local administration and was assisted in general supervision of the little nation's prosperity by the brightest of the young men, who were sent up to him

by their clan heads. Thus began the Mandarinate, that ever renewed aristocracy of intellect which ruled China for several thousand years. Warriors were regarded as outcasts—at best a necessary evil. Many rulers and philosophers denied their necessity altogether.

This contrasts strangely with the rapine, murder, organized cruelty, leadership of the proficient killer and general individualism out of which our Western nations grew. With us the warrior supplanted the patriarch, kings and emperors were but glorified warriors. In China the patriarch was not supplanted by the warrior chief. China, mentally superior to everything about her, needed no strong arm to procure the obeisance of the Pacific Asian world. If aliens conquered her they promptly became culturalized. They were Chinesified so readily that prolonged resistance lost its incentive.

#### CLASHING STANDARDS

Out of this development came two fundamentals of Eastern culture which concern us to-day: The first, *pacifism*, or more accurately the spirit of live and let live (closely allied to the extreme Asiatic tolerance which we will consider)—a spirit according to our standards lazy, craven, unventuresome. The second, *group organization*, making for settled society and great mutual responsibility, but crushing to initiative and deadening to originality. To these are added the third distinguishing fundamental, *tolerance*, which seems to have grown out of a different religious experience or conception.

There are no "Thus saith the Lord's" in Chinese scripture. There is no conception of revelation or supernatural fiat in any of the native Chinese religions. Chinese holy men were not spirit-possessed mouthpieces of God, but calm and dispassionate, although

sympathetic, critics and analysts of man and nature. Chinese holy writ consists not of *ex cathedra* instructions from a Superior Being unobligated to convince his subjects of the necessity and logic of his commands, but of confessedly human deductions from history and biographies as to the "most harmonious way" of life.

Men discussing human opinions are more likely to be tolerant of varying views and interpretations than men promulgating God-given instructions. They are not so prone to the self-righteous assuredness arising from conviction that they are fulfilling supernatural designs. They are very prone to over-sophistication and suspicion—the great vices of genial natures, from which our whole-hearted natures tend to save us. The sticklerism which is an over-development of the Western conscience appears childish to them, just as their tolerance and freedom religiously appear slipshod and unprincipled to us, whose ancestors burned rather than recant, and fought wars over a theological syllable. And, on the other hand, they lack the ability to face the world in the unshakable stubborn confidence of Westerners whose motto is "God with us."

Men of this spirit are, passively, more humane. When the interpreted will of heaven clashes with the feelings of men they do not sacrifice the men. They do not produce Pauls, Luthers, Cromwells, Wesleys, Lincolns, nor do they produce Crusader Barbarossas and Kaiser Wilhelms. For when our God-convicted men are humane they are more powerfully constructive than any Chinese. When they are merely controversial or egomaniacal their capacity for bringing destruction and misery is appalling.

These, then, are the unique basic qualities of Chinese culture which contrast with ours. In so far as China

culturized the rest of Pacific Asia they became the distinguishing characteristics of Pacific Asian culture. Among all China's imitators Japan adopted them most in form and perhaps least in spirit—which gives rise to the peculiar problem of Japan. A culture with a similar spirit grew in India. It was corrupted by many Aryan invasions, but the old Asian spirit has survived it and is strong to-day, as Ghandi has proved. (To be geographically complete in speaking of Asian culture we should, of course, classify the power-lustful Tatars under the great Khans. I sidestep this completely, as being neither typically Asian nor cultured. The Near East, likewise untouched here, is a mixed problem, and of second moment to the modern world, however momentous it was in past eras.)

#### TRAITS THAT GALL AND VIEWPOINTS HARD TO RECONCILE

These basic characteristics of what I am designating as Pacific Asian culture work out in innumerable traits, manners and racial features. The same is true on our side. In some of these things in particular the East and West are likely to "get on one another's nerves."

For instance: the penchant of our Western culture for proselyting. It is a marked trait, psychologically related, no doubt, to our aggressiveness, cocksureness and conception of "God with us." It has been immensely furthered by the missionary spirit in Christianity and by the material philanthropy, so developed in prosperous America. In fact, if Americans to-day can be said to have one typical creed, it is: whatever you believe, preach it with your might. The idea of being able to rest in a conviction without propagandizing it is essentially foreign to the West—it is essentially Asian.



This zeal has sent us militantly into Asia with our ideals. Mingled with an intolerance inspired of conviction and bolstered by material accomplishment it becomes galling to Asiatics. Many, like Ghandi and Ku Hung-ming, react to the extreme of rejecting our mechanical accomplishments entirely. The younger Asiatics—the students who attend our universities—react more dangerously. Their idea is to “show us.” Apprehending, rightly or not, that our most confident pride is in the material and mechanical instruction we are able to present Asia, not the philosophical or religious lessons we offer her, the prime ambition of this young generation is to outstrip us in material things. That way, as said, lies strife.

It might have been well for mutual relations had Asia felt an equal urge to propagandize us. Our feeling that we have everything to teach and they everything to learn would not then lie so athwart the path of mutual understanding.

There is the matter of man's social attitude toward his fellows. Western culture adopts the slogan “I am my brother's keeper,” and carries it out sincerely in many of its works, although still limited by nationalistic lines. However, this doctrine of service, readily degenerating into a mere cult of interference, can seem intolerant and repulsive to Asiatics. Beyond the mutual responsibilities within family and gild they do not take to the thought that we should all be advisers in our neighbors' businesses. America, particularly, threatens to become a nation of self-constituted censors. Nothing is more difficult for the Asiatic to reconcile with “civilization” than statutory regulations of morals and habits, prohibition, Sunday laws and censorships.

On the other hand, mutual respect,

the Chinese substitute for our “mutual concern,” strikes us as a thin and watery mortar to hold society together. The Confucian description of civilization as the sum of the intricacies whereby every man's personal dignity is preserved and respected is foreign to our sterner conceptions. In fact, the whole Oriental philosophy of “Face,” with the fustian conventional courtesy which is its outward expression, is ridiculous or repugnant to us. Mutual respect carried to such an excess of aloofness from one another's affairs as to allow a neighbor to starve to death because he does not belong to one's clan or gild, seems poorly justified by the multiplicity of bows given that neighbor when he is met upon the street.

Viewpoints as to social grouping differ as widely as those on social attitude. Nationalism has been—is still in spite of a mighty jar—a sacred doctrine with our Western peoples. It has been placed on a par with the doctrine of the sanctity of the family. But the loyalty of Asiatics, excepting Japan, which in many respects classifies “western” rather than “eastern,” is to their culture rather than to their political forms. Patriotism, meaning the sacrifice of life and endangering of culture for sentimental questions as to what capital shall administer them, or what coterie of men shall officer them, or what system of governmentation shall distinguish them, is a puerility or a hysteria rather than a virtue in their eyes. They will fight like anyone else, of course, over economic matters affecting food and life. But the face-touchiest people in the world have been remarkably insensitive to political considerations over which Greeks, Romans, Britons and Americans have shed rivers of blood. Their own fights are opportunistic, personal, always subject to compromise and

always tending to "degenerate" (from the Western viewpoint) into a talkfest.

Yet to-day the primary ambition of young Asiatics is "strong national organization." They do not love the idea for itself. The conviction lives, even grows in them, that their loose-knit type of society has capacity for out-living the strong nations of the West. But they are driven. They espouse nationalism for the promise it gives of compelling our respect. They know that we appraise peoples by their belligerent ability. They are out to "show" us.

The Western attitude toward the natural resources of the earth is another point upon which we get afoul. The Oriental cannot squelch the feeling that we rush with undue haste to ravish the treasures of the earth. The conservatism which opposes the exploitation of every known resource as rapidly as possible is not so unreasoning as we have thought. This intuitive reticence is being reinforced to-day by the warnings of scientists who compute how fast the world's supply of tin, copper, lumber, coal, iron and oil are diminishing.

Asia, in large part unwittingly, has saved her pie while we have been eating ours. Possibilities of conflict are large here. The day is very near when the West will be absolutely dependent on the raw materials which the "slowness" of the East will have left unravished. At that time we will possess less relative power to take what we need. Our ethic is that no people have the right to hoard resources of which the world is in need. We insist that if the Asiatic will not promptly exploit those in his courtyard we are justified to step in and do it for him. Naturally he regards the question in a different light.

The puerilities of our culture, detected by our own seers, are doubly

evident and disgusting to our Asian critics. Quantity for quantity's sake, power for power's sake, accomplishment for the "stunt's" sake, wealth for pride's sake, opinions respected according to the financial rating of their promulgators, a bonfire mood in consuming earth's resources: these are obvious fallacies of our modern European civilization—smoldering fires of self-destruction built into its very structure. We boast of the newspaper and radio: tremendous production, wonderful process—but what product?

Yet Asia enters competition with us in this folly. Only thus can she keep foot-room on the earth. Our aggressiveness is driving the old Chinese ideal of life—the point in which our civilization compares most favorably—out of Asia.

Yet are not we ourselves coming to long for some such philosophy as that which we are engaged in stamping out? A definition of life as a work of art, instead of as an exhibition of prolonged self-lashing and dominant will? Such a definition makes *living*, not accomplishment, the purpose of life. It presents the completed life not as a worn-out memorandum of appointments kept, a cast-off entry book of things done, but rather as a leisurely-painted canvas; a soft background of repose here, a bright dash of action there, and an atmosphere of poise over all.

You may modernize the Asiatic, make him the manager of belching factories or the nimble demagogue of a fickle citizenry, but his heart yearns still for these things of the old culture. It is in such considerations that the great gulf between East and West lies. Spectacular, skin-deep externals—dress, housing, social customs—are not the fundamental differences between the twain. Steam trains, sanitary plumbing, and electric communica-

tion are learned in an hour. Within a generation there will be no difference between the material living conditions of the Pekingese and the Londoner. And yet the introduction of the three characterizing institutions of our culture: the European interpretation of Christianity, nationalism, and industrialism—particularly the latter—has doomed the old order in Asia. Modification is inevitable.

Old Asia to-day stands bewildered, while young Asia heroically casts aside everything for the sake of awing us with our own weapons and compelling our respect. A few eclectic minds like Dr. Shih Hu and his disciples scrap both Western and Eastern institutions in the indomitable hope of starting society anew. European culture is hated both in aversion and in rivalry, and Euroamericans, their institutions and their enterprises, naturally fall into disfavor for the time. Such are the turmoil we have brought to Asia and the reaction thereof against us. I quote from T. B. Partington, F.I.L.:

Present conditions in China . . . constitute a revolt inspired not so much by a hatred of the white man's power as by an utter disbelief in the white man's philosophy of life.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *Fortnightly Review* of August 25.

There was a time when Pacific Asia was near conversion to the white man's philosophy—to Western culture. That was before 1914. Then the missionary popularized his religious teaching with a large flavoring of Western culture. To-day he is compelled to divorce his culture from his religion to get a hearing. One of the broadest results of the war was to throw Asians back on Asian culture. That, and the transfer of Russia from European to Asiatic affiliation are its two effects which will loom largest in history.

Is the reaction strange after all? By what definition of civilization can we justify our conduct towards Asia? Insisting upon the superiority of our social customs and religion we have made no effort to examine theirs. We have shown little respect for their persons, customs and possessions. We have said, in attitude "when you display an ability to whip us, we will show you some regard."

Asia is disillusioned with regard to our culture. Yet there is a good in their knowing us as not the superior, cocksure beings we once appeared. We, also, blindly grope for the light. There, at least, is the starting point for sympathy between East and West.

## American-Japanese Relations The Logic of the Exclusionists

By SIDNEY L. GULICK

Secretary, Commission on International Justice and Goodwill, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York City

THE enactment by Congress of the new immigration law containing a section forbidding admittance to the United States (with certain exceptions for temporary visits) of "aliens ineligible for citizenship," abruptly annulled the Gentlemen's Agreement, deeply wounded Japanese sensibility, and may prove to have been a fateful turning point in the relations of two powerful neighbors on either side of the Pacific.

The law went into effect on July 1, 1924. That day was observed throughout Japan as a "day of humiliation," and Tokyo was blazing with posters which read "Hate Everything American." The largest of her sixteen meetings of protest lasted continuously from one until ten in the evening, with an audience ranging from 5000 to 12,000 at its maximum. Those scores of popular demonstrations throughout Japan constituted an expression of the national mind of which the United States received little information and has little understanding. They illustrate afresh the extraordinary difficulty of conveying to one nation adequate information of the fateful results of its acts on the life of another nation.

Now that the dust of the battle has somewhat settled and the passion of the conflict abated, it may not be amiss in the light of sober realities to analyze the logic of those who fought for that exclusion clause.

### A VIOLATION OF NATIONAL POLICY

It has been alleged in support of Japanese exclusion that it is "the long

established policy of the United States to preserve this country for the white race." The common form of this statement is that this is a "white man's country." These assertions raise a fundamental issue. Just what is meant by this phrase? Does it mean that the historic and abiding American national policy has been the giving to the white race of the sole right to come and live here and the excluding of all others? If so, how has it happened that we have over ten million Negroes? And how does it happen that even under the new immigration law Negroes are still admitted?

Or does it mean that the Constitutional policy and purpose of our government has been and is to give the white race exclusive right to participate in the government and to have fair and equal opportunity and treatment? If so, how does it happen that Filipinos may become citizens by naturalization and that Negroes and all Asiatics born in this country are given the privileges, rights and duties of citizens?

In either case the contention is not substantiated by history or by an impartial study of our laws in their full historical meaning and intent.

The first naturalization law of 1790 was carefully worded so as to deny citizenship to imported Negro slaves and to American Indians; hence the phrase, "free white persons." Its primary aim was the maintenance of liberty and democracy. It was expected at that time that slavery would naturally pass away.



Expectations were not realized; slavery continued and expanded. During many decades hundreds of thousands of new slaves were imported. Finally a great war was fought to determine whether or not a State had the right to secede, and involved in it was the main issue as to whether or not this was to be a nation wholly of free men, possessed of equal rights and equal liberty. The South was defeated and its policy rejected. The national policy of a nation of men free and equal, whatever might be their race or color, was triumphant, first in a military sense and then legally. In order to make that clear, the Constitution and also the law of naturalization were amended. The right of *citizenship* was conferred on all Negroes in the United States, and the right of *naturalization* was "extended" to persons of "African nativity or descent." The very Congress which enacted the new immigration law also by law (June, 1924) conferred citizenship on all American Indians.

The foregoing statements and arguments are not invalidated by the fact that in some of our Southern and Western states the national policy of equality, liberty and opportunity for all, regardless of race, color or religion, is more or less nullified by local laws and customs. All such laws and customs are violations, not exemplifications, of our national policy. Moreover, they are being gradually rectified by the wise leadership in the South of men of both races, and by the remarkable achievements of the colored race itself in rising out of the terrible economic, educational and moral conditions due to slavery.

It is absurd now to call the United States a "white man's country" in the sense in which that is evidently meant, when one-tenth of our population is Negro, when considerable numbers of

American Indians, Mexicans, Chinese and Japanese constitute a permanent part of our population, and especially when all born here, regardless of race or color, are endowed by our Constitution and our laws with the rights of citizenship.

Moreover, to this day the immigration of Negroes is permitted, and they have been coming here and settling in far larger numbers than have the Japanese. Immigration from Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo and all South America is still unrestricted, not even being limited by the quota provisions of the new law.

The contention expresses, indeed, the desires and purposes of a group in the United States, but it is not the policy of our nation. It is in direct conflict with the principles and ideals of the Declaration of Independence, with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and with the Naturalization Law as amended in 1870, which law is still in force. Until 1882 that law was understood to grant privileges of naturalization to all races, from the extreme white to the extreme black. When the Chinese were denied naturalization in 1882, this was done not on the basis of a settled national policy but in compliance with rabid anti-Chinese agitators who declared that the Chinese were vicious, degenerate and inherently unfit to come to the United States or to become American citizens.

From 1882 onward until 1906 all races and colors except Chinese were granted privileges of naturalization. Then, without a new law or act of Congress, a rigid interpretation was adopted by the Naturalization Bureau in order to exclude Japanese. But Hindus and others, including Mexicans, were still regarded (until 1923) as eligible for naturalization.

It is not to be denied that the narrow, race discriminatory view has

gained much influence; but it is nevertheless essentially oligarchic in spirit. It is not democratic nor truly American. Its official adoption by the United States would destroy the fundamental characteristic of our nation and lose the most distinctive glory of our people.

If it is asserted that the phrase "a white man's land" merely means that we cherish and intend to preserve our civilization with its characteristic and essential principles of liberty, equality, humanity and brotherhood, two things may well be said:

(1.) The phraseology utterly fails to convey the alleged meaning.

(2.) These principles of our civilization are not inherently believed and practiced by a man merely because he is white, nor are they ignored and violated by another man merely because he is yellow or black. The belief and practice of these principles is not a matter of race or color. It is entirely a matter of education, of training and of personal character.

The argument, therefore, that the action of Congress in excluding as immigrants "aliens ineligible for citizenship" was taken in order to preserve the United States as a "white man's land" is unhistorical, un-American and unethical, and in this modern world of the 20th century in reality impracticable. In proportion as the "white man's land" theory is proclaimed and embodied in law will our national stability be threatened and our international relations become difficult and dangerous.

#### DID JAPAN BREAK FAITH?

It has been frequently asserted in support of the exclusion measure that Japan had been culpably lax in administering the Gentlemen's Agreement; that in giving passports to tens of thousands of Japanese to enter Amer-

ica she had herself virtually abrogated the Agreement; and that in self-defense, in order to keep out the "menacing flood" which she was sending to America, we were forced to take the matter into our own hands. The persistence with which this charge of bad faith has been made reflects on the information, the intelligence, or the moral character of those who made it. For the facts are clear. During the sixteen years between the summers of 1908 and 1924 more Japanese males left the United States (including Hawaii) than entered, by 21,869; and the net increase of Japanese foreign-born population in continental United States through the coming of wives and children during those same years (as permitted by the Agreement) was 10,959. These figures do not, of course, deal with deaths and births in the United States.

It should be noted that Mr. V. S. McClatchy, who long attacked the honor and honesty of Japan's administration of the Agreement, now declares that it is "not necessary to question her good faith; it is sufficient to point out that the Agreement in operation has failed to produce the desired results." This is a more correct statement of the case.

If the matter had been taken up in this spirit by California and by the Department of State years ago it could have been easily adjusted. Indeed, so soon as it became clear to Japan that strong feeling against the Agreement had developed in the United States, she voluntarily stopped (in 1920) the coming of the so-called "picture brides," and she later offered to modify the Agreement still further, in harmony with the wishes of the United States. The complete ignoring of that offer was one of the factors which deeply wounded the feelings of the Japanese people. The enactment of the exclusion section of the immigration law

was, in fact, a case of flagrant international discourtesy.

It was frequently stated in the course of the discussion that "the Gentlemen's Agreement not only constituted an invasion of Congressional prerogative by the Executive but also surrendered the national sovereignty." Strange—is it not—that President Roosevelt, the Honorable Elihu Root and all the other advisers in making the Agreement did not discover this fatal objection!

Stranger, too, that the Senate in ratifying the treaty with Japan in 1911 did not discover it, for the treaty recognizes the Gentlemen's Agreement as a satisfactory method of dealing effectively with a confessedly difficult matter.

And strangest of all—is it not—that President Coolidge and Secretary Hughes, who are made by the Constitution peculiarly responsible for dealing with foreign nations, after hearing all that the Immigration Committees of the House and Senate had to say on the matter of "prerogatives" and "sovereignty," still felt to the very end that the best way to deal with the question was the way which anti-Japanese agitators have continued to describe as an "invasion of Congressional prerogative" and a "surrender of national sovereignty." It is clear to many of us that Congress, exercising its prerogative and maintaining the national sovereignty, could, perfectly properly, and should have co-operated with the Department of State and the President in solving this issue in a manner that would have secured the practical results of the demand for exclusion and also have preserved the moral and courteous requirements for amicable international intercourse.

#### ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION

Among the most disturbing factors in this entire situation is the persistent

failure by so many of our leaders to understand the point of Japan's earnest contention and anxious desire. One of the fundamental postulates of the anti-Japanese agitation is the assumption that Japan is insistently and insidiously seeking opportunity for her emigrants to swarm into our country. This assumption is absolutely wrong. Japan has repeatedly declared that she is not asking for an open door for her emigrants. The Gentlemen's Agreement and its actual working show that this is the case. Her official offer to make that Agreement even more drastic is still further evidence.

There was not the slightest practical need for the exclusion section of the new immigration bill. For three years more Japanese had been leaving than had been entering the United States. The Agreement could easily have been modified to stop the further coming of wives for Japanese laborers in the United States, if that were deemed necessary. The Japanese Government was ready to modify the Agreement.

What Japan asks, and earnestly asks, is that she shall be recognized as one of the great, equal and friendly nations of the world, to be treated with consideration and respect, and that her nationals shall, so far as the law is concerned, receive the same economic opportunities, the same civil rights, and the same courtesies as are given to nationals of every other great nation. At the same time she has been willing to stop all her immigration into the United States by friendly and informal arrangements.

Japan, therefore, is not asking for things which, it is often said, we cannot give. She asks only what any self-respecting, well-ordered nation must ask. And the day will come sooner or later when both China and India will make the same insistent demand for courteous and respectful treatment.

The way in which anti-Japanese agitators have persistently distorted and misrepresented the so-called Japanese immigration issue is one of the very serious aspects of this most unfortunate situation. This spirit of deliberately misunderstanding and misrepresenting the Japanese seemed to possess the Senate when it insisted on distorting the obvious meaning and purpose of Ambassador Hanihara's famous letter to Secretary Hughes.

One thing is clear. If our country wants world peace and goodwill it must as a whole, through its press and its legislatures, deal more sincerely and understandingly with Japan, her problems and her policies.

Two important factors in this unfortunate situation should be noted. We should keep in mind the vast volume of misinformation regarding Japan and the Japanese which has issued from the anti-Japanese agitators of the Pacific Coast. It has been almost impossible for our people to know the facts. This it is that prepared Congress to do the needless and even humiliating thing which it did. The people have been led to believe that California was being flooded with Japanese immigrants; that the Gentlemen's Agreement was being flagrantly violated; that Japan had vast plans of military aggression for the capture and annexation of California; that Japanese controlled a large proportion of the best agricultural land of California; that Japanese laborers were in fact soldiers; that the coming of picture brides was a part of this military scheme; that Japan controlled and directed all Japanese in America by an *imperium in imperio* in harmony with these alleged grandiose ambitions, etc. Americans have been deliberately taught to suspect, fear and hate Japan and the Japanese. A vast and vicious propaganda of hate, even embodied in

a number of popular novels, has carried these poisoned ideas all over America.

We need also to note the mischievous politics that have made use of the Asiatic problem for more than fifty years. Because of personal and party ambitions, in the years of Presidential elections it has apparently been impossible to deal with this difficult question in a careful, scientific and rational way. Congress has been repeatedly stampeded. All well-informed men and women know and lament the sinister influence of mischievous politics. The politicians, no doubt, congratulate themselves on the differential legislative treatment of Asiatics, ignoring the fact that not a little of that legislation is in violation of treaties, of agreements, and of the principles of international courtesy and amity.

#### ADDING INSULT TO INJURY

Those who defend the action of Congress in enacting the exclusion law insist that Japan should not regard it as aimed particularly at her or as discriminatory against her people, for it also excludes all other Asiatics. They claim that what Japan really wants is "preferential treatment" as compared with other Asiatics. In point of fact, all other Asiatics had already been excluded by earlier laws—the Chinese exclusion law (1882) and the "Barred Zone" Act (1917). The sole and only purpose of the exclusion clause in the Immigration Act of 1924 was to abolish all Japanese immigration and to annul the Gentlemen's Agreement. This purpose was notorious. Secretary Hughes called pointed attention to it in his letter of February 8 to the Honorable Albert Johnson, declaring that "it would be idle to insist that the provision is not aimed at the Japanese," since the other exclusion laws are continued in force.

The assertion that Japanese should



not feel offended by the discriminatory law because it treats all Asiatics alike exhibits extraordinary failure to appreciate the situation. A man kicked down stairs which many are freely ascending is not likely to feel mollified by being told that a dozen others like himself have received the same brutal treatment. In resenting his ill-treatment, moreover, he naturally pleads his own case. It is not necessarily his duty to champion the cause of his fellow-sufferers.

It should, however, be added that intelligent Asiatics all feel offended and mortified by our law. The old exclusion laws were fairly rigid and excluded laborers successfully. This new law excludes all, including the highest and most cultured, and adds insult to injury, for it puts exclusion on a new basis which carries implications stoutly resented.

#### REMEDYING THE SITUATION

What is to be done? Can the situation be remedied? It is, of course, useless to ask Congress to rescind its action until a change of mind has taken place on the part of the people generally. The fundamental question concerns the nature of our present naturalization law, which permits only Whites and Africans to become citizens, as though the accident of color were vital to citizenship. As now interpreted by the Supreme Court, literally and legalistically, that law is obsolete. Fitness for citizenship and for naturalization is not a matter of color but of personal qualities. We need to amend this law so that our great Republic shall base its definition of fitness for citizenship on a correct principle. Our antiquated law—adopted in stages many decades ago, when we lived in a world of peoples and races far apart—is an affront now to more than half the world.

But I do not intend to argue this matter at length. I wish merely to say that the amendment of this law should be urged by Americans, not by Japanese nor by any other nationality. Americans should urge it, not to please Japan, but to express more adequately the real meaning and significance of the fundamental principles of democracy, liberty and fraternity. These are the only principles on which our national life can be wholesomely built up and international relations of amity and peace be permanently maintained between the great races.

It should at once be stated with utmost possible emphasis that the proposal to give privileges of naturalization to all who qualify personally, regardless of race or color, is not a proposal to open the doors to promiscuous or free immigration. Not at all. Naturalization and immigration are two distinct things. Much of the difficulty in recent discussions has developed because these two matters have been so commonly confused. The restriction of all immigration—even its rigid restriction—as on the Reed plan embodied in the new law is, in principle, what I have advocated for many years. But if we allow any immigration by quotas, such quotas should in my judgment include all peoples. The numbers which would be admitted from Japan, China and India would, on the quota plan, be absolutely negligible.

Finally, omitting many other matters that might well receive consideration, I wish to record my conviction that they are mistaken who insist that the "question is closed" and that nothing can be done to heal the wound inflicted on American-Japanese relations by the ungentlemanly, unnecessary and essentially unethical action of Congress. The injury done not only to Japan but also to the United States

is far more serious than is generally realized. The proposal to regard the question as "closed," in the belief that soon it will be forgotten is, in fact, likely to aggravate it. No question is ever closed and settled that is not settled right, as Lincoln once declared.

We cannot afford to have our country appear before the world as in-

different to matters of international courtesy, honor and justice. When an error has been made or a wrong inflicted, even unintentionally, an honorable nation will surely desire to reconsider the question and will seek to set matters right. There is surely some way to do it. Let us earnestly search for it.

# The Gentlemen's Agreement

## How It Has Functioned

By KIYO SUE INUI

Professorial Lecturer, Tokyo University, Tokyo, Japan

THE summary procedure on the part of the United States Congress brought the Gentlemen's Agreement to an abrupt end. This Agreement was one of those peculiar and interesting international arrangements unprecedented in the history of modern nations. Many arguments have been advanced, various misunderstandings have been created and ill-feelings have been entertained because of the lack of adequate and accurate information concerning it. For many years its context was unknown, and until its last days the authority of those who entered into such an agreement was subject to challenge.

Even as high an authority as Mr. Albert Johnson, Chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, of the U. S. House of Representatives, does not seem to possess a clear understanding as to the background of the Agreement. He alleges, for instance, that it was the evasion of the Japanese who held passports to neighboring states like Canada and Mexico in order to gain entry into the United States which caused the American and Japanese governments to enter into this arrangement. Prior to the Agreement, the Japanese were free to "enter, travel and reside" in the territory of America by the Treaty of 1894. Therefore, no "evasion" was necessary.

During the early days of American-Japanese intercourse, there were very few Japanese who crossed the Pacific. Not until ten years after the enactment of the Chinese restriction laws of

1882 did the Japanese migrating to America exceed more than 1000; and this as the result of a vigorous campaign on the part of the industrial interests of the Pacific Coast to secure imported labor. Even this did not hasten any organized opposition against the entrance of the Japanese.

In 1898 the United States annexed Hawaii where already forty per cent of the population were Japanese. In the light of this fact, the oft repeated panicky phrase of "the Hawaiianization of California" is a false misrepresentation, for it was after the American guarantee that Japanese rights and interests would be respected that Japan withdrew her protest and the annexation was completed. In 1900 for the first time the census of the United States included the arrivals to and from Hawaii. This brought the immigration figure to the United States up to 12,000, which was augmented to 30,000 in 1907, thus exciting the alarm of the laborites of San Francisco who held the control of the city's politics.

### BEHIND THE SCENES POLITICALLY

However, the direct motives for the Gentlemen's Agreement must be sought in the famous San Francisco earthquake which occurred in 1906, when thirty-six out of seventy-six school buildings were destroyed. Taking this as a God-given opportunity the School Board, which was controlled by laborites, proposed to put into practice the segregation ordinances which had been a dead letter up to that time.

The motive which prompted this significant action was of great consequence.

My readers will undoubtedly recall the year 1906 as a memorable one in the history of San Francisco, not because of the earthquake alone, but because of the publicity thus gained, and the shortage in relief funds that were pouring into the city from all over the world. Just what happened to those who were concerned, including the city's political boss, is notorious. In the municipal administration were a group who did not care to have a great searchlight of publicity thrust upon the city. They sought to shift the focus of the world's attention upon some other object.

Just at that moment Japan was winning the Russo-Japanese War. People began to talk about her, some to fear her as perhaps an ominous future foe. Here, certainly was an opportunity. Thus it was, we are told, that the School Board of the city, which was the cat's paw of the mayor and his coterie of friends, proceeded to segregate the Japanese children. Japan, naturally, but perhaps too vigorously, protested. Rumors were spread far and wide to the effect that "Japan is getting cocky"; "she is getting smart"; "she is finding fault with Uncle Sam"; "she is going to dictate as to what America should do"; "she is finding provocation to fight the United States"; "the victory gave her the 'big head'." Thus was the attention of the world shifted from the "earthquake" in the city administration to the rising power in the Far East.

President Roosevelt in his characteristic manner took the matter in hand and summoned the representatives of the San Francisco School Board with the hope of effecting a compromise. The result, in which Japan was compelled to do most of the yielding, was

the now famous but defunct Gentlemen's Agreement.

#### THE EXCLUSION ACT

As a sequence of this growing alarm and agitation on the Pacific Coast, an immigration act was approved on February 20, 1907, a provision of which was attached to its Section I, which read as follows:

That whenever the President shall be satisfied that passports issued by any foreign government to its citizens to go to any other country than the United States, or to any insular possession of the United States, or to the Canal Zone are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders to come to the continental territory of the United States to the detriment of labor conditions therein, the President may refuse to permit certain citizens of the country issuing such passports to enter the continental territory of the United States from such other country or from such insular possessions, or from the Canal Zone.

Clothed with this authority, the President, on March 14, 1907, issued a proclamation excluding from continental United States "Japanese or Korean laborers, skilled or unskilled, who had received passports to go to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, and come therefrom." This pronouncement was soon followed by the Department circular and regulations. "In order," says Mr. Johnson, "that the best results might follow an enforcement of the regulations, an understanding was reached with Japan that the existing policy of emigration of its subjects of the laboring class to continental United States should be continued and should, by co-operation of the governments, be made as effective as possible."

It is to be noted here that so long as the freedom of travel within the territory of the contracting party was guaranteed by treaty to all classes of the Japanese, the Presidential procla-



mation was made disregarding the existing treaty stipulation. However, no question was openly raised by the Japanese Government, and it was through the conciliatory, co-operative and self-denying attitude of the Japanese Government that the prohibition of the Hawaiian Japanese laborers from entering the continent of the United States was made possible.

#### HIGH LIGHTS OF THE AGREEMENT

The Gentlemen's Agreement is an understanding whereby Japan was to restrict voluntarily the emigration of her laborers to continental United States. It has been often erroneously contended by a rather misleading nicety of logic that the object of the Agreement was to restrict the increase of Japanese population in America, as is exemplified by the statement of Mr. Johnson, Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, in the following: "Under the plan, Japan was to prevent the coming of her people to continental United States so that the Japanese population therein would not increase."

Publicists of America have frequently complained of the unavailability of the exact terms of the Agreement, which is perfectly true, for, strictly speaking, they have never been published. However, it has not been impossible to discern the substance through the working of the Agreement, through administrative instructions and regulations, and able and complete reports of the U. S. Commissioner General of Immigration for 1908, 1909 and 1910 on pages 1256, 121 and 1245 respectively.

We can do no better than to quote a portion of the letter of Mr. Hanihara to Secretary Hughes, dated April 10, 1924, which gives the context of the Agreement, and in which the State Department concurs with the understanding

of the Japanese Government. The essential points are as follows:

(1) The Japanese Government will not issue passports good for continental United States to laborers, skilled or unskilled, except those previously domiciled in the United States or parents, wives, or children under twenty years of age of such persons. The form of the passport is so designed as to omit no safeguard against forgery and its issuance is governed by various rules of detection in order to prevent fraud. The Japanese Government accepted the definition of laborer as given in the United States Executive Order of April 8, 1907.

(2) Passports are to be issued by a limited number of specially authorized officials only under close supervision of the Foreign Office which has the supreme control of the matter and is equipped with the necessary staff for the administration of it. These officials shall make thorough investigation, when application for passports is made by students, merchants, tourists or the like, to ascertain whether the applicant is likely to become a laborer and shall enforce the requirement that such person shall either be supplied with adequate means to insure the permanence of his status as such or that surety be given therefor. In case of any doubt as to whether such applicant is or is not entitled to a passport, the matter shall be referred to the Foreign Office for decision. Passports to laborers previously domiciled in the United States will be issued only upon production of certificate from Japanese consular officers in the United States and passports to the parents, wives and children of such laborers will be issued only upon production of such consular certificate and of duly certified copy of official registry of members of such laborers' families in Japan. Utmost circumspection is exercised to guard against fraud.

(3) Issuance of passports to so-

called picture brides has been stopped by the Japanese Government since March 1, 1920, although it had not been prohibited under the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement.

(4) Monthly statistics covering incoming and outgoing Japanese are exchanged between the American and Japanese governments.

(5) Although the Gentlemen's Agreement is not applicable to the Hawaiian Islands, measures restricting issuance of passports for the Islands are being enforced in substantially the same manner as for continental United States.

(6) The Japanese Government is further increasing strict control over emigration of Japanese laborers to foreign territories contiguous to the United States in order to prevent their surreptitious entry into the United States.

Being a voluntary action on the part of Japan, the Agreement was not intended to restrict the sovereign right of America to regulate her immigration. Its only restriction was a self-imposed one on the part of the United States not to enact any discriminatory legislation against the Japanese. This is clearly seen in the official correspondence between the two governments.

According to the treaty arrangement of 1894 the nationals of each of the High Contracting Parties were free to enter, travel and reside in the territory of the other High Contracting Party, with this proviso: that the United States was at liberty to make ordinances and regulations regarding trade, the immigration of laborers, police and public security. It must be noted at once that it was not quite clear whether these laws and ordinances could be discriminatory or not, and that modification regarding the immigration pertains only to the restriction of laborers.

In the Treaty of 1911 the above said

freedom to enter, travel and reside was little changed. But the provisory clause was deleted entirely; and in its place the Japanese declaration was added, not as a part of the treaty, but as a statement by Japan, which is as follows:

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States, the undersigned Japanese Ambassador at Washington, duly authorized by his Government, has the honor to declare that the Imperial Japanese Government is fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in regulation of the emigration of laborers to the United States.

Just before the exchange of the ratification of the revised Treaty of 1911, the Acting Secretary of State notified the Japanese Ambassador that the advice and consent of the Senate "is given with the understanding, which is to be made part of the instrument of ratification, that the treaty shall not be deemed to repeal or affect any of the provisions of the Act of Congress entitled 'An Act to Regulate Immigration of Aliens into the United States'". The Acting Secretary further elucidated:

Inasmuch as this Act applies to the immigration of aliens into the United States from all countries and makes no discrimination in favor of any country, it is not perceived that your Government will have any objection to the understanding being recorded in the instrument of ratification.

As a result of such a guarantee from the American Government of the absence of any statutory discrimination against the Japanese, Mr. Hanihara tells us that the Japanese Government agreed to have the above referred to understanding recorded when the ratifications were made.

## LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENT

The legality of the Agreement is often brought into question by some advocates of the senatorial ratification theory of treaties. They claim that nothing is internationally binding, so far as America is concerned, without "advice and consent of the Senate." It must be conceded, even by these people, that there are multitudinous dealings between nations and that all of them surely cannot take the form of a rigid and strict treaty. One of these may be the question of issuing passports and honoring them. Such after all was the substance of the arrangement which could be naturally and conveniently made under the authority conferred upon the President by the Act of 1907.

Second, the Gentlemen's Agreement should have been considered as bilateral in its obligations. As we have already seen, Japan was to place a self-imposed restriction upon the emigration of her laborers to the United States with the understanding that whatever immigration law the United States might enact in the exercise of her sovereign right, she was not to discriminate against the Japanese people.

Third, such an agreement was recognized not only by the Roosevelt administration, under which it was reached, but also by each successive administration, both Democratic and Republican, and by Presidents Taft, Wilson, Harding and Coolidge, who so strenuously condemned the attitude of Congress in this regard. It is recognized as a binding agreement by many authorities on international law, including Senator Root and Professor Garner, President of the American International Law Association.

Fourth, it has been recognized by Congress. We have already seen that Congress empowered the President to

limit the validity of the passports issued for the purpose of enabling the holders to go to the insular possessions and Canal Zone in 1907. No one can deny that the spirit of the authorization was to prohibit the Japanese laborers in Hawaii from entering continental United States, and that Congress was fully aware of this co-ordinating measure to the contemplated Gentlemen's Agreement. The Treaty of 1911 was accompanied by the declaration to which it was referred several times in the course of Senate ratification. The original immigration bill of 1917, which proposed to exclude "the aliens ineligible to citizenship," was deleted because it was against the spirit of the existing understanding between America and Japan. In the immigration law of 1921, not only do we see that some references were made to the Agreement but that some modifications were effected because of it.

Moreover, the Agreement has been in practice for more than seventeen years with complete satisfaction to both parties. All of these may be said to amount to consent or at least a *de facto* ratification.

Agreements without formal ratifications are of common occurrence in Europe and Asia. Even in America they are not without precedent. In 1871 the Rush-Bagot agreement of demilitarization of the United States-Canadian borders and Great Lakes was concluded, but no formal exchange of ratification took place between Great Britain and America.

In 1851 Horseshoe Reef, Niagara Falls, Canada, was ceded to the United States by an exchange of letters between Mr. Abbott Lawrence, the American Minister in London, and Lord Palmerston. The Senate never advised or consented on this matter.

Again, an agreement was reached on June 6, 1882, by Mr. Frelinghuysen,

Secretary of State and Senor Romero, the Mexican Minister, providing for the reciprocal crossing and recrossing of the frontier by the troupes of the United States and Mexico in pursuit of marauding Indians. A similar agreement was renewed in June 4, 1896, between Secretary Olney and Senor Romero. In both of these cases Congress was never consulted.

But would America disregard the Rush-Bagot agreement now? Would she be willing to retrocede Horseshoe Reef? Did not Mr. Wilson utilize the Olney-Romero agreement and doctrine of hot-pursuit in 1916 against Villa, in spite of the vigorous protest of Carranza?

#### MIGRATION AND ANTI-JAPANESE AGITATION

Now let us observe how the Agreement has worked by tracing the status of the Japanese migration since 1908 when the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect. Statistically the result is seen, naturally, from the year 1909.

#### ALIEN JAPANESE ADMITTED TO AND DEPARTED FROM CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (Excluding Hawaii, etc.)

*Showing Various Details Bearing on the Gentlemen's Agreement*

	Admitted	Departed	Net
1909.....	2,432	5,004	-2,572
1910.....	2,598	5,024	-2,426
1911.....	4,282	5,869	-1,587
1912.....	5,358	5,437	-79
1913.....	6,771	5,647	1,124
1914.....	8,462	6,300	2,162
1915.....	9,029	5,967	3,062
1916.....	9,100	6,922	2,178
1917.....	9,159	6,581	2,578
1918.....	11,143	7,691	3,452
1919.....	11,404	8,328	3,076
1920.....	12,868	11,062	1,806
1921.....	10,675	11,638	-963
1922.....	8,981	11,173	-2,192
1923.....	8,055	8,393	-338
	120,317	111,636	8,681

Thus we see clearly, that, with the exception of the war period, (including one or two years before and after) those who departed from the United States were more than those who arrived there. According to the reports compiled by the U. S. Commissioner-General of Immigration, the total number of Japanese admitted to continental United States, during the period of 1908-23, was 120,317, and 111,626 departed during the same period. This makes the net increase for these fifteen years 8681 or only a meagre number of 578 a year. These 578 include not only those entitled to come under the Gentlemen's Agreement but such people as merchants, students, tourists, government officials, etc. These figures are sufficient proof of the effective international co-operation and of Japan's sincerity.

It must be further noted that, with the commercial, industrial and educational advancement of Japan, the number of Japanese who went abroad increased remarkably; and it is but natural that such an increase should be felt in the United States.

But coming more to the specific point of the arrivals of the women, the report of Mr. Johnson to the House says:

Under the Agreement thousands of Japanese women have come in as laborers, designated on the manifest and in the reports as such, and have performed the double duty of field laborers and mothers of families averaging five children. Even the stoppage of picture brides did not put an end to this immigration, for it continued to come and served the same purpose under the "Kankodan" bride system.

It is true that the wives of laborers were designated as laborers but that does not mean that they all became laborers upon their arrival. Nor did the Gentlemen's Agreement ever intend



to prohibit the legal wives of the Japanese, even though they may be what are commonly known as picture brides.

The Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration for 1919 officially recognized this interpretation.

In the absence of treaty provisions the validity of such a marriage is to be determined by the law of the place where it is contracted or celebrated, and if valid there it will generally be regarded as valid in any State or country in which the parties may subsequently reside, although invalid under the law of the subsequent domicile if contracted or celebrated there.<sup>1</sup>

But in order to obviate any unnecessary coast agitation, Japan again voluntarily discontinued in 1920 the practice of giving passports to these women. This is termed by someone as the "Ladies' Agreement." This is another proof of Japan's sincere desire to retain America's friendship and avoid unnecessary friction.

We recall with chagrin the cable report to the effect that there were 90,000 Japanese picture brides in America, which report was literally swallowed by the unsuspecting and unreasoning masses of America. The fact of the matter was that it so happened that a bride chanced to hold a passport with that number, as all passports are numbered. According to the practice of the Foreign Department, which gives out these documents, they assign them to different prefectures by so many lots. One to 1000 may be sent to one place and 10,000 to 20,000 to another, and so on up to the tens of thousands to some of the remote districts. Number 90,000 does not actually mean that there are that number of picture brides in America. A most liberal figure does not

<sup>1</sup> Annual Report of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1919, p. 58.

place it much beyond 5000. Roughly speaking, they do not constitute more than one-fourth of the Japanese wives who are allowed to enter the continent. This is merely one of hundreds of misrepresentations and falsehoods that are afloat in the waters of the Pacific and which have been used to bring discredit to Japan in the eyes of the world.

Furthermore, this system of "importing" wives was no new one among pioneer peoples. Proud Virginians and noble Carolinians in their early experiences resorted to a similar picture bride system (minus picture) and many a woman crossed the Atlantic to become the wife of these early settlers. Even at this very moment there are some European nations entering America who still cling to the practice.

It has often been charged that Japanese women work in the field as laborers. The writer does not condone the fact that some of the Japanese women do work in the fields, nor does one wish to encourage any such labor of women, although it was considered to be the patriotic duty of every man, woman and child to engage in production during the war; nor is it any strange sight to see them by the sides of their husbands and brothers even now in some of the Middle Western states. Indeed, in many communities of Europe they do furnish the bulk of labor and continue to do so for some time upon their arrival in America. However, it is admitted that it is not the American standard and the Japanese community is doing its best to discourage this practice through their various organizations.

There is another phase that must be taken into consideration. It must be borne in mind that the Japanese farmers are working under the most unfavorable conditions: economic persecution is not any too strong an epithet for the conditions to which they are

subjected. No Japanese in California was allowed to lease farm land for more than three years after 1920. Such a situation is not conducive to the establishment of a permanent home nor does it encourage the improvement of it. Now they are merely tolerated as farm laborers, subject to the conditions of employment and easy dismissal. Often their shacks are furnished by their employers. These ill-fated women not only do not have their own homes where they could rest nor the motive for home keeping, but they are literally driven from one camp to another, in which they naturally have no pride or attachment.

To them lies the choice of one of two ways: to fold their hands in these two-by-four shabby old huts all day long, or to stand loyally by the sides of their equally unfortunate husbands and heroically and patiently bear the ordeal of toil. The fact that the women are laboring, and possibly, incidentally, in competition with their American neighbors, is not to be countenanced. But to be condemned are discriminatory land laws, social ostracism and economic persecution, the cause of this deplorable condition.

#### MINORITY FEAR COMPLEX

Of all ridiculous denunciations of the Gentleman's Agreement is the charge of the increase of population through birth. This is irrelevant to either the Gentleman's Agreement or the "Ladies' Agreement." This is, however, by far the best argument produced by the Coast alarmist for the consumption of the innocent masses. Phelan, McClatchy, Shortridge, Free, Chambers, etc., have all contended nervously that the rate of natural increase of the Japanese is three times as great as the white population of California. At the present rate they aver that the Japanese will over-run the state in the

near future, and in fifty years they will be in the majority.

This fear is nothing new in history. Bismarck once remarked that Poles increased like rats. The like phrase was introduced to California against the Chinese. British-Canadians are in fear of the minority, the French-Canadians. The former being the Protestants and the latter Catholics, their fear assumed a religious aspect as well. Now the once feared Poles are beginning to use the selfsame phrase against their Ukranian minority. The same may be said of all other minority races within the majority nations. The majority is extremely despotic, but fears the minority which is next in size. The Japanese happened to be next in number among the foreign elements on the Pacific Coast with the exception of Italians in San Francisco; hence this traditional fear of the minority by the majority.

Mathematically speaking such reasoning as that of McClatchy is correct. But the Japanese are human. We must use sociological figures. It is true that the Japanese birth-rate in this country is large. A Japanese woman gives birth to a child every three and one-half years, whereas the American wife gives birth to one in every nine years. Why? First, because more than sixty per cent of the Japanese are living in rural communities which usually show a higher rate of natural increase. Second, because of their economic well-being as compared with their former environment in Japan; but this is universally true of all immigrant races. Third, because California's birth-rate is low even compared with other states, as the state is composed of many immigrants from the East, the majority of whom come here to spend their lives after they pass middle age. The largest percentage of Japanese men in this state are be-

tween the ages of thirty and forty; women, between twenty and thirty. Fourth, because they are young, their death-rate is very small, while the increase is abnormal. Fifth, the birth-rate of the Japanese is usually high compared with that of the abnormal war time, when over 2,000,000 American youths were away from their homes. Sixth, this increase will decline as time goes on. Those who are in the period of reproduction will pass into another state, while it is too early for the second generation to take their place. As was stated before, the Japanese are human beings. They have no monopoly on perpetual youth. This accusation and its arguments are another example of the vicious and malicious means used by the anti-Japanese to villify the Japanese. Says Mr. Johnson:

The surreptitious entries of Japanese, partly through Canada but perhaps more extensively through Mexico, must be great. The information before this committee from the Department of Labor and elsewhere, shows that thousands leaving Japan with passports from South America worked their way back through Mexico and the Imperial Valley into California.

#### REFUTING SMUGGLING CHARGES

In the absence of reliable statistics, from the very nature of the case, it is impossible to dispute Mr. Johnson, who avers that the surreptitious entries of the Japanese must be great. He admits, however, the existence of an effective passport system in Japan. This much we know that, according to the best available statistics concerning the number of the Japanese in Mexico, it does not exceed 3000. It is impossible to smuggle by the thousands more than once or twice. But that process has been going on for twenty years according to the reports emanating from California.

During the heat of the campaign of 1920 the charges of smuggling were not left alone at the doors of the irresponsible Japanese from Mexico, but Mr. Phelan accused Consul-General Oyama of San Francisco, then of Los Angeles, that he was assisting the Japanese in the alleged attempt of smuggling through the borders. Upon an investigation it was discovered that Mr. Oyama in the course of his ordinary business happened to visit the Japanese ship which was running between the Japanese and South American ports. Later a Japanese was arrested for smuggling. And to an inquiry by the immigration official if the ambitious individual knew Mr. Oyama, he replied, naturally, "yes." Mr. Phelan and his associates with their genius of originality created a sensation to the effect that the Japanese Consul was helping the smuggling of their nationals. This was denied and charges were challenged. But the Senatorial aspirant could not substantiate his story.

Statistics are meagre indeed on this subject. During 1919 there were 1381 Mexicans, 188 English and 138 Japanese who attempted to enter illegally, according to the statistics of Washington. Now after the Japanese leave the country the government of Japan no longer has control over these emigrants except in theory. Japan cannot be responsible for the integrity of every Japanese who crosses the border illegally. But these charges and accusations have been resorted to without ever revealing any actual plots or plans, for they are most conveniently made without the danger of actual proof or reproof on either side.

But even in this Japan has more than co-operated in the spirit of the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Lemieux Agreement with Canada works practically in the same manner as the Gentlemen's Agreement and the smuggling

through the Canadian border is neither practicable nor possible, for those who are qualified to enter Canada and the United States are identical.

Japan's efforts to observe the Agreement are most noteworthy examples of international co-operation and self-denial, as is shown by the following:

(1) Japan perfected a system of national control of issuing passports by examining and investigating the perspective emigrants to foreign countries, particularly to the United States.

(2) The Agreement does not apply to Hawaii. But substantially the same rules were made to govern the case of the emigrants to Hawaii.

(3) Japan limited the number of her labor emigrants to Mexico although the Agreement cannot and does not cover that country.

(4) The Japanese Government instructed the steamers of Japanese registry not to sell any ticket to the Japanese laborer from South America to the United States. Thus Japan has gone out of her way to live up to the spirit of the Agreement.

(5) According to the Japanese family system the adoption of children often takes place. Being legal children, they are also entitled to go to the United States. But Japan has not given passports to those children save in a very few exceptional cases, and that six months after such adoption took place.

(6) As we have already seen, issuing of passports to so-called picture brides was discontinued in spite of the fact that both international law and the American Government recognized such a marriage.

So far as Japan is concerned there has been no stone unturned in order to meet the supposed and exaggerated requirements of the Agreement. Every conceivable means has been improvised by Japan in order to carry out the

Agreement in a most gentlemanly manner. And to think that all of these efforts on the part of the two Governments were to be thrown to the winds by another department of the national system!

These conscientious and loyal efforts of Japan have been appreciated and recognized by the United States Government officials. Testimonies to the effect are not lacking:

In 1910, the Commissioner of Labor in Hawaii said that the Agreement had effectively stopped the influx of Japanese plantation labor there. In May, 1916, Secretary of Labor Wilson defended the Agreement in a letter to Senator Phelan. In another letter to the same Senator of August, 1919, Hon. William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, likewise said that the Agreement was defended by a "fair degree of satisfaction." The Agreement was defended by Secretary Hughes in his letter to the House Committee, of February 8, 1924. . . . In 1913 President Roosevelt wrote: "The arrangement we made (the Gentlemen's Agreement) worked admirably, and entirely achieved its purpose."<sup>2</sup>

The Gentlemen's Agreement has served its purpose. It fulfilled its peculiar mission of satisfying two proud peoples of the Pacific for almost two decades. For one, by making the enactment of offensive and discriminatory legislation unnecessary, and by safeguarding the other from open humiliation among the civilized nations. Its abrupt and disastrous termination is one of the greatest blots on the pages of Pacific international history.

However, we shall not lay all the blame on the shoulders of the diplomats concerned and Congress alone. One of the greatest objections to it in the United States was the erroneous and widespread belief that it delegated

<sup>2</sup> *Japanese Immigration*, by Raymond Buell, World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, Vol. VII, Nos. 5-6, p. 292.



to a foreign nation the power of Congress in the regulation of her domestic question. The other difficulty was the fact that its terms were not made public, and that the law-making bodies were not taken into confidence. This objection, without doubt, is the most serious one from an international point of view.

The rise of democratic control of national and international affairs within the past decade or two found a concrete expression in Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which requires that

Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the League shall be forthwith registered

with the Secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it.

Japan can console herself by thinking that a part of the sad fate of the Agreement was due to the secret nature of the engagement. In this, however, she must share her responsibility, as she is one of the foremost nations voluntarily committed to the program laid down by the League of Nations. There is nothing to prevent the lifting of the veil of secrecy between America and Japan at this time. It is to be hoped that they will publish all relevant documents relative to the Agreement with the view of clearing up the mystery, and start anew on the road toward international confidence and harmony.

# California's Attitude Towards the Oriental

By ELIOT GRINNELL MEARS

Executive Secretary, The Survey of Race Relations, headquarters at Stanford University

## THE SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS

**I**N the field of Oriental-American relations, the significance of California is out of all proportion to its area and population. The attitude of California and Californians has largely determined American foreign policy toward the Oriental.

The reasons for this situation do not appear on the surface. Why should three per cent of the population of continental America be the major factor in these diplomatic relations? Analogies made between Orientals on the Pacific Coast and negroes in the Southern states fail to provide the desired clues because of the marked points of difference, among which may be mentioned: eligibility to citizenship, social status, language difficulties, organization, industry, thrift, attitude towards women, pride, psychology and human geography. A fundamental distinction is that there is no African emperor to watch over the interests of descendants of former emigrants, while on the Pacific there stands a territorially small but sensitive and powerful nation ready to protect its nationals. Nevertheless, a balancing of these various factors, as weighed by the writer, an adopted son of Yankee birth, who expresses views not necessarily his own, makes it appear all the more remarkable that the wishes of Californians and their commonwealth should dominate this situation.

It is in California, rather than in the northward states of Oregon and Washington, that one finds leadership. There are three explanations: first, the

great majority of Orientals on the Pacific Coast as well as in the United States (excluding Hawaii) have resided in California; second, Pacific Coast affairs have taken their cue mainly from California, and, in particular, the locality between San Francisco and Sacramento; and third, the cross currents of the coast press unduly favor this state. Relative to point three, it is worth while to note that the news channels to and from California operate largely east and west; also, California news is fairly well distributed in Oregon, Washington and the Province of British Columbia, but the return news is meager. Therefore, the California attitude as expressed by the ever-influential press permeates all sections of the country, including the Pacific Northwest. California assumes the rôle of the big brother of the American Pacific Coast.

Yet the national importance of the state is of far more consequence. The part California has played and is playing in the determination of this American immigration policy is in marked contrast to the failure of the Southern states to convert the nation to their pronounced view on an intimate racial problem. Locally, it is believed that the fairly consistent attitude of the State Department towards Californian race problems has been too negative in character to admit of needed solutions: hence, the virile, determined and assertive state residents, both native son and adopted son, have not remained quiescent. Both official and private California take the position that they know. Practically every step taken is

deliberate. Confidence, bred of first-hand knowledge not obtainable elsewhere, breeds cocksureness. The vacillating national policy and Eastern public opinion in the 'seventies and 'eighties towards the human floods of Chinese impress the Californian with the belief that persons who attempt to solve the racial destinies of California, therefore America, without even crossing the Mississippi River, much less the Sierra Nevadas, are not only ignorant but gullible. Not only is California determined, but her position seems to her in accordance with the facts. The situation is decisively stated by the conservative *San Francisco Argonaut*, when in the midst of the local school crisis of 1906, this editorial comment appeared:

The reason that we in California are calm in the presence of this crisis is: first, because we know we are right; second, because we hope to convince our countrymen that we are right; third, that if we fail to so convince them, we will, whatever they do or say, do what we know to be right.

But who are these Californians? The answer is clear. They are outstandingly Americans, descendants of the same stock which makes our country what it is to-day. Of the total population of 3,426,861 according to the Federal census of 1920, three-quarters are native-born whites and nearly one-fifth are foreign-born whites; the remainder are mostly Japanese, Chinese, and American Indians. Furthermore, due to the westward migration, the Golden State is more representatively American than probably any other state. For example, excluding the foreign-born, of the total recorded population of Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego and Long Beach, the percentages of native Americans born in other states, were 50 per cent, 44 per cent, 20 per cent, 20 per cent, and 12 per cent, respec-

tively. Therefore, state sentiment is influenced to a major degree by persons who were not born and brought up in their most impressionable years—the age groups show this also—in their present habitat. With all due consideration to the streams of immigrants from northern and southern Europe, the native American is the natural and accepted leader in her affairs.

This effect of sources of population on attitude towards Orientals must not be passed over without a mention that the Californian view is not localized. The early anti-Chinese traditions of the early days of Sacramento and San Francisco, for example, seem to the writer to have no direct casual effect upon the present community attitude. More potent factors are the relative number of other foreign nationalities, and the local attitude towards them, as in the case of the numerous Armenians and Russo-Germans in Fresno County where the Japanese have a much preferred status, or that of Mexicans in parts of southern California where Orientals are often forgotten. Contrary to popular belief, but confirmed in a conversation by a leading member of the Japanese community, it appears that the Japanese believe that they receive better treatment in the city by the Golden Gate than in any other large-sized city of California; an explanation due, it is said, both to the familiarity of its prominent citizens with the actual conditions and to their larger breadth of view, a parallel experience to the treatment of the black race by Southern gentry. Further contributory evidence is produced by the strong, anti-Japanese resolutions passed recently by the Long Beach Chamber of Commerce, a community organization composed largely of Middle Westerners who probably never saw an Oriental until a few years ago. Therefore, even at best, generalizations

by anyone are unsatisfactory as applied to a state larger than New York and New England combined; yet certain marked tendencies stand forth.

#### CAUSES OF PRESENT SITUATION

Historically, the Oriental problem in California deserves extensive comment, but space forbids more than a mention of a few significant happenings. The Chinese who came to California were needed for mining, construction work and truck farming. Largely from the agricultural peasantry of Kwang Tung and Fukien, they engaged in menial work at low wages and long hours. They supplied a demand which had never been satisfied by native or other foreign workers; therefore, they deserve due credit for their share in California's early progress. Their presence was not seriously resented until the hard times of the 'seventies, when falling wages and profits, and the invasion of the local market due to the opening of transcontinental lines, brought about serious unemployment among the white population. The immediate feeling against the conditions of unrest, by no means confined to California, brought forth a noted agitator, an Irishman named Denis Kearney, who directed his vehemence first against the wealthy, local corporations, later centering his attacks upon the large Chinese population. Aroused public opinion became directed against coolie labor and against Oriental labor; the Chinese were not coolies, although they had virtually that status. In submitting the question of exclusion to popular verdict on September 3, 1879, the size of the vote as well as the unanimity were remarkable; all but 4000 registered persons voted, and of the total vote of 155,521, all but 883 were in favor of the proposed act. There followed the Federal Chinese Exclusion Act of May 6, 1882; more recent legis-

lation extended its operations indefinitely.<sup>1</sup>

Similar to the Chinese, the Japanese were at the outset welcome to our shores. They were likewise peasants, mostly recruited from the Hawaiian Islands. They took the place in large measure of the Chinese population that had begun to diminish year by year. However, the substitution of Japanese for Chinese was not a quantitative affair because Californians soon perceived that, unlike the docile, easy-going and subservient Chinese, the Japanese were ambitious, aggressive, and were backed by a proud, imperial government. The Chinese did not seek equality; the Japanese were insistent upon equal social recognition. Whereas the crimes, misdemeanors and legal restrictions practised on the Chinese evoked no marked protest from their government, similar treatment of the Japanese—which, however, has always been of far less intensity—met with immediate exchange of diplomatic notes or local pressure emanating from official Japan. A successful conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05 had produced, according to one well informed writer, "a certain arrogance or overbearing attitude in individual Japanese." The school question in San Francisco in 1906 prompted a militant message from President Roosevelt to the state of California and the dispatching of the Secretary of the Navy Metcalf to report on the situation.<sup>2</sup> The Gentle-

<sup>1</sup> The Asiatic Zone Act of February 5, 1917, directed largely against Southeastern Asia, does not apply to either China or Japan because of the separate arrangements with these two countries.

<sup>2</sup> The local grievance was that alien Japanese attending the local schools were frequently several years older than their white classmates, and that social conditions were open to suspicion. There was truth in the former assertion since it may be noted in Secretary Metcalf's report that in the sixth grade of San Francisco's Public



men's Agreement of 1907 soon followed. In 1909 the Asiatic Exclusion League, composed of labor union representatives, met at the Labor Temple in Seattle and initiated a powerful campaign against the Orientals, a movement which was doubtless backed by public support, but largely unorganized.<sup>3</sup> Labor has always been a pronounced element in anti-Oriental agitation.

With the Japanese rising rapidly from the status of agricultural laborers to tenant and in some cases to farm owners, the land question began to assume large proportions. Political changes at Washington and the need for local campaign issues played their part; but it was primarily the exhibition of industry, skill and thrift, those qualities which Americans admire in themselves, which brought about a fresh agitation culminating in the Webb-Heney act of 1913 whereby persons ineligible to citizenship could not lease land for a period of more than three years.<sup>4</sup> The terms of the latter were considerably tightened by the Anti-Alien initiative measure of 1920,

despite the opposition by the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and other commercial bodies on the ground that it was unnecessarily harsh and, moreover, would prove ineffectual; the measure was carried by a ratio of 3 to 1 with 72 per cent of the registered votes cast. It is interesting to record that San Diego County cast the heaviest vote against the act; Sacramento County piled up the largest ratio in its favor, and San Francisco County and Los Angeles County had somewhat similar results—both corresponding fairly closely to the state-wide poll. Nevertheless, this land measure is not to be taken as a satisfactory test of public opinion because of mixed features including (1) an entirely one-sided press, (2) economic pressure, (3) the plea for a "square deal," and (4) post-war psychology influenced by Japan's Shantung demands on China and her reported military aggressions in Manchuria, Korea and Siberia.

The latest and most fateful step has been the passage of the American Immigration Act of 1924 which abrogated without notice the Gentlemen's Agreement, arranged between President Roosevelt and Japan in 1907, to avoid the exclusion issue at that troublesome time. Section 13 of this recent act excludes from admission aliens ineligible to citizenship; therefore, it is regarded, and fairly, by the Japanese as aimed at them since the other Asiatics had already been excluded. The precipitous action of Congress was keenly resented by the sensitive Japanese people, since it appeared to question the good faith of the Imperial Government in carrying out the Gentlemen's Agreement and gave no time for reflection and consideration—an important factor in Oriental psychology; it placed the Japanese on a par with the Chinese and British Indians; and it denied them their cherished desire for

Schools there were 12 pupils born in Japan of whom one was 20 years old; one 19; one 18; four 17; two 16; two 15; and one 14; the average age of the white girls and boys was from four to ten years younger. Similar statistics apply to other grades. The alleged moral conditions, figments of local prejudices, had scant if any basis in fact.

<sup>3</sup> In November, 1907, the *Stockton Record* gave this advice to the Native Sons of the Golden West: "The Native Sons can perform no greater patriotic service than to dedicate themselves to a sober and intelligent agitation of the Japanese problem. They should resolve to hold this state against the threatening blight of the brown . . . it is all very well for our statesmen to talk of international obligations, of world-wide fraternity and equality. Such eloquence looks nice on paper. It fits to the rules of diplomacy."

<sup>4</sup> Prof. Eugene Wambaugh recently directed my attention to the inability of aliens to acquire property in the District of Columbia. See Act of March 3, 1887, also Section 396 of present code.

equal treatment by non-Asiatic governments. Their resentment was doubtless directed more against their failure to be placed on an equal basis with European countries than with reference to the immigration question proper. Although this immigration measure passed Congress by a large majority, the inclusion of Section 13 met with hearty opposition on the part of much of the midwestern and eastern press of the United States, and was likewise regretted by many influential individuals, organizations and newspapers in California.

At present writing, the local attitude toward the Chinese is not unfriendly; towards the Japanese there has been a somewhat better sentiment largely through a feeling that the immigration and alien land acts have removed what was considered a menace; and the British Indians amounting to less than five thousand, including more Sikhs than Hindus, are a scattered and disappearing element, and do not cause much irritation.

#### THE PROBLEM TO-DAY

The telling slogan, "Keep California white," centering about population numbers, has no exclusive reference to a color line; hence the phrase is most unfortunate. The successive Federal censuses of 1850, 1860 and 1870 record that each tenth person in this state was born in China; moreover, in 1880, approximately 15 per cent of the state residents were Chinese, roughly equivalent to the adult white population of the state. Obviously, this situation could not go on indefinitely. As a result of the exclusion acts, whose provisions have been reasonably well carried out, the Chinese population both in the United States and on the Pacific Coast has been steadily decreasing since 1890. The Japanese population, likewise excluding Hawaii,

but including the large gains through births in America, increased from 55 in 1870, 2039 in 1890, 24,326 in 1900, 72,157 in 1910, to 111,010 in 1920. The gradual dispersion of Chinese and Japanese away from the Pacific Coast is shown graphically in Chart 1.

The birth and death records for the Japanese appear in Chart 2, to which should be correlated Chart 3, which gives the age of distribution of California's entire population. The great fear of Californians, that the Japanese population would eventually swamp the state, was soon widespread, especially when the Registrar of Vital Statistics of the State Board of Health expressed the opinion that "unless checked, the Japanese will, in time, equal the whites in number in California." Since the early Chinese and Japanese communities were mainly made up of men, the Oriental population increase was not a matter of immediate fear until the Japanese, in accordance with local customs, received their young "picture brides."<sup>5</sup> The average person, living in the midst of racial propaganda, could not be expected to appreciate the illogical comparison, moreover, between Japanese and the local white population, with no account taken that much of California's population consists of married people from other states who are in middle or later life. How-

<sup>5</sup> According to Japanese custom, an exchange of photographs and registration of domicile in Japan is sufficient for a legal marriage. Therefore, a young Japanese woman might become duly married in Japan, then proceed to America to join her husband. Her admittance to America was sanctioned by the former Immigration Act. On the other hand, Chinese women did not come to America because of the existing exclusion law. Failure to appreciate the corresponding influx of Oriental women into California—as immigrants, future mothers, and agricultural workers has induced the superficial observer to have false notions regarding the comparative effectiveness in the carrying out of the Chinese exclusion acts and the Gentlemen's Agreement.

CHART 2




CHART 1




CHART 4





CHART 3





ever, there was general recognition of the youth of the Japanese brides and the few childless marriages.<sup>6</sup>

The remarkable agricultural ability of the Japanese, rather than the inertia of the white population, is the explanation for the acknowledged place attained by the Japanese in the production of fruit and vegetables. The lower standard of living, the willingness to work their women and themselves at all hours and patient drudgery made it comparatively easy for the Japanese to obtain a commanding position in the case of certain distinctive and not unimportant state agricultural products. Chart 5 gives the occupation distribution, and Chart 6 gives the percentage of specified crops raised by them. Both these charts are reproduced from figures furnished by Japanese interests and are probably thoroughly reliable. The Chinese, who had done most of the truck farming half a century ago, have left the country for the city and are seldom seen in agricultural pursuits. The native population pursues the world trend by forsaking rural for urban callings.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> For further details regarding population and vital statistics, consult the "Tentative Findings of The Survey of Race Relations", a Canadian-American study of the Oriental on the Pacific Coast, headquarters at Stanford University, California, 1925. To quote: "The frequently quoted birth rates of the Japanese are high because they are extremely crude . . . the birth rate of the Japanese is very nearly the same as the birth rate of the white population of the state. In 1922 the average issue per white mother was 2.63; the average issue per Japanese mother was 2.83; and the average per Chinese mother was 3.26 . . . the number of births per 1000 married women of child-bearing age among the white population of California was 125.5; among the Japanese, 317.2; among the Chinese, 621.1." The sex ratio is shown in Chart 4.

<sup>7</sup> "The so-called white labor in California is, to a large extent, made up of alien peoples, notably Italians, Portuguese, Swiss, Scandinavians and Armenians. The real economic competition in agriculture is not so much between the descendants of the white pioneers and the Orientals

The issue in California is clouded by prejudice, half-truths, lies, malice, ignorance and by a general apathy which is shaken off only during periodic incidents. The yellow journals of Japan and California, read by the multitude, are great movers of public opinion. Moreover, it is practically unheard of for any consequential journal in either Japan or California to adopt a pro-foreign attitude. The politicians, even the statesmen, must come in for their share of the responsibility, for, as Paul Scharrenberg, the thoughtful secretary of the California State Federation of Labor and member of the California State Immigration Commission, wrote:

Japanese and American diplomats have so beclouded the main issue that the average man who is not a member of the diplomats' union, and hence not versed in the fine points of that game, cannot possibly follow the play.

Entirely overemphasized in the popular California stand is an alleged racial inferiority factor. In fact, even the rabid talkers admit in private, if not in public, that there is no basis for assuming that the Oriental civilization is inferior to our own; it may be superior. The important point is its marks of difference which appear to make assimilation biologically and culturally exceedingly difficult. "Whatever right-mindedness may be achieved," stated Viscount Bryce, "these racial marks still exist and cause them to be classified as members of their original class group."

The heart of the problem is naturally the presence, distribution and number

as it is between the later European immigrants and the Orientals. A five-months' firsthand survey in the Great Valley of California brings increasing testimony that the sons of white farmers of pioneer and later stock are leaving agriculture for business and the professions."—*Tentative Findings*, op. cit.

CHART 6

Percentages of Total Specified California Crops Raised by Japanese.  
(Figures Compiled March 1921, by  
Japanese-Agricultural Association)





CHART 5

Percentage distribution of 52,000 Japanese  
in Central and Northern California in March, 1924  
by Occupation  
(Computed from data compiled by Japanese Consulate General.)



of the Japanese population in California. Nearly everyone is agreed, on the basis of total numbers alone, that the admission of a few more Japanese would cause absolutely no concern. The ratio of the combined Chinese and Japanese to the total population in 1920 was 2.9 per cent, a marked contrast to the numerical density of the Chinese during the middle and later 19th century; but the distribution in localities has changed greatly. The Chinese have mostly abandoned rural for urban life, segregating themselves into the "Chinatown" colonies of the larger cities. The Japanese have preferred to stay on the land, one result of which is that the bulk of the state population knows about them by hearsay more than by actual contact. One of the important preliminary findings of *The Survey of Race Relations* is that the sentiment in rural communities is apparently much more favorable to the Japanese than is true elsewhere: this is directly contrary to the accepted belief that the greatest hostility is in the regions where the Japanese are not only the most numerous but also the best known. However, city opinion, partly emanating and partly expressed by metropolitan dailies, is the natural dominating force. The fact that the percentage of Chinese and Japanese to the total population in tiny Yuba County, for example, was 34.5 per cent in 1920, and that colonies in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys were conspicuous, gave useful ammunition for the anti-Japanese barrage. More important still was the concentration of Japanese in the most favored agricultural localities, where their intense energy and co-operative aggressiveness have been resulting in a rapid acquirement of land control.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Dr. Elwood Mead recounted this story told by an elderly farmer (*The Annals*, January, 1921):

"I came to this district twenty years ago. I

The alarming increase of the state's Japanese population has been the chief cause for worry. The real purpose of the Gentlemen's Agreement, to put a stop to an increase without recourse to statutory legislation, had failed. Great alarm was experienced in a comparison of Japanese and white state birth records, to be explained by the influx of a people with a lower standard of living and in the younger age groups. Figures, appearing in the guise of statistics, were used with the utmost abandon—and no people can resist the combination of an embittered racial problem and rapid-firing statistics.

It appears that the majority of Californians agree that the economic pressure was and is the main cause for international friction; and from this friction, which partakes of competition rather than conflict, the social, racial and political aspects are emerging in more concrete form.

The essence of the economic factor is that nothing shall be done, domesti-

live on the farm that I bought then and where my six children were born. They go to the country school. Three years ago all their playmates were white children. Now all the children in that school except mine and those of one other farmer are Japanese. My white neighbors who have sold or leased their land to Japanese have gone to towns. They don't come in contact with these aliens. They simply take their money. I live among them, but am not one of them. I am living there without neighbors. Last week a Japanese family moved into a house across the road in front of my home. That means more Japanese children in the school. It means that my isolation from people of my own race is more complete and I too am here to 'declare myself.'

"My farm is for sale. It is for sale to the first Japanese who will buy it. No white man will buy, for none will go into a Japanese neighborhood. When I sell, my white neighbor will leave and it then becomes a Japanese community. When that happens the trade of that community will go into new channels. I have always traded at the white man's store, put my money in the white man's bank, but the Japanese will do neither. They trade with their own race."

cally or internationally, to lower the American standard of living. To compete successfully with any peoples of so-called inferior standards of living, work and pleasure, the American must sacrifice his standard or go out of business. A cultured, well-educated, thoroughly Christian woman of San Jose remarked recently: "Please don't misunderstand me. I have absolutely nothing against the Japanese and I admire their thrift and patience and skill, but oh! I am so jealous of our land and our young men. The Japanese have come in and worked for such small wages and under such conditions that our boys haven't the slightest chance to compete with them. It isn't fair that our own boys are being driven away from the country because of cheap labor and poor working conditions." Other economic considerations are a generally believed but not wholly fair appraisal of Japanese commercial honesty,<sup>9</sup> a disposition to take advantage of political influence abroad, government subsidies and rebates for merchant shipping, a demand for an exorbitant increase in wages by Japanese laborers when fruit or vegetables must be harvested immediately or spoil, and the general practice of working all the members of the family and at any hours of the day or night. Nowhere are there more industrious, less meddlesome, or more thrifty agricultural workers; moreover, no people are more generous than the Japanese in neighborhood gifts of choice fruits, vegetables and flowers. But they are competitors.

The social factor is too broad to be definitive. There should be men-

tioned the Japanese language schools and joint attendance at public schools; Oriental group organizations; inter-marriage between Japanese and foreigners is always mentioned, despite its rare occurrence anywhere in the world; religious bigotry might be included under this heading although it, too, is of minor practical importance as a cause for ill-feeling; segregated dwellings; an absence of personal contact between Occidentals and Orientals, between Chinese and Japanese, and also among some members of any race. It should not be overlooked that the inferior social status of the typical Chinese and Japanese coming to America placed a certain stigma on all persons of the same nationality. Finally, even the attractive, third-generation American flappers of San Francisco's Chinatown, not less enchanting than their Anglo-Saxon or Latin girl friends, belong to Chinatown.

The racial factor, also, is so seldom isolated that Californian opinion on this point is most difficult to ascertain. Where the line is to be drawn between racial and other features is a problem in itself. Unquestionably, however, a conflict of loyalties between America and the old country, Japan, enters in to a certain extent; therefore, Californians look for significant signs such as the failure of American-born Japanese to take out citizen papers,<sup>10</sup> the sending of American-born to Japan to be educated, and the close supervision exercised by Japanese associations and Imperial diplomatic and consular officers. The hand of the Mikado's Government was also suspected in the Magdalena Bay fishing scares, rumors of countless spies, reported stacking of

<sup>9</sup> This is too large a subject to discuss in this article. It should be appreciated, nevertheless, that the Western standards of business contracts, so much a part of our national life, are less important than personal contacts in the eyes of the Eastern world.

<sup>10</sup> The Japanese Act of 1925 reverses the process by requiring such persons to apply to the Japanese consul, providing they wish to become Japanese citizens: otherwise they possess only American citizenship.



arms, and the usual military hysteria. The "Supremacy of the Yellow Races" is also associated with political, military and naval manœuvres in the islands of the Pacific Ocean and on the Asiatic mainland. The writings of Lafcadio Hearn have a wide circulation. Nevertheless the pronouncements of powerful propaganda, such as the California Joint Immigration Committee as well as the personal statements of V. S. McClatchy, state emphatically that the difficulty is economic, not racial.

Most unfortunately, the Japanese Government and people cannot be persuaded that American national and state legislation is other than grossly discriminatory and has as its basis the indelible mark of social inferiority. Thus, at the passage of the Californian land law of 1913, the Imperial Government stated:

The provisions of law, under which it is held that Japanese people are not eligible to American citizenship, are mortifying to the government and people of Japan, since the racial distinction inferable from its provisions is hurtful to their just national susceptibility.

When individual Californians have any feeling of superiority, the reason may be attributed mainly to the class of early Oriental immigrants; but the children of the latter are disproving even this unequal comparison by holding their own in our schools and intelligence tests. The writer strongly believes that it is very unusual when a fellow resident regards the Japanese as inferior. At any rate, the evidences are apparently far less frequent than in the social attitude of cultured Japanese in the old country towards either the Californian Japanese or towards East Indians and Chinese. On the other hand, Chester H. Rowell has stated that he experiences a distinct inferiority complex in the company of a cultured

Chinese gentleman. It may be stated with emphasis, especially true when East and West meet, that personal sensitiveness on the subject of racial discrimination is more frequently the result of a strained imagination than of a stern reality. An aroused national feeling, fed by a yellow press and loose agitators, fails to analyze the entirely different motives of economic pressure, charitable donations in times of disaster, politics, patriotism, internationalism and the continued extremely cordial diplomatic relations.

The political equation in America is an unsettling yet powerful element in Japanese-American relations. Locally, the anti-Japanese groups find it a simple matter to enroll parties and candidates on their side; and the appeal to this manifestation of "One Hundred Per Cent Americanism" is welcomed by aspirations for office. The situation is unlike that of Greeks and Italians, for example, whose votes are courted in Massachusetts and elsewhere; there are very few Orientals who are registered voters, therefore political campaigns based largely on this issue entail the minimum amount of possible political damage. It is noteworthy that Federal anti-Oriental legislation, directed first against the Chinese and later against the Japanese, has been agitated and passed just before Presidential elections. Coast friends of the Orientals sometimes claim that the whole movement is political. Actually, however, the local politicians are interpreting the real feelings of the majority of their constituents, while Congress has become duly impressed with the political balance held by California and the other Coast states and the apparently inflexible stand taken on the exclusion issue. The overwhelming passage of Section 13 of the Immigration Act of 1924 was due principally to the concentrated

attention and education given to national Congressmen by the determined spokesmen for a "White California." In the opinion of the writer, this was an excellent example of the use, and abuse, of the legislative function by a modern democracy.

#### EXCLUSION OR RESTRICTION?

California is too vast and too divergent in its interests to have any individual or group as its sole spokesman. Within the Golden State are the same extreme views which one would encounter in any part of the Union. For example, some preach and practice the Brotherhood of Man; some ask the same naturalization rights for Orientals as for Europeans; some prominent persons hope for Chinese indentured labor; and one meets individuals who are heartily in favor of denying citizenship to all persons of Asiatic origin. In the present analysis, these expressions can be discarded practically. Too much consideration, however, cannot be given to the nearly unanimous view that either exclusion or restriction of immigration is necessary; the only divergence has been as to the method of dealing with the Japanese Government and the treatment of Orientals within our borders who have come virtually upon our invitation. Bishop Edward L. Parsons, of California, wrote in the *New York Churchman*:

To sum up: a true American policy is the same as a true Christian policy. It means an agreement with Japan in the interests of world peace to stop further immigration; and it means an honest effort to Americanize the Japanese already here. Until such efforts have failed, we have no right to appeal to what is essentially force.

Usually the immigration and Americanization features are much confused.

The extreme views of organized labor, the American Legion, the Native Sons, the Grange, together with ex-Senator Phelan, Attorney General

Webb, and V. S. McClatchy, are represented in the California Joint Immigration Committee, an organization which went on record in the fall of 1924 (partly as the result of a false charge regarding a Japanese resident, and partly to soften the blow of Section 13) as favoring the "square deal" for resident Orientals. The friendly Japanese Relations Committee of California reported in 1920 that "the greatest hindrance to friendly relations between Japan and the United States is the increasing number of permanent Japanese residents." Big business is well-disposed toward industrious aliens like the Japanese or Chinese.

The California Federation of Women's Clubs (1924) expressed to the women of the Orient and the Occident "our desire that we may arrive at an understanding of and a friendship for each other." The Commonwealth Club at San Francisco, in 1923, unanimously resolved that "immigration for the sake of cheap labor should be prohibited." The Southern California Sunday School Convention proceeded upon the assumption that "we understand that the Japanese Government is not asking for free immigration." An American missionary from Japan, speaking in Stockton lately, said: "There'll be no exclusive districts in the Kingdom of Heaven. . . . This does not mean that we missionaries believe in free and unlimited immigration of the Japanese. It is not the fact of exclusion to which we object—it is the method of exclusion. This is also the point of view taken by the Japanese." The church and missionary organizations have protested against the spirit and methods employed in dealing with Oriental relations, but they too do not publicly advocate unrestricted immigration, but state their Christian belief that they "are unalterably opposed to any and all legislation which discriminates

against any particular nation."<sup>11</sup> Finally, it should be made clear that the individual churches in the state do not authorize any outside organization to speak for them, but as individual communicants they are nevertheless in sympathy with the purpose, although not with the method, of Oriental immigration acts; and, it must be admitted, many ordained clergymen take a surprisingly extreme stand for exclusion. Generally speaking, however, there is abundant evidence in California of great latent goodwill towards Japan and the Japanese, once fears are removed or greatly diminished.<sup>12</sup>

These words of President Ray Lyman Wilbur, of Stanford University, to Dr. Tasuku Harada, in 1920, are doubtless true to-day:

The present anti-Japanese sentiment seems to me to be fairly universal among all classes of citizens (except perhaps among those who might be called the strictly intellectual groups) in California, Washington and Oregon. The present temper of the people of California is not normal and would be hard to satisfy. . . . My own idea is that an open survey of the whole question by representatives of both nations would lead to a clear understanding of all the problems involved and would clear away many of the misconceptions.

<sup>11</sup> Rev. F. M. Larkin, executive secretary of the California State Church Federation, wrote me in August, 1925: "On the subject of immigration, there is a wide difference of opinion. In the north there are more people than in the south who are opposed to all Oriental immigration. It is my opinion, however, that the majority of ministers and our people are in favor of a law which would provide for the admission of Orientals into this country on exactly the same basis as immigration from European countries. There is a strong opposition to unlimited immigration and it is believed that the small number of Orientals who would be admitted under such a provision would not disturb our social relations with the Orient, which we believe is essential to the future civilization."

<sup>12</sup> The state of public opinion in 1920, somewhat less vehement now, appears in the following extract of a talk before the Commonwealth Club by Congressman William Kent: "We have reason

To iron out these misunderstandings, to secure "a meeting of the minds," is the great task in Japanese-American co-operation upon which depends a continued happy era of "Peace on the Pacific." Public opinion in the two countries is now at logger-heads. Japan feels brutally injured by the abrupt disregarding of the Gentlemen's Agreement through the enactment of a statutory exclusion act. Many Californians deeply regret the means chosen by Congress to reach an end attainable equally well by means acceptable to both peoples. Now that the offense has been inflicted, they, like other sensitive Americans, are at a loss to know how to placate Japan. Japan, on the other hand, claims to oppose as strongly as Americans a mass immigration movement of her subjects into the rich state of California. *Since the population increase is the only issue about which Californians are seriously concerned,*<sup>13</sup> *the question is more a matter of mutual understanding that of irreconcilable differences.*

#### INADVISABILITY OF QUOTA PLAN

From even the California point of view, the application of the quota

to fear Japan, unless we watch our step. Japan is deliberate in its motions. I am sure as I can be of anything that it looks forward to conquest—to settlement of many parts of the world. I do not blame the Japanese for this. I have seen a very frank statement from a Japanese professor who stated that they were in close quarters; that they proposed to expand; that the white race had grabbed off the best part of the land and they proposed to get their part of it. This isn't pleasant to consider, from the standpoint of our white descendants. It points clearly to what may happen.

"I have long been an apostle of peace. I have gone as far as a man could in that direction, but I can't go far enough in my desire for peace to look forward to the Mongolizing of the state of California or the United States, nor to the creation of a mongrel race."

<sup>13</sup> What better evidence is there than the statement of the Japanese Relations Committee in 1920, when the Sub-Committee composed of Reuben B. Hale, now president of California De-

provision to Japanese would make no material difference in the number of immediate immigrants, but it would be a loop-hole providing a change was made in the general Immigration Act to permit the admission of relatives. Stated more fully, these are the arguments contained in the latest publication of the California Joint Immigration Committee, which would be endorsed by hundreds of thousands of Californians:

Adoption of the plan would entail abandonment of the Nation's established policy of excluding aliens ineligible to citizenship and of the principle upon which that policy is founded; it would necessitate granting a similar privilege to all Asiatic races, or gratuitously offending many of them by discriminating against them and in favor of Japanese; it is known now that the quota plan alone would not satisfy Japan and her friends, and that it would serve only as an entering wedge for demand for unrestricted entrance of women for wives, for land ownership and for citizenship, etc.

Furthermore, in the opinion of the writer, it is decidedly questionable whether the reopening of the immigration provisions would not be the worst possible procedure for pricking national sensibilities already sore but in a healing process. Already there are portents that Californians who have been past leaders in anti-Oriental agitation

would not raise serious objections to a revision of certain of the discriminatory state statutes.<sup>14</sup>

#### IN CONCLUSION

What is most needed is a clearing house of information, such as may be expected from the recently organized Institute of Pacific Relations which met in Hawaii this summer. Most important, however, it is to discover and harmonize the views of the following important groups: (1) the American, Chinese and Japanese governments; (2) the Orientals located on the American and Canadian Pacific Coast; (3) the native white residents of this Pacific area. Who should be the prime spokesman for American-resident Orientals? In conclusion, from an analysis of the various factors in the situation, the writer believes that the past California position, which in many respects has virtually become the American position,<sup>15</sup> can within a few years undergo a considerable modification in both its public and private aspects.

embodied, as Japanese policy, in the Gentlemen's Agreement. It is understood that the Japanese Government intends to take further steps toward the more effective practical realization of the purposes of the Agreement, and it is evident that the two governments should co-operate to this end. Criticism of the failure of the Gentlemen's Agreement to prevent the increase of population does not raise any question of good faith of the Japanese Government in its actions under the Agreement, but does recognize that there are individual Japanese who desire to evade its intent, and that the people of California believe that many of them have succeeded in doing so."

<sup>14</sup> This bears out the statement in the *Tentative Findings of The Survey of Race Relations* that "Since the enactment of the land laws and the Federal exclusion law, the Pacific Coast has had a kindlier feeling toward its Japanese population."

<sup>15</sup> President Coolidge, in signing the Immigration Act of 1924, made this statement regarding the exclusion provision: "There is scarcely any ground for disagreement as to the result we want, but this method of securing it is unnecessary and deplorable at this time."

velopment Association, Milton H. Esberg, a leading Coast business man, and Chester H. Rowell, now president of the California Academy of Social Science, reported to Chairman Wallace M. Alexander, for several years president of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce and leader in State activities: "The existing dissatisfaction with the Gentlemen's Agreement among the people of California is due to the fact that during the life of that Agreement the Japanese immigrant population has substantially increased. The people will be satisfied with anything which actually results in a cessation of that increase and will continue critical unless this occurs. The test will be the fact, regardless of explanations. The reasons why this result is desirable are well understood in both countries, and have been



# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CHINA, JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Compiled under the direction of  
WILLIAM ADAMS SLADE

CHIEF, DIVISION OF BIBLIOGRAPHY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

## A LIST OF BOOKS ON CHINA

### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cordier, Henri*—*Bibliotheca Sinica*. Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1904-08.
- Andreae, Hermann Victor*—*Bibliotheca Sinologica*. Frankfurt a. M.: K. T. Volcker, 1864.
- Deutsch-japanische Gesellschaft* (Wa-doku-kai). *Mitteilungen*, Berlin: 1908-13.
- Möllendorff, Paul Georg von*—*Manual of Chinese Bibliography*. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh; London: Trübner & Company, 1876.
- Paris Bibliothèque Nationale—Département des Estampes*. Catalogue des albums chinois et ouvrages relatifs à la China, par M. Henri Cordier, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1909.
- Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*—China Branch, Shanghai Library. Catalogue *The Shanghai Times*, 1909.
- Swingle, Walter T.*—*Chinese Historical Sources*. *American historical Review*, July, 1921.
- Vindel, Pedro*—*Biblioteca Oriental*. Madrid: P. Vindel, 1911-12.
- Wang, Chung Yu*—*Bibliography of Mineral Wealth and Geology*. London: C. Griffin & Company, Ltd., 1912.
- Williams, Frederick Wells*. *The Best Hundred Books on China*. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Library, 1924.
- Far East*. New York: T. Y. Crowell & Company, 1910. Recent Developments in China. New York: G. E. Stechert & Company, 1913.
- Bland, John Otway Percy*—China, Japan and Korea. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921.
- Brown, Arthur Judson*—New Forces in Old China; An Unwelcome but Inevitable Awakening. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1904.
- Browne, George Waldo*—China; the Country and Its People. Boston: D. Estes & Company, 1901.
- Cecil, Lord William Rupert Ernest Gascoyne*—Changing China. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1912.
- The China Review*—Hongkong: "China Mail" office, 1872-1901.
- The China Year Book*—Peking & Tientsin: The Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1921.
- The Chinese Repository*—Canton: May 1832-Dec. 1851.
- Colquhoun, Archibald Ross*—China in Transformation. London and New York: Harper & Brothers, 1912.
- Cordier, Henri*—La Chine. Paris: Payot & Cie, 1921. Notice sur la Chine, Paris: H. Lamirault & Cie, 1890.
- Couling, Samuel*—The Encyclopaedia Sinica. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1917.
- Donovan, John Patrick*—Yesterday and To-day in China. London: Drane's, 1924.
- Eliot, Charles William*—Some Roads Towards Peace. Washington, D. C.: Press of B. S. Adams, 1913.
- Erkes, Eduard*—China. Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1919.
- Goodrich, Joseph King*—Our Neighbors the Chinese. Chicago: Browne & Howell Company, 1913.
- Gorst, Harold Edward*—China. London: Sands & Company, 1899.
- Headland, Isaac Taylor*—China's New Day; a Study of Events that Have Led to Its Coming. West Medford, Mass.: The

### GENERAL WORKS

- Ball, James Dyer*—Things Chinese; or Notes Connected with China. London: J. Murray, 1904.
- Bard, Émile*—Les Chinois Chez Eux. Paris: A. Colin, 1901.
- Bashford, James Whitford*—China; an Interpretation. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press, 1919.
- Beresford, Charles William De la Poer*—The Break-up of China. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1899.
- Blakeslee, George Hubbard*—China and the

- Central Committee on the United Study of Missions, 1912.
- High, Stanley*—China's Place in the Sun. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- Hovelague, Émile Lucien*—China. London & Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1923.
- Les Peuples d'Extrême-Orient, La Chine*. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1920.
- Hutchinson, Paul*—China's Real Revolution. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1924.
- The Indo-Chinese Gleaner*—Malacca: 1817-21.
- King-Hall, Stephen*—Western Civilization and the Far East. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott*—The Development of China. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.
- Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre*—The Awakening of the East. London: W. Heinemann, 1900.
- Little, Archibald John*—The Far East. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Gleanings from Fifty Years in China*. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, Ltd., 1910.
- Martin, William Alexander Parsons*—The Awakening of China. New York: Doubleday Page & Company, 1907.
- Moule, Arthur Evans*—The Chinese People. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1914.
- New China and Old*. London: Seeley & Company, Ltd., 1902.
- Parker, Edward Harper*—China, Her History, Diplomacy and Commerce from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. London: J. Murray, 1917.
- Peking Oriental Society, Journal of*—Peking, Pie-t'ang Press, 1885-98.
- Rodes, Jean*—La Chine Nouvelle. Paris: F. Alcan, 1910.
- Rohrbach, Paul*—Deutschland und China Nach dem Kriege. Deutschland und das Chinesische Geistesleben. Berlin: K. Curtius, 1916.
- Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*—North China Branch, Shanghai. *Journal*, 1858-.
- Russell, Hon. Bertrand Arthur William*—The Problem of China. New York: The Century Company, 1922.
- Ssuma Ch'ien*—Les Mémoires Historiques de Sema-Ts'ien. Paris: E. Leroux, 1895-1905.
- Suess, Eduard*—The Face of the Earth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1904-09.
- Thomson, John Stuart*—China Revolutionized. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1913.
- Townley, Lady Susan Mary*—My Chinese Notebook. London: Methuen & Company, 1904.
- Tyau, Min-ch'ien Tuk Zung*—China Awakened. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- Werner, Edward T. C.*—China of the Chinese. London, New York: Sir I. Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1919.
- Wieger, Leon*—La Chine à Travers les Ages, Hommes et Choses. Sienhsien (Hokienfu): Impr. de la Mission Catholique, 1920.
- Williams, Edward Thomas*—China Yesterday and To-day. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923.
- Williams, Samuel Wells*—The Middle Kingdom. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1899.

## BIOGRAPHY

- Burton, Margaret Ernestino*—Notable Women of Modern China. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1912.
- The China Who's Who*—Shanghai: Kelley & Walsh, Ltd.
- Giles, Herbert Allen*—A Chinese Biographical Dictionary. London: B. Quaritch; Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1898.
- Mayers, William Frederick*—The Chinese Reader's Manual. London: Probsthain & Company, 1910.
- Walker, Merle R.*—Contemporary Chinese Leaders. New York: The China Society of America, 1922.
- Who's Who in China*—Shanghai: Millard's review, 1920.
- Who's Who of American Returned Students*—Peking: Tsing Hua College, 1917.

## CIVILIZATION

- Bryan, William Jennings*—Letters to a Chinese Official. New York: McClure, Phillips & Company, 1906.

- China To-day Through Chinese Eyes*—By Dr. T. T. Lew, Prof. Hu Shih, Prof. Y. Y. Tsu, Dr. Cheng Ching Yi. London: Student Christian movement, 1922.
- Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes*—An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China and Japan. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1914. Letters from a Chinese Official. New York: McClure Phillips & Company, 1903.
- Giles, Herbert Allen*—The Civilization of China. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1911.
- Griffis, William Elliot*—China's Story in Myth, Legend, Art and Annals. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922.
- King-Hall, Stephen*—Western Civilization and the Far East. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- Laufer, Berthold*—Sino-Iranica; Chinese Contributions to History of Civilization of Ancient Iran. Chicago, 1919.
- Martin, William A. P.*—The Lore of Cathay or The Intellect of China. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1912.
- Reinsch, Paul Samuel*—Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911.
- Renholm, G.*—Kinas Folk och Civilisation. Bearbetning efter Tcheng-Ki-Tong och Andra Källor af G. Renholm. Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1900.
- Saunders, J. R.*—The Chinese As They Are. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921.
- Ular, Alexander*—A Russo-Chinese Empire. Westminster: Arnold Constable & Company, Ltd., 1904.
- Finance and Commerce Year Book*—Shanghai, 1921-22.
- Ireland, Alleyne*—China and The Powers. Boston: Private printing for L. Maynard by G. H. Ellis Company, 1902.
- Morse, Hosea Ballou*—The Gilds of China. London, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1909: The Trade and Administration of China. London, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1921.
- Pan, Shü-lun*—The Trade of the United States with China. New York: China Trade Bureau, Inc., 1924.
- Sargent, Arthur John*—Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1907.
- See, Chong Su*—The Foreign Trade of China. New York: Columbia University, Longmans, Green & Company, agents, 1919.
- Tai, En Sai*—Treaty Ports in China. New York: Columbia University Printing Office, 1918.
- Tchen Ki Chan*—La Politique de la Porte Ouvert en Chine. Paris: M. Giard & E. Brière, 1912.
- Tomimas, Shutaro*—The Open Door Policy and the Territorial Integrity of China. New York: A. G. Seiler, 1919.
- U. S. Bureau of Foreign & Domestic Commerce (Dept. of Commerce)*—China Trade Act, 1922, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Commercial Handbook of China, by Julean Arnold. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919-20.
- Yen, En Tsung*—The Open Door Policy. Boston, Mass.: The Stratford Company, 1923.

## DESCRIPTION AND TRAVEL

- COMMERCE—See also ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
- Bau, Mingchien Joshua*—The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.
- Brien, Joseph Marie*—Souvenirs d'Extrême Orient. Paris: "Les Oeuvres Nouvelles," 1916.
- Dingle, Edwin John*—The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China. Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, 1917.
- Andrews, Roy Chapman*—Camps and Trails in China. New York, London: D. Appleton & Company, 1918.
- Baddeley, John F.*—Russia, Mongolia, China (being some record of the relations between them from beginning of xviii century to death of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, A. D. 1602-76). London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1919.
- Bates, Lindon Wallace*—The Russian Road to China. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910.

- Bishop, Isabella Lucy Bird* (Mrs. Bishop)—*The Golden Chersonese and the Way Thither*. New York, London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892: *The Yangtze Valley and Beyond*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900.
- Blake, Sir Henry Arthur*—China, by Mortimer Menpes, text by H. A. Blake. London: A. & C. Black, 1909.
- Bland, John O. P.*—Houseboat Days in China. London: W. Heinemann, 1919.
- Bonnard, Abel*—En Chine (1920-21) Paris: A. Fayard et Cie, 1924.
- Borel, Henri*—The New China, a Traveler's Impressions. London: T. F. Unwin, 1912.
- Bredon, Juliet*—Peking. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1922.
- Bretschneider, Emil*—Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1910.
- Brinkley, Frank*—China—Its History, Arts and Literature. Boston and Tokyo: J. B. Millet Company, 1902.
- Browne, George Waldo*—The New America and the Far East. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1910-12.
- Buxton, Leonard H. D.*—The Eastern Road. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1924.
- Carnegie Institution of Washington*—Research in China, 1907-13.
- Clark, Robert Sterling*—Through Shen-kan—Account of Clark Expedition in North China. London: T. F. Unwin, 1912.
- Collins, Gilbert*—Far Eastern Jaunts. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- Colquhoun, Archibald Ross*—Amongst the Shans. London: Field & Tuer. New York: Scribner & Welford, 1885. Overland to China. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1900.
- Cordier, Henri*—Ser Marco Polo. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1920.
- Daly, Mrs. de Burgh*—An Irishwoman in China. London: T. W. Laurie, Ltd., 1915.
- Dautremer, Joseph*—La Grande Artère de la Chine, le Yangtseu. Paris: E. Guilmoto, 1911.
- Davies, Henry Rodolph*—Yün-nan, the Link between India and the Yangtze. Cambridge: The University Press, 1909.
- Dewey, John*—Letters from China and Japan. New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1920.
- Dingle, Edwin J.*—Across China on Foot; Life in the Interior and the Reform Movement. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1911.
- Enders, Mrs. Elizabeth Crump*—Swinging Lanterns. New York, London: D. Appleton & Company, 1923.
- Fitkin, Gretchen Mae*—The Great River; the Story of a Voyage on the Yangtze Kiang. Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, Ltd. Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1922.
- Franck, Harry Alverson*—Wandering in North China. New York and London: The Century Company, 1923.
- Gaunt, Mary E. B.*—A Broken Journey, Wanderings from the Hoang-Ho to the Island of Saghalien and Upper Reaches of the Amur River. London: T. W. Laurie, Ltd., 1919. A Woman in China. London: T. W. Laurie, Ltd., 1914.
- Geil, William Edgar*—Eighteen Capitals of China. Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1911.
- Hawkins, Horatio B.*—Commercial Press Geography of China. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1915.
- Heuen-Tsang*—Si-yu-ki. Buddhist records of western world. London: Trübner & Company, 1884.
- Huntington, Ellsworth*—The Pulse of Asia. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1907.
- Imperial Japanese Government Railways*. An Official Guide to Eastern Asia. Prepared by Imperial Japanese Government Railways, Tokyo: 1913.
- Johnston, Reginald Fleming*—From Peking to Mandalay. London: J. Murray, 1908.
- Kemp, Emily G.*—Chinese Mettle. New York, London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1921. The Face of China. London: Chatto & Windus, 1909.
- Kendall, Elizabeth K.*—A Wayfarer in China. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913.
- Little, Mrs. Archibald*—Intimate China, the Chinese as I Have Seen Them. London,



- Hutchinson & Company; Phila. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1899. The Land of the Blue Gown (China). London: T. F. Unwin, 1902.
- Little, Archibald John*—Through the Yangtse Gorges, or Trade and Travel in Western China. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, Ltd., 1898.
- Marsh, James Reid*—The Charm of the Middle Kingdom. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1922.
- Martin, W. A. P.*—A Cycle of Cathay or China, South and North. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1896.
- Morse, Edward Sylvester*—Glimpses of China and Chinese Homes. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1902.
- Moule, Arthur Evans*—Half a Century in China. London, New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911.
- Murdock, Victor*—China the Mysterious and Marvellous. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920.
- Ollone, Henri Marie Gustave*—In Forbidden China. The d'Ollone Mission, 1906-09. London: T. F. Unwin, 1912.
- Perry-Ayscough, H. G. C.*—With the Russians in Mongolia. London: John Lane; New York: John Lane Company, 1914.
- Playfair, George Macdonald Home*—The Cities and Towns of China. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1910.
- Pollard, Samuel*—In Unknown China. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company; London, Seeley, Service & Company, Ltd., 1921.
- Polo, Marco*—The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the Venetian, Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East. Translated by Col. Sir Henry Yule. London: J. Murray, 1903.
- Pumpelly, Raphael*—My Reminiscences. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1918.
- Richard, L.*—Comprehensive Geography of Chinese Empire and Dependencies. Shanghai: T'uswei Press, 1908.
- Richthofen, Ferdinand Paul Wilhelm*—Baron Richthofen's Letters, 1870-72. Shanghai: Printed at the North China Herald Office, 1903.
- Rockhill, W. W.*—The Land of the Lamas. New York: The Century Company, 1891.
- Scidmore, Eliza Ruhamah*—China, the Long-Lived Empire. New York: The Century Company, 1900.
- Stein, Sir Marc Aurel*—Serindia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921.
- Wade, Mary H.*—Twin Travelers in China & Japan. New York: Frederic A. Stokes Company, 1922.
- Wilson, Ernest Henry*—A Naturalist in Western China with Vasculum, Camera and Gun. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1913.
- Wilson, James Harrison*—China. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1901.
- Younghusband, Sir Francis Edward*—Among the Celestials. London: J. Murray, 1898.
- Yule, Sir Henry*—Cathay and the Way Thither. London: Printed for the Hakluyt Society, 1913-16.
- ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, Etc.—See also COMMERCE, FINANCE
- American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*—China, Social and Economic Conditions, 1912.
- Arnold, Julean H.*—Changes in the Economic Life of the Chinese people. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Labor and Industrial Conditions in China. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- China International Famine Relief Commission*—Annual Report, 1922.
- Collins, William F.*—Mineral Enterprise in China. London: W. Heinemann, 1918.
- Great Britain. Department of Overseas Trade*—Report on the Industrial and Economic Situation of China. London: 1920.
- Han Tiauw Tjong*—De Industrialistic van China. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1922.
- Hosie, Sir Alexander*—Szechwan, Its Products, Industries and Resources. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1922.
- Hsu, Mongton Chih*—Railway Problems in China. New York: Columbia University, 1915.
- Jernigan, Thomas R.*—China's Business Methods and Policy. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1904.
- King, Franklin Hiram*—Farmers of Forty Centuries. Madison, Wis.: Mrs. F. H. King, 1911.

- Lee, Mabel Ping-hau*—The Economic History of China, with Special Reference to Agriculture. New York: Columbia University, 1921.
- North China International Society for Famine Relief*—Report. Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1920.
- Overlach, Theodore William*—Foreign Financial Control in China. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919.
- Peking United International Famine Relief Committee*—Report of. Peking: Printed by Commercial Press Works, Ltd., 1922.
- Remer, Charles F.*—Readings in Economics for China. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1922.
- Rockhill, William Woodville*—Inquiry into the population of China. Smithsonian miscellaneous collections, Washington, 1905. Vol. xlvii. (quar. issue, vol. 11). The 1910 Census of the Population of China. Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1912.
- Smith, Cades Alfred Middleton*—The British in China and Far Eastern Trade. London: Constable & Company, Ltd., 1920.
- Sun Yat-sen*—The International Development of China. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1922.
- Wabel, Srinivas R.*—Finance in China. Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald, Ltd., 1914.
- Woolf, Leonard Sidney*—Economic Imperialism. London: Swarthmore Press Ltd., New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920.

## EDUCATION

- Burton, Margaret Ernestine*—The Education of Women in China. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.
- Chang, Peng Chun*—Education for Modernization in China. New York City: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1923.
- Chiang, Monlin*—A study in Chinese Principles of Education. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1918.
- China Educational Commission*—New York City: Committee of Reference and Counsel of Foreign Missions, Conference of North America, 1922.
- Chuang, Chai-Hsuan*—Tendencies Toward a Democratic System of Education. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1922.
- Edmunds, Charles Keyser*—Modern Education in China. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919.
- The Educational directory of China*—Shanghai.
- Foster, Mrs. Arnold*—Chinese Schoolgirls in the Valley of the Yangtse. London: Missionary Society, 1909.
- Kuo, Ping Wen*—The Chinese System of Public Education. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1915.
- Lewis, Ida Belle*—The Education of Girls in China. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1919.
- Monroe, Paul*—A Report on Education in China. New York: 1922.

## EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION

- Cowan, Robert E.*—Bibliography of Chinese Question in the U. S. San Francisco: A. M. Robertson, 1909.
- Campbell, Persia Crawford*—Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries Within British Empire. London: P. S. King & Sons, Ltd., 1923.
- Chen, Ta.*—Chinese Migrations. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923; Japanese Emigration to China. Chinese Patriotic Committee of New York City, 1921.
- Coolidge, Mary Roberts*—Chinese Immigration. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1909.
- Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington*—The Status of Aliens in China. New York: Columbia University, 1912.
- Li, Tien Lu*—Congressional Policy of Chinese Immigration. Nashville, Tenn. Printed for author, Publishing House of Methodist Episcopal Church, South, 1916.

## FINANCE

- Gibson, Rowland R.*—Forces Mining and Undermining China. New York: The Century Company, 1914.
- Great Britain. Foreign office*—Correspondence re New Financial Consortium in China. London: Printed and published H. M. Stationery office, 1921.

- Li, Chuan Shih*—Central and Local Finance in China. New York: Columbia University, 1922.
- U. S. Dept. of Commerce*.—Chinese Currency and Finance, by A. W. Ferrin. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919.
- Wagel, Srinivas R.*—Chinese Currency and Banking. Shanghai: *North China Daily News and Herald, Ltd.*, 1915. Finance in China. Shanghai: *North China Daily News and Herald, Ltd.*, 1914.
- FOREIGN RELATIONS
- Ariga, Nagao*—La Chine et la Grande Guerre Européenne au Point de Vue du Droit International d'Après les Documents Officiels du Gouvernement Chinois. Paris: A. Pedone, 1920.
- Bau, Mingchien Joshua*—The Foreign Relations of China. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1922.
- Buell, Raymond Leslie*—The Washington Conference. New York, London: D. Appleton & Company, 1922.
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of International Law*—Manchuria, Treaties and Agreements; Outer Mongolia, Treaties and Agreements; The Sino-Japanese Negotiations of 1915. Washington: The Endowment, 1921.
- China. The Chino-Japanese Negotiations*—Peking, 1915; Treaties, etc., Shanghai: *North China Herald Office*, 1902; Treaties, etc. Shanghai: Published at the Statistical Department of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1917; Treaties, etc. (Canton? 1846?)
- Chinese National Welfare Society in America*—The Shantung Question. San Francisco, 1919.
- Chu Ao-Hsiang*—Le Régime des Capitulations et la Reforme Constitutionnelle en Chine. Cambridge: The University Press, 1915.
- Chung, Henry*—The Oriental Policy of the U. S. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1919.
- Clements, Paul Henry*—An Outline of the Politics and Diplomacy of China and the Powers, 1894-1902. New York, 1914.
- Cordier, Henri*—Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales. Paris: F. Alcan, 1901-02. Histoire Générale de la Chine et de ses Relations avec les pays Étrangers Depuis les Temps les Plus Anciens Jusqu'à la Chute de la Dynastie Mandchoue. Paris: P. Geuthner, 1920.
- The Crisis in China*, by G. B. Smythe, Rev. G. Reid, Chas. Johnston and others. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1900.
- Dennett, Tyler*—Americans in Eastern Asia. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- Dewey, John*—China, Japan and the U. S. A. New York: Republic Publishing Company, Inc., 1921.
- Eames, James Bromley*—The English in China. London: Sir I. Pitman & Sons, Ltd., 1909.
- Foster, John W.*—American Diplomacy in the Orient. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1903.
- Gt. Brit. Foreign office*—Despatches re Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol of 21st Oct. (Nov. 3) 1912. London: published by H. M. Stationery Office, printed by Harrison & Sons, 1913.
- Gt. Brit. Foreign office. Historical section*—Kiaochow and Weihaiwei. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1920.
- Guerlet, Pierre*—Étude des Divers Procédés d'Action Politique des Puissances en Chine. Paris: A. Rousseau, 1907.
- Hertslet, Sir Edward*—Hertslet's China Treaties. London: Printed for H. M. Stationery Office, by Harrison & Sons, 1908.
- Hodgkin, Henry Theodore*—China in the Family of Nations. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1923.
- Hoo Chi-Tsai*—Les Bases Conventionnelles des Relations Modernes Entre le Chine et la Russie. Paris: Jouve & Cie, 1918.
- Hoshien, Tchen*—Les Relations Diplomatiques Entre la Chine et la Japon de 1870 à Nos Jours. Paris: Éditions de "La Vie Universitaire," 1921.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl*—Japan and World Peace. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919. Japan's Pacific Policy. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922.
- Koo, Vi Kyuin Wellington*—China and the League of Nations. London, G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919.

- Krausse, Alexis Sidney**—China in Decay: the Story of a Disappearing Empire. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1900.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott**—The history of early relations between the U. S. and China, 1784-1844. New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1917.
- Lauffer, Berthold**—The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands. Smithsonian miscellaneous collections. Washington, 1908. (Quar. issue. Vol. IV.)
- MacMurray, John Van Antwerp**—Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China. New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.
- Michie, Alexander**—The Englishman in China During Victorian Era, as illustrated in the Career of Sir Rutherford Alcock. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1900.
- Millard, Thos. F. F.**—America and the Far Eastern Question. New York: Moffat, Yard & Company, 1909. Our Eastern Question: New York: The Century Company, 1916.
- Morse, Hosea Ballou**—The International Relations of the Chinese Empire. London, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1910-18.
- Pasvolsky, Leo**—Russia in the Far East. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- Reid, Gilbert**—China, Captive or Free? New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1921.
- Robinson, Geroid Tanquary**—Asia's American Problem. New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1921.
- Rockhill, William Woodville**—Treaties and Conventions With or Concerning China and Korea, 1894-1904. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.
- Simpson, Bertram Lenox**—The Truth About China and Japan. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1919.
- Smith, Arthur Henderson**—China and America To-day. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1907.
- Teichman, Eric**—Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet. Cambridge: The University Press, 1922.
- Tyau, Minchien Tuk Zung**—The Legal Obligations Arising out of Treaty Relations between China and Other States. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., foreign agents; New York: G. E. Stechert & Company, 1917.
- U. S. Commissioner to China**—Report of William W. Rockhill. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901.
- U. S. Dept. of State**—Text of Notes U. S. and Japanese Governments re Policy in China and Declaration of Chinese Government on subject. London: H. M. Stationery Office, Harrison & Sons, printers, 1908.
- Washington, D. C. Conference on the Limitation of Armament, 1921-22**. Nine powers treaty on China. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- Willoughby, Westel Woodbury**—China at the Conference, a Report. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922. Foreign Rights and Interests in China. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920.
- Wood, Ge-Zay**—The Chino-Japanese treaties of May 25, 1915. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921. The Twenty-one Demands, Japan vs. China. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia**—The Annals, Vol. CI, 1901, supplement: Modern China and Her Present-Day Problems.
- Backhouse, E.**—Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914.
- Bau, Mingchien Joshua**—Modern Democracy in China. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1923.
- Bland, John Otway Percy**—Li Hung-Chang. London: Constable & Company, 1917.
- Brunnert, Ippolit Semenovich**—Present-day Political Organization of China. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1912.
- Cheng, Sih-Gung**—Modern China: a Political Study. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919.
- Douglas, Sir Robert Kennaway**—Europe and the Far East, 1506-1912. Cambridge: University Press, 1913.
- Duboseq, André**—L'évolution de la Chine; Politique et Tendances. Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1921.



- Dutcher, George M.*—The Political Awakening of the East. New York, Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1925.
- Eu-Yang Kwang*—The Political Reconstruction of China. Shanghai: St. John's University, 1922.
- Harding, Gardner Ludwig*—Present-day China: a narrative of a nation's advance. New York: The Century Company, 1916.
- Holcombe, Chester*—China's Past and Future. London: Morgan & Scott, 1904.
- Hornbeck, Stanley K.*—Contemporary Politics in the Far East. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1916.
- McElroy, Robert McNutt*—The American Constitution and the Chinese Republic. New York: The China Society of America, 1922.
- Maybon, Albert*—La Politique Chinoise; Étude sur les Doctrines des Partis en Chine, 1898-1908. Paris: V. Giard & E. Brière, 1908; La République Chinoise; A. Colin, 1914.
- Rockhill, William Woodville*—China's Inter-  
course with Korea from the xvth Century to 1895. London, Luzac & Company, 1905.
- Russell, Bertrand Arthur William*—The Problem of China. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922.
- Simpson, Bertram Lenox*—The Fight for the Republic in China. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1917.
- Smith, Stanley Peregrine*—China From Within. London: Marshall Bros., 1901.
- Tsien Tai*—Le Pouvoir Législatif en Chine. Paris: A. Pedone, 1914.
- Tyau, Minchien Tuk Zung*—China's New Constitution and International Problems. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd.; foreign agents, New York: G. E. Stechert & Company, 1918.
- Vinacke, Harold Monk*—Modern Constitutional Development in China. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1920.
- Vinaya-Kumāra Sarkār*—The Futurism of Young Asia, and other essays on relations between the East and West. Berlin: J. Springer, 1922.
- Wan Chao-Tse*—The Development of Political Parties in China. Baltimore, 1917.
- Wheeler, W. R.*—China and the World War. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919.
- Willoughby, Westel Woodbury*—Constitutional Government in China, Present Conditions and Prospects. Washington: The Endowment, 1922.
- Yen, Hawking Lugine*—A Survey of Constitutional Development in China. New York: Columbia University, Longmans, Green & Company, 1911.
- Allan, C. Wilfrid*—HISTORY Makers of Cathay. Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1909.
- Bland, John O. P.*—China Under the Empress Dowager (being the history of the life and times of Tzū Hsi). Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1910. Recent Events and Present Policies in China. J. B. Lippincott Company, 1912.
- Boulger, Demetrius Charles de Kavanagh*—China. New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1900.
- Brown, Arthur Judson*—The Chinese Revolution. New York: Student Volunteer Movement, 1912.
- Chavannes, Édouard*—Les Documents Chinois Découverts par Aurel Stein dans les Sables du Turkestan Oriental. Oxford: Impr. de l'University, 1913.
- Clements, Paul Henry*—The Boxer Rebellion. New York, 1915.
- Coleman, Frederic Abernethy*—The Far East Unveiled. London, New York: Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1918.
- Conger, Sarah Pike*—Letters from China. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1909.
- Cordier, Henri*—Histoire Générale de la Chine, etc. Paris: P. Geuthner, 1920. La Révolution en Chine; les Origines. Liège, lib. et impr. ci-devant E. J. Brill, 1900.
- Dingle, Edwin J.*—China's Revolution: 1911-12. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1912.
- Douglas, Sir Robert Kennaway*—China. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901.
- Giles, Herbert Allen*—China and the Manchus. Cambridge: The University Press; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912. The Civilization of China. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1911. Historic China and Other Sketches. London: T. de La Rue & Company, 1882.

- Gowen, Herbert Henry*—An Outline History of China. London: T. W. Laurie, Ltd., 1914.
- Griffis, William E.*—China's Story in Myth, Legend, Art and Annals. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922.
- Grousset, René*—Histoire de l'Asie. Paris: G. Crès & Cie, 1921-22.
- Hall, Josef Washington*—In the Land of the Laughing Buddha; the Adventures of an American Barbarian in China. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.
- Hart, Sir Robt.*—"These from the Land of Sinim." London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1901.
- Hirth, Friedrich*—The Ancient History of China to the End of the Ch'ou Dynasty. New York: The Columbia University Press, 1908.
- Johnsen, Julia E.*—China and Japan, a study outline. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1922.
- Kent, Percy Horace*—The passing of the Manchus. London: E. Arnold, 1912.
- Krausse, Alexis Sidney*—The Story of the Chinese Crisis. London: Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1900.
- Landor, A. H. S.*—China and the Allies. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott*—China Under the Republic. New York: Institute of International Education, 1921. The Development of China. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.
- Li Ung Bing*—Outlines of Chinese history. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1914.
- McCormick, Frederick*—The Flowery Republic. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1913.
- Macgowan, John*—The Imperial History of China. Shanghai: printed at American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1906.
- MacNair, Harley Farnsworth*—Modern Chinese History. Shanghai: Commercial Press, Ltd., 1923.
- Millard, Thos. F. F.*—The Great War in the Far East. Shanghai: printed by Mercantile Printing Company, Ltd., 1915.
- Oliphant, Laurence*—Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan 1857, '58, '59. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1860.
- Parker, Edward H.*—Ancient China Simplified. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1908. A Thousand Years of the Tartars. London: K. Paul Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd. New York: A. A. Knopf, Inc., 1924.
- Pooley, A. M.*—Japan's Foreign Policies. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920.
- Pott, F. L. H.*—A Sketch of Chinese History. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1923.
- Reinsch, Paul S.*—An American Diplomat in China. Garden City, N. Y. Doubleday, Page & Company, 1922.
- Simpson, Bertram Lenox*—The Fight for the Republic in China. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1917.
- Smith, Arthur Henderson*—China in Convulsion. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Co., 1911.
- Thomson, H.*—China and the Powers; a narrative of the outbreak of 1900. London, Bombay: Longmans, Green & Company, 1902.
- Wieger, Léon*—Textes Historiques. London: E. L. Morice, 1903-05.
- Williams, Samuel Wells*—A History of China. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897.

## LAW

- Alabaster, Ernest*—Notes and Commentaries on Chinese Criminal Law. London: Luzac, 1899.
- China, Laws, Statutes, etc.*—Provisions Criminal Code of Republic of China. Peking: Printed by Peking Gazette, 1915.
- Jamieson, George*—Chinese Family and Commercial Law. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1921.
- Jernigan, T. R.*—China in Law and Commerce. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1905.
- Liang Jen Kié*—Étude Sur la Jurisdiction Administrative en Chine. Paris: Jouve & Cie, 1920.

## LITERATURE, ETC.

- Ayscough, Mrs. Florence*—Fir-flower Tablets; poems translated from Chinese. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.

- Brown, Brian*—Chinese Nights Entertainments; stories of old China. New York: Brentano's, 1922.
- Budd, Charles*.—Chinese Poems, translated by. London: H. Frowde, 1912.
- Cranmer-Bung, Launcelot Alfred*—A Lute of Jade: selections from classical poets of China. London: J. Murray, 1911.
- Douglas, Robert Kennaway*—The Language and Literature of China. London: Trübner & Company, 1875.
- Giles, Herbert Allen*—Adversarie Sinica. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1905. China and the Chinese. New York: The Columbia University Press, Macmillan Company, agents, 1902. A History of Chinese Literature. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1901.
- Legge, James*—The Chinese Classics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893-95.
- Li Po*—Works of, translated into English verse by Shigeyoshi Obata. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922.
- Ollone, Henri Marie Gustave*—Langues des Peuples non Chinois de la Chine. Paris: E. Leroux, 1912.
- P'u Sung-ling*—Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1916.
- Smith, Arthur H.*—Proverbs and Common Sayings from the Chinese. Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1902.
- Terrien de Lacouperie, Albert*—The Languages of China Before the Chinese. London: D. Nutt, 1887.
- Waley, Arthur*—A Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems, translated by. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1919. More translations from the Chinese. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1919.
- Wylie, Alexander*—Notes on Chinese Literature. Shanghai: Printed at American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1901.
- tian Occupation of China. Shanghai, 1922.
- The China Mission Year Book*—Shanghai. *Gamewell, Mrs. Mary Ninde*—New Life Currents in China. New York: Missionary Education Movement of U. S. and Canada, 1919.
- Inglis, Mrs. Theodora Marshall*—New Lanterns in Old China. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1923.
- Kerschner, Mabel Gardner*—Young China. New York: Missionary Education Movement of U. S. and Canada, 1924.
- Meyer, Minna McEuen*—Chinese Lanterns. New York, Cincinnati: The Methodist Book Concern, 1924.
- Miller, G. A.*—China Inside Out. New York, Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1917.
- Porter, Lucius Chapin*—China's Challenge to Christianity. New York: Missionary Education Movement of U. S. and Canada, 1924.
- Richard, Timothy*—Forty-five Years in China, reminiscences. New York: F. A. Stokes Company, 1916.
- Scott, Charles E.*—China from Within. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1917.
- Smith, Arthur Henderson*—Rex Christus: an Outline Study of China. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903. The uplift of China. New York: Young People's Missionary Movement, 1907.
- Soothill, W. E.*—Timothy Richard of China, seer, statesman, missionary and the most disinterested adviser the Chinese ever had. London: Seeley, Service & Co., Ltd., 1924.
- Taylor, Fred H.*—Hudson Taylor and the China Inland Mission; the growth of a work of God. London: Morgan & Scott, Ltd. Philadelphia: China Inland Mission, 1920.

## MISSIONS

- Bashford, James W.*—China and Methodism. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1906.
- Cecil, Lord William Gascoyne*—Changing China. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1912.
- China Continuation Committee*. The Chris-

## RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, ETC.

- Broomhall, Marshall*—Islam in China, a Neglected Problem. London: Morgan & Scott, Ltd. Philadelphia: China Inland Mission, 1910.
- Bruce, Joseph Percy*—Chu Hsi and His Masters. London: Probsthain & Company, 1923.

*Chu Hsi*—The Philosophy of Human Nature. Translated by J. P. Bruce. London: Probsthain & Co., 1922.

*Chuang, Tzu*—Musings of a Chinese Mystic. London: J. Murray, 1911.

*Clennell, Walter James*—The Historical Development of Religion in China. London: T. F. Unwin, Ltd., 1917.

*Confucius*—The Analects of, by W. E. Soothill. Yokohama. Printed by Fukuin Printing Company, 1910. The Ethics of. New York and London: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1915.

*Edkins, Joseph*—Chinese Buddhism. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1893. Religion in China. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1893.

*Forke, A.*—*Mê Ti des Socialthikers und Seiner Schüler Philosophische Werke.* Berlin, 1922.

*Franke, Otto*—Studien zur Geschichte des Konfuzianischen Dogmas und der Chinesischen Staatsreligion. Hamburg: L. Friederichsen & Company, 1920.

*Giles, Herbert Allen*—Confucianism and Its Rivals. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

*Granet, Marcel*—*La Religion des Chinois.* Paris: Gauthier-Villars et Cie, 1922.

*Groot, Jan Jakob Maria de*—The Religion of the Chinese. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910.

*Johnston, Reginald Fleming*—Buddhist China. London: J. Murray, 1913.

*Laou-Tsze*—The Canon of Reason and Virtue. Translated from Chinese by Dr. Paul Carus. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1903.

*Martin, W. A. P.*—Hanlin Papers. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1894.

*Parker, Edward Harper*—China and Religion. London: J. Murray, 1905.

*Soothill, W. E.*—The Three Religions of China. New York: Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1923.

*Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro*—A Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy. London: Probsthain & Company, 1914.

*Vinaya-Kumāra Sarkār*—Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1916.

*Wang Yang-Ming*—The Philosophy of, translated by F. G. Henke. London,

Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916.

#### SOCIAL LIFE AND CUSTOMS

*Alsop, Gulielma Fell*—My Chinese Days. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1918.

*Anderson, Mrs. Emma T.*—A'Chu and Other Stories. Washington, D. C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1920.

*Bard, Émile*—Chinese Life in Town and Country; adapted from French of, by H. Twitchell. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.

*Benn, Rachel R.*—Ping-Kua; a Girl of Cathay. Boston, Mass. Woman's Foreign Missionary Society, Methodist Episcopal Church, 1912.

*Brandt, Max August Scipio von*—Der Chinese in der Öffentlichkeit und der Familie wie er sich Selbst Sieht und Schildert. Berlin: D. Reimer, 1911.

*Bryson, Mrs. Mary I.*—Child Life in China. London: Religious Tract Society, 1900.

*Burton, Margaret Ernestine*—The Education of Women in China. New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.

*Carl, Katharine Augusta*—With the Empress Dowager. New York: The Century Company, 1905.

*Carus, Paul*—Chinese Life and Customs. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1907.

*Ching Ke-Tung*—Chin-chin, or the Chinaman at Home. London: A. P. Marsden, 1895.

*Chitty, J. R.*—En Chine, Choses Vues. Paris: Librairie Vuibert, 1910. Things Seen in China. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1909.

*Cochran, Jean Carter*—Foreign Magic; Tales of Everyday China. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the U. S. and Canada, 1919.

*Cody, Jennie L.*—Letters to Betsey. Philadelphia, Boston: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1915.

*Cordier, Henri*—La Piété Filiale et le Culte des Ancêtres en Chine. Paris: E. Leroux, 1910.

*Courant, Maurice August Louis Marie*—En Chine; Mœurs et Institutions, Hommes et Faits. Paris: F. Alcan, 1901.



- Crémazy, Laurent*—*Coutumes, Croyances, Moeurs et Usages en Chine, dans L'Annam et en Corée.* [Paris? 1907?]
- Denby, Charles*—*China and Her People*; Boston: L. C. Page & Company, 1906.
- Denby, Jay*—*Letters of a Shanghai Griffin.* Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1923.
- Der Ling, Princess* (Mrs. Thaddeus C. White)—*Two years in the Forbidden City.* New York: Moffitt, Yard & Company, 1911.
- Doré, Henri*—*Researches into Chinese Superstitions.* Shanghai: T'uswei Printing Press, 1915-23.
- Douglas, Sir Robert Kennaway*—*Society in China.* London: S. D. Innes & Company, 1895.
- E le*—*The I-li, or Book of Etiquette and Ceremonial.* Translated by John Steele. London: Probsthain & Company, 1917.
- Foster, Mrs. Arnold*—*Chinese Schoolgirls in the Valley of the Yangtse.* London: London Missionary Society, 1909.
- Gamble, Sidney David*—*Peking, a Social Survey.* New York: George H. Doran Company, 1921.
- Gregg, Eva A.*—*Hints from Squints in China.* Cincinnati: printed for author by Canton Press, 1923.
- Hardy, Edward John*—*John Chinaman at Home.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905.
- Headland, Isaac Taylor*—*Court Life in China.* New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1909. *Home Life in China.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914.
- Honsinger, Welthy*—*Beyond the Moon Gate, being a diary of ten years in the interior of the Middle Kingdom.* New York, Cincinnati: Abingdon Press, 1924.
- Hosie, Lady Dorothea*—*Two Gentlemen of China.* London: Seeley, Service & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- La Motte, Ellen N.*—*Peking Dust.* New York: The Century Company, 1919.
- Liang, Y.*—*Village and Town Life in China.* New York: The Macmillan Company; London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1915.
- McCormick, Elsie*—*Audacious Angles on China.* New York, London: D. Appleton & Company, 1923.
- Macgowan, John*—*Men and Manners of Modern China.* London: T. F. Unwin, 1912. *Sidelights on Chinese Life.* London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, 1907.
- Matignon, Jean Jacques*—*Superstition, Crime et Misère en Chine.* Lyon: A. Storck & Cie. Paris: Masson & Cie, 1900.
- Mauger, George Edouard Marie Jean*—*Quelques Considérations sur les Jeux en Chine et Leur Développement Synchrone avec Celui de l'Empire Chinois.* Paris, 1917.
- My Chinese Marriage*—By M. T. F. New York: Duffield & Company, 1921.
- Nance, Mrs. Florence Rush*—*The Love Story of a Maiden of Cathay, told in letters from Yang Ping Yu.* New York, Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1911.
- Navarra, Bruno*—*China und die Chinesen.* Bremen: N. Nossler, 1901.
- Parker, Edward Harper*—*China, Past and Present.* London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1903. *John Chinaman and a Few Others.* London: J. Murray, 1901.
- Ready, Oliver George*—*Life and Sport in China.* London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1904.
- Roe, Mrs. A.*—*Chance and Change in China.* New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920. *China as I Saw It—a Woman's Letters from the Celestial Empire.* London: Hutchinson & Company, 1910.
- Ross, Edward Alsworth*—*The Changing Chinese; the Conflict of Oriental and Western Cultures in China.* New York: The Century Company, 1911.
- Seton, Grace*—(Mrs. Ernest Thompson Seton)—*Chinese Lanterns.* New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1924.
- Smith, Arthur Henderson*—*Chinese Characteristics.* New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1900. *Village Life in China.* New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1899.
- Su, Sing Ging*—*The Chinese Family System.* New York: Columbia University, 1922.
- Tsu, Yu Yue*—*The Spirit of Chinese Philanthropy; a Study in Mutual Aid.*

## PERIODICALS

- Asia*—Journal of American Asiatic Association. New York.  
*The Asiatic Review*, London.  
*The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*. Peking.  
*The Far Eastern Republic*. San Francisco.  
*The Far-Eastern Review*. Manila, P. I.  
*The National Review*. Shanghai.  
*The New China Review*. Shanghai.  
*The North-China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette*, Shanghai.  
*The Oriental Economic Review*. New York.  
*The Oriental Review*. New York.

## A LIST OF BOOKS ON JAPAN

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Asiatic Society of Japan*—Library. Catalogue of library of, Yokohama: Japan Gazette Press, 1919.  
*Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences*—Museum. Bibliography of Japan. Brooklyn: The Museum, 1916.  
*Cordier, Henri*—*Bibliotheca Japonica*. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, E. Le-roux, 1912.  
*Deutsch-japanische gesellschaft*—(Wa-doku-kai) Mitteilungen, Berlin: 1908-13.  
*Japan Society of New York*—New York. New York, Public library—List of Works Relating to Japan. New York: 1906.  
*Pages, Léon*—*Bibliographie Japonaise*. Paris: B. Duprat, 1859.  
*Vinaza, Cipriano Munoz y Manzano*—*Escritos*, etc. Lisboa: M. Gomes; Londres: B. Quaritch, 1892.  
*Vindel, Pedro*—*Biblioteca, Oriental*. Madrid: P. Vindel, 1911-12.  
*Wenckstern, Friedrich von*—*Bibliography of the Jap. empire*. Leiden; E. J. Brill, 1895-1907. 2 v.

## GENERAL WORKS

- Anderson, Mrs. Isabel W.*—*The Spell of Japan*. Boston: The Page Company, 1914.  
*Angus, D. C.*—*Japan, the Eastern Wonderland*. London, Paris, New York and Melbourne; Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1904.

- Asiatic society of Japan*—Yokohama.  
*Blakeslee, George Hubbard*—*Japan and Japanese-American Relations*. New York: G. E. Stechert and Company, 1912.  
*Bland, John Otway Percy*—*China, Japan and Korea*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921.  
*Brinkley, Frank*—*Japan*. Boston: J. B. Millet Company, 1897-98.  
*Brown, Arthur Judson*—*The Mastery of the Far East*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921.  
*Cameron, W. H. Morton*—*Present-day Impressions of Japan*. Chicago, London: The Globe Encyclopedia Company, 1919.  
*Chamberlain, Basil Hall*—*Things Japanese*. London: J. Murray. Yokohama. Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1902.  
*Clark, Joseph Ignatius Constantine*—*Japan at First Hand*, etc., New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1918.  
*Clement, Ernest Wilson*—*A Handbook of Modern Japan*. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1913.  
*Cordier, Henri*—*Notice sur le Japon*. Paris: H. Lamirault et Cie, 1894.  
*Crow, Carl*—*Japan and America, a contrast*. New York: R. M. McBride & Company, 1916.  
*Curtis, William Eleroy*—*The Yankees of the East*. New York: Stone & Kimball, 1896.

- De Bonneville, James Seguin*—Sakurambō. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1906.
- Dumolard, Henry*—Le Japon Politique, Economique, et Social. Paris: A. Colin, 1903.
- Dyer, Henry*—Dai Nippon. London: Blackie & Son, Ltd., 1904.
- Eliot, Charles William*—Some Roads Towards Peace. Washington, D. C.: Press of B. S. Adams, 1913.
- Gleason, George*—What Shall I Think of Japan? New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.
- Hearn, Lafcadio*—Exotics and Retrospectives. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1898.
- Hershey, Amos Shurtle*—Modern Japan, etc. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1919.
- Holland, Clive*—Old and New Japan. London: J. M. Dent & Company: New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1907.
- Hovelague, Émile Lucien*—Les peuples d'Extrême-Orient. Le Japon. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1921.
- Japan Society*—Transactions of. London.
- The Japan Year Book*—Tokyo.
- Kendall, Carlton Waldo*—The truth about Korea. San Francisco: The Korean National Association, 1919.
- King-Hall, Stephen*—Western Civilization and the Far East. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- Kjellén, Rudolf*—Die Grossmächte und die Weltkrise. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1921.
- Knapp, Arthur May*—Feudal and Modern Japan. Boston: J. Knight Company, 1897.
- Knox, George William*—Imperial Japan; the Country and Its People. London: G. Newnes, Ltd., 1905.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott*—The Development of Japan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918.
- Lauterer, Joseph*—Japan, das Land der Aufgehenden Sonne, Einst und Jetzt. Leipzig: O. Spamer, 1904.
- Lawton, Lancelot*—Empires of the Far East. London: G. Richards, Ltd., 1912.
- Le Roux, Robert Charles Henry*—L'Heure du Japon. Paris: Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1918.
- Leroy-Beaulieu, Pierre*—The Awakening of the East. London: W. Heinemann, 1900.
- Longford, Joseph Henry*—Japan of the Japanese. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912.
- Mabie, Hamilton Wright*—Japan To-day and To-morrow. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914.
- McGovern, William Montgomery*—Modern Japan; Its Political, Military and Industrial Organization. London: T. F. Unwin, Ltd., 1920.
- Masaoka, Naoichi*—Japan to America. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914.
- Maybon, Albert*—Le Japon d'Aujourd'hui. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1924.
- Mitford, Eustace Bruce*—Japan's Inheritance; the Country, Its People and Their Destiny. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914.
- Mihakawa, Masuji*—Life of Japan. New York and Washington: The Neale Publishing Company, 1910.
- Nitobé, Inazo Ota*—The Japanese Nation; Its Land, Its People and Its Life. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.
- Norman, Sir Henry*—The Real Japan. London: T. F. Unwin, 1892.
- Okuma, Shigenobu*—Fifty Years of New Japan. London: Smith, Elder & Company, 1909.
- Papino, E.*—Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie du Japon. Tokyo: Librairie Sansaisha, 1906.
- Pooley, Andrew Melville*—Japan at the Cross-roads. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1917.
- Ransome, Stafford*—Japan in Transition. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1899.
- Rein, Johann Justus*—Japan, nach Reisen und Studien im Auftrage der Königlich Preussischen Regierung dargestellt. Leipzig: W. Engelmann, 1905.
- Salvey, Mrs. Charlotte Marie*—The Island Dependencies of Japan. London: E. L. Morice, 1913.
- Shaw, Loretta L.*—Japan in Transition. London: Church Missionary Society, 1922.

*Sherrill, Charles Hitchcock*—Have We a Far Eastern Policy? New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920.

*Société Sinico-Japonaise*, Paris.

*Stead, Alfred*—Great Japan; a Study of National Efficiency. London: J. Lane; New York: J. Lane Company, 1906. Japan by the Japanese. London: W. Heinemann, 1904. Japan To-day. London: T. F. Unwin, 1902. Unser Vaterland Japan. Leipzig: E. A. Seeman, 1904.

*Weulersse, Georges*—Le Japon d'Aujourd'hui; Études Sociales. Paris: A. Colin, 1904.

## BIOGRAPHY

*Iseki, K. R.*—Who's Who Hakushi in Great Japan. Tokyo, Hattensha, 1921-22.

*The Japan Year Book*—Tokyo.

*Langman, Charles*—Leading Men of Japan. Boston: D. Lothrop & Company, 1883.

*Madden, Maude Whitmore*—Women of the Meiji Era. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1919.

*Stephenson, Edward S.*—Famous People of Japan (ancient and modern). Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1911.

## CIVILIZATION

*Brinkley, Frank*—A History of the Japanese People from the Earliest Times to the End of the Meiji Era. New York: George H. Doran, 1920.

*Couchoud, Paul Louis*—Japanese Impressions with a note on Confucius. London: John Lane. New York: John Lane Company, 1921. Sages et Poètes d'Asie. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1916.

*De Benneville, James S.*—More Japonico. Yokohama: Japan Gazette Press, 1908.

*Dickinson, Goldsworthy Lowes*—An Essay on the Civilizations of India, China and Japan. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1914.

*Feenstra Kuiper, J.*—Japan en de Buitenwereld in de Achttiende eeuw. 's-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1921.

*Gérard, August*—Nos Alliés d'Extrême-Orient. Paris: Payot & Cie, 1918.

*Griffis, William Elliot*—The Japanese Nation in Evolution, etc. New York: T. Y. Crowell & Company, 1907.

*Gulick, Sidney Lewis*—Evolution of the Japanese, Social and Psychic. New York: F. H. Revell Company, 1903.

*Hearn, Lafcadio*—Japan, an attempt at interpretation. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1904.

*Honaga, S.*—The National Spirit of Japan; a contribution to spiritual understanding between nations. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Company, Ltd., 1916.

*Kobayashi, Tetsuaki*—La Société Japonaise, Étude Sociologique. Paris: F. Alcan, 1914.

*Okakura, Yoshisaburo*—The Japanese Spirit. New York: J. Pott & Company, 1905.

*Rathgen, Karl*—Staat und Kultur des Japaner. Beilefeld und Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing, 1907.

*Reinsch, Paul Samuel*—Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911.

*Satomi, Kishio*—Japanese Civilization, Its Significance and realization. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1923.

*Witte, Johannes*—Ostasien und Europa. Das Ringen Zweier Weltkulturen. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1914.

## COMMERCE—See also STATISTICS, PERIODICALS

*American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Commercial Relations Between the U. S. and Japan. Philadelphia: 1910.

*Batchelder, Charles C.*—Trade of British India with the United States, Japan, and Germany. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923.

*Bülow, Heinrich August Ernst von*—Russland-Japans Handelspolitik und Industrie. Dresden: B. Sturm, 1904.

*Hattori, Yukimasa*—The Foreign Commerce of Japan Since the Restoration. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1904.

*Japan. Bureau of Customs*—Monthly Return of the Foreign Trade of Empire of Japan. Tokyo: Returns of Foreign Trade of Japan for the Eighteen Years



- 1868-85. Tokyo: printed at Insetsu Koiku, 1886?
- Japan. Dept. of finance.* Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of Empire of Japan, Tokyo.
- Japan and America.* New York: H. Hoshi, 1901-03.
- Japanese-American Trade Year Book*—San Francisco: Japanese Chamber of Commerce.
- Kinosita, Yetaro*—The Past and Present of Japanese Commerce. New York: Columbia University Press, 1902.
- Masuda, Takashi*—Japan; Its Commercial Development and Prospects. London: Sisley's, Ltd., 1908.
- Mochizuki, Kotaro*—Japan and America. Tokyo: The Liberal News Agency, 1909.
- Neugebauer, Wilhelm*—Japan im Handelsverkehr mit Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1914.
- Nilobe, Inazo Ota*—The Intercourse between the United States and Japan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1891.
- Porter, Robert Percival*—Commerce and Industries of Japan. Philadelphia: 1896.
- Steintorf, Paul P.*—Japan as a Market for American Agricultural Implements and Machinery. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923.
- Tokyo. Imperial Commercial Museum.* The Exporters' Directory of Japan. Tokyo.
- U. S. Dept. of Commerce.* Japanese Markets for American Lumber. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915.
- U. S. Tariff commission*—The Foreign Trade of Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Japan: Trade During the War. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919.
- DESCRIPTION AND TRAVEL
- Arnold, Sir Edwin*—Japonica. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891. Seas and Lands, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1891.
- Bell, Archie*—A Trip to Lotus Land. New York: John Lane Company, 1917.
- Bigelow, Poultney*—Japan and Her Colonies. London: E. Arnold & Company, 1923.
- Bishop, Isabella Lucy*—Unbeaten Tracks in Japan. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1880?
- Browne, George Waldo*—Japan, the Place and the People. Boston: D. Estes & Company, 1904. The new America and the Far East. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1910-12.
- Burton, Leonard Halford Dudley*—The Eastern Road. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1924.
- Collins, Gilbert*—Far Eastern Jaunts. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- Cousins, James H.*—The New Japan. Madras: Ganesh & Company, 1923.
- Davidson, Augusta M. Campbell*—Present-day Japan. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1904.
- Del Mar, Walter*—Around the World Through Japan. London: A. & C. Black. Norwood, Mass.: Norwood Press, 1904.
- Dewey, John*—Letters from China and Japan. New York: E. P. Dutton Company, 1920.
- Edwards, A. Herbage*—Kakemonna; Japanese Sketches. London: W. Heinemann, 1906.
- Exner, A. H.*—Japan as I Saw It. London: Jarrold & Sons, 1912.
- Finck, Henry Theophilus*—Lotos-time in Japan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1895.
- Fisher, Gertrude Adams*—A Woman Alone in the Heart of Japan. Boston: L. C. Page & Company, 1906.
- Franck, Harry Alverson*—Glimpses of Japan and Formosa. New York and London: The Century Company, 1924.
- Fraser, Mary (Crawford)*—A Diplomatist's Wife in Japan. London: Hutchinson & Company, 1911.
- Goodrich, Joseph King*—Our Neighbors: the Japanese. Chicago: F. G. Browne & Company, 1913.
- Greenbie, Sydney*—Japan, Real and Imaginary. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1920.
- Hearn, Lafcadio*—Gleanings in Buddha-fields. Boston & New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1897. Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan. Same pub., 1894. Out of the east. 1895.

- Hesse-Wartegg, Ernst von*—China und Japan Erlebnisse. Leipzig, J. J. Weber, 1900.
- Hitchcock, Alfred Marshall*—Over Japan Way. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1917.
- Huish, Marcus Bourne*—Japan and Its Art. London: The Fine Art Society, Ltd., 1889.
- Imperial Japanese Government Railways*. The Hot Springs of Japan, etc. Tokyo, 1922.
- Japan, Local affairs bureau*—The Rural Life of Japan. Tokyo: printed by Toppan Printing Company, Ltd., 1914.
- Japan Society of New York*.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl*—Japan and the Japanese as Seen by Foreigners Prior to the Beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. Tokyo: The Keiseisha, 1904.
- Kellermann, Bernhard*—Ein Spaziergang in Japan. Berlin: P. Cassirer, 1920.
- Kipling, Rudyard*—Letters from the East. New York: F. F. Lovell Company, 189-?
- Kirtland, Lucian Swift*—Samurai trails. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918.
- Ladd, George Trumbull*—Rare Days in Japan. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1910.
- La Farge, John*—An Artist's Letters from Japan. New York: The Century Company, 1897.
- Lucas, Edward Verrall*—Roving East and Roving West. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1921.
- Lucy, Sir Henry William*—East by West. A Journey in the Recess. London: R. Bentley & Son, 1885.
- Luffman, Charles Bogue*—The Harvest of Japan, etc. London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, Ltd., 1920.
- McLean, Ethel Louise*—A Gentle Jehu in Japan. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1912.
- Menpes, Mortimer*—Japan, a Record in Colour. London: A. & C. Black, 1902.
- Migeon, Gaston*—Au Japon; promenades aux Sanctuaires de l'Art. Paris: Hachette & Cie, 1908.
- Morris, Alice A.*—Dragons and Cherry Blossoms. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1896.
- Morris, J.*—Advance Japan: a Nation Thoroughly in Earnest. London: W. H. Allen & Company, 1895.
- Neustadt, Arthur*—Japanische Reisebriefe, Berichte über eine fahrt durch Japan. Berlin: P. Cassirer, 1913.
- Perry, Matthew Calbraith*—The Americans in Japan. New York, London: D. Appleton & Company, 1857. Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, etc. Washington: A. O. P. Nichol-Green & Company, 1898.
- Ponting, Herbert George*—In Lotus-land Japan. London and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922.
- Powers, Harry Huntington*—Japan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.
- Redesdale, Algernon Bertram Freeman-Mitford*—The Garter Mission to Japan. London, New York: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1906. A Tragedy in Stone and Other Papers. New York: John Lane Company, 1912.
- Rittner, George H.*—Impressions of Japan. London: J. Murray, 1904.
- Robertson, Scott J.*—The foundations of Japan, etc. London: J. Murray, 1922.
- Russell, Sir Herbert William Henry*—With the Prince in the East. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1922.
- Sanders, Thomas Henry*—My Japanese Year. New York: J. Pott & Company, 1915.
- Seidmore, Eliza Ruhaman*—Jinrikisha Days in Japan. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1891.
- Seitz, Don Carlos*—Surface Japan; short notes of a swift survey. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1911.
- Sladen, Douglas Brooke Wheelton*—Japan in Pictures. New York: F. Warne & Company. London: G. Newnes, Ltd., 1904. The Japs at Home. London: Hutchinson & Company, 1892.
- Steele, James King*—Wandering Feet Along Well-known Highways and Unfrequented Byways of China and Japan. San Francisco: A. Carlisle & Company, 1923.
- Steinitzer, Wilhelm*—Japanische Bergfahrten, Wanderungen fern von Touristenpfade. München: E. Reinhardt, 1918.
- Taylor, Bayard*—Japan in Our Day. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1889.

- Tessan, François de*—Par les Chemins Japonais. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1918.
- Tudesq, André*—Les Six Beautés sous les Arbes. Paris: B. Grasset, 1923.
- Tyndale, Walter*—Japan and the Japanese. London: Methuen & Company, 1910.
- Viaud, Julien*—Japoneries d'Automne, par Pierre Loti. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1889. L'exilée. Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1896.
- Wade, Mary H.*—Twin Travelers in China and Japan. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1922.
- Walton, Sir Joseph*—China and the Present Crisis. London: Sampson Low, Marston & Company, 1900.
- Weston, Walter*—The Playground of the Far East. London: J. Murray, 1918.
- Yamasaki, Naomasa*—The Topography of Japan. New York: 1907. (Encyclopedia Americana)

## ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- Dautremet, Joseph*—The Japanese Empire and Its Economic Conditions. London: T. F. Unwin, Ltd., 1915.
- Eldridge, Frank Reed*—Japan After the Earthquake. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923.
- Gt. Brit. Consulate, Osaka*—Report on Japanese Labor. London: H. M. Stationery office, 1920.
- Gt. Brit. Dept. of Overseas Trade*—Report on the Industrial and Economic Situation in Japan. London.
- Heber, E. A.*—Japanische Industriearbeit. etc. Jena: G. Fischer, 1912.
- Japan. Special Finance and Economic Commission to the U. S. 1917-18*—Report. Tokyo Printing Company, Ltd., 1918?
- The Japan Business Register*—Yokohama: The "Eastern Commerce."
- The Japan Mercantile and Manufacturers' Directory.* Kobe: Far Eastern Advertising Agency.
- Knox, Philander Chase*—Public and Official Utterances of. Washington: Government Printing office, 1912.
- Kushida, Tamizô*—War and Armament taxes of Japan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923.
- Masuda, Norimoto*—Military Industries of Japan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1922.
- Ono, Yejiro*—The Industrial Transition in Japan. Baltimore: American Economic Association, 1890.
- Porter, Robert Percival*—The Full Recognition of Japan. London, New York: H. Frowde, 1911. Japan, the New World-power. London, New York: H. Milford, Oxford University Press, 1915.
- Rathgen, Karl*—Die Japaner in der Weltwirtschaft. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1911.
- Saint-Maurice, comte de*—La Civilisation Économique du Japon (1908) Son Expansion en Extrême-Orient. Paris: G. Roustan, 1908.
- Takata, Y.*—Conscription System in Japan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.
- Thery, Edmond*—La Situation Économique and Financière du Japon Après la Guerre de 1904-05. Paris: Économiste Européen, 1907.
- Viallate, Achille*—L'avenir Économique du Japon. Paris: M. Rivière, 1907.
- Vilenkin, Grigori Abramovich*—The Political and Economic organization of Modern Japan. Tokyo: Kondo Shoten, 1908.

## EDUCATION

- Japan. Dept. of Education*—Education in Japan. Tokyo, 1914?
- Kikuchi, Dairoku*—Japanese Education. London: J. Murray, 1909.
- Lewis, Robert Ellsworth*—The Educational Conquest of the Far East. New York: F. H. Revell Company, 1903.
- Mizuno, Tsunekichi*—The Kindergarten in Japan. Boston: The Stratford Company, 1917.
- Montgomery, Walter Alexander*—Educational Conditions in Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919.

## EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION

- Clavery, Edouard*—Les Étrangers au Japon et les Japonais à l'Étranger. Paris: Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1904.
- Grünfeld, Ernst*—Die Japanische Auswanderung. Tokyo: Druck der Hobunsha, 1913.

*Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl*—Asia at the Door. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1914.

*McClatchy, Valentine Stuart*—Japanese Immigration and Colonization. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921.

*Trevor, John Bond*—Japanese Exclusion. Washington Government Printing Office, 1925.

## FINANCE

*Igarashi, Eikichi*—The National Wealth of Japan. Tokyo: National Wealth of Japan Publishing Office, 1906.

*Japan. Dept. of finance*—Financial and Economical Annual of Japan. Tokyo.

*Odate, Gyoju*—Japan's Financial Relations with the U. S. New York: Columbia University, 1922.

*Ono, Giichi*—War and Armament Expenditures of Japan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1922.

*Oyama, Hisashi*—Expenditures of the Russo-Japanese War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

*Boston. Public Library*—The U. S. and Japan. Boston: The Trustees, 1921.

*New York, Public Library*—Japanese-American Relations. New York: printed at New York Public Library, 1921.

*Abbott, James Francis*—Japanese Expansion and American Policies. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.

*American-Japan Society*—Tokyo, 1920.

*American peace Society of Japan*—Relations with Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911.

*Aubert, Louis*—Américains et Japonais. Paris: A. Colin, 1908. Paix Japonaise. Paris: A. Colin, 1906.

*Bau, Mingchien Joshua*—The Foreign Relations of China. New York, Chicago, 1921.

*Blois, Louis Albert Aymar Léon Marie*—En Face du Soleil Levant. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1909.

*The Browbeating of China and an Analysis of the Japanese Demands, etc.*—Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1915.

*Byram, Léo*—Petit Jap Deviendra Grand! L'expansion Japonaise en Extrême-Orient. Paris: Berger-Levrault et Cie, 1908.

*Bywater, Hector C.*—Sea-power in the Pacific. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.

*Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*—Division of intercourse and education. The Imperial Japanese mission, 1917. Washington Press of B. S. Adams, 1918. The Sino-Japanese Negotiations of 1915. Washington: The Endowment, 1921.

*China. The Chino-Japanese Negotiations*—Peking, 1915.

*Chinese National Welfare Society in America*—The Shantung Question. San Francisco: Chinese National Welfare Society in America, 1919.

*Chung, Henry*—The Case of Korea. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell, 1921. The Oriental Policy of the U. S. Same pub. 1919.

*Colville, Sir Henry Edward*—The Allies. London: Hutchinson & Company, 1907.

*Curzon, George Nathaniel*—Problems of the Far East. New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1896.

*Dennis, Alfred L. P.*—The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1923.

*Dewey, John*—China, Japan and the U. S. New York: Republic publishing Company, 1921.

*Diplomatic Relations Between the U. S. and Japan, 1908-24*—Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1925.

*Dyer, Henry*—Japan in World Politics. London: Blackie & Son, Ltd., 1909.

*Far Eastern Republic*—Japanese Intervention in the Russian Far East. Washington: 1922.

*Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America*—The Friendship of America for Japan, etc. New York? 1916?

*Flowers, Montaville*—The Japanese Conquest of American Opinion. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1917.

*Gérard, August*—La Triple Entente et la Guerre. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1918. La Mission au Japon avec un Épilogue de 1914 et 1919. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1919.

*Gt. Brit. Foreign office*—Correspondence re ownership of land and mines by British subjects in Korea. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1911. Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Melbourne: A. J. Mullet,



- Government printer for state of Victoria, Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Franco-Japanese Alliance. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- Gulick, Sidney Lewis*—The American-Japanese Problem. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914.
- Hashagen, Justus*—Ostasienpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber, 1917.
- Haushofer, Karl*—Dai Nihon. Berlin: E.S. Mittler und sohn, 1913.
- Hayashi, Tadasu*—The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, by A. M. Pooley. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.
- Hoshien, Tchen*—Les Relations Diplomatiques Entre la Chine and le Japon de 1871 à Nos Jours. Paris: Éditions de "La Vie Universitaire," 1921.
- Iyenaga, Toyokichi*—Japan's Real Attitude Toward America. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1916.
- Japan. Treaties, etc.*—Tokyo, Z. P. Maruya & Cie, 1908. Correspondence *re* negotiations between Japan & Russia. Washington Gibson Bros., 1904. Japanese-Korean protocol, etc. Tokio? Foreign office, Japanese Imperial Government, 1906.
- Japanese Aggression in the Far East*—Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- Katsuizumi, Sotokichi*—Critical Observation on the Washington Conference. Ann Arbor, Mich., 1922.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl*—American-Japanese Relations. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1912. Japan and World Peace. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1919. Japan in World Politics. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917. Japan's Pacific Policy. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922. What Japan Thinks. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.
- King-Hall, Stephen*—Western Civilization and the Far East. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd., 1924.
- Kleffens, E. N.*—De Internationaalrechtelijke betrekkingen tusschen Nederland en Japan. Amsterdam: E. van der Vecht, 1919.
- Krahmer, Gustav*—Die beziehungen Russlands zu Japan. Leipzig: Zuckschserdt & Company, 1904.
- Kuno, Yoshi S.*—What Japan Wants. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1921.
- Labroue, Henri*—L'impérialisme Japonais. Paris: C. Delagrave, 1911.
- Ladd, George Trumbull*—In Korea with Marquis Ito. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908.
- Lodge, Henry Cabot*—Treaty Relating to the Pacific Islands. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921.
- McCormick, Frederick*—The Menace of Japan. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1917.
- McKenzie, Frederick Arthur*—The Tragedy of Korea. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1908. The Unveiled East. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1907.
- Matsudiara, Yorikatzu von*—Die völkerrechtlichen verträge des kaiserthums Japan in wirthschaftlicher, rechtlicher und politischer bedeutung. Stuttgart: Deutsche verlags-anstalt, 1890.
- Millard, Thomas F. F.*—America and the Far Eastern Question. New York: Moffat, Yard & Company, 1909. The New Far East. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906. Our Eastern Question. New York: The Century Company, 1916.
- Millis, Harry Alvin*—The Japanese Problem in the U. S. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1915.
- Moulin, Henri Alexis*—La Politique Russe et la Politique Japonaise en Asie. Dijon: L. Venot, 1905.
- Murray, Arthur M.*—Imperial Outposts from a Strategic and Commercial Aspect. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1907.
- Noguchi, Yone*—Japan and America. Tokyo: Keio University Press. New York: Orientalia, 1921.
- Núñez Ortega, Angel*—Noticia Histórica de la Relaciones Políticas y Comerciales Entre México y el Japon durante el siglo xvii. Mexico: La Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1923.
- Nuttall, Mrs. Zelia*—The Earliest Historical Relations between Mexico and

- Japan. Berkeley: The University Press, 1906.
- Osbourne, Sidney*—The Isolation of Japan. Amsterdam, Rotterdam: C. L. van Langenhuysen, 1919. The New Japanese Peril. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.
- Ostwald, Paul*—Japans Expansionspolitik, 1900-14. Berlin: Politic, 1916.
- Pavolsky, Leo*—Russia in the Far East. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- Pitkin, Walter Boughton*—Must We Fight Japan? New York: The Century Company, 1921.
- Pooley, Andrew Melville*—Japan's Foreign Policies. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1920.
- Rea, George Bronson*—Japan's Place in the Sun; the Menace to America. Washington: W. L. Bass, 1915?
- Reigelsberger, Josef*—Japan und Deutschland. Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1914.
- Sato, Kōjirō*—If Japan and America Fight. Tokyo, Meguro buntēn (pref. 1921).
- Scherer, James A. B.*—The Japanese Crisis. New York: Fred A. Stokes Company, 1916.
- Seibold, Louis*—Japan, Her Vast Undertakings and World Expansion. New York: The New York Herald, 1921.
- Siebold, Alex. G. G.*—Der eintritt Japans in das Europäische Völkerrecht. Berlin: Kisak Tamai, 1900.
- Simpson, Bertram Lenox*—An Indiscreet Chronicle from the Pacific. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1922. The Truth about China and Japan. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1919.
- Sunderland, Jabez Thomas*—Rising Japan. Is She a Menace or a Comrade to be Welcomed in the Fraternity of Nations? New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1918.
- Taft, Henry W.*—Japan and the Far East Conference. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.
- Tokutomi, Iichiro*—Japanese-American relations. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922.
- Treat, Payson Jackson*—The Early Diplomatic Relations Between the U. S. and Japan. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1917. Japan and the U. S. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.
- U. S. Dept. of State*. Occupation of Korea. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916. The Policy of the U. S. and Japan in the Far East. New York City: American branch of Associated International Conciliation, 1908: Text of notes re the U. S. and Japanese Governments re their policy in China, etc. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1918.
- U. S. President, 1921 (Harding)*. The Lansing-Ishii agreement. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- U. S. Treaties, etc. Japan*—Commerce and Navigation and Protocol. Washington: 1895. Convention between U. S. and Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1908. Agreement between U. S. and Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1914, 1919. Exchange of Notes between U. S. and Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923. Treaty between U. S. and Japan. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922, 1924.
- The United States and Japan*—New York City: American Association for International Conciliation, 1918.
- Washington, D. C.* Conference on the Limitation of Armament—Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923. Four powers treaty re Pacific possessions, 1922. Nine powers treaty on China, 1922. Treaty between U. S., British Empire, France and Japan, 1923.
- Weale, B. L. Putnam*—pseud. See Simpson, Bertram Lenox.
- Willoughby, Westel Woodbury*—Foreign Rights and Interests in China. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1920.
- Wood, Ge-Zay*—China, the U. S. and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1921. The Chino-Japanese Treaties of May 25, 1915. Same pub. The twenty-one demands. Same pub.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Asakawa, Kanichi*—The Early Institutional Life of Japan. Tokyo: printed at Tokyo Shueisha, 1903.
- Asami, Noboru*—Japanese Colonial Government. New York, 1924.

- Challaye, Félicien*—*La Chine et le Japon Politiques*. Paris: F. Alcan, 1921.
- Clement, Ernest Wilson*—*Constitutional Imperialism in Japan*. New York: Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1916.
- Coleman, Frederic Abernethy*—*Japan or Germany*. New York: G. H. Doran Company, 1918.
- Dutcher, George M.*—*The Political Awakening of the East*. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press, 1925.
- Fujisawa, Rikitaro*—*The recent aims of Political Development of Japan*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923.
- Gubbins, John H.*—*The Progress of Japan*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1911.
- Hornbeck, Stanley K.*—*Contemporary Politics in the Far East*. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1916.
- Ito, Hirobumi*—*Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan*. Tokyo: (Central University), 1906.
- Iwasaki, Uichi*—*The Working Forces in Japanese Politics*. New York: Columbia University, 1921.
- Iyenaga, Toyokichi*—*The Constitutional Development of Japan*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1891.
- Kaibara, Ekken*—*Women and Wisdom of Japan*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1908.
- Kawabé, Kisaburo*—*The Press and Politics in Japan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi Karl*—*The Political Ideas of Modern Japan*. Iowa City: The University Press, 1903.
- Kiyaoka, Tsunejiro*—*Growth of Liberalism in Japan*. Washington, D. C., 1918.
- Miyakawa, Masuji*—*A Comparison Between the Constitutions of Japan and the U. S.* Washington, D. C., 1909.
- Nagata, Hidejiro*—*A Simplified Treatise on the Imperial House of Japan*. Tokyo: Hakubunkwan Company, 1921.
- Nakano, Tomio*—*The Ordinance Power of the Japanese Emperor*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1923.
- Ozaki, Yukio*—*The Voice of Japanese Democracy*. Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, 1918.
- Ronaldshay, Lawrence J. L. D.*—*A Wandering Student in the Far East*. Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1908.
- Sato, Hiroshi*—*Democracy and the Japanese Government*. New York: Columbia University Press Bookstore, 1920.
- Uyehara, George Etsujiro*—*The Political Development of Japan, 1867-1909*. London: Constable & Company, 1910.
- Watson W. Petrie*—*The Future of Japan*. London: Duckworth & Company, 1907.
- Japan: Aspects and Destinies*. London: G. Richards, 1904.

## HISTORY

- Asakawa, Kanichi*—*The Russo-Japanese Conflict—Its Causes and Issues*. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1904.
- Ballard, George A.*—*The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1921.
- Bertin, Louis Émile*—*Les Grandes Guerres Civiles du Japon*. Paris: E. Leroux, 1894.
- Brinkley, Frank*—*A History of the Japanese People from Earliest Times to end of the Meiji Era*. New York: G. F. Doran Company, 1920. Japan; Its History, Arts and Literature. Boston and Tokyo: J. B. Millet Company, 1910.
- Clement, Ernest W.*—*A Short History of Japan*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1915.
- Coleman, Frederic A.*—*The Far East Unveiled*. London, New York: Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1918.
- Dautremere, Joseph*—*Chez Nos Alliés Japonais, Esquisse Historique; passé-évolution-présent*. Paris: Garnier Frères, 1918.
- Davis, F. H.*—*Japan from the Age of the Gods to the fall of Tsingtau*. London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, Ltd., New York: F. A. Stokes Company, 1916.
- Driault, Edouard*—*La Question d'Extrême-Orient*. Paris: F. Alcan, 1908.
- Griffis, W. E.*—*Japan*. New York City: Globe Printing Company, 1923. Japan in history, folk lore and art. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1892. The Mikado; Institution and person. Princeton, Princeton Uni-

- versity Press, 1915. The Mikado's empire. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1913.
- Grousset, René*—Histoire de l'Asie. Paris: G. Cres & Cie, 1921-22.
- Gubbins, J. H.*—The Making of Modern Japan: London: Seeley, Service & Company, Ltd., 1922.
- Hara, Katsuro*—An Introduction to the History of Japan. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1920.
- Hildreth, Richard*—Hildreth's "Japan as It Was and Is"; a handbook of Old Japan. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1906.
- Hishida, Seiji George*—The International Position of Japan as a Great Power. New York: The Macmillan company, 1905.
- Japan. Dept. of education*—History of the Empire of Japan. Printed at Japan Mail Office, Yokohama, 1893. Japan from the Japanese government. New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1916.
- Johnsen, Julia E.*—China and Japan. New York City: H. W. Wilson company, 1922.
- La Mazelière, Antoine Rous*—Le Japon, histoire et Civilisation. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1907.
- Latourette, Kenneth Scott*—The Development of Japan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918. Japan: suggested outlines for a discussion of. New York: Japan Society, 1921.
- Longford, Joseph Henry*—The Evolution of New Japan. Cambridge: University Press, 1913. Japan. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1923. The story of old Japan. London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1910.
- McLaren, Walter Wallace*—A political history of Japan during the Meiji Era. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1916.
- Murdoch, James*—A History of Japan. Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd. London: K. Paul, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1910.
- Murray, David*—Japan. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1920. The Story of Japan. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1894.
- Okakura, Kakuzo*—The Awakening of Japan. New York: special edition for Japan society, 1921. The Ideals of the East. London: J. Murray, 1903.
- Oliphant, Laurence*—Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in years 1857, '58, '59. New York: Harper & Bros., 1860.
- Ostwald, Paul*—Japans Entwicklung zur Modernen Weltmacht. Bonn und Leipzig: K. Schroeder, 1922.
- Pitkin, Walter B.*—The Political and Economic Expansion of Japan. New York: Institute of International Education, 1921.
- Porter, Robert P.*—Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918.
- Saito, Hisho*—A History of Japan. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1912.
- Satow, Sir Ernest Mason*—A Diplomat in Japan, etc. London: Seeley, Service & Company, 1921.
- Takahashi, Seigo*—A Study of the Origin of the Japanese State. New York City: Printed by W. D. Gray, 1917.
- Temple, Sir Richard*—Progress of India, Japan and China in the Century. London, Philadelphia: Linscott Publishing Company, 1900.
- Yamada, Nakaba*—Ghenkō, the Mongol Invasion of Japan. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1916.

## LAW

- De Becker, Joseph Ernest*—Commentary on the Commercial Code of Japan. London: Butterworth & Company, 1913. International Private Law of Japan. Same pub., 1919. Principles and Practice of the Civil Code of Japan. Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1921.
- Japan. Laws, Statutes, etc.*—Annotated Civil Code of Japan. London: Butterworth & Company, 1909-10; Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure. Yokohama: Kelly & Walsh, Ltd., 1918.

## LITERATURE

- Aston, William George*—A History of Japanese Literature. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1899.
- Chamberlain, Basil Hall*—Japanese poetry. London: J. Murray, 1911.



- Florenz, Karl Adolf*—Geschichte der Japanischen Literatur. Leipzig: C. F. Amelangs verlag, 1906.
- Hearn, Lafcadio*—A Japanese Miscellany. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1901.
- Japanese literature*—London, New York: Colonial Press, 1902.
- Japanese lyrics*—translated by Lafcadio Hearn. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1915.
- Page, Curtis Hidden*—Japanese Poetry. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923.
- Riordan, Roger*—Sunrise Stories. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896.
- Seitz, Don Carlos*—Monogatari, tales from Old and New Japan. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1924.
- Taketomo, Torao*—Paulownia; Seven Stories from Contemporary Japanese writers. Translated by. New York: Duffield & Company, 1819.
- MISSIONS
- Azling, William*—Japan on the Upward Trail. New York: Missionary Education Movement of U. S. and Canada, 1923.
- Broomhall, Marshall*—The Chinese Empire. London: Morgan & Scott. Philadelphia: China Inland Mission, 1907.
- Brown, Arthur Judson*—The mastery of the Far East. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921.
- Carey, Otis*—A History of Christianity in Japan. New York, 1909.
- The Christian Movement in the Japanese Empire*—Tokyo: Methodist publishing house.
- Erickson, Mrs. Lois Johnson*—The White Fields of Japan. Richmond, Va., Texarkana, Ark-Tex., Presbyterian Company of publication, 1923.
- Fisher, Galen M.*—Creative Forces in Japan. West Medford, Mass.: Central Committee on the United Study of Foreign Missions, 1923.
- Griffis, William E.*—Dux Christus. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1904.
- Haas, Hans*—Geschichte des Christentums in Japan. Tokyo, 1902-04.
- Kerschner, Mabel Gardner*—Young Japan. New York: Missionary Education Movement of U. S. and Canada, 1923.
- Noss, Christopher*—Tohoku, the Scotland of Japan. Philadelphia: Board of Foreign Missions, Reformed Church in U. S., 1918.
- Pell, Edward L.*—Heroes of faith in Japan. E. B. Chappell. Nashville, Tenn. Dallas, Tex. publishing house of M. E. Church, South, Smith & Lamar, 1917. Japan: Key to the East. Same pub.
- Protestant Episcopal Church in the U. S. A.*—Domestic and foreign missionary society. Japan advancing—whither? New York: Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society, 1912.
- RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, ETC.
- Anasaki, Masaharu*—Quelques Pages de l'Histoire Religieuse du Japon. Paris: E. Bernard, 1921.
- Armstrong, Robert Cornell*—Light from the East. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1914.
- Aston, William George*—Shinto (the way of the gods). London, New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1905.
- Griffis, William E.*—The Religions of Japan. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1895.
- Harada, Tasuku*—The Faith of Japan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914.
- Holton, Daniel & Clarence*—The Political Philosophy of Modern Shintō. Chicago, 1922.
- Japan. Bureau of religions.*—A General View of the Present Religious Situation in Japan—Tokyo: printed by the Shueisha, 1920.
- Knox, George W.*—The Development of Religion in Japan. New York and London: G. P. Putnam, 1907.
- Lloyd, Arthur*—The creed of half Japan. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1912.
- Lowell, Percival*—Occult Japan. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1895.
- Nihongi*—Chronicles of Japan from the Earliest Times to A. D. 697. Translated by W. G. Aston. London: Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1896.

- Nitobé, Inazo Ota*—Bushido, the soul of Japan. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.
- Reischauer, August Karl*—Studies in Japanese Buddhism. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917.
- Satomi, Kishio*—Discovery of Japanese Idealism. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1924. Japanese Civilization, Its Significance and Realization, etc. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner & Company, Ltd., 1923.
- Vinaya-Kumāra Sarkār*—Chinese Religion Through Hindu Eyes. Shanghai: The Commercial Press, Ltd., 1916.

## SOCIAL LIFE AND CUSTOMS

- Adam, Evelyn*—Behind the screens. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910.
- Anethan, Eleanora Mary*—Fourteen Years of Diplomatic Life in Japan. London: S. Paul & Company, 1912.
- Ayrton, Mrs. Matilda Chaplin*—Child-life in Japan and Japanese Child Stories. Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1901.
- Bacon, Alice Mabel*—Japanese Girls and Women. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1902; A Japanese Interior. Same publisher, 1893.
- Edwards, Osman*—Japanese Plays and Playfellows. London: W. Heinemann, 1901.
- Fraser, Mary Crawford*—Letters from Japan. New York and London: The Macmillan Company, 1899.
- Gulick, Sidney Lewis*—Working Women of Japan. New York: Missionary Education Movement of the U. S. and Canada, 1915.
- Harrison, E. J.*—The Fighting Spirit of Japan and Other Studies. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; London: T. F. Unwin, 1912.
- Hearn, Lafcadio*—In Ghostly Japan. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1899. Kokoro; Hints and Echoes of Japanese Inner Life. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1896.
- Holland, Clive*—Things Seen in Japan. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1907.
- Howard, Ethel*—Japanese Memories. London: Hutchinson & Company, 1918.
- Klein, Matthias*—By Nippon's Lotus Ponds. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1914.
- Knox, George William*—Japanese Life in Town and Country. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904.
- Lampe, William E.*—The Japanese Social Organization. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1910.
- Lawson, Kate*—Highways and Homes of Japan. London: T. F. Unwin, 1910.
- Lloyd, Arthur*—Everyday Japan. London, New York: Cassel & Company, Ltd., 1909.
- McGovern, Mrs. Janet B.*—The Butterflies of Taiwan and Other Fantasies. Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1924.
- Madden, Maude Whitmore*—In the Land of the Cherry Blossoms. New York: F. H. Revell Company, 1915.
- Markino, Yoshio*—When I was a Child. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912.
- Morse, Edward S.*—Japan Day by Day, etc. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917. Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings. Boston: Ticknor & Company, 1886.
- Naudeau, Ludovic*—Le Japon Modern; Son Évolution. Paris: E. Flammarion, 1909.
- Omori, Annie Shepley*—Diaries of Court Ladies of old Japan, translated by. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920.
- Redesdale, A. B. Freeman-Mitford*—Tales of Old Japan. London: Macmillan & Company, 1871.
- Régamey, Félix Élie*—Japan in Art and Industry. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.
- Scherer, James A. B.*—Young Japan. Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1905.
- Sladen, Douglas Brooke W.*—Queer Things about Japan. London: A. Treherne & Company, Ltd., 1904. More Queer Things about Japan. Same publisher.
- Street, Julian L.*—Mysterious Japan. Garden City, New York and Toronto: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1921.

## STATISTICS

*Japan. Bureau de la Statistique Générale*—Diagrams and numerical tables re population and vital statistics of Japanese empire. Statistical bureau, Imperial cabinet, Tokyo, 1915. Exposé générale des résultats du recensement de la population de l'empire du Japon à la fin de 1913. Tokio, 1916. Graphiques statistiques sur l'état de la population de l'empire du Japon, Tokio, 1916. Mouvement de la population de l'empire du Japon, Tableaux, Tokio. (Proportions) Tokio 45<sup>e</sup> année de Meiji, 1912. Statistiques des causes de décès de l'empire du Japon. Tokio. Tables des matier de l'Annuaire statistique de l'empire du Japon. Résumé statistique, Tokio.

*Department of Agriculture and Commerce*—Abstract of the statistics of the Imperial Japanese department of state for agriculture and commerce. Tokyo and Osaka. Statistical report, Tokyo.

## PERIODICALS

*Asia: journal of the American Asiatic Association*, New York.

*The Asiatic Review*.

*The Far Eastern Review*, engineering, commerce, finance. Manila.

*The Japan-American Commercial Journal*, Tokio. Japan-American Commercial and Industrial Association.

*The Japan Chronicle*. Weekly ed. Kobe, Japan.

*The Japan Financial and Economic Monthly*.

*The Japan Magazine*.

*The Japan Review*.

*Japanese-American Commercial Weekly*.

*Japon et Belgique*. Tokio, Bruxelles.

*The New East*. Azabu, Tokyo.

*New York-Japan Review*. New York.

*The Oriental Economic Review*. New York.

*The Oriental Review*. New York.

*The Taiyo*. Tokyo.

*The Times* (Japanese Section). London

## A LIST OF BOOKS ON THE PHILIPPINES

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

*Chadenat, Ch.*—Collection, Importante d'Ouvrages, Cartes et Plans, Paris: 1898-99.

*Josephson, A. G. S.*—Bibliographies. Boston: The Boston Book Company, 1899.

*LeClerc, Charles*—Bibliotheca Americana. Paris: Maisonneuve et Cie., 1867, 1868, 1878, 1881-87.

*Medina, José Toribio*—Bibliografía Española. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Cervantes, 1897-98. Brevísimo epitome. Madrid: Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1896. La imprenta en Manila. Santiago de Chile, 1896.

*Middleton, Rev. Thomas Cooke*—Notes. Philadelphia: E. Stern & Company, 1900.

*Pardo de Tavera, Trinidad Hermenegildo*—Biblioteca Filipina, Washington: Government printing Office, 1903.

*Pérez, Angel*—Adiciones, etc. de "La Imprenta en Manila" de Medina. Manila: Imprenta de Santos y Bernal, 1904.

*Philippine Islands*—Bureau of Printing,

Price List of Public Documents. Manila: Journal of Science, 1918. Library, 1912. Library and Museum, 1919. Legislative Reference Division, 1918.

*Retana y Gamboa, Wenceslao Emilio*—Aparato Bibliográfico. Madrid: Imprenta de la sucesora de M. Minuesa de Los Rios, 1906. Archivo del bibliófilo, 1895-1905. Bibliografía de Mindanao, 1894. Catálogo abreviado, 1898, pub. same. Catálogo, 1893, pub. same. Catálogo de obras Filipinas. Madrid, Barcelona, Impr. "El Siglo xx" 1902. Documentos Politicos. Madrid: pub. same, 1897-98. Epítome de la Bibliografía. Madrid, 1895-98. La imprenta en Filipinas, 1897, pub. same.

*Robertson, James Alexander*—Bibliography. Cleveland: The A. H. Clark Company, 1908.

*U. S. Library of Congress*—Bibliography, by A. P. C. Griffin. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903-1905.

*Vindel, Pedro*—Biblioteca Oriental. Madrid: P. Vindel, 1911-12. Biblioteca Ultramarine. Madrid: Vindel, 1917.

## GENERAL WORKS

- Anderson, Mrs. Isabel W.*—The Spell of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines. Boston: The Page Company, 1916.
- Atkinson, Fred W.*—The Philippine Islands. Boston, New York: Ginn & Company, 1905.
- Bacon, Augustus O.*—Will the Philippines Pay? etc., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.
- Blumentritt, Ferd.*—Die Philippinen, Hamburg, etc., J. F. Richter. 1900. The Philippines. Chicago: Donohue Brothers, 1900.
- Brown, Arthur Judson*—The New Era. New York, Chicago: F. H. Revell Company, 1903.
- Chamberlin, Frederic C.*—The Philippine Problem. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1913.
- Coursey, Oscar William*—The Philippines and Filipinos. Mitchell, S. D., The Educator Supply Company, 1914.
- Craig, Austin*—The Former Philippines thru Foreign Eyes. Manila: Philippine Education Company, Inc., 1916.
- Crow, Carl*—America and the Philippines. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1914.
- Devins, John Bancroft*—An Observer in the Philippines. Boston, New York: American Tract Society, 1905.
- Doherty, David Jessup*—Conditions. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.
- Elliott, Charles Burke*—The Philippines. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917.
- Forbes-Lindsay, C. H. A.*—The Philippines. Philadelphia: J. C. Winston Company, 1906.
- Foreman, John*—The Philippine Islands. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1906.
- Gannett, Henry*—The Philippine Islands. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.
- Hamm, Margherita A.*—Manila and The Philippines. London, New York: F. T. Neely, 1898.
- Kroeber, Alfred Louis*—Peoples of the Philippines. New York: American Museum Press. 1919.
- Laufer, Berthold*—The Relations of the Chinese to the P. I. Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 1908.
- New York Tribune*—Our new possessions. New York: *The Tribune*, 1899.
- Nieto, Aguilar José*—Colonización. Madrid: Estab. tip. de A. Alonso, 1893.
- Peñaranda y Escudero, Carlos*—Por la Patria. Manila: 1895. Tipo. lit. de Chofré y comp., 1897.
- Philippine Islands*—Dept. of Commerce and Police—The Land of Palm and Pine. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1912.
- Louisiana Purchase Exposition Board*, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1903-4.
- Russell, Charles Edward*—The Outlook for the P. New York: The Century Company, 1922.
- Taft, William Howard*—The Philippine Islands. Washington, D. C. 1904.
- U. S. Congress—Senate—Committee on the Philippines*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900, 1901.
- U. S. Philippine Commission*—Reports of the Taft Philippine Commission. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901. 1900-16.
- U. S. War Department*—Special Report. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910. 1908. 1919.
- Williams, Daniel R.*—The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1913.
- Worcester, Dean C.*—The Philippines Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.
- Wright, Hamilton Mercer*—A Handbook. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1907.
- Yearbook of the Philippine Islands*—Manila: Chamber of Commerce of the P. I., 1920.

## BIOGRAPHY

- Norton, Morilla Maria*—Builders of a Nation. Manila; 1914.

## COMMERCE

- 1923 Directory of Importers and exporters*. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923.
- Trade Directory, 1919, Statistical Bulletin, 1918. Trade Information, 1923. Trade Opportunities, 1919. Annual Report, 1912.



- Pitt, Harold M.*—Reciprocity. Manila: Manila Merchants' Association, 1911.
- Reyes, José S.*—Legislative History, etc., New York: Columbia University, 1923.
- U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs*—Foreign Commerce of the Philippine Islands. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1912-13. Summary of Commerce, 1900-11.
- U. S. Dept. of Commerce*—P. Markets for American Lumber. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915.
- DESCRIPTION AND TRAVEL
- Algué, José S. J.*—The Climate. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.
- Austin, Oscar Phelps*—Uncle Sam's Children. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1906.
- Boyce, William Dickson*—The Philippine Islands. Chicago, New York: Rand, McNally & Company, 1914.
- Brown, George Waldo*—The Far East, etc. Boston: D. Estes & Company, 1901. The New America and The Far East, Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1910-12. The Pearl of the Orient. Boston: D. Estes & Company, 1900.
- Bryan, William Smith*—Our Islands, etc. St. Louis, New York: N. D. Thompson Publishing Company, 1899-1900.
- Buckland, Ralph Kent*—In the Land of the Filipino. New York: Every Where Publishing Company, 1912.
- Carpenter, Frank George*—Through the P. and Hawaii. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1925.
- Conger, Mrs. Emily Bronson*—An Ohio Woman in the Philippines. Akron: Press of R. H. Leighton, 1904.
- Coronas, José*—The Climate and Weather. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920.
- Dauncey, Mrs. Campbell*—An Englishwoman in the Philippines. New York (Edinburgh printed) E. P. Dutton & Company, 1906. The Philippines. Boston and Tokio: J. B. Millet Company, 1910.
- Davis, Oscar King*—Our Conquests in the Pacific. New York: F. A. Stokes Company, 1899.
- Fee, Mary Helen*—A Woman's Impressions of the P. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1910.
- Lala, Ramon Reyes*—The P. I. New York: Continental Publishing Company, 1899.
- Landor, Arnold H. S.*—The Gems of the East. New York and London: Harper & Bros., 1904.
- Manila. Observatorio*—Atlas. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900.
- Martínez de Zuñiga, Joaquín*—Estadismo. Madrid: Imp. de la viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1893.
- Maus, Louis Mervin*—An Army Officer, etc. Chicago: A. C. McClurg & Company, 1911.
- Niera, Gregorio*—La Vida, etc. Manila: E. C. McCullough & Company, Inc., 1915.
- Philippine Islands Parliamentary Mission to the United States, 1922*.—Beautiful Philippines. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923.
- Scott, Erastus H.*—Travel Letters from the Orient. Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Company, 1922.
- Shunk, Mrs. Caroline Saxe (Merrill)*—An Army Woman in the Philippines, etc. Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1914.
- Stevens, Joseph Earle*—Yesterdays in the Philippines. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898.
- Stuntz, Homer Clyde*—The Philippines and the Far East. New York: Easton and Mains, 1904.
- Taft, Mrs. William Howard*—Recollections of Full Years. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914.
- U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs*—A Gazetteer, etc. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.
- Usteri, Alfred*—Beiträge zur Kenntnis der P. etc. Zurich: Druck von Zurcher & Furrar, 1905.
- Verea, F.*—Guide for the American. Manila: Chofré y comp. 1899.
- Worcester, Dean Conant*—The non-Christian People of, etc. Washington: National Geographic Society, 1911-13. The P. I., and Their People, etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Company, Ltd., 1899.

## ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- Miller, Hugo H.*—Economic Conditions, etc. Boston, New York: Ginn & Company, 1920.
- Nieva, Gregorio.*—La vida etc. Manila: E. C. McCullough & Co., Inc., 1915.
- Philippine Islands, Resources and Opportunities*—New York, San Francisco: Philippine Government Commercial Agencies, 1921. (Bureau of Education) Commercial Geography. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1915.
- Philippine Islands, Civico-Educational Lectures*—Manila: 1910. (Bureau of Lands) Annual report; Compilations of Laws, etc., 1921. Primer, 1921. (Council of State) Rules, etc. Washington: Government Office, 1920. Laws, statutes, etc. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923. Beautiful Philippines, 1923.
- Waters, Henry Jackson*—The Development of, etc. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1915.

## EDUCATION

- Freer, William Bowen*—The Philippine Experiences of an American Teacher. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1906.
- Orias, Camilo*—Barrio life and Barrio Education. Yonkers: World Book Company, 1921.
- Philippine Islands. Bureau of Education*—Annual report. Washington: Government Printing Office. Course of study. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1921, 1924. Information etc., 1923. Journal of Education, Manila, University of the P. I.: 1918. Education in the territories and dependencies. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919.

## GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

- Ballentine, Charles*—As it is in the, etc. New York: Lewis Scribner & Company, 1902.
- Blount, James Henderson*—The American Occupation of. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.
- Bocobo, Jorge Cleofas*—General Wood and the Law. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923.
- Diamonon, Victoriano D.*—The Development of Self-Government. Iowa City, Iowa, 1920.

- Dutcher, George M.*—The Political Awakening of the East. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press, 1925.
- Elliot, Charles Burke*—The Philippines to the End of the Commission Government. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1917.
- Grant, Percy Stickney*—Observations in Asia. New York: Brentano's, 1908.
- Harrison, Francis Burton*—The cornerstone, etc. New York: The Century Company, 1922.
- Ireland, Alleyne*—The Far Eastern Tropics. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1905.
- Jernegan, Prescott Ford*—The Philippine Citizen. Manila: Philippine Education Company, 1912.
- Johnsen, Julia E.*—Independence, etc. New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1924.
- Kalaw, Maximo M.*—The Case for the, etc. New York: The Century Company, 1916. El Progreso, etc. Manila: Impr. "Cultura Filipina" 1915. A Guide Book. Washington 1919. The Present Government of, etc. Manila: The McCullough Printing Company, 1921. Self-Government in the. New York: The Century Company, 1919.
- Malcolm, George A.*—The Constitutional Law of, etc. Rochester, N. Y.: The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Company, 1920. Civics. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1924. Government. Manila: The Associated Publishers. New York: D. C. Heath & Company, 1923.
- Mayo, Katherine*—The Isles of Fear. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1925.
- Osmenia, Sergio*—The Constitutional Development of, etc. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1924.
- Palma, Rafael*—Nuestra Compania, etc. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923.
- Peffer, William Alfred*—Americanism and the Philippines. Topeka: Crane and Company, 1900.
- Pettigrew, Richard Franklin*—The Course of Empire, etc. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920.
- Philippine Islands Official Gazette.* Manila—Report of the Governor-General. Washington: Government Printing Office.

- Laws, Statutes, etc., Administrative code. Manila: Bureau of Printing; 1916.
- Journal of the Philippine Commission. Manila: Bureau of Printing; 1908.
- Journal of the Philippine Commission. Manila: Bureau of Printing; 1908.
- Filipino Appeal for Freedom. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- Nuestra Demanda de Libertad. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1923.
- The *Philippine Review*, May 1901-2. Boston: 1901, New York 1901-2. La Política de España en Filipinas.
- Randolph, Carman Fitz—The Law and Policy of Annexation. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1901.
- Reinsch, Paul Samuel—Colonial Autonomy. Chicago: 1904.
- Rodriguez Berriz, Miguel—Diccionario, etc. Manila: Impr. de Ml. Perez, hijo, 1888-93.
- Root, Elihu—The Military and Colonial Policy of the U. S. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916.
- Schurman, Jacob Gould—Philippine Affairs. New York: C. Scribners' Sons, 1902.
- Taft, William Howard—The Duty of Americans in the. Washington: Government Printing Office 1904.
- U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs—The Government of the. Washington: Government Printing Office 1916.
- The Philippine Islands. Washington, 1913. Report, 1903.
- U. S. Congress. House. Committee Reports 1903, 1905, 1908, 1909. Hearings, 1902, 1904. Statement, 1902 (by Felipe Buencamino), 1906 (by Hon. Moorfield Story). U. S. Congress. Senate, Hearings before the Committee, 1902. Publishing same, 1915.
- U. S. Laws, Statutes, etc.,—Organic Act. War Department. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915.
- Acts of Congress and Treaties, etc. 1920. Public Land Laws of the, 1920.
- U. S. Special Mission.—Condition in P. I., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922. Report, 1921.
- Welsh, Herbert—The Other Man's Country. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1900.
- Willis, Henry Parker—Our Philippine Problem. New York: H. Holt & Company, 1905.

## HISTORY

- Aguinaldo y Famy, Emilio—Reseña verídica, etc. Imprenta "La Bicolana," 1899. True version of the, etc. Revolution. Tarlak, P. I., 1899.
- Alcázar, José de—History. Madrid: Establecimiento tip. de el Nacional, 1897.
- Altamirano y Salcedo, Enrique—Filipinas. Madrid: Impr. de C. Perrin, 1902.
- Barrows, David Prescott—A decade of American Government in the. Yonkers, N. Y.: World Book Company, 1914.
- History. Yonkers, Chicago: World Book Company, 1924.
- Blount, James Henderson—The American Occupation of the. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912, 1913.
- Compañía general de tabacos de Filipinas—Colección general. Barcelona: Impr. de la viuda de L. Tasso, 1918.
- Craig, Austin—The Filipinos Part, etc. Manila: The Herald Press, 1921.
- El Defensor de Filipinas. Madrid: 1901.
- Blair, Emma Helen—The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803. Cleveland: The A. H. Clark Company, 1903-9.
- Bourne, Edward Gaylord—Discovery, Conquest and Early History of the. Cleveland: The A. H. Clark Company.
- Chamberlin, Frederick Carleton—The Blow from Behind; or, etc. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1903.
- Cunningham, Charles Henry—The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies. Berkeley: University of California, 1919.
- Filipinas ante Europa—Organo defensor. Madrid: 1899-1901.
- Fiske, Amos Kidder—The story of the Philippines. New York: The Army and Navy illus., 1898.
- Fiske, Bradley A.—War Time in Manila. Boston: R. G. Badger, 1913.
- Funston, Frederick—Memories of Two Wars. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911.
- LeRoy, James Alfred—The Americans in the. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914.
- Llorens y Asensio, Vicente—Historia. Sevilla: Tip. de Rodríguez y López, 1898.
- Millet, Francis Davis—The expedition to the. New York and London: Harper Brothers, 1899.

*Panama-Pacific Historical Congress*—The Pacific Ocean in History. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917.

*Philippine Islands Military Governor*—Report of Major-General E. S. Otis. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899.

*Philippine Information Society*—Facts about the Filipinos. Boston: 1901.

*Retana y Gamboa, Wenceslao Emilio*—Archivo del bibliófilo. Madrid: 1895-1905.

*Reverter, Delmas Emilio*—La Insurrección de Filipinas. Barcelona: Centro editorial de A. Martin, 1899, '97.

*Robinson, Albert G.*—The Philippines, etc. New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1901.

*Salas y Rodriguez, Francisco Javier de*—Documentos inéditos. Madrid: Est. tip. "Sucesores de Rivadeneyra," 1886-87.

*Sastrón, Manuel*—La Insurrección en Filipinas. Madrid: Imp. de la viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1897.

*Spain. Ministerio de fomento*—Cartas de Indias. Madrid: Impro. de M. G. Hernandez.

*U. S. Adjutant-general's Office*—Correspondence re War with Spain. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902.

*U. S. Army, Division of the Philippines*—Annual Report. Manila: 1903.

*U. S. Bureau of Insular Affairs*—Compilation of Philippine Insurgent Records. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903.

*U. S. President McKinley*—Communications. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900.

*Williams, Daniel Roderick*—The U. S. and the P. I. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1924.

*Worcester, Dean Conant*—The Philippines, Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921.

*Younghusband, Sir George John*—The Philippines and Round About. New York: The Macmillan Company, etc., 1899.

## LITERATURE

*Fansler, Mrs. Harriott Ely*—The Philippine Literature Series. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.

*Martin de la Cámara, Eduardo*—Parnaso Filipino. Barcelona: Casa editorial Maucci, 1923.

## RELIGION

*Blumentritt, Ferdinand*—Diccionario mitológico. Madrid: Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios, 1895.

*Kroeber, Alfred Louis*—The History of Philippine Civilization, etc. New York: The Trustees, 1918.

*Laubach, Frank Charles*—The People of the Philippines, etc. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1925.

*Middleton, Rev. Thomas Cooke*—Religion and Education in the Philippines, Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press. 1903.

*Retana y Gamboa, Wenceslao Emilio*—Supersticiones de los Filipinos, etc. Madrid: Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Rios. 1894.

## SANITARY AFFAIRS

*Long, John D.*—Sanitation in the P. I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916.

*National Conference on Infant Mortality and Public Welfare*—Proceedings of. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1922.

*Philippine Islands—Bureau of Public Health*.—Annual report. Manila: Bureau of Public Printing. Monthly bulletin. Quarterly report.

## SOCIAL LIFE AND CUSTOMS

*Gilbert, Paul Thomas*—The Great White Tribe in Filipinia. New York: Eaton and Mains, 1903.

*Kershner, Bruce L.*—The Head Hunter and Other Stories of the. Cincinnati: Powell & White, 1921.

*LeRoy, James Alfred*—Philippine Life in Town and Country. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.

*Moses, Mrs. Edith*—Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife. New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1908.

*Philippine Islands Independence Commission*—The Social Integration of the. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1924.



Robertson, James Alexander—The Social Structure of P. I. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917.

Sawyer, Frederic Henry Read—The Inhabitants of the P. I. London: Sampson Low Marston & Company, 1900.

#### STATISTICS

Beyer, H. Otley—Population of the P. I. in 1916. Manila: Philippine Education Co., Inc., 1917.

Philippine Islands. Census Office—Abstract of Statistical Data, Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920. Census, 1918. Population and Mortality in the. Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1920. Report, 1919.

#### PERIODICALS

*The Asiatic Review.* London.

*The Far Eastern Review.* Manila.

*Heraldo filipino.* Revista bi-semanal bilingue.

*The Independent*, a weekly journal—organ of the Filipino people.

*The Manila Review of Trade and Price Current.*

*The Philippines Monthly.*

*The Philippine Observer.*

*The Philippine Review*, a monthly magazine.

*R. Sociedad economica filipina de amigos del pais.*

# The Three Major Commodities of Persia

By HON. SULTAN M. AMERIE, M. F. S.

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D. C.

## I. The Petroleum Industry of Persia

### INTRODUCTION

**T**HE rapid growth of industries in the United States, with petroleum and its by-products as their main-springs, puts forth to us a formidable question—the exhaustion of oil resources.

If America's industrial wheels are to continue turning, the captains of her industries must look for a continued supply of energy; for petroleum is of peculiar value to society because it is the sole source of gasoline, the dominant motor fuel; provides kerosene, the most important illuminant outside of cities; and yields lubricating oil, upon which all the wheels of industry revolve. Moreover, the development of airships for transportation and for national defense suggests the need of petroleum resources.

The peculiar value of oil in the Southwest, and on the Pacific Coast, where coal is lacking, cannot be over-emphasized, for this lack of coal necessitates the operation of an oil-burning fleet in the Pacific Ocean.

Up to date, the United States has produced a little over sixty per cent of all petroleum known to have been produced in the world. This country now produces and consumes annually more than the rest of the world put together. This, however, does not mean that the United States has enough resources reserved to enable her to continue at this rate of production and consumption. Her consumption, undoubtedly, will increase, while her maximum production, according to

the estimate of the geologists, will be reached in four years, and from that time on, the production will be at a dwindling rate.

Unfortunately, this priceless product cannot be replaced, nor, as yet, has any substitute for it been found. If one takes into consideration the calculations made by well-informed authorities, the United States petroleum resources, at the rate of present production, will be exhausted in less than twenty years; and, if the estimates of the more optimistic experts be regarded, it may take seventy-five years in which to discover all the oil in this country.

The question of oil reserve is a serious problem before all the industrial nations. Its vital importance in the development of modern industry and transportation, for military and naval needs, as well as for future aerial operation, has resulted in an eager search for concessions in the areas from which it may be obtained.

These concessions in turn, because of their varied locations, have a political as well as commercial aspect. Industrial nations, appreciating the importance of the situation, strive to obtain petroleum concessions wherever they can. The United States and Great Britain, being the leading industrial nations, are, therefore, in the lead in this strife, the United States because of the two following reasons: first, as intimated before, this country is on the verge of exhausting her resources, mainly on account of reckless drilling and overproduction; and, second, the United States consumption of

oil has been far greater than that of any other industrial nation. The figures given out by the Chief of the Petroleum Division of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce indicate that in 1923 this country consumed nearly twice as much petroleum and its products as all other nations of the world combined. The consumption of petroleum in this country will, undoubtedly, increase with the expansion of her industries.

Great Britain, on the other hand, is not only dependent upon her manufacturing industries for the support of her population, but her shipping industry, which forms the important source of her revenue, and provides work to her labor, forces that nation to search for oil.

The political importance of the Persian oil fields is appreciated when it is realized that with Persian oil near at hand, the British Fleet, between the Suez Canal and Singapore, can be sure of a sufficient supply of fuel in order to control the trade route which joins the East and the West. True enough, her coal is sufficiently important for fuel, but coal cannot be substituted for oil and the economic advantages of petroleum over coal, both in industries and in shipping, are so well known that it scarcely needs any comment. We should not, therefore, wonder why the British Government holds the majority of the shares of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The rivalry of the Americans with the British in obtaining oil concessions in whatever areas they are obtainable, combined with the desire of the Persian Government to utilize the northern oil fields of that country through American capital only, led to the opening of negotiations by the Persian Government in November, 1921, with the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and later on with the Sinclair Con-

solidated Oil Company, for the grant of the Northern Oil Concession.

In order to appreciate the position of Persia as an oil producing country, a general knowledge of the oil industry in that country should be acquired.

#### HISTORY OF PETROLEUM IN PERSIA

The knowledge and the use of petroleum in Persia is not recent; the ancient Persians not only knew the use of it, but also the method of refining. Herodotus, "Father of History," in 500 B. C. gave an interesting account of the method of its refining by the Persians in the following words:

Near Ardericca (identified with the plain of Ghir-ah, "Pitch Spring," some seventy-five miles from Shushtar, in the Province of Khouzestan, also known as Arabistan) is a well which produces three different substances, for asphalt, salt and oil are drawn up from it in the following manner: they are raised by a sweep to which, instead of a bucket, half a wine-skin is attached. Having dipped down with this, a man raises it and pours the contents into a reservoir. It is then poured from this into another, and assumes the different forms; the asphalt and salt immediately become solid; but the oil they collect and the Persians call it Rhadimke. It is black and emits a strong odor.

Strabo, the Greek geographer, mentions the oil springs of Kasri Shirin, near the Mesopotamian-Persian frontier, while Plutarch, the Greek biographer, in his *Life of Alexander*, relates how the Persians lighted the naphtha with which they had "scattered the street that led to his (Alexander's) lodging" and at night "they lighted it at one of the ends, and the first drop taking fire, in the twinkling of an eye, all the rest, from one end of the street to the other, was in flames . . ."

However, the recollection of the oil fields, and the possibilities for their future development, did not come to

the European mind until after such eminent geologists and writers as Loftus, Stahl and De Morgan reported to the public the result of their scientific expeditions. Mr. William Knox D'Arcy, an Australian, prompted by rumors of oil in Persia, took a special interest in the matter, and, in the late nineties, explored that country.

#### ANGLO-PERSIAN OIL COMPANY, LTD.

On May 28, 1901, Mr. D'Arcy, backed by the British Legation at Teheran, succeeded in obtaining a valuable concession from the Shah. This concession covered the right of exploitation for petroleum of approximately 500,000 square miles, or nearly two-thirds of the empire; the provinces of Adarbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astrabad and Khorassan being excluded from this grant. The D'Arcy Concession ran for a period of sixty years, and gave the concessionaire the exclusive right of laying pipelines within the area covered by the concession.

In 1903, the First Exploitation Company, Ltd., with a capital of 600,000 pounds sterling, was organized; and it was stipulated that the Company should deliver to the Persian Government, gratuitously, the equivalent of 20,000 pounds sterling of the Company's shares, and the sum of 20,000 pounds sterling in cash. The concession provides, moreover, for a royalty of sixteen per cent of the net profits to be paid to the Persian Treasury.

In 1909, the operations of the Company were centered around one square mile, namely, in Maidani-Naftun. The Company had concluded an agreement with the Bakhtiari tribe that, in case their operations should extend to the Bakhtiari district, the Company should pay three per cent of their profits to

the latter. So, for the purpose of extending the Company's operation further, a subsidiary company—the Bakhtiari Oil Company, Ltd., with a capital of 400,000 pounds sterling, was organized. In the same year the D'Arcy Concession was transferred to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which was formed to work the concession obtained by Mr. D'Arcy.

The area in which the main engineering work has been accomplished, falls under the geologic division of the country which the geologists class with the Southern Coastal Plain. This plain extends between the Persian Gulf and the front ranges of the Zagros Mountains; it is said to be of Pleistocene and recent clay, loess and dune sand, bordered on its inner margin by foothills of folded Tertiary and a few Cretaceous strata. Beneath the younger formation of the coastal plain, the Tertiary beds form a broad syncline or trough. These Tertiary beds have been affected by earth movements of several ages, which culminated at the close of the Pliocene. Near the mountains, the beds have been closely folded, even contorted, sheared and over-thrust. Near the coast, the folding is much less intense. Numerous seepages extend in the coastal plain from the Mesopotamian border to the Gulf of Oman. Practically all of the known oil seeps occur in Tertiary, chiefly in the gypsum-bearing marl formation of the Lower Fars series, of lower Miocene age. A few seeps issue from the Middle Fars series (middle Pliocene), notably at Nafti-Safid, forty miles southwest of Shuster. The productive rock at Maidani-Naftun, however, is the dark, hard, compact Asmari limestone, of Oligocene to lower Miocene age. It has been made porous by dolomitization and by solution.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> U. S. Geological Survey.



That the Persian field is very rich is illustrated by the fact that, during a comparatively short time (1909-1925), the production of petroleum in that country, from only a few wells, has placed her among the leading oil-producing countries of the world; and, although the officers of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have preferred to cap their wells rather than to oversupply the market, still Persia stands fourth, so far as supplying the market is concerned.

It is worthy of note that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has been described as a "one-well company," due largely to their having such wells as the famous F7, which has given a total yield of over 6,000,000 tons, and is still maintaining the same high rate of production. Such a high rate of yield is not confined to F7 only, but it is typical of the wells that that Company has opened up in other sections of the country. The well B17 for instance, situated one and three-quarter miles from F7, flows at the rate of 18,000 barrels daily, or roughly, 1,000,000 tons per annum. Sir John Cadman, in an interview with a representative of the *Financial News*, regarding the limit of Persian Oil fields, said:

... the limits of the field have not yet been determined. One may imagine, with a close approach to the truth, that in each direction from the original drilling center, test boreholes have been put down to determine the lateral extent of the available oil horizon. We know already that a dry hole has never yet been drilled in this area. . . .

In another place Sir John Cadman describes Maidani-Naftun as "the greatest single oil field in the world."<sup>2</sup>

The following table shows the course of the development of the production

(in Persia) of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd.:

	Barrels
In 1913 the production was	1,857,000
" 1914 " " "	2,910,000
" 1915 " " "	3,616,000
" 1916 " " "	4,477,000
" 1917 " " "	7,148,000
" 1918 " " "	8,623,000
" 1919 " " "	10,139,000
" 1920 " " "	12,230,000
" 1921 " " "	16,673,000
" 1922 " " "	21,909,000
" 1923 " " "	25,000,000
" 1924 " " "	31,845,000

The production of crude oil from the main Persian fields is now, as shown above, at the rate of 31,845,000 barrels per annum, which is the maximum quantity the Company can dispose of at the present time, and all of this is produced from flowing wells. According to the report of the Chairman, before the 15th Ordinary General Meeting of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., if they were to tap all the wells already opened up they could at once increase their production to 10,000,000 tons per annum.

Out of the 3,714,216 tons of crude oil produced in 1923-24, over 2,800,000 tons were refined in Abadan refineries, whence they were shipped to various markets.

The oil is pumped through pipelines some 145 miles to the Abadan refinery. The first line had a diameter of six inches from Maidani-Naftun to Wais, and of eight inches the rest of the way. A second parallel pipe-line, ten inches in diameter throughout, was opened in 1919; and a new pumping station has been built which increases the capacity of the lines to four million tons a year.

The Abadan refinery produces gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil. Its original capacity was one and one-quarter million tons of crude per annum. However, the refinery was to be enlarged

<sup>2</sup> *Oil News*, Dec. 20, 1924.

in capacity to two million tons in 1920 and was to permit the manufacture of gas oil, lubricating oil, paraffin and

porary damage; however, the refinery was repaired.

The specific gravity of the Persian crude is 0.840 (36.67° Baume). On distillation, it yields eleven per cent of light gasoline, 12.3 per cent of heavy gasoline, 29.6 per cent of kerosene, and 29.6 per cent of fuel oil.<sup>3</sup>

Persian oil has become of increasing importance in the European markets, particularly in Great Britain, where American oil had a hold. During the three years preceding 1924, Mexico and the United States lost about twenty-seven per cent of their participation in the British market, while Persia gained twenty-five per cent.

Of Persia's exports of oil, Great Britain (including British India) takes the most; next is Egypt, and then come Mesopotamia, France, Japan, Holland and Italy.

#### NORTH PERSIA OIL FIELDS


Previous to 1921, Persia was a bone of contention between England and (up to the time of the Revolution) Russia. By methods, peculiar to British diplomacy and Russian brutality, monopolies of trade and concessions were wrenched from her under duress. Of the treatment of Persia by her neighbors on his return from that country in 1912, Mr. Shuster wrote:

Only the pen of a Macaulay or the brush of a Verestchagin could adequately portray the rapidly shifting scenes attending the downfall of this (Persia) ancient nation, —scenes in which two powerful and presumably enlightened Christian countries (referring to Great Britain and Russia) played fast and loose with truth, honor, decency and law, one, at least, hesitating not even at the most barbarous cruelties to accomplish its political designs and to put Persia beyond hope of self-regeneration.

In order to shake off the commercial monopoly and economic domination of

<sup>3</sup> *Petroleum in Persia*, by Arthur Redfield.

OIL PRODUCTION OF PERSIA



pitch, but while under extension, fire broke out in 1923, and caused a tem-

Great Britain and Russia, who sought to monopolize Persia's resources, and for the sake of introducing a healthy competition, the Persian Government, in 1921, appointed one of her reputable citizens, Mr. Hussein Alai, as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. Mr. Alai had, among other tasks, the instruction to open negotiations with reputable American companies, with a view to inviting American enterprise to engage in the exploitation for petroleum in four of the five northern provinces of Persia: namely, Adarbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astrabad and Khorassan.

Accordingly, in November, 1921, the Persian Minister at Washington initiated the negotiation with the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Matters were going smoothly and agreements were reached, but when a concession was to be signed, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, supported by the British Government (which, as was said before, holds the majority shares of the Company), stepped in and, on the pretext of possessing certain rights in the Northern Oil Fields, under the Khoshtaria Concession (to which I shall refer later), attempted to block further negotiations. Sir John Cadman succeeded in bluffing out the Standard so well that the latter yielded and offered to go into the Persian field on a fifty-fifty basis. As a matter of course the Persian Government refused to negotiate any concession of such a nature. Later on, however, the Standard Oil changed its policy, and, in August, 1922, presented for the consideration of the Persian Government a formulated draft, whereby it proposed to that government to take the entire concession, own all the stock and assume complete management and control, and to pay ten per cent of the gross production as royalty.

While the Standard people were negotiating the terms of the concession with the Persian Minister at Washington, the representatives of the Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation, who had been sent to Teheran, carried on direct negotiations in Persia. Due to their complete dissociation from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, they made a favorable impression. The terms submitted by the Standard and Sinclair concerns were examined by a special parliamentary committee, and by the Persian Government. None of them were found to be satisfactory. The ten per cent gross production offered by the Standard and the sixteen per cent of the net profits offered by the Sinclair as royalty were considered inadequate.

The government was, therefore, asked to formulate a third draft of concession, which it did; and, taking the government's proposals as a basis, the Medjless (Parliament), in 1923, voted an oil law, which lays down the fundamental terms upon which the government is authorized to grant an oil concession. There are three main features to this drafted concession: namely, that of Article II, which reads as follows:

The petroleum concession shall be given to an independent and reputable company of the United States (Etats-Unis).

Or, in other words, if Persia decides to grant the concession to concerns other than American, different terms will be formulated—probably a higher rate of royalty would be asked. Article IV states:

The granting of this concession shall be subject to the Concessionaire arranging a loan of at least \$10,000,000 for the government of Persia through the means of American banks of recognized standing, subsequent to the final ratification of the concession by the Medjless, and provided further that the *terms of the transaction* shall be satisfactory to the Persian Govern-

ment and that the loan shall cause the strengthening of the credit of Persia in America.

Article XVI provides that the royalty to the Persian Government will be at least twenty per cent of the net profits of the Company or companies formed under the terms of Article XIV for the various operations of this concession, whether such companies are formed within or outside the boundaries of Persia. The contract must further provide for the payment of royalties to the Persian Government as follows:

The Concessionaire, company or companies formed in accordance with Article XIV, shall, within the first six months of each year, pay a sum equivalent to not less than twenty per cent of the net profits of the previous year derived from the working of the concession as shown by the balance sheet of the Company in question. In order that the Government may share in the excess profits which may be derived from the operations of this concession, the percentage of the net profits which the Government received shall be progressive according to the following schedule:

*When the Excess Profits Are*

Less than 60% of Invested Capital	
Between 60% and 75% of Invested Capital	
" 75% " 85% " " "	" "
" 85% " 95% " " "	" "
" 95% " 105% " " "	" "
" 105% " 115% " " "	" "
More than 115% of the Invested Capital	

*The Government Shall Receive*

20% of the net profits	
21% " " " "	" "
22% " " " "	" "
23% " " " "	" "
24% " " " "	" "
26% " " " "	" "
28% " " " "	" "

Paragraph 1. The government must clearly define in the contract the definition of excess profits and net profits, and the manner by which they shall be determined in the Concessionaire's accounts.

It seems that the Standard Oil Company could not enter the field independent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company

without breaking their previous arrangements with the latter. Hence they did not step forward. On the other hand, the Sinclair representative, in December, 1923, succeeded in signing a concession with the Persian Government, dependent, however, on ratification by the Parliament. After the Sinclair proposal had gone to the Parliament and the majority of the articles therein had been ratified, the Sinclair representative requested the government not to send to the Parliament the article which provided for the \$10,000,000 loan until his arrival in the United States, in order to make arrangements with the bankers. The Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation apparently has failed to raise the loan, and thus the grant of the concession is still pending.

The geologic survey of that portion of the Northern Oil Field, which has gone through, indicates that the southern end of the Caspian Sea is bordered by a narrow coastal plain of Pleistocene sand and clay. In places, the coastal zone is only two to six miles wide, while, on the contrary, on the Sefid-Rud, Heras-Pei, Babul, Talar and Tadjan, the coastal zone varies between eighteen and thirty-six miles in breadth. The structure of the underlying Tertiary beds is not fully known. At the foot of the mountains, which border the coastal plain on the south, Tertiary sediments are observed in only a few places. In many places these have been washed away from the mountain front, or are covered by later deposits. In the mountain ranges, which parallel the south shore of the Caspian Sea, the Tertiary strata lie in steep and even inverted folds. In the plain, lying between the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea, oil indications occur for about 600 miles, from Ardabil, in the province of Adarbaijan, to Astrabad, in the province of



the same name. The oil seeps from a Tertiary foraminiferous sandstone which some geologists think represents the same facies as that of the Russian fields of Baku Miocene.

The alleged Khoshtaria Concession has been very often mentioned lately in connection with the Northern Oil Concession. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company succeeded in admonishing the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, mainly on the grounds that they possessed previous rights to the Northern Oil fields through the purchase of the alleged Khoshtaria Concession. The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, on the other hand, in reply to a letter of inquiry, published in the *National Petroleum News*, of February 6, 1924, went so far as to say that

The Standard Oil Company (N. J.) meantime holds jointly with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Ltd., a one-half interest in these (the so-called Khoshtaria Concession) earlier Persian grants covering three and one-quarter provinces in north Persia, and . . .

It is due to such statements that I find it expedient to explain the legal weight and the limit of the validity of this so-called "Khoshtaria Concession," with a view to disprove the claims of Khoshtaria to the concession and to disclose the truth heretofore left unrevealed. By laws promulgated by Muzaffarod-Din-Shah, on December 30, 1906, and by his successor, Mo-hamed Ali Shah, October 7, 1907, the form of the Persian Government was changed to a constitutional monarchy. These two laws comprise the fundamental laws of Persia. The law of December 30, 1906, made specific provisions in regard to the alienation of the natural resources of the nation and the granting of concessions therefor. The provisions relating to this matter are the following:

Article 22. Any proposal to transfer or sell any portion of the (National) resources, or of the control exercised by the Government of the Throne, or to effect any change in the boundaries and frontiers of the Kingdom, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

Article 23. Without the approval of the National Council, no concession for the formation of any public company of any sort shall, under any plea whatsoever, be granted by the State.

Article 24. The conclusion of treaties and covenants, the granting of commercial, industrial, agricultural and other concessions, irrespective of whether they be to a Persian or to foreign subjects, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

Article 26. The construction of railroads or chaussées, at the expense of the Government, or of any company, whether Persian or foreign, depends on the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

From these provisions, it will be observed that grants or concessions of the national resources, or for the formation of any company or the construction of any transportation facilities, or the operation of the same, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly which is the Persian Parliament or Medjless. The first Khoshtaria Concession, which was granted on March 9, 1916, was for the exploitation of petroleum and natural gas in the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran and Astrabad. The second concession was given on January 22, 1917, and was for the exploitation of mineral deposits, with certain exceptions, in the same provinces and also in Ardebil. These grants were without the approval of the Medjless, which was not then in session, and had not been since November, 1915. Such approval was required by Articles 22, 23, 24 and 26 of the organic laws of 1906 and 1907. Therefore, concessions of

this nature to be rendered valid require, by the organic laws of Persia, the sanction of both the executive and legislative branches of the government. One branch alone cannot make such grants binding upon Persia. Without the approval of both branches of the government, such grants are as inoperative as a contract which has been drafted but not signed by the parties. It must be conceded, therefore, that the grants to Khoshtaria did not comply with the validating provisions of the constitutional laws of Persia which require the approval by the Medjless.

That the British Government admitted the invalidity of the Khoshtaria Concession may be proved by an official note (said to have been dated on or about December 3, 1919) of the British Minister at Teheran to the Persian Prime Minister, stating, in substance, that the British Government after reconsidering the subject, had come to the conclusion that the Khoshtaria Concession, having been wrenched from Persia under duress and without application of the procedure required by the constitutional laws of Persia (its ratification by the Medjless), was invalid. But, the British Government requested the government of Persia that whenever the latter desired to grant a concession of the Northern Oil fields, the British companies should be given the first option.<sup>4</sup>

When the Persian Government hesitated to put into effect the unpopular Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, which it later, on February 27, 1921, declared null and void, the British Government changed its attitude.

In spite of this change of attitude, the British Government, nevertheless, continued to entertain the feeling that the Khoshtaria Concession required

further recognition by Persia. In the beginning of 1922 the British Minister at Teheran informed the Persian Government, in substance, that the British Government would not object to the Imperial Bank of Persia and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company making an advance of funds to the Persian Government upon compliance with four conditions, of which one was that "the important existing concessions in Persia be fully recognized."

Moreover, the British Government has recognized in practice that the approval of the Medjless is necessary for important agreements involving restrictions on the sovereign rights of the Persian nation. For example, the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 contained no provision for approval by the Medjless, but nevertheless the British Government insisted that it be submitted to the Medjless and in fact admitted that without the approval of that body the agreement was of no effect. Khoshtaria himself recognized the invalidity of his concession unless it was confirmed by the Medjless, for he contracted an agreement with one of the ex-officials of Persia, on November 24, 1921, to obtain a reconfirmation and extension of these concessions.

The Soviet Government also admitted the necessity of complying with the constitutional requirements if the grants were to become valid, for, with the knowledge and approval of the Soviet Government, and at its suggestion, the Persian Government, by decree of July 27, 1918, rendered null and void all concessions granted to Russian subjects by irregular means during this period. This action was confirmed in the Treaty of February 26, 1921, between the government of Persia and the Soviet Government, which provided for the cancellation of all such concessions.

Without admitting for a moment

<sup>4</sup> Since the above note has not been officially published, I could not obtain the exact contents of the letter.

that the concessions were valid, legal and binding upon the Persian Government, but assuming that they were, for the sake of argument, non-compliance with the terms is alone sufficient to annul them and to extinguish any rights which may have been acquired under them.

The Northern Oil Concession, if granted, will cover the four provinces of Adarbaijan, Mazandaran, Astrabad, and Khorassan, which approximately aggregate 90,000,000 acres. The province of Gilan has been reserved for exploitation by Persian citizens.

## II. The Rug Industry of Persia

### HISTORY OF PERSIAN RUGS

The history of the rug dates back to 3000 years before Christ, but the actual weaving of it is shown on at least two of the rock-cut tombs of Beni-Hassan, in Egypt, dating to B. C. 2800-2600.

Tradition has it that long before the days of Alexander the Great, rugs were woven at Shuster, then the capital; and, being a luxury, they were woven solely for king's palaces, and on the finest gold warp. History authoritatively states that under the Sasanian<sup>5</sup> dynasty, Persian fabrics, known as *Susancherd*, were highly prized in the West, and when Ctesiphon was captured by Sad,<sup>6</sup> among the loot was a silk carpet, sixty ells long. The design represented was a *firdaus*, or paradise, with running streams marked out by crystals, the ground in gold thread, the leaves worked in silk and the blossoms represented by precious stones.

It was during the reign of Shah Abbas the Great, in the 17th century, that the art of rug weaving in Persia attained a degree of excellence which has never been equalled. That sovereign being of an artistic bent, and having great admiration for the beautiful creations of this industrial art, gave a decided impetus to rug weaving. Con-

sequently, the rugs made during his reign bring fabulous prices to-day.

The making of rugs is a simple but very slow process. It is, however, only to the Persians themselves, with fingers trained to deft, skillful manipulation and an inherited taste and ability for such work, that the process of weaving and blending of the varied hues seems easy. The weavers are usually the women and girls of the household, who sit before the loom and taking the threads of wool, previously prepared and sorted, attach them to the warp by a running knot. They then insert the weft for the back, press the knots home, with a wooden comb, and level the pile with a pair of scissors.

Generally each weaver has a special piece of the pattern assigned to her. To make a carpet four and one-half yards square, six women are usually employed, being placed at a distance of twenty-seven inches from each other. Usually the weaver knows the pattern from memory and is never at a loss for the correct shade. When, however, new designs are desired, the most expert weavers are employed to produce a pattern carpet from the design required, and from this the general weavers copy the design from the back of the pattern carpet by counting the knots. It will thus be seen that the manufacture of Persian rugs is not only a slow process, but requires infinite pains, care and inherited taste and skill

<sup>5</sup> 226-641 A. D.

<sup>6</sup> In the seventh century, when the Arabs conquered Persia, Sad was one of the greatest generals of their army.

to bring it to the perfection it has attained as being the handsomest, most artistic, and most durable of Oriental rugs.

The loom used for the weaving of an Oriental rug is never more than a simple vertical frame, carrying on its upper part a beam containing the warp, which is kept stretched by a rod passing through it.

The Oriental looms of antiquity were in all essential respects the same as those upon which rugs and carpets are now woven in all countries of the Orient, where rugs are still made by hand labor, and, as is well known to the trade, the best product of these early looms has never been equalled by modern goods, so far as durability and beauty are concerned.

*The Wool Used.*—Sheep's wool, camel's hair, mohair from the Angora goat, hair from the Yak and from the Thibetan goat, are all used as the basic materials from which rugs are woven.

*Quality.*—The high quality and durability of the rug depend largely upon the quality of the wool and the number of knots to the square foot. In one square foot of the best made Persian rugs, there are between ten and thirty thousand stitches made by hand. Indeed, in some of the antiques dating back to the reign of Shah Abbas, the number of stitches to every square foot exceeds thirty thousand. The wool must be of fine quality, but not too soft. It should be closely woven, and evenly cropped.

*Price.*—As it is practically impossible to set a standard price on works of art, there is no standard price for Persian rugs. There may be two rugs of exactly the same quality, insofar as the number of knots and the fineness of wools are concerned, but a small difference in design or color scheme may result in a wide difference in the ultimate price demanded.

*Designs.*—One of the most convincing proofs of Persian genius in carpets is the remarkable variety of designs displayed, every nomad tribe weaving its own specific pattern; while there is an enormous difference between the bright varied colors of the carpets of Kerman, exhibiting Shia<sup>7</sup> tendencies, and the sombre but infinitely rich colors of the austere Sunni,<sup>8</sup> Turkoman fabrics. Both are treasures to the collector, and so also are good specimens of the rugs all over Persia, from Kurdistan on the west to Khorassan on the east.

Although rugs are woven throughout the Persian Empire with the exception of a very few regions, yet, commercially, rugs which excell in quantity and quality are the products of Sultanabad (Aragh), Baluchistan, Kerman, Khorassan, Adarbaijan, Kurdistan, Fars, and the City of Kashan. Each region has a pattern different in main ground and border design and even sometimes in the color scheme and weave from those of other districts. Thus a person who is familiar with Persian rugs can readily distinguish the origin of one from that of the other. In illustration, the rugs of two different regions, for instance, those of Kerman (a city in southeast Persia) and Kurdistan (a region in western Persia), will be found wholly different in design and color. In the rugs originating in the former district, a medallion in the center entwined with flowers is usually the characteristic feature. Occasionally the Tree of Life is represented, its branches bearing different fruits; and often symbolical tiny birds appear in the border. A vase of flowers is sometimes the principal ornament; and frequently several small trees, either

<sup>7</sup> A Mohammedan sect to which the Persians belong.

<sup>8</sup> A Mohammedan sect to which the Turks belong.



with or without foliage, constitute the main decoration. But the rugs woven in the latter region have, as a rule, for their central design, a diamond or delicate tracing of the palm leaf; while occasionally flowerets of variegated hues cover the entire rug.

#### THE EXPORT OF RUGS


Rugs and carpets have for many years formed an important portion of Persia's exports. In fact, among the finished products of that country, rugs maintain the highest position.

A study of Persia's exports during the last eleven years, as reported by the Customs Administration of that country, discloses the fact that rugs and carpets have been not only important items in its foreign trade, but also have

kept pace with the progressive increase in the total exports of the Empire. Thus, for example, the value of the rugs exported during the two years preceding the Great War amounted to \$11,407,000, Europe being the principal consumer. During the war, however, the value of exports decreased to \$6,412,000, which was mainly due to lack of transportation facilities; while during the last two financial years exports in these lines realized \$19,761,900, the major portion of which was purchased by the United States.

Prior to the war, the prosperity of Europe was fully demonstrated in its heavy purchases of rugs, being Persia's best customer for that product. Russia alone took, during the Persian calendar year 1913-14, over two and



*The export of Rugs as compared with the Total-Export of Persia*  
Million-Dollar

one-half million dollars' worth, while Austria-Hungary and Germany also bought in worthwhile proportions. Since the war, however, owing to lack of purchasing power, the European market for Persian rugs has been reduced to a minimum. But this deficiency was more than compensated for by the vast expansion in the American demand for Persian rugs, which had grown from \$728,400 in the year 1913-14 to \$5,122,782 in 1922-23, an increase of over 600 per cent. All evidences point to the conclusion that the United States will continue for many years to be the

dominating purchaser of Persian rugs. Hence with the growing demand in this country, and the reopening of the European markets, the Persian rug industry has a prosperous period ahead of it.

The exports of rugs and carpets have kept pace with the increase of the total exports of Persia. This is clearly shown in the following table, which deserves a careful examination:

It must be noted that although the export of rugs in 1912-13 comprised 13.8 per cent of the total exports of Persia in that year, yet it amounted to

	Total Export of Rugs	Per Cent of Total Export	Total Export of Persia
1912-13.....	\$6,039,278	13.8	\$43,633,327
1913-14.....	5,367,748	11.9	45,583,963
1914-15.....	2,676,233	15.3	39,605,786
1915-16.....	1,295,459	3.7	37,713,461
1916-17.....	1,347,177	3.1	43,389,534
1917-18.....	713,094	3.1	33,871,438
1918-19.....	480,786	1.7	27,086,894
1919-20.....	2,937,339	8	36,781,735
1920-21.....	4,996,800	13.5	37,119,877
1921-22.....	6,610,000	13.3	50,204,478
1922-23.....	9,280,000	12.6	73,398,284
1923-24.....	10,475,500	13.6	76,839,215

only a little over six million dollars; while during 1923-24, when the export of that article was 13.6 per cent of the total exports, it aggregated over \$10,000,000.

#### HOW THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AFFECTED THE EXPORT OF RUGS

The Russian Revolution and the commercial policy adopted by the Soviet Government weakened many trade centers of Persia, and resulted in the growth of some of the trade centers which formerly were comparatively unimportant. Thus we see that in 1913-14 the custom office of Enzeli (the most important port on the Caspian Sea) reported the export of \$1,507,642 worth of rugs, while the official figures for 1923-24 place the value of exports at only \$1205. On the other hand, the records of the Customs Bureau of the city of Kermanshah (in western Persia at a distance of 120 miles from Khanikin, where the Bagdad railroad terminates) indicate that in 1913-14 only \$111,944 worth of rugs were exported from that city, while in 1923-24 the value of exports of that article amounted to \$4,687,043.

#### A CUSTOMER FOR PERSIAN RUGS

The most important export of Persia to this country, both in volume and value, is rugs. Previous to the Great War, the United States ranked third as far as direct importation was concerned; Russia and Turkey, respectively, being the two most important importers of Persian rugs. However, at that time, Constantinople was the entrepôt for Persian rugs from which great numbers were shipped to various countries of Europe and America. But, as previously stated, the European market is for the present financially disqualified to purchase rugs. The export to this country has increased

remarkably since the war. It must be kept in mind that great numbers of Persian rugs are sent to this country through British jobbers which are not accounted for among the direct exports from Persia to this country.

The following table shows the value of rugs exported from Persia to this country during the last twelve years:

#### *Export of Rugs to United States*

1912-13*	\$610,921
1913-14*	728,416
1914-15*	393,213
1915-16*	805,562
1916-17*	823,985
1917-18*	551,609
1918-19*	217,720
1919-20*	1,249,341
1920-21*	2,301,283
1921-22*	2,816,700
1922-23*	5,122,782
1923-24†	4,680,198
1924-25†	5,148,077

\* Persian Customs Statistics.

† U. S. Customs Statistics.

Recently the American dealers have come to understand the value of having their own buyers in Persia and are actually sending representatives to purchase and ship them directly to the United States.

It is of interest to know that several American citizens have established rug (looms) factories in important rug weaving centers of Persia. The product of these factories is exported to Europe and America.

#### GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGEMENT TO INDUSTRY

The rug of Persia would during the present century have lost its reputation and consequently its markets had not the government taken immediate steps to prevent it. Aniline dyes made their way into Persia and were about to replace the vegetable dyes, the method and production of which require time and effort. Thus, in order to eliminate this danger, the

government in 1904 passed a law prohibiting the importation of any kind of aniline dye into Persia. The government also levied a penal duty of three per cent *ad valorem* on such rugs as even show a trace of aniline dye. This was to be increased by three per cent every six months until it reached twenty per cent *ad valorem*. But the rug exporters time and again appealed to the government, requesting a revision of the law. Consequently, in 1914, a committee of experts were summoned to study the case and to submit to the government the result of their investigation.

The committee, after a thorough study of the case, submitted a report proposing that, beginning with the (Persian calendar year) year 1915, the government should levy a penal duty (*taxe de dispense*) of nine per cent *ad valorem* on such rugs as even show a trace of aniline dye; this tax was to be increased by three per cent every year up to a maximum of twenty per cent. The proposal was ratified by the government and was put into force until 1919, when the new tariff law was enacted. By the provisions of the tariff law of 1920, the penal duty (*taxe de dispense*) was changed to an export duty of six per cent *ad valorem* which was to be put into effect until 1923 and from 1923 the export duties on aniline dyes were to be raised to twenty-five per cent *ad valorem*. The government, however, in order to take stricter measures for prevention of

using aniline dyes in 1922, raised the penal duty to twelve per cent but instead of enforcing the previous law of levying twenty-five per cent export duty, in 1923 it was found advisable to increase the penal tax by three per cent each year after 1923.

At the same time, the government has established schools in various rug weaving centers of Persia to teach the scientific method of dyeing the wool. As a result of this action, in 1923-24, out of an export of \$10,475,500 worth of rugs, \$8,727,422 have had no aniline dye in them.

It is the opinion of Persian interests that the rug industry has entered upon a new era of prosperity. This era was forecast by increased activity in the industry at the opening of the 20th century, and which continued to 1914, when it was interrupted by the war, both because of the loss of its markets for the time being, and the general economic disturbance of the belligerent nations which were reflected in Persia. The declaration of peace, however, has not only restored renewed activity, but also has given the industry a new impulse.

The farmers are again in position to raise sheep and cultivate the plants essential for the manufacture of the true Persian dyes. The rug weaver knows that she will not be disturbed by the looting hordes of a foreign army, and so can finish in peace the rug she has commenced.

### III. Cotton as a Commodity in Persia

From time immemorial, the Persians have utilized cotton for various purposes; for clothing, beautiful floor-covers and artistic tapestries. There is no period in Persia wherein the growth and use of this valuable commodity is not shown.

Although the Persian cotton is, as a whole, of short staple variety, there are provinces which also produce long staple, not inferior to that of America in color, softness and thread quality; the Province of Mazandaran (in northern Persia), for example, which



has a warm humid climate and the rise and fall of its temperature is not sudden where there is fertility of soil, produces cotton similar to that of high grade American quality.

During recent years, through the combined efforts of the government and cotton exporters, American upland and Egyptian seed has been experimented with and satisfactory results have been obtained.

Cotton grows with facility in Persia to an elevation of 5000 feet above the sea, but the predominant area under cultivation is the northern half of the empire. Mazandaran, Khorassan, Semnan, Kum, Kashan, Ispahan and the districts of Adarbaijan lying around Khoi and Urmia are known as the largest cotton-producing centers, while patches of cotton are frequently found in various sections of the southern provinces.

#### PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

No official statistics to ascertain the production and consumption of cotton in Persia have been published but reliable foreign estimates indicate that during the American Civil War, Persia's export of cotton aggregated in value \$58,000,000 per annum. Although this estimate seems to be unusual, there is every reason to indicate that with the development of irrigation systems that country has a greater capacity for production of cotton than it is generally believed, since there are large areas of available fertile land with suitable climatic conditions for this crop. In some localities cotton grows to the height of five feet even without irrigation. The chief obstacles to Persian cotton are the lack of interest of the farmers and the lack of seed selection. Methods of cultivation are also primitive as well as the method of ginning and pressing. The Russian

market under normal conditions takes over ninety-five per cent of the Persian crop. Prior to the war, almost the entire Persian crop was shipped to Russia with the exception of a small quantity going into India from the southern provinces.

Practically the entire cotton crop exported to Russia passes through the Caspian ports. The ports of Enzeli in the province of Gilan, Meshedsar in Mazandaran, and Bender-Gez in Astrabad being the most important entrepôts, cotton comes down to them from the interior in small bales of 230 to 270 pounds, whence it is shipped to Russia.

The total production of cotton in Persia as recorded in the *Agriculture Year Book* (1923) of the United States is as follows:

Year	Bales of 478 Pounds Net
1909-13 (average).....	136,000
1917-18.....	86,000
1918-19.....	89,000
1919-20.....	94,000
1920-21.....	105,000

As intimated before, no official statistics of production or consumption have been published by the Persian Government, and, therefore, the above figures are estimates which are probably based on the official export statistics. But export statistics give no indication of the consumption of this crop in Persia itself. In spite of the lack of factories, far more cotton is consumed than is exported. The majority of the population have so little income that they cannot afford to use imported cotton goods. Hand looms exist in practically every house in the rural districts. The agrarian populace wears and uses native cloth and in recent years this practice seems to have become common amongst urban inhabitants.

The cities of Yezd and Kerman and

the surrounding districts are the cotton manufacturing centers. Owing to recent improvement in their fabrics, high government officials as well as the middle class have patronized their markets and as a result, the consumption of Persian cotton has increased within the country.

The exportation of cotton first received a forward impetus at the time of the American Civil War, when Persian cotton began to be seen in foreign markets. Later on because of the geographical position of Persia, Russia, whose policy was to have always enough Persian cotton to feed the Russian spindles, gave considerable attention to bringing about the improvement of cotton cultivation in Persia. This was done by distributing through its cotton importers, free of charge, American seed among land owners and peasants of northern provinces where the cotton crop is best adapted to their climate and soil.

According to a report on the Persian cotton industry published in the *Foreign Trade* (the official publication of the Russian Department of Commerce of Moscow) for the years 1906 to 1918, of the total exports of raw cotton from Persia more than ninety per cent went to Russia; this fell off to only 10.3 per cent in 1919 and rose again to 39.5 per cent in 1920. It is to be presumed that this percentage will increase still further.

The following table obtained from the Persian Customs Statistics shows the importance of the Russian market for Persian cotton, or vice versa, the importance of Persian cotton to the Russian spindles:

Year	Total Export of Cotton from Persia	Export to Russia
1911-12.....	\$7,396,389	\$7,263,743
1912-13.....	9,384,361	9,256,549
1913-14.....	8,523,632	8,395,932

Year	Total Export of Cotton from Persia	Export to Russia
1914-15.....	7,348,423	7,329,396
1915-16.....	7,163,150	7,045,412
1916-17.....	5,347,462	605,464
1917-18.....	2,406,033	29,727
1918-19.....	371,972	38,102
1919-20*		10,547
1920-21.....	234,300	28,771
1921-22.....	304,100	127
1922-23.....	1,693,400	653,379
1923-24.....	4,939,900	3,926,300

\* No statistics could be found.

The customs statistics of Persia indicate that raw cotton, up until the year 1915-16, made up almost twenty per cent of the total exports of that country and that this crop up to 1914-15 maintained the highest place in the list of Persia's exports. Due to a great reduction in the production of cotton, however, in 1917-18, only six per cent of Persian exports were cotton and this percentage had fallen to only two per cent in 1920-21, and held the twelfth place among the items of export of that year. However, it again rose to fourth place in 1923-24.

It is interesting to note that in 1920-21 Persia, probably for the first time, exported \$349,900 worth of cotton textile to Russia in addition to her \$234,300 of raw cotton.

Of the \$4,939,900 export of raw cotton in 1923-24, Russia took \$3,926,300 and Great Britain (including British India) \$983,045.

#### PRICE COMPARISONS

It is calculated that the relation of the price of Persian to American cotton is at about the ratio of ten to fourteen. That is, the best quality of Persian cotton should sell for about seventy per cent of the price of ordinary American upland. In December, 1922, the price of American cotton at Liverpool

was 14.96 pence per pound, or 20.09 roubles per pood. When the cost of transportation and other charges, amounting to about 8.25 roubles, is added to this, the cost of American cotton in Liverpool would be about 28.34 roubles per pood. On this basis, Persian cotton in Liverpool should cost about 19.83 roubles. At this time, however, the local price of Persian cotton was 6.83 roubles. Add to this an export duty of four roubles and a delivery cost of about fifty per cent of the price, and it will be found that Persian cotton could be sold on the Liverpool market at 14.99 roubles. This leaves a difference of five roubles or nineteen per cent in price as a factor in favor of Persian cotton.

#### GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGEMENT TO INDUSTRY

It is hoped that with the economic improvement of Russia, Persian cotton will again resume its former place in the markets of that country; and that with the efforts of the Persian Government in teaching the peasants the selection of seed and by persuading them to sow American cotton, the British market also will be more and more available to Persian cotton. These influences, together with the constant effort of the present government to encourage the Persians in the use of home spun goods, should give a new impetus to this long existing important industry of Persia.

## Book Department

*Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918.* 2 Volumes. Pp. 1118. Price, \$10.00. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

There are several ways of reading these intensely interesting volumes. One can read them straight through from cover to cover and get a vivid picture and revelation of one of the remarkable friendships of the past two generations. In passing, if one wishes a sympathetic insight into this un-interrupted friendship, he will find it in Bishop Lawrence's striking brochure on Henry Cabot Lodge. Another way to read them is to read them topically either as to individuals or events and thus get an inside view, in many instances of amazing frankness.

It is quite likely, however, that they will prove of most interest and value to students of history and politics, as they reflect the workings of the minds, and sometimes the emotions, of two men who may very properly be considered as master craftsmen in politics of the broader sort, with the advantage of a historical training and interest. Both Lodge and Roosevelt have an assured position among the second rank of historians. They might very likely have achieved first rank had they devoted themselves exclusively to historical research and writing. They chose public careers, however, and so developed their political instincts to a high degree of efficiency. Their course in the Blaine Campaign in 1884 affords an illuminating chapter on party regularity. Comments on "genuine, but misguided reformers," likewise constitute another study, of value not only to the practical man of affairs who is seeking to accomplish definite ends, but likewise to the political scientist who is seeking light on the human elements of his problems.

So, from whichever point of view one reads these two elaborate volumes, one is quite likely to be abundantly repaid.

CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF.

WILSTACH, PAUL. *Jefferson and Monticello.* Pp. 258. Price, \$5.00. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company.

In *Jefferson and Monticello* we have an intimate portrait of the home of the author and signer of the Declaration of Independence, the first Secretary of State, our first sole Minister Plenipotentiary to France and the third President of the United States, written in such a way as to give us a better insight into his life and activities. Paul Wilstach, whose *Mount Vernon* served a similar purpose for Washington, has a distinct gift for throwing additional light on historical events by a recital of what to some may seem petty details, but which are of importance in filling out the picture.

C. R. W.

*The Chinese Abroad.* MACNAIR, HARLEY F., Professor of Government, St. John's University. Shanghai, China: Commercial Press, 1924.

Much has been written concerning the foreigner in China, but the case of the Chinese in foreign lands had been almost entirely neglected until Professor MacNair contributed this authoritative work. The book is particularly timely in company with various restrictive and prohibitive movements throughout the world, having as their object the peoples of the Far East. To judge from the statements of advocates of these movements, legislative and economic, one would be led to believe that Chinese residents in Western countries had proven themselves a lawless and demoralizing influence, whereas a dispassionate, careful investigation of the facts reveals the fallacy of such a charge. An examination of the criminal records of the several states of the United States, for example, will demonstrate that the Chinese are a law-abiding and peaceful people, causing trouble only when provoked by flagrant persecution and injustice. The same statement is true of the Japanese. These two peoples are thrifty and seldom if ever become public



charges. The arrival of Chinese immigrants as laborers in undeveloped parts of the world was welcomed and encouraged, but now that that work is finished they are denied the right to enjoy its fruits and must give way to other races. One of the most frequent charges brought against Chinese immigrants is that they are incapable of assimilation, but it has not been satisfactorily established that they are any less so than certain other nationalities. On the other hand, the offspring of the union of the higher levels of Chinese and American (for example) people have been just as truly American, if in the United States, as the offspring of unions of Western races. Dr. MacNair outlines the circumstances surrounding Chinese immigration in various countries of the Old and New World with incisive comments upon their reception at various stages.

Another phase of Chinese residents abroad is their treatment by the people and government of the country wherein they are making their living. Being denied citizenship upon every conceivable pretext they are frequently classed as undesirable aliens. The Chinese Government at first made no effort to protect their interests, furnishing an interesting contrast to the attitude of Western Powers toward the protection of their subjects and citizens in China, where of course they were not citizens. Of late, when the government of China has shown a disposition to demand protection for its nationals, it has lacked the military power, the possession of which appears to be the determining factor. In the United States, which prides itself upon its policy of justice and fair dealing toward oppressed peoples, "no aliens have suffered as have the Chinese; compared with the treatment meted out to them in the United States, the ill-treatment of foreigners in China prior to 1900 was almost mild."

Dr. MacNair cites numerous other examples of the plight of Chinese in the United States, and calls attention to the "continued failure of Congress to pass legislation empowering the Federal Government to take cognizance at once of all cases having to do with ill-treatment of any nature of aliens . . . and the difference in the attitude taken by the Federal Government

in handling cases such as those just discussed, in dealing with a strong and a weak power."

The book is convincingly written, in good style, and with extensive footnote references to sources, showing a breadth of range unusual in a work of this nature. It is a distinct contribution to the authoritative literature concerning China and her relations with Western nations and will be found a convenient source of information. The scholarly character of the work is indicated by the presence of footnote references on almost exactly ninety per cent of the 314 pages of text, but the author has in many cases used abbreviations unfamiliar to readers who are not technicians in the field and many of the references are vague and inexact, defeating the very purpose of their insertion.

A fifteen-page bibliography is appended, divided into Government Documents, Annuals, General Works, and Periodicals and Pamphlets. Of these, General Works alone is above criticism and contains but minor mechanical errors. With this exception, there are many inconsistencies and irregularities of arrangement in the Annuals, Periodicals and Pamphlets listed and especially in the Government Documents. Many of the writers of books in the fields of government and history are regrettably careless in the citation of government documents and more attention should be paid to this problem in the preparation of reports and theses by students who later become teachers.

W. LEON GODSHALL.

JANES, GEORGE MILTON, PH.D. *Who Should Have Wealth and Other Papers.* Pp. ix, 170. Price, \$1.50. Milwaukee, Wis.: Morehouse Publishing Company, 1925.

Mr. Dooley, in his inimitable way, remarks: "Wan iv th' s'trangest things about life is that th' poor who need th' money th' most ar-re th' very wans that never have it." This may be a frank commendation of what Dr. Janes calls a democratic system of distribution, or it may be a sly denunciation of the inequities which many people see in competitive organization. Who should have wealth is a problem which has bothered some of the best

brains of the world from the time of Plato and Aristotle down to the present day. The answer to the riddle depends in large part on the point of view taken. Despots, whether royal or of the modern business type, answer in one way; radicals of all shades in another; and the socialized individualist in still another.

Dr. Janes is neither a die-hard conservative nor a blatant revolutionary radical. He claims to be a middle-of-the-road man. After showing the inadequacy of the aristocratic, communistic and socialistic positions on wealth and its distribution, he proceeds to demonstrate briefly the advantages and essential justice of a democratic, as he calls it, system of acquiring wealth. His norm or standard is service. Essentially, I take it, the idea expressed by Tawney in his book *The Acquisitive Society*. Nowhere does he attempt to define service. Does he mean service in terms of value of product, in terms of what products shall be produced, or in terms of quantity and quality? Furthermore, service to whom? From an extreme individual and mercenary viewpoint, rum runners, proprietors of gambling dens, manufacturers of specious patent medicines, and a goodly number of other occupations add to value, perform a service, and should have wealth. Presumably he means by service that line of economic action which proves beneficial to the group. But to what group? A line of action which is highly serviceable to one community might be quite otherwise to the neighboring community. What is good for the United States might prove highly detrimental to Canada. A protective tariff, for example, may be very advantageous to manufacturers but extremely disadvantageous to consumers. Going easy on the job may be beneficial to house painters in the short run, but not at all beneficial in the long run, or to workers in general. After all, what is the measure of serviceability and who will determine this measure?

There is one fundamental inconsistency in the first essay. On page 3 the writer says: "Distribution in the economic sense deals with the causes which determine the division or sharing of economic goods among the individuals in industrial society," and three pages farther on he holds

that "the question of distribution centers about the rewards for the various factors of production." Of course, it is in this latter sense, functional distribution as it is sometimes called, in which the term is commonly used in economics, and connected with which serious economic problems and controversies have arisen.

The book is a series of disconnected essays which were originally written and published in several periodicals. These have been largely revised for the purposes of this book. It is a bit puzzling to know what ties them together under the caption "Who Shall Have Wealth." By implication, perhaps, most of these essays deal with the problem of distribution. Some of them are a brief description of experiments in economic organization which have been tried out, such as Co-operative Production Among Shingle Weavers and The Non-Partisan League. Others deal with such topics as, "Who Pays for War," "Scientific Method in the Social Sciences," "The Steel Strike Report," and "The Social Viewpoint."

There is nothing particularly new about the book unless it be the author's middle-of-the-road attitude, and the interpretation and emphasis which he gives. But, possibly, in these days a middle-of-the-road attitude and social emphasis is common enough. The style is straightforward, direct, clear, which makes the several chapters very readable. The whole treatment is popular in character. For this reason the book is likely to appeal to those who have little information about the various topics treated, and who want a concise, compact and clear statement of facts and tendencies. One thing more must be added, the author is extremely fair in his interpretations, which reflects an earnest desire to present the truth. There is nothing of dogmatism or finality to be found in this little book.

EVERETT W. GOODHUE.

ODUM, HOWARD W. *Southern Pioneers*. Pages vi, 221. Price, \$2.00. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

This is a series of life stories of Southern leaders. The leaders and those who pre-

sent the interpretations of their lives are:

Chapter

- I. Introductory: A Southern Promise, Howard W. Odum.
- II. Woodrow Wilson, Gerald W. Johnson.
- III. Walter Hines Page, Robert D. W. Connor.
- IV. Charles Brantley Aycock, Edwin A. Alderman.
- V. Seaman A. Knapp, Jackson Davis.
- VI. Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, John Donald Wade.
- VII. Joel Chandler Harris, Julia Collier Harris.
- VIII. Booker T. Washington, Monroe N. Work.
- IX. Madeline McDowell Breckinridge, S. P. Breckinridge.
- X. Edward Kidder Graham, Robert D. W. Connor.

ODUM, HOWARD W. and JOHNSON, GUY B. *The Negro and His Songs*. Pp. vii, 306. Price, \$3.00. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

This is a collection of Negro songs collected in two counties of northern Mississippi and in two counties of northern Georgia, interspersed by a few songs from North Carolina and Tennessee for comparative purposes.

Despite its 300 pages, the book leaves one with a feeling of incompleteness. The authors state in their preface that another volume is soon to follow and a third will come along presenting song and story centered around case studies.

The authors group their songs under the following chapter headings:

Chapter

- I. Presenting the Singer and His Song.
  - II. The Religious Songs of the Negro.
  - III. Examples of Religious Songs.
  - IV. Examples of Religious Songs, concluded.
  - V. The Social Songs of the Negro.
  - VI. Examples of Social Songs.
  - VII. Examples of Social Songs, concluded.
  - VIII. The Work Songs of the Negro.
  - IX. Imagery, Style, and Poetic Effort.
- Bibliographical Notes.  
Index of Songs.

Those interested in folk psychology will find a wealth of material in the book. The book is put up in a splendid type and invites one to read it through.

CULBERTSON, WILLIAM SMITH. *International Economic Policies*. Pp. xviii, 575. Price, \$3.50. New York: D. Appleton & Company.

Mr. Culbertson, who was until recently a member of the U. S. Tariff Commission, has assembled in this volume his views on a wide field. As might be expected because of his experience with tariff problems, his chapters on commercial treaties, tariff bargaining and British preference are among the best. International finance and other topics treated have not been so fully developed, while there is no space devoted to still other questions of importance, such as immigration.

The author is an internationalist. To him the nation is not to be minimized in importance but we have passed far beyond the days of *laissez-faire* and also well past the time when extreme nationalism can be approved. The nation is viewed as "an agent for international co-operation," yet national safety can be preserved only in case "nationalism recognizes its limitations." These expressions are found in the last chapter but the entire volume develops them. His zeal is, however, tempered by his realization that in many particulars the present trend is unsatisfactory. While progress is being made in some directions, there are grounds for discouragement in others, *e.g.*, in the tendency to abandon open door pledges on the slightest excuse.

Little attempt is made to develop underlying theories of trade and here and there the reviewer is disposed to disagree with some of the theoretical implications. In some places, too, it is difficult to assent to all of the conclusions. When in Chapter VIII it is argued that "we treat all countries on the same terms, and in turn require equality of treatment from every other country," the reader may hesitate, remembering our attitude toward most-favored-nation treatment as discussed in Chapter III and our attitude toward commerce with our colonies as described in Chapter VII.

ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON.

DAWES, RUFUS C. *The Dawes Plan in the Making*. Pp. 525. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company.

One could wish that this volume really lived up to the announcement of the publishers that it is "the inside story" of the making of the Dawes Plan. For this the author is not to be criticised. He has given an account of the making of the Plan which offers no pretense of telling an inside story, at least in the sense of revealing any important or hitherto unknown information.

The latter half of the book is appendices, chiefly the Dawes and McKenna reports. The first half is a running account of the work of the Dawes Committee, arranged in diary form, but interspersed with lengthy comments and arguments by the author. Also there are included a number of the special reports submitted by the experts accompanying the Committee. The result is a mixture. Instead of being, as announced, "without technicalities," there is enough technical material to make it difficult for the untrained reader, but with so much commonplace economics and finance as to lessen its interest for the trained economist.

On the whole the author's attitude toward Germany is tolerant and sympathetic and is particularly characterized by goodwill toward Chancellor Marx and Dr. Schacht, the President of the Reichsbank. Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest any doubt regarding Germany's war guilt. In this as in other particulars, the author necessarily maintains a correct attitude as a member of the staff of the Committee.

There are several points calling for special comment. In the first chapter and elsewhere the author argues that the settlement of May, 1921, with its capital sum of 132 billions of marks is not to be viewed as an attempt to determine the principal amount of Germany's obligation on reparation account but merely "an annual fixed payment, plus a variable annuity . . . and with the condition that the payment of such annuities should never exceed the present value of one hundred thirty-two billion marks." At the time of the settlement, many critics urged the impossibility of collecting such large sums as were named and doubtless those who framed the terms

felt they could not be met. Nevertheless, the wording of the agreement is specific and clearly contemplates a principal sum of 132 billion marks. The author's argument appears to be a defense of the view that past attempts to fix principal sums are to be argued away. If this could be done it would relieve Allied statesmen of odium and make slightly easier a readjustment of reparations to a really practicable amount, a step that has not yet been taken (*e.g.* p. 34).

Here and there in the book (*e.g.* p. 34) there appears an economic fallacy that is widely held. It is argued that freedom from taxation would give German manufacturers an advantage over their competitors in world markets and that the remedy is to impose reparation charges which will compel the German Government to levy heavy taxes and thus aid the manufacturers of Allied countries in their struggle for trade. But little argument is needed to indicate the inaccuracy of such reasoning. If reparations are paid it must be through a large exportation of goods which will compete in the world's markets. In fact, the greater the success in collecting reparations the more severe the competition and the greater the sales from Germany. Taxing German industrialists cannot prevent this outcome if the payments are made.

Not the least interesting aspect of the book is its direct and implied defense of the work of the Committee. This appears most definitely in the last few pages. As a matter of fact the Committee could do but little even though that little was highly important. It is now appropriate even for officials to admit or perhaps proclaim what few would believe late in 1923. The Dawes Committee was organized just in time to lessen but not to prevent entirely a terrible tragedy in Germany which, unchecked, would have spread through Western Europe. But no miracle could be accomplished. The Plan has done a little but only a little. Reparations are not actually being collected in any real sense. Certain payments have been made on account but the German trade balance is more heavily adverse than ever and the aggregate indebtedness of Germany (government and private) is heavier than ever. The reparation question is not solved. In our ap-



proval of the Dawes Plan there is no reason for exaggerating its accomplishments.

ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON.

EMDEN, CECIL S., M.A. *Principles of British Constitutional Law*. Pp. xix, 221. Price, 7/6 net. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd.

Many important changes have taken place in the practical working of the British Constitution in the last few years. This book lists those changes up to date. The author is a barrister at law and the book is made from the point of view of legal machinery. It is well documented. There is a good Table of Statutes referred to. The appendices giving specimens of Provisional Orders, subordinate legislation and appropriation accounts are informing and valuable.

The text discusses the functions of the executive, legislature and judiciary and the inter-relations of each with the other. It is commendable in its thoroughness and worthwhileness.

MOFFIT, LOUIS W., PH.D. (Edin.) *England on the Eve of the Industrial Revolution*. Pp. xxii, 312. Price, 12s. 6d. London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1925.

Readers who desire as much information to the square inch as possible should find this book to their liking. Those who desire variety and vivacity of style will find it somewhat monotonous and infelicitous of phrase, and may criticise it for an occasional unprofitable elaboration of the obvious. Such faults are mentioned because they illustrate an all too frequent tendency in works of detailed scholarship. They do not, in this case, seriously impair the value of the work. In respect to the larger aspect of style, the criticism is favorable; that is to say, the theme is developed in an orderly and logical manner. And the theme is a significant one. The author is exceptionally objective and is generally (though not always) accurate in describing English economic arrangements during the vitally important middle decades of the 18th century. The focus of his attention is fixed most frequently on Lancashire.

The first part of the book, which deals

with agriculture, discusses technique, land tenure, enclosing, engrossing, marketing, rural classes, and social conditions. The second part, on industry and commerce, analyzes the distribution of industry and population, the technical methods, the organization of the productive and distributive processes, and the various classes connected with trade and manufacturing, with some attention to labor conditions. The appendices include pertinent statistical data. The author has used many of the principal contemporaneous sources, but the chief value of the book is that it combines in concise form a large amount of information previously available only in many treatises.

WITT BOWDEN.

LONG, JOHN C. *Public Relations*. Pp. ix, 248. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

The author is manager of the Educational Department of the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce. It may well be presumed that this book comes from one who has had wide experience in industrial publicity. The book discusses ably newspapers, news syndicates, magazines, the pulpit and the radio as news agencies. It relates the news possibilities and limitations in the public relations of corporations, retail stores, financial institutions, chambers of commerce, trade associations, philanthropic enterprises and personal publicity.

The book is from a rather new point of view. It is a good handbook not only for business men but for all students of present day factors in social and economic problems.

OGG, FREDERIC A., and RAY, P. ORMAN. *Introduction to American Government*. Second edition. Price, \$3.75. New York: The Century Company.

The authors in this book have revised the 1922 edition. The same general plan of arrangement of material has been used.

The first part of the book, six chapters, is given to discussion of principles and problems of government in general and the position of the individual under government. Following these chapters is an examination, consisting of seven chapters, of

the foundations of government in the United States. Next the structure of the national government is set forth in sixteen chapters, followed by two chapters discussing the bases of popular control. Then ten chapters have to do with state government and, finally, eight chapters are given to local government and administration.

Two new chapters, "Expansion of National Activities" and "People as Voters," have been added. In the chapter on "Expansion of National Activities" is found discussion of expansion by constitutional amendment, statute and judicial interpretation, and grants-in-aid. The chapter on "People as Voters" is occupied by an examination of woman suffrage, suffrage qualifications, negro suffrage problems, and non-voting problems.

The discussion of the work of the Commerce and of the Labor Departments has been expanded considerably, with new paragraphs under the first on patent and census administration and on the subsidiary bureaus. Under the latter, the Labor Department, more attention has been given to the women's and children's bureaus and to giving a fuller view of the variety of work done by the Department.

Scattered here and there throughout the book are instances of the material being brought up to date; acts of Congress, passed since the first edition, are included; important movements, such as the departmental reorganization movement, are discussed; and figures used, such as those for receipts and expenditures of the national government in the chapter on finance, are those for 1924.

In many cases additions have been made to the bibliography at the end of chapters. These additions, it seems, constitute the most important and beneficial feature of the revised work. However, the book may be used with greater confidence in accuracy and completeness.

E. B. LOGAN.

*The Problem of Business Forecasting.* Paper presented at the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Statistical Association, Washington, D. C., December 27-29, 1923. (Number Six, Publications of the Pollak Foundation for Eco-

nomic Research.) Edited by Warren M. Persons, William Trufant Foster, and Albert J. Hettinger, Jr. Pp. vii, 311. Price, \$4.00. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.

Hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of students of applied economics will experience thrills of pleased anticipation when they scan the lists of newly published books and note that the Houghton Mifflin Company has put out a volume under the enticing title of, "The Problem of Business Forecasting." Many, or perhaps most of them, will experience a distinct disappointment when they send for the volume and find that it is a collection of twenty-one papers presented at the meeting of the American Statistical Association held at Washington in December of 1923.

That meeting was one of the best attended, and beyond question one of the most interesting, of the long series of conventions that have been held by the oldest among American scientific associations, and the papers were of exceptionally high quality. They deal with the problems of forecasting in the fields of trade, commerce, transportation, industry, building, mining, and agriculture. Oddly enough no papers are devoted to the problems of banking or the security markets.

The papers are of widely varying quality, and of course they follow no uniform plan. Most of them report pieces of work done for practical business purposes, but some are theoretical, and a few deal mostly with problems of method. The book carries some forty tables of numerical data, and the papers are illustrated by no fewer than fifty-five diagrams. Thanks are due the editors for having added a complete and carefully arranged index.

LEFFINGWELL, WILLIAM HENRY. *Office Management.* Pp. 850. Price, \$5.00. Chicago and New York: A. W. Shaw Company.

The outstanding feature of this comprehensive volume is its emphasis upon scientific management and the possibility of its application to clerical activities. In this respect the author has done an excellent piece of work. His understanding of the spirit and the underlying principles of

scientific management as distinguished from technical procedure is clearly apparent. In fact, in a field abounding in details it is refreshing and encouraging to find a book that is characterized by the absence rather than the presence of innumerable illustrations of forms, mechanical contrivances, and the like.

As a logical expression of the scientific management point of view, it is not surprising to find the author constantly subjecting every phase of office activity to a rigid examination as to its value when compared with its cost. The great increase in managerial technique which we have witnessed during recent years has entailed an increased cost which should not be permitted to escape the closest scrutiny. The author's emphasis at this point is to be commended.

The program of placing all clerical activities under a single executive head, while logical from the standpoint of functional organization, has its practical difficulties and the author's views in this respect will not meet with universal acceptance. In his advocacy of centralized supervision and control, however, he does not ignore these difficulties.

There appears to be some needless repetition of subject matter and this is unfortunate in view of the size of the volume. It contains more than eight hundred pages of text. This repetition results from the plan of first discussing the principles of scientific office management using abundant illustrations and then following this with a discussion of the application of scientific management to each specific problem of the office. As the understanding of scientific management principles becomes a matter of more common experience, it should be possible in such discussions as this to combine the exposition of the principles and their application and thus to cover the field more concisely.

O. R. MARTIN.

MCDougALL, WILLIAM. *The Indestructible Union*. Pp. 249. Price, \$2.50. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

One has a right to expect a good deal of the author of *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, which has gone through twenty

editions and has really been one of the fertilizing books of the generation. The volume under review is, therefore, all the more disappointing. *The Indestructible Union* bears as a sub-title, *Rudiments of Political Science for the American Citizen*, and, as such, attempts to discuss such fundamental concepts as nationalism, patriotism and democracy. Here is a first-rate opportunity for a foreigner to write interpretively of our national ideals and progress. The author, however, contents himself with a presentation of what looks to the reviewer suspiciously like the orthodox statements concerning such matters found in textbooks on so-called political science. The discussions of such subjects as anarchism, pacifism and internationalism seem to the reviewer downright superficial (pp. 47, 51, 72). That nationalism and internationalism are complementary (p. 73) may be a tenable point of view, but, once stated, it gets us nowhere in the solution of the problem of peace to which it seems to be offered as a contribution.

On the other hand the reviewer has seldom seen a more satisfactory statement of the processes of nationalization of opinion and sentiment than that contained in Chapter V. This chapter and the two following, on disrupting influences (the new immigration and religious differences) and the Negro problem, are easily the best in the book and are worth reading for their freshness and conciseness. Mr. McDougall's style makes it easy to read even those portions of the book with which the reader may most violently disagree. The book, however, is in no real sense a contribution and will certainly not add to the author's reputation.

LANE W. LANCASTER.

BEACH, WALTER GREENWOOD. *An Introduction to Sociology and Social Problems*. Pp. xiv, 369. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925.

This is an excellent handbook for college classes or for the general reader, although somewhat brief for teaching purposes unless supplemented generously by outside readings. Its intellectual level is perhaps better adapted to juniors than to sophomores. The book as a whole is a

rather skillful combination of the type of treatment emphasized in Cooley's *Social Organization* with the best features of books like Ellwood's *Sociology and Modern Social Problems*. The first nineteen chapters are remarkably reminiscent of the categories and viewpoint of the former book, with occasional chapters which recall the plan of treatment of Ross (*Principles of Sociology*) and Bushee. But, it should be said, the resemblance of this book to the others mentioned is one of similarities of concepts and outlook only. Professor Beach has collected and organized his own material in his own way, and he has done it well.

Seven of the eight chapters in Part I deal with human nature, inherited and acquired. Part II (ten chapters) is concerned with communication, group life, social change, conflicts (three chapters) and co-operation (one chapter). Part III (ten chapters) has for its theme social organization and social control, with the emphasis upon social institutions. The family, the economic order (four chapters), political, moral, and educational institutions are the ones emphasized. Population and immigration, as well as class conflicts and war, are given the economic emphasis. On the whole, environmental rather than the inheritance factors are made prominent. Institutions are viewed largely from the control aspect, but causal factors are not neglected. There is a final brief chapter on Progress and the Elimination of Social Evils which is quite sane. There are good bibliographical references and stimulating questions at the end of each chapter. The treatment as a whole leans further toward the psycho-social emphasis than that of any other text book in sociology except Ross' *Principles*; and the brand of social psychology drawn upon is Cooley's rather than Ross'.

L. L. BERNARD.

SIMS, NEWELL LEROY. *Society and Its Surplus*. Pp. xii, 581. New York: D. Appleton and Company.

This author contends that the controlling force in social evolution is the surplus of energy that remains after the social group has satisfied the needs of simple existence. The best chapters are those devoted to the acquisition of cultural surplus. The book

is invigorating and will serve a useful purpose, though not many will agree with the implication in the last few pages that the way to social democratization is through a form of Guild Socialism.

SCOTT, GEORGE G. *The Science of Biology*. Pp. xii, 617. Price, \$3.50. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1925.

This textbook for college and university students contains a wealth of facts, which make it a useful reference book for the general reader, but it is written in a style too staccato to be read with pleasure.

The book is conveniently organized in four parts. Part I, of 40 pages, contains an account of the various biological sciences, and a general study of protoplasm and the cell. Part II, 95 pages, considers briefly the biology of plants, and Part III, 195 pages, gives a similar account of the biology of animals. Part IV, 235 pages, is devoted to a consideration of "Comparative Anatomy," "Histology," "Embryology," "Physiology," "Distribution of Animals in Space and Time," "Heredity, Adaptation and Evolution," and the "Biology of Man." In these studies the chief emphasis is given to Vertebrates, with references, wherever helpful, to special types of plants and lower animals. This emphasis seems wise, since, as the author points out, "there is a special human interest in studying the group to which man himself belongs."

Four useful appendices summarize the "Classification of Plants and of Animals," show in tabular form the "Distribution of Organisms in Time," give a "Genealogical Tree of Organisms," and provide a helpful "Biological Catalogue" of nearly 60 of the master biologists of all time. A very complete and detailed index of 27 pages adds greatly to the reference value of the work, which is further enhanced by the lists of Selected References following each chapter.

FREDERICK C. GROVER.

GIDDINGS, FRANKLIN HENRY. *The Scientific Study of Human Society*. Pp. 247. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1924.

This book is an interesting essay on the subject of scientific sociology. It consists of twelve brief chapters of 240 pages, with



a short bibliography. The separate chapters were originally published in the *Journal of Social Forces* and elsewhere as signed articles.

Professor Giddings has succeeded in condensing in small compass a great deal of suggestive material.

Throughout the book the author insists on the necessity of rigorous scrutiny of societal facts, as well as upon the importance of verification. These are admonitions which many preach but few practice.

The book is written in Professor Giddings' usual brilliance of statement and there are many telling aspects of his analysis. The book should do much to stimulate and inspire an intelligent and discriminating interest in the scientific study of society among younger students whose approach to social study has hitherto been credulous and uncritical. It should serve the same function for the general reader. Research

students will, however, find the book disappointing in many respects, particularly because of its brevity of treatment, and also because there are a number of omissions on important points, which, although they might be rather abstruse to the general reader, constitute an important part of the work of the advanced research worker. This comment applies to the chapters on "Societal Variables," "Classification," "The Pluralistic Field and the Sample," and "Exploration and Survey."

F. STUART CHAPIN.

*American Citizenship.* A series of addresses given over the radio by JOHN W. DAVIS, PHILIP COOK, ALBERT C. RITCHIE, LUTHER B. WILSON and CHARLES E. HUGHES, under the auspices of the American Bar Association. Introduction by JOSIAH MARVEL. Price, \$1.00, postage extra. 12 mo., 96 pages.

# Index

- American Immigration Act of 1924, 202.  
 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS. Sidney L. Gulick, 181-7.  
 AMERIE, SULTAN M. The Three Major Commodities of Persia, 247-64.  
 Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 249-51.  
 ARNOLD, JULEAN. China's Post-War Trade, 82-95.  
 Asia, Europeanization of, problem of, 174.  
 ATCHESON, GEORGE, JR. The Cable Situation in the Pacific Ocean with Special Reference to the Far East, 70-7.  
 BIBLIOGRAPHY—CHINA, JAPAN, PHILIPPINES. William Adams Slade, 214-46.  
 Birthrate increase, Japanese alleged, 195, 208.  
 Boxer uprising, 2, 8, 61, 137, 206.  
 CABLE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FAR EAST, THE. George Atcheson, Jr., 70-7.  
 Cable communications: importance of, in Pacific and Far East, 71; 78; value of, 70; Trans-Pacific, 76.  
 CALIFORNIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ORIENTAL. Eliot Grinnell Mears, 199-213.  
 CARPENTER, W. B. The Equipment of American Students for Foreign Service, 124-30.  
 CHENG, CHI-PAO and W. T. TAO. China's New System of Schools, 100-10.  
 CHINA, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON. William Adams Slade, 214-27.  
 CHINA, LIVING CONDITIONS IN. Maude B. Warner, 167-73.  
 CHINA, WHAT POLICY IN? G. Nye Steiger, 15-7.  
 China: cable monopoly concessions in, 78; chaotic conditions in, 15; characteristics of, 168; "Chihli Clique" in, 12; commerce, condition of, in, 170; Constitution, work on, 9, 10; culture in, 175-7; education, present system of, 101-10; efforts of, at political reorganization, 8; exports of, 87-90; financial and political control in, 133; foreign control in, of govt. revenues, 135-9; foreign financial assistance, 131; imports in, 82-7; industries, 169; Japan and, 15; opium use in 149; policy of Japan in, 3, 4; of Powers in, 16; population in, 168; present conditions in, 13, 94, 95; railway concessions, 134; Republic of: establishment of, 3; party struggles for supremacy under, 9-13; situation in provinces under, 11; Russo-Chinese Bank, concessions, 59, 60; spheres of interest in, 133.  
 CHINA'S NEW SYSTEM OF SCHOOLS. Chi-Pao Cheng and W. T. Tao, 100-10.  
 CHINA'S POST-WAR TRADE. Julean Arnold, 82-95.  
 CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY, THE. Chin-Chun Wang, 57-69.  
 Chinese Eastern Railway, constitution and management of, 62-5; formation of, 59; supplementary agreement *re*, 65; Russia's treatment *re*, 61; trade, 90.  
 CLOSE, UPTON. Europeanization and the Ancient Culture in Pacific Asia, 174-80.  
 Compradors (China) decrease in, 93.  
 Concessions, oil, Persia, 247, 248.  
 CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE REPUBLIC. Harold S. Quigley, 8-14.  
 Coolidge, President: view of *re* Wood Administration in Philippines, 46.  
 Cotton industry, in China, 83-5; in Persia, 261-3.  
 Culture, Eastern *vs.* Western, 177-80.  
 Customs revenues, control in China of, 135-9.  
 D'Arcy Concessions, 249.  
 DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN JAPAN. J. Takaku, 49-56.  
 EDUCATION IN JAPAN. Ignacio Villamor, 111-23.  
 Education: China, 102-10; Japan, 111-6.  
 ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC. Walter S. Rogers, 78-81.  
 EQUIPMENT OF AMERICAN STUDENTS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, THE. W. B. Carpenter, 124-30.  
 EUROPEANIZATION AND THE ANCIENT CULTURE IN PACIFIC ASIA. Upton Close, 174-80.  
 Exclusion, act of Japanese, in U. S., 181, 185, 186, 202.  
 Extraterritorial privileges, in China, existence of, 57.  
 FAR EAST, CABLE SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE. George Atcheson, Jr., 70-7.  
 FAR EAST AND THE PACIFIC AS A PHASE OF EUROPEAN POLITICS, THE. Herbert Adams Gibbons, 1-7.  
 Far East: cable enterprises, monopolies in, 71-6; German influence in, 3. Russian activities in, 58.  
 Foreign leaders, influence of, on China, 101.  
 Foreign service, division in, 127, 128; equipping students of, 125-7; length of term of, 128.  
 Foreign trader in China, condition of, 93.  
 GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT, THE: HOW IT HAS FUNCTIONED. Kiyo Sue Inui, 188-98.  
 Gentlemen's Agreement, contents of, 190-1; background of, 188-9; passing of, 189; severance of, 202.

- GIBBONS, HERBERT ADAMS. The Far East and the Pacific as a Phase of American Politics, 1-7.
- GOWEN, HERBERT H. Living Conditions in Japan, 160-6.
- GRAY, WELLES A. The Opium Problem, 148-59. Great Britain, policy, pre-war, 1, 2.
- Grey, Viscount, statement of, 1.
- GULICK, SIDNEY L. American-Japanese Relations, 181-7.
- HARRISON, Gov. Gen. Francis Burton, régime of, in Philippines, 32-6.
- HAYDEN, RALSTON. The United States and the Philippines, 26-48.
- IDEALS OF THE PHILIPPINES. MAXIMO M. Kalaw, 18-25.
- INUI, KIYO SUE. The Gentlemen's Agreement: How It Has Functioned, 188-98.
- International Opium Commission, 149, 150.
- JAPAN, EDUCATION IN. Ignacio Villamor, 111-23.
- JAPAN, NATURAL RESOURCES OF. Hiroshi Saito, 96-9.
- JAPAN, SOURCES OF REVENUE IN. Tadao Wikawa, 141-7.
- JAPAN, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON. William Adams Slade, 227-40.
- Japan: agricultural conditions in, 168; resources, 96; budget system of, 141; economic situation in, 163; factory conditions, 161-3; forest resources of, 99; labor organization in, 164; marine resources in, 98; mineral resources, 97; participation of, in Chinese Eastern Railway, 62; public utilities, growth of, 160; refuting charges against, 183; result of Western culture in, 175; road facilities, etc., in, 51, 52; revenue sources in, 142-7; rise of, 2; tax system of, 142-4; water power in, 99; water transportation, 49-51; welfare work in, 164, 165.
- Japanese-American relations, 210.
- Japanese, anti, agitation, 184, 185, 194, 206.
- Japanese exclusion from U. S., 181, 185, 186, 202, 211.
- Jones Law, 18, 19, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42.
- KALAW, MAXIMO M. Ideals of the Philippines, 18-25.
- League of Nations: work of Advisory Committee on Opium, 157; First Conference, 152; results of, 157; Second Conference, 153-7.
- LEE, FREDERIC E. The Significance of Foreign Financial Control in China, 131-40.
- LIVING CONDITIONS IN CHINA. Maude B. Warner, 167-73.
- LIVING CONDITIONS IN JAPAN. Herbert H. Gowen, 160-6.
- McClatchy, V. S., 183.
- Manchu Dynasty, disappearance of, 3; overthrow and reasons for, 8.
- MEARS, ELIOT GRINNELL. California's Attitude Towards the Oriental, 199-213.
- Monopolies, cable, 72, 73, 78, 79, 144, 145.
- NATURAL RESOURCES OF JAPAN. Hiroshi Saito, 96-9.
- North Persia oil fields, 251-56.
- Oil: imports, China, 85; Persia, 249.
- Open door in China, 3.
- OPIMUM PROBLEM, THE. Welles A. Gray, 148-59.
- Opium: abuse of, 148; trade, China, 85; use of, 149.
- ORIENTAL, CALIFORNIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE. Eliot Grinnell Mears, 199-213.
- Oriental problem, California, 201, 202.
- Osmeña, Sergio, 35, 36, 43.
- PACIFIC, ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE. Walter S. Rogers, 78-81.
- Paris Peace Conference, 6.
- Pay, adequate for foreign service, 129.
- PERSIA, THE THREE MAJOR COMMODITIES OF. Sultan M. Amerie, 247-64.
- Persian oil fields, political importance of, 249.
- Persia rug industry, 256, 61.
- Petroleum: history of in Persia, 248; U. S. need of, 247; value of, 247.
- PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES, THE. Ralston Hayden, 26-48.
- PHILIPPINES, IDEALS OF THE. MAXIMO M. Kalaw, 18-25.
- PHILIPPINES, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON. William Adams Slade, 240-6.
- Philippines: characteristics of, 26-9; independence, 18; government in, 19; nationalistic movement in, 21; parliamentary mission, 36; purposes, declaration of, 18; political parties in, rise of, 37-9; reasons for failure of, 40; sovereignty, anti-American; system of government in, 30-2; U. S. policy in, 29-30.
- Price comparisons, Persian vs. American cotton, 263.
- Quezon, Manuel E., 32, 39, 46.
- QUIGLEY, HAROLD S. Constitutional and Political Development in China under the Republic, 8-14.
- Quota plan, Japanese in California, 212.
- Railways, China, 87; Japan, 52-6.
- Renaissance, Chinese, period of, 100.
- Rice imports, China, 85.

- ROGERS, WALTER S. Electrical Communications in the Pacific, 78-81.  
 Rouble, depreciation of (China), 63-5.  
 Roxas, Speaker Manuel, 43.  
 Rugs, Persia, export of, 258; history of, 256-8.  
 Russia and England, controversies *re* Persian oil fields, 251; effects of revolution, 5.
- SAITO, HIROSI. The Natural Resources of Japan, 96-9.  
 Salt Gabelle, control of, 137-9.  
 Shantung Agreement, 4, 5, 15.  
 Shipping trade, China, 90.
- SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA, THE. Frederic E. Lee, 131-40.  
 Sinclair Consolidated Oil Company, negotiations with Persia, 248, 252, 253.
- SLADE, WILLIAM ADAMS. Bibliography, China, Japan, Philippines, 214-46.
- SOURCES OF REVENUE IN JAPAN. Tadao Wikawa, 141-7.  
 Spheres of interest and influence, meaning of, 132.  
 Standard Oil Company, N. J., negotiations with Persia, 248, 252, 253.  
 Steamers, number, etc., Japan, 50.
- STEIGER, G. NYE. What Policy in China? 15-7.  
 Sugar, China, 86.
- TAKAKU, J. Development of Transportation in Japan, 49-56.
- TAO, W. T. and CHI-PAO CHENG. China's New System of Schools, 100-10.
- THREE MAJOR COMMODITIES OF PERSIA, THE. Sultan M. Amerie, 247-64.
- Trade, Pacific, increase in, 124.  
 Trading ports, China, 92.  
 Transportation facilities, China, 87.  
 Twenty-one demands of China, 4.
- UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES, THE. Ralston Hayden, 26-48.  
 United States: approval of Gen. Wood, 45, 46; cable activities of, in Far East, 79; Naturalization Law, first, 181; policy of, *re* cable communications, 70; position of *re* Philippines, 23; policy of, in Philippines, 29-32; as purchaser of rugs in Persia, 259, 260.
- VILLAMOR, IGNACIO. Education in Japan, 111-23.
- WANG, CHIN-CHUN. The Chinese Eastern Railway, 57-69.
- WARNER, MAUDE B. Living Conditions in China, 167-73.
- Washington Conference, discussion of trans-Pacific communications at, 80.  
 Webb-Heney Act, 202.  
 Welfare work, Japan, 164.
- WHAT POLICY IN CHINA? G. Nye Steiger, 15-7.
- WIKAWA, TADAO. Sources of Revenue in Japan, 141-7.
- Wilson, President, 138; Shantung matter and, 4, 5.  
 Women, Japanese, 162, 194; status of, Chinese, 170-2.  
 Wood, Gov. Gen., opposition to, 43; Philippine charges against, 22; régime of, 42-6.  
 Wood-Forbes Mission to Philippines, 36.